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  1. added 2018-09-04
    Flat Physicalism: Some Implications.Orly Shenker - 2017 - Iyyun 66:211-225.
    Flat Physicalism is a theory of through and through type reductive physicalism, understood in light of recent results in the conceptual foundations of physics. In Flat Physicalism, as in physics, so-called "high level" concepts and laws are nothing but partial descriptions of the complete states of affairs of the universe. "Flat physicalism" generalizes this idea, to form a reductive picture in which there is no room for levels, neither explanatory nor ontological. The paper explains how phenomena that seem to be (...)
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  2. added 2018-08-20
    The Swapping Constraint.Henry Ian Schiller - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (3):605-622.
    Triviality arguments against the computational theory of mind claim that computational implementation is trivial and thus does not serve as an adequate metaphysical basis for mental states. It is common to take computational implementation to consist in a mapping from physical states to abstract computational states. In this paper, I propose a novel constraint on the kinds of physical states that can implement computational states, which helps to specify what it is for two physical states to non-trivially implement the same (...)
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  3. added 2018-07-26
    Abstraction, Multiple Realizability, and the Explanatory Value of Omitting Irrelevant Details.Matthew C. Haug - manuscript
    Anti-reductionists hold that special science explanations of some phenomena are objectively better than physical explanations of those phenomena. Prominent defenses of this claim appeal to the multiple realizability of special science properties. I argue that special science explanations can be shown to be better, in one respect, than physical explanations in a way that does not depend on multiple realizability. Namely, I discuss a way in which a special science explanation may be more abstract than a competing physical explanation, even (...)
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  4. added 2018-07-02
    Fish and Microchips: On Fish Pain and Multiple Realization.Matthias Michel - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    Opponents to consciousness in fish argue that fish do not feel pain because they do not have a neocortex, which is a necessary condition for feeling pain. A common counter-argument appeals to the multiple realizability of pain: while a neocortex might be necessary for feeling pain in humans, pain might be realized differently in fish. This paper argues, first, that it is impossible to find a criterion allowing us to demarcate between plausible and implausible cases of multiple realization of pain (...)
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  5. added 2018-06-19
    Where Do You Get Your Protein? Or: Biochemical Realization.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Biochemical kinds such as proteins pose interesting problems for philosophers of science, as they can be studied from the points of view of both biology and chemistry. The relationship between the biological functions of biochemical kinds and the microstructures that they are related to is the key question. This leads us to a more general discussion about ontological reductionism, microstructuralism, and multiple realization at the biology-chemistry interface. On the face of it, biochemical kinds seem to pose a challenge for ontological (...)
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  6. added 2018-06-07
    Multiple Realization and Compositional Variation.Kevin Morris - forthcoming - Synthese:1-19.
    It has often been thought that compositional variation across systems that are similar from the point of view of the special sciences provides a key point in favor of the multiple realization of special science kinds and in turn the broadly nonreductive consequences often thought to follow from multiple realization. Yet in a series of articles, and culminating in The Multiple Realization Book, Tom Polger and Larry Shapiro argue that an account of multiple realization demanding enough to yield such nonreductive (...)
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  7. added 2018-03-15
    Ethical Reductionism.Neil Sinhababu - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (1):32-52.
    Ethical reductionism is the best version of naturalistic moral realism. Reductionists regard moral properties as identical to properties appearing in successful scientific theories. Nonreductionists, including many of the Cornell Realists, argue that moral properties instead supervene on scientific properties without identity. I respond to two arguments for nonreductionism. First, nonreductionists argue that the multiple realizability of moral properties defeats reductionism. Multiple realizability can be addressed in ethics by identifying moral properties uniquely or disjunctively with properties of the special sciences. Second, (...)
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  8. added 2018-03-13
    Review of Thomas W. Polger and Lawrence A. Shapiro: The Multiple Realization Book. [REVIEW]Marion Godman - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Book Reviews.
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  9. added 2018-02-27
    Mental Causation Via Neuroprosthetics? A Critical Analysis.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2018 - Synthese (12):5159-5174.
    Some recent arguments defending the genuine causal efficacy of the mental have been relying on empirical research on neuroprosthetics. This essay presents a critical analysis of these arguments. The problem of mental causation, and the basic idea and results of neuroprosthetics are reviewed. It is shown how appealing to the research on neuroprosthetics can be interpreted to give support to the idea of mental causation. However, it does so only in a rather deflationary sense: by holding the mental identical with (...)
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  10. added 2018-02-16
    Why the Social Sciences Are Irreducible.Tobias Hansson Wahlberg - 2017 - Synthese:1-27.
    It is often claimed that the social sciences cannot be reduced to a lower-level individualistic science. The standard argument for this position is the Fodorian multiple realizability argument. Its defenders endorse token–token identities between “higher-level” social objects and pluralities/sums of “lower-level” individuals, but they maintain that the properties expressed by social science predicates are often multiply realizable, entailing that type–type identities between social and individualistic properties are ruled out. In this paper I argue that the multiple realizability argument for explanatory (...)
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  11. added 2017-11-01
    Crosscutting Psycho-Neural Taxonomies: The Case of Episodic Memory.Muhammad Ali Khalidi - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (2):191-208.
    I will begin by proposing a taxonomy of taxonomic positions regarding the mind–brain: localism, globalism, revisionism, and contextualism, and will go on to focus on the last position. Although some versions of contextualism have been defended by various researchers, they largely limit themselves to a version of neural contextualism: different brain regions perform different functions in different neural contexts. I will defend what I call “environmental-etiological contextualism,” according to which the psychological functions carried out by various neural regions can only (...)
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  12. added 2017-08-10
    Some Concerns with Polger and Shapiro’s View.Mark Couch - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):419-430.
    This paper provides some responses to Tom Polger and Larry Shapiro’s The Multiple Realization Book (2016). I first provide a description of the authors’ framework for thinking about multiple realization and the conditions they claim this involves. I explain what I think they get right and what they get wrong with this framework. After this, I then consider a few examples of multiple realization they discuss and the interpretations they offer. While I am sympathetic to several things they say about (...)
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  13. added 2017-06-02
    Review of The Multiple Realization Book. [REVIEW]Umut Baysan - forthcoming - Analysis:anx078.
    _The Multiple Realization Book_By PolgerThomas W. and ShapiroLawrence A.Oxford University Press, 2016. xiv + 258 pp. £71.14 cloth, £18.99 paper.
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  14. added 2017-06-02
    Realization Relations in Metaphysics.Umut Baysan - 2015 - Minds and Machines (3):1-14.
    “Realization” is a technical term that is used by metaphysicians, philosophers of mind, and philosophers of science to denote some dependence relation that is thought to obtain between higher-level properties and lower-level properties. It is said that mental properties are realized by physical properties; functional and computational properties are realized by first-order properties that occupy certain causal/functional roles; dispositional properties are realized by categorical properties; so on and so forth. Given this wide usage of the term “realization”, it would be (...)
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  15. added 2017-05-24
    Review of The Multiple Realization Book by Thomas W. Polger & Lawrence A. Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press). [REVIEW]Tuomas K. Pernu - 2017 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 21.
  16. added 2017-04-25
    The Multiple Realization Book.Thomas W. Polger & Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Since Hilary Putnam offered multiple realization as an empirical hypothesis in the 1960s, philosophical consensus has turned against the idea that mental processes are identifiable with brain processes, and multiple realization has become the keystone of the 'antireductive consensus' across philosophy of science. Thomas W. Polger and Lawrence A. Shapiro offer the first book-length investigation of multiple realization, which serves as a starting point to a series of philosophically sophisticated and empirically informed arguments that cast doubt on the generality of (...)
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  17. added 2017-04-25
    Multiple Realization and Expressive Power in Mathematics and Ethics.David Liggins - 2016 - In Uri D. Leibowitz & Neil Sinclair (eds.), Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability. Oxford University Press.
    According to a popular ‘explanationist’ argument for moral or mathematical realism the best explanation of some phenomena are moral or mathematical, and this implies the relevant form of realism. One popular way to resist the premiss of such arguments is to hold that any supposed explanation provided by moral or mathematical properties is in fact provided only by the non-moral or non-mathematical grounds of those properties. Many realists have responded to this objection by urging that the explanations provided by the (...)
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  18. added 2017-04-25
    Constitution, and Multiple Constitution, in the Sciences: Using the Neuron to Construct a Starting Framework. [REVIEW]Carl Gillett - 2013 - Minds and Machines 23 (3):309-337.
    Inter-level mechanistic explanations in the sciences have long been a focus of philosophical interest, but attention has recently turned to the compositional character of these explanations which work by explaining higher level entities, whether processes, individuals or properties, using the lower level entities they take to compose them. However, we still have no theoretical account of the constitution or parthood relations between individuals deployed in such explanations, nor any accounts of multiple constitution. My primary focus in this paper is to (...)
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  19. added 2017-04-25
    Multiple Realization by Compensatory Differences.Kenneth Aizawa - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (1):69-86.
    One way that scientifically recognized properties are multiply realized is by “compensatory differences” among realizing properties. If a property G is jointly realized by two properties F1 and F2, then G can be multiply realized by having changes in the property F1 offset changes in the property F2. In some cases, there are scientific laws that articulate how distinct combinations of physical quantities can determine one and the same value of some other physical quantity. One moral to draw is that (...)
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  20. added 2017-04-25
    Powers and the Realization Relation.John Heil - 2011 - The Monist 94 (1):34-53.
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  21. added 2017-04-25
    Realization, Determination, and Mechanisms.Matthew C. Haug - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (3):313-330.
    Several philosophers (e.g., Ehring (Nous (Detroit, Mich.) 30:461–480, 1996 ); Funkhouser (Nous (Detroit, Mich.) 40:548–569, 2006 ); Walter (Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37:217–244, 2007 ) have argued that there are metaphysical differences between the determinable-determinate relation and the realization relation between mental and physical properties. Others have challenged this claim (e.g., Wilson (Philosophical Studies, 2009 ). In this paper, I argue that there are indeed such differences and propose a “mechanistic” account of realization that elucidates why these differences hold. This (...)
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  22. added 2017-04-25
    Dissociable Realization and Kind Splitting.Carl F. Craver - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):960-971.
    It is a common assumption in contemporary cognitive neuroscience that discovering a putative realized kind to be dissociably realized (i.e., to be realized in each instance by two or more distinct realizers) mandates splitting that kind. Here I explore some limits on this inference using two deceptively similar examples: the dissociation of declarative and procedural memory and Ramachandran's argument that the self is an illusion.
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  23. added 2017-04-25
    Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation.Jaegwon Kim - 1998 - MIT Press.
    This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind...
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  24. added 2017-02-14
    Realization, Reduction and Psychological Autonomy.Schweizer Paul - 2001 - Synthese 126 (3):383-405.
    It is often thought that the computational paradigm provides a supporting case for the theoretical autonomy of the science of mind. However, I argue that computation is in fact incompatible with this alleged aspect of intentional explanation, and hence the foundational assumptions of orthodox cognitive science are mutually unstable. The most plausible way to relieve these foundational tensions is to relinquish the idea that the psychological level enjoys some special form of theoretical sovereignty. So, in contrast to well known antireductionist (...)
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  25. added 2017-02-13
    Multiple Scales of Brain-Mind Interactions.Lester Ingber - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):360.
  26. added 2017-02-13
    Are There Multiple Movement Strategies?Robert G. Lee - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (2):356.
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  27. added 2017-02-13
    Multiple Mechanisms for Partitioning.Avis H. Cohen - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (4):649.
  28. added 2017-02-13
    A New Abstract Code or the New Possibility of Multiple Codes?Annette Karmiloff Smith - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):149.
  29. added 2017-02-13
    Multiple Cranial Nerve Palsies.J. Roger, J. Bille & R. A. Vigouroux - 1969 - In P. Vinken & G. Bruyn (eds.), Handbook of Clinical Neurology. North Holland. pp. 2--86.
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  30. added 2017-02-09
    Connectionist Agency.David DeMoss - 2003 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 10 (2):9-15.
    Any mind-brain theory eventually will have to deal with agency. I do not claim that no other theory could do this successfully. I do claim that connectionism is able to handle some key features of agency. First, I will offer a brief account of connectionism and the advantages of using it to account for human agency, comparing and contrasting connectionism with two other mind-brain accounts in cognitive science, symbolicism and dynamicism. Then, since a connectionist account of agency depends on a (...)
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  31. added 2017-02-09
    Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences.O. G. - 1978 - Review of Metaphysics 32 (1):129-130.
  32. added 2017-02-09
    Multiple Definition.I. A. Richards - 1933 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 34:31 - 50.
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  33. added 2017-02-08
    Multiplex Vs. Multiple Selves.Owen Flanagan - 1999 - The Monist 82 (4):645-657.
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  34. added 2017-02-02
    Reconstructing Technoliteracy : A Multiple Literacies Approach.Richard Kahn & Douglas Kellner - 2006 - In John R. Dakers (ed.), Defining Technological Literacy: Towards an Epistemological Framework. Palgrave-Macmillan.
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  35. added 2017-01-27
    Form and Cause in Multiple Sclerosis.F. Pansera - 1992 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 36 (2):306-310.
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  36. added 2017-01-27
    History of Multiple Sclerosis.E. Stenager & K. Jensen - 1990 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 34 (2):311-312.
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  37. added 2017-01-25
    Cameron Shelley, Multiple Analogies in Science and Philosophy.Sergio Cremaschi - 2004 - Pragmatics and Cognitionpragmatics and Cognition 12 (2):389-395.
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  38. added 2017-01-25
    Multiple Obstacles to Gene Therapy in the Brain.David Avram Sanders - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (1):67.
  39. added 2017-01-25
    Muscle Partitioning Via Multiple Inputs: An Alternative Hypothesis.James H. Abbs & Benoni B. Edin - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (4):645.
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  40. added 2017-01-25
    Multiple 5-HT Systems and Multiple Punishment Processes.J. F. W. Deakin - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (2):337.
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  41. added 2017-01-24
    An Example of a Function with Multiple Ambiguities.Paul D. Humke - 1975 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 21 (1):413-416.
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  42. added 2017-01-22
    Multiple Constraints, Simultaneous Solutions.Peter Galison - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:157 - 163.
    In the 1960s, the history and philosophy of science made common cause in the search for universal patterns of theory change: philosophers provided models, historians offered examples. But the two enterprises pulled apart during the 1970s. Now there is a new arena of joint concern. Historians and philosophers are searching for the conditions under which standards of theoretical and experimental demonstration are established. I argue against the picture of these standards as independent of (or reducible to) the context of their (...)
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  43. added 2017-01-21
    Multiple Review.James Hampton - 1987 - Mind and Language 2 (3):264-269.
  44. added 2017-01-21
    Multiple Review.Robyn Carston - 1987 - Mind and Language 2 (4):333-349.
    Gavagai! or the Future History of the Animal Language Controversy. By DAVID PREMACK.
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  45. added 2017-01-21
    Multiple Review.Margaret Harris - 1987 - Mind and Language 2 (4):350-353.
    Language and Experience: Evidence from the Blind Child. By BARBARA LANDAU and LILA R. GLEITMAN.
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  46. added 2017-01-20
    Multiple Approaches to Understanding.Howard Gardner - 2009 - In Knud Illeris (ed.), Contemporary Theories of Learning: Learning Theorists -- In Their Own Words. Routledge.
  47. added 2017-01-20
    Realizability, Set Theory and Term Extraction.J. Lipton - 1995 - In Philippe De Groote (ed.), The Curry-Howard Isomorphism. Academia. pp. 8--257.
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  48. added 2017-01-19
    Multiple Reductions Revisited.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2008 - Philosophia Mathematica 16 (2):244-255.
    Paul Benacerraf's argument from multiple reductions consists of a general argument against realism about the natural numbers (the view that numbers are objects), and a limited argument against reductionism about them (the view that numbers are identical with prima facie distinct entities). There is a widely recognized and severe difficulty with the former argument, but no comparably recognized such difficulty with the latter. Even so, reductionism in mathematics continues to thrive. In this paper I develop a difficulty for Benacerraf's argument (...)
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  49. added 2017-01-19
    On an Alleged Non-Equivalence Between Dispositions and Disjunctive Properties.Jonathan Cohen - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (1):77-81.
    This paper shows that grounded dispositions are necessarily coextensive with disjunctive properties. It responds to several objections against this thesis, and then shows how to construct a disjunctive property necessarily coextensive with an arbitrary grounded disposition.
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  50. added 2017-01-17
    A Physicalist Account of Multiple Realizability in the Special Sciences.Meir Hemmo & Orly R. Shenker - manuscript
    Multiple realizability seems to be empirically justified and provides the conceptual basis for the autonomy of the special sciences. But it is mysterious. In this talk I propose a new reductionist approach to the special sciences that removes the mystery: I explain why the special sciences kinds appear to be multiply realized although they are identical with physical kinds and in what sense the special sciences kinds and laws are autonomous although they are physical laws. This approach is based on (...)
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1 — 50 / 267