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  1. added 2019-01-08
    The Metaphysics of Moral Explanations.Daniel Fogal & Olle Risberg - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
    (Forthcoming pending external review) -/- It’s commonly held that particular moral facts are explained by ‘natural’ or ‘descriptive’ facts, though there’s disagreement over how such explanations work. We defend the view that general moral principles also play a role in explaining particular moral facts. More specifically, we argue that this view best makes sense of some intuitive data points, including the supervenience of the moral upon the natural. We consider two alternative accounts of the nature and structure of moral principles—’the (...)
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  2. added 2018-08-30
    Why Believe in Normative Supervenience?Debbie Roberts - manuscript
    According to many, that the normative supervenes on the non-normative is a truism of normative discourse. This chapter argues that those committed to more specific moral, aesthetic, and epistemic supervenience theses should also hold (NS*): As a matter of conceptual necessity, whenever something has a normative property, it has a base property or collection of base properties that metaphysically necessitates the normative one. My main aim is to show that none of the available arguments establish (NS*), or indeed the relevant (...)
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  3. added 2018-06-20
    Hybrid Non-Naturalism Does Not Meet the Supervenience Challenge.David Faraci - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (3).
    It is widely agreed that normative properties supervene on natural properties. Non-naturalists face a distinctive challenge to explain this relation. Stephanie Leary argues that non-naturalists can meet this explanatory demand by positing the existence of hybrid normative properties. I argue that this proposal does not meet the supervenience challenge.
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  4. added 2018-04-30
    Contemporary Ethical Naturalism : A Comparative Metaethical Evaluation of Expressivism and Cornell Realism.Jorn Sonderholm - 2005 - Dissertation, St. Andrews
    This thesis contains a critical discussion of two metaethical theories: expressivism, as developed in the works of Simon Blackburn, and Cornell realism, as presented by Richard Boyd and David Brink. In the introduction, a distinction is made between external and internal accommodation projects for moral discourse and it is argued that the external accommodation project should be guided by acceptance of methodological naturalism. Expressivism and Cornell realism are then subjected to an extended comparative evaluation, and an answer is sought to (...)
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  5. added 2018-02-17
    Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates.Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.) - 2012 - Cambridge University Press.
    Ethical naturalism is narrowly construed as the doctrine that there are moral properties and facts, at least some of which are natural properties and facts. Perhaps owing to its having faced, early on, intuitively forceful objections by eliminativists and non-naturalists, ethical naturalism has only recently become a central player in the debates about the status of moral properties and facts which have occupied philosophers over the last century. It has now become a driving force in those debates, one with sufficient (...)
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  6. added 2018-02-17
    How to Prove That Some Acts Are Wrong.Christian Coons - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (1):83-98.
    I first argue that there are many true claims of the form: x-ing would be morally required, if anything is. I then explain why the following conditional-type is true: If x-ing would be morally required, if anything is, then x-ing is actually morally required. These results allow us to construct valid proofs for the existence of some substantive moral facts—proofs that some particular acts really are morally required. Most importantly, none of my argumentation presupposes any substantive moral claim; I use (...)
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  7. added 2018-02-17
    Normativity, Moral Realism, and Unmasking Explanations.Josep Corbí - 2004 - Theoria 19 (2):155-172.
    Moral Projectivism must be able to specify under what conditions a certain inner response counts as a moral response. I argue, however, that moral projectivists cannot coherently do so because they must assume that there are moral properties in the world in order to fix the content of our moral judgements. To show this, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism, which is, nowadays, the most promising version of moral projectivism. In this context, I call into question both (...)
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  8. added 2017-08-14
    Supervenience Arguments and Normative Non‐Naturalism.Billy Dunaway - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):627-655.
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  9. added 2017-08-14
    Intrinsic Value and the Supervenience Principle.Dale Dorsey - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):267-285.
    An important constraint on the nature of intrinsic value---the “Supervenience Principle” (SP)---holds that some object, event, or state of affairs ϕ is intrinsically valuable only if the value of ϕ supervenes entirely on ϕ 's intrinsic properties. In this paper, I argue that SP should be rejected. SP is inordinately restrictive. In particular, I argue that no SP-respecting conception of intrinsic value can accept the importance of psychological resonance, or the positive endorsement of persons, in explaining value.
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  10. added 2017-04-21
    Normative Supervenience and Consequentialism.Krister Bykvist - 2003 - Utilitas 15 (1):27.
    Act-consequentialism is usually taken to be the view that we ought to perform the act that will have the best consequences. But this definition ignores the possibility of various non-maximizing forms of act-consequentialism, e.g. satisficing theories that tell us to perform the act whose consequences will be good enough. What seems crucial to act-consequentialism is not that we ought to maximize value but that the normative status of alternative actions depends solely on the values of their outcomes. The purpose of (...)
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  11. added 2017-04-21
    Supervenience: A Study in the Theory of Value.Elliot David Cohen - 1977 - Dissertation, Brown University
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  12. added 2017-03-27
    Facts, Values, and Normative Supervenience.Stephen W. Ball - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 55 (2):143 - 172.
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  13. added 2017-02-10
    Good and Right as Non-Natural Properties.Peter Schaber - unknown
  14. added 2017-02-07
    Book Review:Reason and Prediction Simon Blackburn. [REVIEW]Charles G. Morgan - 1974 - Philosophy of Science 41 (1):98-.
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  15. added 2017-01-29
    BLACKBURN, SIMON.: "Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language". [REVIEW]R. M. Sainsbury - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36:211.
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  16. added 2017-01-27
    Moral Realism, Supervenience, Externalism and the Limits of Conceptual Metaphor.Ron Wilburn - 2004 - ProtoSociology 20:320-373.
    In this paper, I articulate a form of moral realism that I take to be of special promise. I hope to show, not only that this realist position satisfies cognitivist, objectivist and success constraints, but also that this position is particularly commended by a number of recent apologetic strategies that have been more commonly deployed in the defense of other non-moral varieties of realism. To this extent, I aim to show that moral realism, far from being a desperate or quixotic (...)
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  17. added 2017-01-23
    Review of Shafer-Landau, Russ, (Ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 6. [REVIEW]Alex Silk - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):622-627.
  18. added 2017-01-17
    Mixed Up About Mixed Worlds? Understanding Blackburn’s Supervenience Argument.Cole Mitchell - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (12):2903-2925.
    Simon Blackburn’s supervenience argument—focusing on the mysterious “ban on mixed worlds”—is still subject to a variety of conflicting interpretations. In this paper, I hope to provide a defense of the argument that clarifies both the argument and the objections it must overcome. Many of the extant objections, I will argue, fail to engage the argument in its true form. And to counter the more compelling objections, it will be necessary to bring in additional argumentation that Blackburn himself does not clearly (...)
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  19. added 2016-12-08
    Base Property Exemplification and Mixed Worlds: Remarks on the Shafer-Landau/Mabrito Exchange.Jeff Wisdom - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):429-434.
    In this essay I distinguish between a synchronic view of base property exemplification and a diachronic one. I argue that only a diachronic view of base property exemplification can substantiate a ban on morally mixed worlds. I then argue that one of Robert Mabrito’s recent criticisms of Russ Shafer-Landau’s moral realism fails on either a synchronic or a diachronic view.
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  20. added 2016-07-08
    Non-Naturalism: The Jackson Challenge.Jussi Suikkanen - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5. Oxford University Press. pp. 87-110.
    Frank Jackson has famously argued that there is no logical space for the view which understands moral properties as non-natural properties of their own unique kind. His argument is based on two steps: firstly, given supervenience and truth-aptness of moral claims, it is always possible to find a natural property which is necessarily co-instantiated with a given moral property, and secondly that there are no distinct necessarily co-instantiated properties. I argue that this second step of the argument must rely on (...)
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  21. added 2016-05-30
    Depending on the Thick.Debbie Roberts - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):197-220.
    The claim that the normative depends on the non-normative is just as entrenched in metanormative theory as the claim that the normative supervenes on the non-normative. It is widely held to be a genuine truism, a conceptual truth that operates as a constraint on competence with normative concepts. Call it the dependence constraint. I argue that this status is unwarranted. While it is true that the normative is dependent, it is not a genuine truism, or a conceptual truth, that it (...)
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  22. added 2016-05-30
    'Explanatory Indispensability Arguments in Metaethics and Philosophy of Mathematics'.Debbie Roberts - 2016 - In Uri D. Leibowitz & Neil Sinclair (eds.), Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability. Oxford University Press.
  23. added 2016-04-14
    Richard Kraut, Against Absolute Goodness , Pp. Xii+ 224.Julie Tannenbaum - 2016 - Utilitas 28 (1):119-122.
    In Against Absolute Goodness Richard Kraut aims to show that absolute goodness (or badness) is not reason-giving; it plays no role is justifying or requiring certain attitudes and no role in reasoning about what to do. It passes the buck (it never adds to the weightiness of more specific reasons) and so for practical purposes can be ignored. However, he claims that the notions of ‘a good R’ (e.g. a good play) and ‘good for S’ do justify certain attitudes and (...)
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  24. added 2015-12-21
    Review of Erik Wielenberg's Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism. [REVIEW]Jussi Suikkanen - 2016 - Ethics 126 (2):541-545.
    This article is a short book review of Erik Wielenberg's book Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism.
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  25. added 2015-08-25
    The Nature of Normativity: Précis.Ralph Wedgwood - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):445 - 448.
    This is a precis of Ralph Wedgwood's book "The Nature of Normativity".
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  26. added 2015-07-07
    The Supervenience Challenge to Non-Naturalism.Pekka Väyrynen - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 170-84.
    This paper is a survey of the supervenience challenge to non-naturalist moral realism. I formulate a version of the challenge, consider the most promising non-naturalist replies to it, and suggest that no fully effective reply has yet been given.
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  27. added 2015-06-22
    Intrinsic Good.Barnett Savery - 1942 - Journal of Philosophy 39 (9):234-244.
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  28. added 2015-04-22
    Is Gracefulness a Supervenient Property?Peter M. Burkholder - 1971 - Tulane Studies in Philosophy 20:19-35.
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  29. added 2015-04-07
    Problems for Moral/Natural Supervenience: DAVID E. ALEXANDER.David E. Alexander - 2011 - Religious Studies 47 (1):73-84.
    ???Everyone agrees that the moral features of things supervene on their natural features??? , 22). Everyone is wrong, or so I will argue. In the first section, I explain the version of moral supervenience that Smith and others argue everyone should accept. In the second section, I argue that the mere conceptual possibility of a divine command theory of morality is sufficient to refute the version of moral supervenience under consideration. Lastly, I consider and respond to two objections, showing, among (...)
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  30. added 2015-04-05
    The Dynamics of Moral Realism.Lorraine Marie Arangno - 1994 - Dissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder
    Ethical naturalists, who reject strong reductivist positions, hold a plausible theory that is a version of realism. In the thesis I provide a critical response to the skeptical attacks levied against these ethical naturalists. In particular, I examine the criticisms that J. L. Mackie and Simon Blackburn have put forward concerning the ethical naturalist's treatment of the concept of supervenience. I argue that the naturalist's position on supervenience can be defended against these criticisms.
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  31. added 2015-03-24
    Are Moral Properties Impossible?Wouter F. Kalf - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1869-1887.
    Perhaps the actual world does not contain moral properties. But might moral properties be impossible because no world, possible or actual, contains them? Two metaethical theories can be argued to entail just that conclusion; viz., emotivism and error theory. This paper works towards the strongest formulation of the emotivist argument for the impossibility of moral properties, but ultimately rejects it. It then uses the reason why the emotivist argument fails to argue that error-theoretic arguments for the impossibility of moral properties (...)
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  32. added 2015-03-17
    Blackburn's Problem: On its Not Insignificant Residue.Jordan Howard Sobel - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):361-383.
    Moral properties would supervene upon non-moral properties and be conceptually autonomous. That, according to Simon Blackburn, would make them if not impossible at least mysterious, and evidence for them best explained by theorists who say they are not real. In fact moral properties would not challenge in ways Blackburn has contended. There is, however, something new that can be gathered from his arguments. What would the supervenience of moral properties and their conceptual autonomy from at least total non-moral properties entail (...)
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  33. added 2015-03-08
    How To Be a Moral Platonist.Knut Olav Skarsaune - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics (10).
    Contrary to popular opinion, non-natural realism can explain both why normative properties supervene on descriptive properties, and why this pattern is analytic. The explanation proceeds by positing a subtle polysemy in normative predicates like “good”. Such predicates express slightly different senses when they are applied to particulars (like Florence Nightingale) and to kinds (like altruism). The former sense, “goodPAR”, can be defined in terms of the latter, “goodKIN”, as follows: x is goodPAR iff there is a kind K such that (...)
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  34. added 2014-11-09
    Can Moral Principles Explain Supervenience?Aaron Elliott - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (4):629-659.
    The distribution of moral properties supervenes on the distribution of natural properties, and this provides a puzzle for non-naturalism: what could explain supervenience if moral properties are not natural properties? Enoch claims moral principles explain supervenience. But this solution is incomplete without an account of what moral principles and properties are, and what relation holds between them. This paper begins to develop such an account by exploring analogous issues for Realism about Laws of nature in philosophy of science. Appealing to (...)
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  35. added 2014-04-03
    Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness Revived.Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons - 1992 - Synthese 92 (2):221 - 260.
    J. L. Mackie argued that if there were objective moral properties or facts, then the supervenience relation linking the nonmoral to the moral would be metaphysically queer. Moral realists reply that objective supervenience relations are ubiquitous according to contemporary versions of metaphysical naturalism and, hence, that there is nothing especially queer about moral supervenience. In this paper we revive Mackie's challenge to moral realism. We argue: (i) that objective supervenience relations of any kind, moral or otherwise, should be explainable rather (...)
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  36. added 2014-04-02
    Causally Inefficacious Moral Properties.David Slutsky - 2001 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):595-610.
    In this paper, I motivate skepticism about the causal efficacy of moral properties in two ways. First, I highlight a tension that arises between two claims that moral realists may want to accept. The first claim is that physically indistinguishable things do not differ in any causally efficacious respect. The second claim is that physically indistinguishable things that differ in certain historical respects have different moral properties. The tension arises to the extent to which these different moral properties are supposed (...)
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  37. added 2014-04-02
    Moral Supervenience.Nick Zangwill - 1995 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20 (1):240-262.
    morality? I want to pursue these questions by examining an argument against moral realism that Simon Blackburn has developed.' In parts 1 and 2, I consider..
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  38. added 2014-03-31
    Explaining Supervenience: Moral and Mental.Nick Zangwill - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (April):509-518.
    I defend the view that supervenience relations need not be explained. My view is that some supervenience relations are brute, and explanatorily ultimate. I examine an argument of Terrence Horgan and Mark Timmons. They aim to rehabilitate John Mackie’s metaphysical queerness argument. But the explanations of supervenience that Horgan and Timmons demand are semantic explanations. I criticize their attempt to explain psychophysical supervenience in this fashion. I then turn to their ‘Twin Earth’ argument against naturalist moral realism. I reconstruct their (...)
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  39. added 2014-03-31
    Supervenience, Goodness, and Higher-Order Universals.Graham Oddie - 1991 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (1):20 – 47.
    Supervenience theses promise ontological economy without reducibility. The problem is that they face a dilemma: either the relation of supervenience entails reducibility or it is mysterious. Recently higher-order universals have been invoked to avoid the dilemma. This article develops a higher-order framework in which this claim can be assessed. It is shown that reducibility can be avoided, but only at the cost of a rather radical metaphysical proposal.
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  40. added 2014-03-28
    Supervenience and Moral Realism.Luc Bovens & Dalia Drai - 1999 - Philosophia 27 (1-2):241-245.
    Blackburn argues that moral supervenience in conjunction with the lack of entailments from naturalistic to moral judgments poses a challenge to moral realism. Klagge and McFetridge try to avert the challenge by appealing to synthetically necessary connections between natural and moral properties. Blackburn rejoins that, even if there are such connections, the challenge still remains. We remain agnostic on the question whether there are such connections, but argue against Blackburn that, if there are indeed such connections, then the challenge to (...)
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  41. added 2014-03-28
    The Price of Non-Reductive Moral Realism.Ralph Wedgwood - 1999 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):199-215.
    Non-reductive moral realism is the view that there are moral properties which cannot be reduced to natural properties. If moral properties exist, it is plausible that they strongly supervene on non-moral properties- more specifically, on mental, social, and biological properties. There may also be good reasons for thinking that moral properties are irreducible. However, strong supervenience and irreducibility seem incompatible. Strong supervenience entails that there is an enormous number of modal truths (specifically, truths about exactly which non-moral properties necessitate which (...)
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  42. added 2014-03-23
    Why Moore's Open Question is Open: The Evolution of Moral Supervenience. [REVIEW]Richmond Campbell & Jennifer Woodrow - 2003 - Journal of Value Inquiry 37 (3):353-372.
  43. added 2014-03-19
    Moral Facts as Configuring Causes.Terence Cuneo - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):141–162.
    The overarching aim of this essay is to argue that moral realists should be "causalists" or claim that moral facts of certain kinds are causally efficacious. To this end, I engage in two tasks. The first is to develop an account of the sense in which moral facts of certain kinds are causally efficacious. After having sketched the concept of what I call a "configuring" cause, I contend that the exercise of the moral virtues is plausibly viewed as a configuring (...)
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  44. added 2014-03-18
    Can There Be Brute, Contingent Moral Facts.John H. Dreher - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):23 - 30.
    In this paper I argue that whether or not a world is good can be a contingent fact about the world that is not dependent upon that world's natural facts, or, indeed, upon anyother facts. If so, the property, good, does not supervene upon the facts of nature (or upon any other facts). My argument for this claimis that it is possible to view the very world in which we live (viz. the natural facts that constitute it) as good and (...)
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  45. added 2014-03-18
    Blackburn's Modal Argument Against Moral Realism.Anthony Brueckner - 2002 - Theoria 68 (1):67-70.
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  46. added 2014-03-17
    Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    Moral Realism is a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. His central thesis, as well as the many novel supporting arguments used to defend it, will spark much controversy among those concerned with the foundations of ethics.
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  47. added 2014-03-15
    Anti-Reductionism and Supervenience.Michael Ridge - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):330-348.
    In this paper, I argue that anti-reductionist moral realism still has trouble explaining supervenience. My main target here will be Russ Shafer-Landau's attempt to explain the supervenience of the moral on the natural in terms of the constitution of moral property instantiations by natural property instantiations. First, though, I discuss a recent challenge to the very idea of using supervenience as a dialectical weapon posed by Nicholas Sturgeon. With a suitably formulated supervenience thesis in hand, I try to show how (...)
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  48. added 2014-03-13
    Why Supervenience is a Problem for Brink's Version of Moral Realism.Jorn Sonderholm - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Research 33:203-213.
    The aim of this paper is to show that David Brink’s influential version of moral realism cannot give a convincing explanation of moral supervenience. Section twocontains an outline and discussion of Brink’s view of moral properties. Section three explicates Brink’s notions of strong and weak supervenience. In sections four and five, Brink’s explanation of moral supervenience is discussed. It is argued that his functionalist view of moral properties means that the explanation of moral supervenience that he explicitly offers is not (...)
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  49. added 2014-03-10
    Normative Appeals to the Natural.Pekka Väyrynen - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):279 - 314.
    Surprisingly, many ethical realists and anti-realists, naturalists and not, all accept some version of the following normative appeal to the natural (NAN): evaluative and normative facts hold solely in virtue of natural facts, where their naturalness is part of what fits them for the job. This paper argues not that NAN is false but that NAN has no adequate non-parochial justification (a justification that relies only on premises which can be accepted by more or less everyone who accepts NAN) to (...)
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  50. added 2014-03-10
    Does Blackburn’s Expressivism Have a Problem with Respect to Supervenience? A Reply to Wright and Zangwill.Jorn Sonderholm - 2009 - Metaphysica 10 (1):89-95.
    This paper is concerned with the expressivist account of moral supervenience that Simon Blackburn has offered. First, the account is presented, and an objection to it is thereafter discussed. In short, the objection is that the supervenience constraint in moral discourse is mysterious, given that no similar constraint governs speech and thought in other areas of discourse that seem to be prime candidates for an expressivist analysis. The conclusion of the paper is that this objection can be fended off.
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