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1 — 50 / 124
  1. added 2018-12-17
    Internalism and the Explanatory Role of Narrow Content.Sam Baird - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    The central problem addressed by this thesis is how narrow content can be genuinely representational and relate to the individuation of mental representations. A second problem relates to the explanatory role of narrow content. The challenge facing the proponent of narrow content is that externalism is the standard position with regard to representation, individuation, and explanation, and it is often held that narrow content is either incoherent or explanatorily redundant. To this end, I defend a version of a two-component theory (...)
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  2. added 2018-10-15
    Secondary Belief Content, What is It Good For?Alexander Sandgren - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1467-1476.
    Some use the need to explain communication, agreement, and disagreement to argue for two-dimensional conceptions of belief content. One prominent defender of an account of this sort is David Chalmers. Chalmers claims that beliefs have two kinds of content. The second dimension of belief content, which is tied to what beliefs pick out in the actual world, is supposed to help explain communication, agreement, and disagreement. I argue that it does not. Since the need to explain these phenomena is the (...)
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  3. added 2018-09-24
    Immediate and Reflective Senses.Angela Mendelovici - forthcoming - In Steven Gouveia, Manuel Curado & Dena Shottenkirk (eds.), Perception, Cognition, and Aesthetics. New York: Routledge.
    This paper argues that there are two distinct kinds of senses, immediate senses and reflective senses. Immediate senses are what we are immediately aware of when we are in an intentional mental state, while reflective senses are what we understand of an intentional mental state's (putative) referent upon reflection. I suggest an account of immediate and reflective senses that is based on the phenomenal intentionality theory, a theory of intentionality in terms of phenomenal consciousness. My focus is on the immediate (...)
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  4. added 2018-03-19
    Consciousness and Meaning: Selected Essays by Brian Loar.Katalin Balog, Stephanie Beardman & Brian Loar - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    One of the most important problems of modern philosophy concerns the place of subjectivity in a purely physical universe. Brian Loar was a major contributor to the discussion of this problem for over four decades. This volume brings together his most important and influential essays in the philosophy of language and of mind.
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  5. added 2018-03-05
    Singular Truth-Conditions Without Singular Propositions.Gregory Bochner - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2741-2760.
    In this paper I argue that propositionalism is what generates a tension between referentialism and harmony. Harmony can be preserved if we replace propositionalism by centred referentialism, according to which referential thoughts and utterances about an object have descriptive contents that must be evaluated relative to a world centred on that object at the relevant time. By disentangling truth-conditions and contents, this move allows us to dissolve the tension between referentialism and descriptivism. The view that emerges has three main components: (...)
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  6. added 2018-02-16
    Atomism, Pluralism, and Conceptual Content.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):131-163.
    Conceptual atomists argue that most of our concepts are primitive. I take up three arguments that have been thought to support atomism and show that they are inconclusive. The evidence that allegedly backs atomism is equally compatible with a localist position on which concepts are structured representations with complex semantic content. I lay out such a localist position and argue that the appropriate position for a non-atomist to adopt is a pluralist view of conceptual structure. I show several ways in (...)
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  7. added 2017-12-12
    A Metarepresentational Theory of Intentional Identity.Alexander Sandgren - forthcoming - Synthese:1-19.
    Geach points out that some pairs of beliefs have a common focus despite there being, apparently, no object at that focus. For example, two or more beliefs can be directed at Vulcan even though there is no such planet. Geach introduced the label ‘intentional identity’ to pick out the relation that holds between attitudes in these cases; Geach says that ’[w]e have intentional identity when a number of people, or one person on different occasions, have attitudes with a common focus, (...)
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  8. added 2017-05-18
    The Rational Role of Experience.David Bourget - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):467-493.
    If there is content that we reason on, cognitive content, it is in the head and accessible to reasoning mechanisms. This paper discusses the phenomenal theory of cognitive content, according to which cognitive contents are the contents of phenomenal consciousness. I begin by distinguishing cognitive content from the closely associated notion of narrow content. I then argue, drawing on prior work, that the phenomenal theory can plausibly account for the cognitive contents of many relatively simple mental states. My main focus (...)
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  9. added 2016-12-08
    Semantic Externalism.Jesper Kallestrup - 2011 - Routledge.
    Semantic externalism is the view that the meanings of referring terms, and the contents of beliefs that are expressed by those terms, are not fully determined by factors internal to the speaker but are instead bound up with the environment. The debate about semantic externalism is one of the most important but difficult topics in philosophy of mind and language, and has consequences for our understanding of the role of social institutions and the physical environment in constituting language and the (...)
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  10. added 2016-12-08
    Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam.Hilary Putnam & George Boolos (eds.) - 1990 - Cambridge University Press.
    In this festschrift for the eminent philosopher Hilary Putnam, a team of distinguished philosophers write on a broad range of topics and thus reflect the remarkably fertile and provocative research of Putnam himself. The volume is not merely a celebration of a man, but also a report on the state of philosophy in a number of significant areas. The essays fall naturally into three groups: a central core on the theme of conventionality and content in the philosophy of mind, language, (...)
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  11. added 2016-12-05
    Lewis on Intentionality.Robert Stalnaker - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):199 – 212.
    David Lewis's account of intentionality is a version of what he calls 'global descriptivism'. The rough idea is that the correct interpretation of one's total theory is the one (among the admissible interpretations) that come closest to making it true. I give an exposition of this account, as I understand it, and try to bring out some of its consequences. I argue that there is a tension between Lewis's global descriptivism and his rejection of a linguistic account of the intentionality (...)
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  12. added 2016-11-13
    Where After All Are the Meanings? A Defense of Internalism. Searle Versus Putnam.Christian Helmut Wenzel - 2004 - Experience and Analysis. Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium 12:408-409.
    There has been recent dispute between Putnam and Searle over whether meanings are “in the head”. Putnam makes use of Twin-Earth thought experiments to show that our mental states alone cannot determine what we refer to (and thus “mean”) and that we rely also on external factors, which are not “in the head”. This suggests to me that we in some way mean more than we actually know. Searle on the other hand makes use of what he calls “Intentional contents”, (...)
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  13. added 2016-10-11
    Semantic Externalism, by Jesper Kallestrup. [REVIEW]Ricardo Miguel & Diogo Santos - 2016 - Disputatio (42):131-137.
  14. added 2016-09-20
    Narrow Content.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri & John Hawthorne - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    Can there be 'narrow' mental content, that is entirely determined by the goings-on inside the head of the thinker? This book argues not, and defends instead a thoroughgoing externalism: the entanglement of our minds with the external world runs so deep that no internal component of mentality can easily be cordoned off.
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  15. added 2016-09-09
    What is the Narrow Content of Fence (and Other Definitionally and Interpretationally Primitive Concepts)?Eric Mandelbaum - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3):138-138.
    It's unclear what narrow content is interpersonally shared for concepts that don't originate from core cognition yet are still definitionally and interpretationally primitive. A primary concern is that for these concepts, one cannot draw a principled distinction between inferences that are content determining and those that aren't. The lack of a principled distinction imperils an account of interpersonally shared concepts.
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  16. added 2016-09-04
    Contenu Étroit, Mécanisme Et Fonctions de Choix.Manuel Rebuschi - 2009 - Philosophie 100 (1):77.
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  17. added 2016-07-19
    Has Fodor Really Changed His Mind on Narrow Content?Murat Aydede - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (3-4):422-458.
    In his latest book, The Elm and the Expert (1994), Fodor notoriously rejects the notion of narrow content as superfluous. He envisions a scientific intentional psychology that adverts only to broad content properties in its explanations. I argue that Fodor's change in view is only apparent and that his previous position (1985-1991) is extensionally equivalent to his "new" position (1994). I show that, despite what he says narrow content is for in his (1994), Fodor himself has previously never appealed to (...)
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  18. added 2016-05-11
    Deference and Indexicality.Francois Recanati - 2001 - In Stephen Kosslyn, Albert Galaburda & Yves Christen (eds.), Languages of the Brain. Harvard University Press. pp. 102-109.
  19. added 2016-05-11
    Deferential Concepts: A Response to Woodfield.François Recanati - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (4):452–464.
  20. added 2016-03-29
    Solving Frege's Puzzle.Richard G. Heck Jr - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (1-2):132-174.
    So-called 'Frege cases' pose a challenge for anyone who would hope to treat the contents of beliefs (and similar mental states) as Russellian propositions: It is then impossible to explain people's behavior in Frege cases without invoking non-intentional features of their mental states, and doing that seems to undermine the intentionality of psychological explanation. In the present paper, I develop this sort of objection in what seems to me to be its strongest form, but then offer a response to it. (...)
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  21. added 2016-02-25
    De Re Thought, Object Identity, and Knowing-Wh*.Ludovic Soutif - 2012 - Analytica (Rio) 16 (1-2):133-164.
    In this paper, I discuss a view of de re thoughts that can be naturally endorsed in the wake of Russell's account. This is the view that a thought is about the very thing (res) rather than a mere characterization of it if and only if it is constitutively tied, if not to the existence, at least to the identity of its object and the thinker knows which/who the object of his/her thought is. Faced with the challenge of accommodating far (...)
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  22. added 2015-09-12
    The Dual Concepts Objection to Content Externalism.Bryan Frances - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2):123-138.
    Many philosophers have used premises about concepts and rationality to argue that the protagonists in the various Twin Earth thought experiments do not have the concepts that content externalists say they have. This essay argues that this popular internalist argument is flawed in many different ways, and more importantly it cannot be repaired in order to cast doubt on externalism.
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  23. added 2015-04-13
    Twin Earth Thought Experiments.Bryan Frances - 1998
  24. added 2014-04-03
    How Narrow is Narrow Content?François Recanati - 1994 - Dialectica 48 (3-4):209-29.
    SummaryIn this paper I discuss two influential views in the philosophy of mind: the two‐component picture draws a distinction between ‘narrow content’ and ‘broad content’, while radical externalism denies that there is such a thing as narrow content. I argue that ‘narrow content’ is ambiguous, and that the two views can be reconciled. Instead of considering that there is only one question and three possible answers corresponding to Cartesian internalism, the two‐component picture, and radical externalism respectively, I show that there (...)
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  25. added 2014-04-03
    Externalism Revisited: Is There Such a Thing as Narrow Content?Pierre Jacob - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 60 (November):143-176.
    First, I argue that the narrow content of a thought cannot be identical with the linguistic meaning of the sentence used to express it. Secondly, I argue that the distinction between narrow content and linguistic meaning is not fatal to content-dualism. Thirdly I argue for the view that the proposition contributed by the clause prefixed by "that" is an interpretation of the believer's thought. Finally, I use this insight to provide an individualist account of Burge's thought-experiments such that recognition that (...)
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  26. added 2014-04-02
    The Problem of Cognitive Dynamics.João Branquinho - 1998 - Grazer Philosophische Studien Grazen 56:2-15.
    This paper is devoted to an examination of some aspects of the central issue of Cognitive Dynamics, the issue about the conditions under which intentional mental states may persist over time. I discuss two main sorts of approach to the topic: the directly referential approach, which I take as best represented in David Kaplan?s views, and the neo-Fregean approach, which I take as best represented in Gareth Evans?s views. The upshot of my discussion is twofold. On the one hand, I (...)
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  27. added 2014-04-02
    Narrow Content: A Defense.Arnold Silverberg - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):109-27.
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  28. added 2014-04-02
    Ruritania and Ecology.Josefa Toribio - 1995 - Philosophical Issues 6:188-195.
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  29. added 2014-04-02
    Language and Nature.Noam Chomsky - 1995 - Mind 104 (413):1-61.
  30. added 2014-04-02
    Narrow Content.Arnold Silverberg - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):109-127.
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  31. added 2014-04-02
    Ruritania Revisited.Ned Block - 1995 - Philosophical Issues 6:171-187.
    Perhaps you are wondering what I mean by ‘holism’. After all, everyone seems to use the term in a different sense. Even if we restrict ourselves to holism of meaning and content, we have many different holisms. Some take holism about meaning to be the doctrine that if you’ve got one meaning, you’ve got lots of them.2 On other views, to say meaning is holistic is to say that the meaning of each term depends on the meanings of all or (...)
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  32. added 2014-04-02
    Belief States and Narrow Content.Curtis Brown - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (3):343-67.
    The first thesis is that beliefs play a role in explaining behavior. This is reasonably uncontroversial, though it has been controverted. Why did I raise my arm? Because I wanted to emphasize a point, and believed that I could do so by raising my arm. The belief that I could emphasize a point by raising my arm is central to the most natural explanation of my action.
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  33. added 2014-04-02
    Narrow Content, Context of Thought, and Asymmetric Dependence.Paul Bernier - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (3):327-42.
  34. added 2014-04-01
    Two Routes to Narrow Content: Both Dead Ends.Pat A. Manfredi - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):3-22.
    If psychology requires a taxonomy that categorizes mental states according to their causal powers, the common sense method of individuating mental states (a taxonomy by intentional content) is unacceptable because mental states can have different intentional content, but identical causal powers. This difference threatens both the vindication of belief/desire psychology and the viability of scientific theories whose posits include intentional states. To resolve this conflict, Fodor has proposed that for scientific purposes mental states should be classified by their narrow content. (...)
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  35. added 2014-04-01
    Saving Psychological Solipsism.J. Christopher Maloney - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 61 (March):267-83.
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  36. added 2014-03-31
    In Defense of Social Content.John Biro - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 67 (3):277-93.
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  37. added 2014-03-30
    Svasamvitti as Methodological Solipsism: Narrow Content and the Problem of Intentionality in Buddhist Philosophy of Mind.Dan Arnold - 2009 - In Mario D'Amato, Jay L. Garfield & Tom J. F. Tillemans (eds.), Pointing at the Moon: Buddhism, Logic, Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
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  38. added 2014-03-30
    In Defence of Object-Dependent Thoughts.Sean Crawford - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):201-210.
    The existence of object-dependent thoughts has been doubted on the grounds that reference to such thoughts is unnecessary or 'redundant' in the psychological explanation of intentional action. This paper argues to the contrary that reference to object-dependent thoughts is necessary to the proper psychological explanation of intentional action upon objects. Section I sets out the argument for the alleged explanatory redundancy of object-dependent thoughts; an argument which turns on the coherence of an alternative 'dual-component' model of explanation. Section II rebuts (...)
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  39. added 2014-03-29
    Awareness, Understanding, and Functionalism.N. Georgalis - 1996 - Erkenntnis 44 (2):225-56.
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  40. added 2014-03-27
    Individualism, Individuation and That-Clauses.Martin Rechenauer - 1997 - Erkenntnis 46 (1):49-67.
    Brian Loar has argued that the well-known arguments against individualism in the philosophy of mind are insufficient because they rely on the assumption that that-clauses uniquely capture psychological content. He tried to show that this is not the use of that-clauses in philosophical psychology. I argue that he does not succeed in his argument. That-clauses sometimes capture psychological content, if our system of mental ascription is to be workable at all. I argue further that individualism tends to be at odds (...)
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  41. added 2014-03-26
    A Slim Book About Narrow Content. Gabriel M. A. Segal.S. E. Boer - 2001 - Mind 110 (440):1115-1119.
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  42. added 2014-03-24
    Narrow Content and Historical Accounts: Can Fodor Live Without Them?Kam-Yuen Cheng - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 27:101-113.
    Fodor’s Informational Semantics states that the content of a representation depends on the counterfactual relation between the representation and the represented. However, his theory suffers from the psychological explanation problem and the indeterminacy problem raised by twin cases. In response to these problems, Fodor has introduced narrow content and a mixed theory of content that combines a historical account with the counterfactual account. In The Elm and the Expert, he drops both of them for the reason that twin cases are (...)
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  43. added 2014-03-23
    Representation and Narrow Belief.Frank Jackson - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):99-112.
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  44. added 2014-03-23
    The Nature of Narrow Content.David J. Chalmers - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):46-66.
    A content of a subject's mental state is narrow when it is determined by the subject's intrinsic properties: that is, when any possible intrinsic duplicate of the subject has a corresponding mental state with the same content. A content of a subject's mental state is..
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  45. added 2014-03-22
    Relational Properties, Causal Powers and Psychological Laws.Sean Crawford - 2003 - Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):193-216.
    This paper argues that Twin Earth twins belong to the same psychological natural kind, but that the reason for this is not that the causal powers of mental states supervene on local neural structure. Fodor’s argument for this latter thesis is criticized and found to rest on a confusion between it and the claim that Putnamian and Burgean type relational psychological properties do not affect the causal powers of the mental states that have them. While it is true that Putnamian (...)
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  46. added 2014-03-22
    On the Explanatory Deficiencies of Linguistic Content.Bryan Frances - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 93 (1):45-75.
    The Burge-Putnam thought experiments have generated the thesis that beliefs are not fixed by the constitution of the body. However, many philosophers have thought that if this is true then there must be another content-like property. Even if the contents of our attitudes such as the one in ‘believes that aluminum is a light metal’, do not supervene on our physical makeups, nevertheless people who are physical duplicates must be the same when it comes to evaluating their rationality and explaining (...)
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  47. added 2014-03-21
    Broad Versus Narrow Content in the Explanation of Action: Fodor on Frege Cases.Jerome C. Wakefield - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (2):119-33.
    A major obstacle to formulating a broad-content intentional psychology is the occurrence of ''Frege cases'' - cases in which a person apparently believes or desires Fa but not Fb and acts accordingly, even though "a" and "b" have the same broad content. Frege cases seem to demand narrow-content distinctions to explain actions by the contents of beliefs and desires. Jerry Fodor ( The elm and the expert: Mentalese and its semantics , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994) argues that an explanatorily (...)
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  48. added 2014-03-18
    Cognitive Significance, Attitude Ascriptions, and Ways of Believing Propositions.David M. Braun - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):65-81.
    We use names to talk about objects. We use predicates to talk about properties and relations. We use sentences to attribute properties and relations to objects. We say things when we utter sentences, often things we believe.
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  49. added 2014-03-09
    The Primacy of the Subjective: Foundations for a Unified Theory of Mind and Language.Nicholas Georgalis - 2006 - Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
    In this highly original monograph, Nicholas Georgalis proposes that the concept of minimal content is fundamental both to the philosophy of mind and to the philosophy of language. He argues that to understand mind and language requires minimal content -- a narrow, first-person, non-phenomenal concept that represents the subject of an agent's intentional state as the agent conceives it. Orthodox third-person objective methodology must be supplemented with first-person subjective methodology. Georgalis demonstrates limitations of a strictly third-person methodology in the study (...)
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  50. added 2014-03-07
    Real Narrow Content.Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (3):304–328.
    The purpose of the present paper is to develop and defend an account of narrow content that would neutralize the commonplace charge that narrow content.
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