About this topic
Summary The project of naturalized epistemology is that of identifying a substantial and constructive role for the sciences in epistemological theorizing. One popular way to think about the continuity between the sciences and epistemology is in terms of how normative questions about how we ought to form our beliefs cannot be answered independently of descriptive questions about how we do form beliefs. Understood thus, the challenge for the naturalized epistemologist is to spell out in more detail the respective contribution by (traditional) epistemology and the sciences, and in particular the extent to which the latter is to replace or simply complement the former.
Key works The contemporary discussion regarding naturalized epistemology goes back to Quine 1969. For discussions of Quine, see Foley 1994Kim 1988, and Stich 1993. Major contributions to the project of naturalizing epistemology can be found in Goldman 1986Goldman 1992, Kornblith 2002, and Bishop & Trout 2004. For a helpful anthology, see Kornblith 1985.
Introductions Kornblith 1985 is a helpful collection of essays on naturalized epistemology. For a more recent overview of developments since Quine 1969, see Kornblith 2007.
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  1. Epistemology.Author unknown - manuscript
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  2. Permissibility of the Use of Empirical Sciences in Epistemology.Rezā Akbari - unknown - Kheradnameh Sadra Quarterly 42.
    The traditional approaches to epistemology are task-oriented and enjoy prescriptive aspects. They do not allow the employment of empirical sciences in epistemology. This is because they believe that such sciences lack any kind of prescriptive aspect and enjoy a descriptive nature. Some contemporary epistemological theoreticians, such as realist naturalists, believe that we have no choice but to employ empirical sciences in epistemology, for they provide us with a more accurate understanding of concepts such as justification and knowledge. It appears that (...)
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  3. Naturalizing Virtue Epistemology.Abrol Fairweather (ed.) - forthcoming - Synthese Library.
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  4. On Naturalizing the Epistemology of Mathematics.Stephen Foster - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
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  5. Review: Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment. [REVIEW]Alan Goldman - forthcoming - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  6. Skepticism, Fallibilism, and Rational Evaluation.Michael Hannon - forthcoming - In Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered.
    This paper outlines a new type of skepticism that is both compatible with fallibilism and supported by work in psychology. In particular, I will argue that we often cannot properly trust our ability to rationally evaluate reasons, arguments, and evidence (a fundamental knowledge-seeking faculty). We humans are just too cognitively impaired to achieve even fallible knowledge, at least for many beliefs.
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  7. Carl Stumpf, “Psychologie Und Erkenntnistheorie”.Jessica Leech & Mark Textor - forthcoming - Tandf: British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-36.
  8. Regularity and Certainty in Hume’s Treatise: A Humean Response to Husserl.Stefanie Rocknak - forthcoming - Synthese:1-22.
    According to Husserl, Hume’s empirical method was deeply flawed—like all empiricists, Hume did not, and could not adequately justify his method, much less his findings. Instead, Hume gives us a “circular” and “irrational” “psychological explanation” of “mediate judgments of fact,” i.e. of inductive inferences. Yet Husserl was certain that he could justify both his own method and his own findings with an appeal to the phenomenological, pre-theoretical, pre-naturalistic “epoché”. However, whether or not Husserl’s notion of an epoché is justified, or (...)
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  9. Can Psychology Be Relevant to Epistemology.H. Siegel - forthcoming - Philosophy of Education.
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  10. Stumpf Between Criticism and Psychologism: Introducing ‘Psychologie Und Erkenntnistheorie’.Mark Textor - forthcoming - Tandf: British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-9.
  11. The Neural and Cognitive Mechanisms of Knowledge Attribution: An EEG Study.Adam Michael Bricker - 2020 - Cognition 203:104412.
    Despite the ubiquity of knowledge attribution in human social cognition, its associated neural and cognitive mechanisms are poorly documented. A wealth of converging evidence in cognitive neuroscience has identified independent perspective-taking and inhibitory processes for belief attribution, but the extent to which these processes are shared by knowledge attribution isn't presently understood. Here, we present the findings of an EEG study designed to directly address this shortcoming. These findings suggest that belief attribution is not a component process in knowledge attribution, (...)
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  12. Verdad, creencias y fundacionalismo confiabilista.Miguel Cabrera Machado - 2020 - Revista de Filosofía 77:51-65.
    Las afirmaciones verdaderas reciben su justificación de creencias que tienen al conocimiento como base, por lo que para su formulación y comprensión se necesita asumir una posición fundacionalista. En este artículo se propone un fundacionalismo confiabilista, inspirado en Goldman, aunque con cambios importantes respecto a su teoría. A diferencia de Goldman, considero que no todas las creencias tienen que ser verdaderas, ni toda justificación de las creencias requiere de la verdad. Adicionalmente, las creencias verdaderas, expresadas mediante oraciones asertóricas, estarían fundadas (...)
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  13. Epistemic Value in the Subpersonal Vale.J. Adam Carter & Robert D. Rupert - 2020 - Synthese:1-30.
    A vexing problem in contemporary epistemology – one with origins in Plato’s Meno – concerns the value of knowledge, and in particular, whether and how the value of knowledge exceeds the value of mere (unknown) true opinion. The recent literature is deeply divided on the matter of how best to address the problem. One point, however, remains unquestioned: that if a solution is to be found, it will be at the personal level, the level at which states of subjects or (...)
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  14. DNAOS for KREMMS: A Distributed Platform for Knowledge Resource Entitlement, Modeling, Management, and Sharing.Andre Cusson - 2020 - Journal of Knowledge Structures and Systems 1 (1):117-133.
    This article is a knowledge technology case study of DNAOS, a distributed platform for Knowledge Resource Entitlement, Modeling, Management, and Sharing (KREMMS). Some historical aspects of its design, development, and release are briefly discussed, after which the DNAOS technology is commented upon from the specific viewpoint of KREMMS. At the core of this platform is the conception of knowledge as a natural phenomenon, which conception is reflected in the ontology of this technology: Fundamental knowledge structures and structuring principles, believed to (...)
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  15. Mysteriánství a dělba epistemické práce.Filip Tvrdý - 2020 - Filozofia 75 (8):693-705.
    Mysterianism has become a popular stance in philosophy of consciousness and other philosophical subdisciplines. The aim of this paper is to show that mysterianism is not justified, mainly because its inclination to epistemic defeatism and the misunderstanding of the division of epistemic labour. In the first part, I will present the history of mysterianism in the 19th and 20th century philosophy. Then, in the second part, I will point out how epistemic defeatism is founded in the unwarranted philosophical futurology. The (...)
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  16. El pragmatismo biológico de las creencias.Miguel Cabrera Machado - 2019 - Caracas: Amazon.
    La teleosemántica es una teoría teleológica de las representaciones mentales, propugnada por David Papineau, que tiene como propósito ofrecer una explicación naturalista y evolucionista de dichas representaciones, en particular de las creencias. Mi objetivo será analizar las creencias y su relación con la verdad en la obra de Papineau. Según Papineau, los contenidos y las representaciones mentales, específicamente las creencias, cumplen funciones derivadas de la evolución biológica de la especie, y correlativamente, la finalidad de las creencias y los contenidos proviene (...)
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  17. Amodal Completion and Knowledge.Grace Helton & Bence Nanay - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):415-423.
    Amodal completion is the representation of occluded parts of perceived objects. We argue for the following three claims: First, at least some amodal completion-involved experiences can ground knowledge about the occluded portions of perceived objects. Second, at least some instances of amodal completion-grounded knowledge are not sensitive, that is, it is not the case that in the nearest worlds in which the relevant claim is false, that claim is not believed true. Third, at least some instances of amodal completion-grounded knowledge (...)
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  18. The Study of Moral Revolutions as Naturalized Moral Epistemology.Dan Lowe - 2019 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 5 (2).
    I argue for the merits of studying historical moral revolutions to inform moral and political philosophy. Such a research program is not merely of empirical, historical interest but has normative implications. To explain why, I situate the proposal in the tradition of naturalized epistemology. As Alison M. Jaggar and other scholars have argued, a naturalistic approach is characteristic of much feminist philosophy. Accordingly, I argue that the study of moral revolutions would be especially fruitful for feminist moral and political philosophers.
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  19. Erkenntnistheorie – eine Inventur. [REVIEW]Nicola Mößner - 2019 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 67 (3):490-495.
    This is a review of Kuenzle, Dominique: Refurbishing Epistemology. A Meta-Epistemological Framework. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017.
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  20. Intellectualism and the Argument From Cognitive Science.Arieh Schwartz & Zoe Drayson - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (5):662-692.
    Intellectualism is the claim that practical knowledge or ‘know-how’ is a kind of propositional knowledge. The debate over Intellectualism has appealed to two different kinds of evidence, semantic and scientific. This paper concerns the relationship between Intellectualist arguments based on truth-conditional semantics of practical knowledge ascriptions, and anti-Intellectualist arguments based on cognitive science and propositional representation. The first half of the paper argues that the anti-Intellectualist argument from cognitive science rests on a naturalistic approach to metaphysics: its proponents assume that (...)
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  21. A Cognitive Perspective on Scientific Realism.Michael Vlerick - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (8):1157-1178.
    The debate about scientific realism is concerned with the relation between our scientific theories and the world. Scientific realists argue that our best theories or components of those theories correspond to the world. Anti-realists deny such a correspondence. Traditionally, this central issue in the philosophy of science has been approached by focusing on the theories themselves (e.g., by looking at theory change or the underlying experimental context). I propose a relatively unexplored way to approach this old debate. In addition to (...)
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  22. Feelings in Guts and Bones: Reply to Lewis, Magnus, and Strevens: Anjan Chakravartty: Scientific Ontology: Integrating Naturalized Metaphysics and Voluntarist Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017, 296pp, US$74.00 HB.Anjan Chakravartty - 2018 - Metascience 27 (3):379-387.
    In Scientific Ontology, I attempt to describe the nature of our investigations into what there is and associated theorizing in a way that respects the massive contributions of the sciences to this endeavor, and yet does not shy away from the fact that the endeavor itself is inescapably permeated by philosophical commitments. While my interest is first and foremost in what we can learn from the sciences about ontology, it quickly extends to issues that go well beyond scientific practices themselves, (...)
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  23. Epistemic Reductionism and the Moral-Epistemic Disparity.Chris Heathwood - 2018 - In Christos Kyriacou & Robin McKenna (eds.), Metaepistemology: Realism & Antirealism. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 45-70.
    In previous work, I defend the following disparity between moral and epistemic facts: whereas moral facts are irreducibly normative, epistemic facts – facts such as that some subject is epistemically justified in believing something – are reducible to facts from some other domain (such as facts about probabilities). This moral-epistemic disparity is significant because it undercuts an important kind of argument for robust moral realism. My defense of epistemic reductionism and of the moral-epistemic disparity has been criticized by Richard Rowland (...)
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  24. Induction and Epistemological Naturalism.Lars-Göran Johansson - 2018 - Philosophies 3 (4):31-0.
    Epistemological naturalists reject the demand for a priori justification of empirical knowledge; no such thing is possible. Observation reports, being the foundation of empirical knowledge, are neither justified by other sentences, nor certain; but they may be agreed upon as starting points for inductive reasoning and they function as implicit definitions of predicates used. Making inductive generalisations from observations is a basic habit among humans. We do that without justification, but we have strong intuitions that some inductive generalisations will fail, (...)
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  25. A Pluralistic Account of Epistemic Rationality.Matthew Kopec - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3571-3596.
    In this essay, I aim to motivate and defend a pluralistic view of epistemic rationality. At the core of the view is the notion that epistemic rationality is essentially a species of practical rationality put in the service of various epistemic goals. I begin by sketching some closely related views that have appeared in the literature. I then present my preferred version of the view and sketch some of its benefits. Thomas Kelly has raised challenging objections to a part of (...)
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  26. Naturalistic Descriptions of Knowledge.Kourken MIchaelian - 2018 - In M. Valaris & S. Hetherington (eds.), Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy. Bloomsbury.
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  27. Some Epistemic Roles for Curiosity.Dennis Whitcomb - 2018 - In Ilhan Inan, Lani Watson, Dennis Whitcomb & Safiye Yigit (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Curiosity. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 217-238.
    I start with a critical discussion of some attempts to ground epistemic normativity in curiosity. Then I develop three positive proposals. The first of these proposals is more or less purely philosophical; the second two reside at the interdisciplinary borderline between philosophy and psychology. The proposals are independent and rooted in different literatures. Readers uninterested in the first proposal (and the critical discussion preceding it) may nonetheless be interested in the second two proposals, and vice versa. -/- The proposals are (...)
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  28. Knowledge, Dexterity, and Attention: A Theory of Epistemic Agency.Abrol Fairweather & Carlos Montemayor - 2017 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Contemporary cognitive science clearly tells us that attention is modulated for speech and action. While these forms of goal-directed attention are very well researched in psychology, they have not been sufficiently studied by epistemologists. In this book, Abrol Fairweather and Carlos Montemayor develop and defend a theory of epistemic achievements that requires the manifestation of cognitive agency. They examine empirical work on the psychology of attention and assertion, and use it to ground a normative theory of epistemic achievements and virtues. (...)
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  29. Our Incorrigible Ontological Relations and Categories of Being.Julian M. Galvez Bunge (ed.) - 2017 - USA: Amazon.
    The purpose of this book is to address the controversial issues of whether we have a fixed set of ontological categories and if they have some epistemic value at all. Which are our ontological categories? What determines them? Do they play a role in cognition? If so, which? What do they force to presuppose regarding our world-view? If they constitute a limit to possible knowledge, up to what point is science possible? Does their study make of philosophy a science? Departing (...)
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  30. Two Paradigms for Religious Representation: The Physicist and the Playground.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2017 - Cognition 164:206-211.
    In an earlier issue, I argue (2014) that psychology and epistemology should distinguish religious credence from factual belief. These are distinct cognitive attitudes. Levy (2017) rejects this distinction, arguing that both religious and factual “beliefs” are subject to “shifting” on the basis of fluency and “intuitiveness.” Levy’s theory, however, (1) is out of keeping with much research in cognitive science of religion and (2) misrepresents the notion of factual belief employed in my theory. So his claims don’t undermine my distinction. (...)
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  31. Boarding Neurath's Boat: The Early Development of Quine's Naturalism.Sander Verhaegh - 2017 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (2):317-342.
    W. V. Quine is arguably the intellectual father of contemporary naturalism, the idea that there is no distinctively philosophical perspective on reality. Yet, even though Quine has always been a science-minded philosopher, he did not adopt a fully naturalistic perspective until the early 1950s. In this paper, I reconstruct the genesis of Quine’s ideas on the relation between science and philosophy. Scrutinizing his unpublished papers and notebooks, I examine Quine’s development in the first decades of his career. After identifying three (...)
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  32. Quine's ‘Needlessly Strong’ Holism.Sander Verhaegh - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 61:11-20.
    Quine is routinely perceived as having changed his mind about the scope of the Duhem-Quine thesis, shifting from what has been called an 'extreme holism' to a more moderate view. Where the Quine of 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' argues that “the unit of empirical significance is the whole of science” (1951, 42), the later Quine seems to back away from this “needlessly strong statement of holism” (1991, 393). In this paper, I show that the received view is incorrect. I distinguish (...)
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  33. A Naturalistic Epistemology: Selected PapersBy Hilary Kornblith.Giacomo Melis - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):397-399.
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  34. Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence Defended: Replies to McGrath, Pautz, and Neta.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):929-946.
    This paper defends and develops the capacity view against insightful critiques from Matt McGrath, Adam Pautz, and Ram Neta. In response to Matt McGrath, I show why capacities are essential and cannot simply be replaced with representational content. I argue moreover, that the asymmetry between the employment of perceptual capacities in the good and the bad case is sufficient to account for the epistemic force of perceptual states yielded by the employment of such capacities. In response to Adam Pautz, I (...)
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  35. A Pluralist Account of Knowledge as a Natural Kind.Andreas Stephens - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (3):1-19.
    In an attempt to address some long-standing issues of epistemology, Hilary Kornblith proposes that knowledge is a natural kind the identification of which is the unique responsibility of one particular science: cognitive ethology. As Kornblith sees it, the natural kind thus picked out is knowledge as construed by reliabilism. Yet the claim that cognitive ethology has this special role has not convinced all critics. The present article argues that knowledge plays a causal and explanatory role within many of our more (...)
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  36. There Is No Sensus Divinitatis.Hans van Eyghen - 2016 - Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 15 (45):24-40.
    Inspired by Alvin Plantinga, many philosophers of religion accept the existence of a sensus divinitatis, a cognitive mechanism that produces religious beliefs. In this paper I will argue that there are no good reasons to accept the existence of a sensus divinitatis and hence its existence should not be affirmed. Plantinga gives two arguments for its existence, one empirical and one from the nature of God. I will argue that the first argument fails because God’s nature makes it more likely (...)
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  37. Quelle naturalisation de l'esthétique du cinéma ?Hugo Clemot - 2015 - Nouvelle Revue d'Esthétique 2015 (15):111-119.
    Vincent Descombes nous a offert une mise au point historique et conceptuelle qu’on peut tenir pour incontournable sur la question de la naturalisation des Humanités. Ce texte vise à restituer certains éléments de cette contribution trop souvent méconnue et à la prolonger sur la question de la naturalisation de l’esthétique du cinéma, entendue au sens large comme philosophie de l’art cinématographique et comme philosophie de l’expérience esthétique.
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  38. Teleologies and the Methodology of Epistemology.Georgi Gardiner - 2015 - In David Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 31-45.
    The teleological approach to an epistemic concept investigates it by asking questions such as ‘what is the purpose of the concept?’, ‘What role has it played in the past?’, or ‘If we imagine a society without the concept, why would they feel the need to invent it?’ The idea behind the teleological approach is that examining the function of the concept illuminates the contours of the concept itself. This approach is a relatively new development in epistemology, and as yet there (...)
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  39. Interpretations of Quine’s “Naturalized Epistemology” and the Character of “Naturalization of Law”.Marek Jakubiec - 2015 - Semina Scientiarum 14:60-81.
    Quine’s project of “naturalized epistemology” is usually interpreted as a rejection of classical epistemology, which becomes merely a “chapter of psychology”. It does not imply, however, a different understanding of the character of naturalization is inadequate or wrong. Susan Haack’s interpretations are briefly analyzed in the paper. Thereafter, they are harnessed as models of interpretation of the “naturalization of law”. The main aim is to point the radical reading of Quine’s project is not the only acceptable one. Consequently, there are (...)
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  40. Metaphilosophical Naturalism and Naturalized Transcendentalism: Some Objections to Kaidesoja’s Critique of Transcendental Arguments in Critical Realism.Dustin McWherter - 2015 - Journal of Critical Realism 14 (1):54-79.
    This essay offers some fairly extensive objections to the critique of Bhaskar’s use of transcendental arguments found in chapter four of Tuukka Kaidesoja’s Naturalizing Critical Realist Social Ontology. The essay has three sections that correspond to three sets of objections, each of which centres around a certain topic in Kaidesoja’s critique. The first concerns Kaidesoja’s appeal to the connection between transcendental arguments and Kant’s transcendental idealism to criticize Bhaskar. The second concerns Kaidesoja’s problematization of a posteriori premises in Bhaskar’s transcendental (...)
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  41. Kvajnov naturalistički empirizam protiv epistemološkog nihilizma.Jelena Mijic - 2015 - Theoria: Beograd 58 (4):77-95.
    Cilj ovog rada je da razmotrimo zašto, i na koji način se Kvajn pozicionira između logičkih pozitivista i epistemoloških nihilista u pogledu shvatanja empirijskog svedočanstva. Naime, on će na nov način formulisati kriterijume opservacionalnosti s namerom da prevaziđe probleme koji su za logički pozitivizam bili nepremostivi, a da time ne žrtvuje objektivnost nauke poljuljanu krahom tradicionalnog pristupa epistemološkim pitanjima. Privučeni provokativnošću Kvajnovog istovremenog ispoljavanja radikalnih, ali i konzervativnih tendencija, odnosno namere da održi balans između stanovišta tradicionalne filozofije i epistemološkog nihilizma, (...)
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  42. Argumente für die naturaliste Erkenntnistheorie.Joshua Shepherd & Michael Bishop - 2015 - In Stefan Tolksdorf & Dirk Koppleberg (eds.), Erkenntnistheorie: Wie und Wozu? Mentis Publishers. pp. 245-274.
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  43. Are Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Really Self-Defeating?Fabio Sterpetti - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):877-889.
    Evolutionary Debunking Arguments are defined as arguments that appeal to the evolutionary genealogy of our beliefs to undermine their justification. Recently, Helen De Cruz and her co-authors supported the view that EDAs are self-defeating: if EDAs claim that human arguments are not justified, because the evolutionary origin of the beliefs which figure in such arguments undermines those beliefs, and EDAs themselves are human arguments, then EDAs are not justified, and we should not accept their conclusions about the fact that human (...)
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  44. Review of Michael Devitt's Putting Metaphysics First: Essays on Metaphysics and Epistemology. [REVIEW]Jussi Suikkanen - 2015 - Mind 124 (493):327-331.
    This is a review of Michael Devitt's collection of previously published articles entitled Putting Metaphysics First: Essays on Metaphysics and Epistemology. The review also suggests a new way of formulation the realism/anti-realism contrast on the basis of Devitt's work. This contrast is understood in terms explanatory priority: should we in a given domain begin our theorizing from metaphysics (realism) or semantics (anti-realism)?
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  45. Evolution and Epistemic Justification.Michael Vlerick & Alex Broadbent - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (2):185-203.
    According to the evolutionary sceptic, the fact that our cognitive faculties evolved radically undermines their reliability. A number of evolutionary epistemologists have sought to refute this kind of scepticism. This paper accepts the success of these attempts, yet argues that refuting the evolutionary sceptic is not enough to put any particular domain of beliefs – notably scientific beliefs, which include belief in Darwinian evolution – on a firm footing. The paper thus sets out to contribute to this positive justificatory project, (...)
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  46. Quine and the A Priori.Lars Bergström - 2014 - In Gilbert Harman & Ernie Lepore (eds.), A Companion to W. V. O. Quine. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 38–53.
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  47. Natural Selection Does Care About Truth.Maarten Boudry & Michael Vlerick - 2014 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (1):65-77.
    True beliefs are better guides to the world than false ones. This is the common-sense assumption that undergirds theorizing in evolutionary epistemology. According to Alvin Plantinga, however, evolution by natural selection does not care about truth: it cares only about fitness. If our cognitive faculties are the products of blind evolution, we have no reason to trust them, anytime or anywhere. Evolutionary naturalism, consequently, is a self-defeating position. Following up on earlier objections, we uncover three additional flaws in Plantinga's latest (...)
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  48. Relies to Our Critics.David Henderson & Terence Horgan - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):549-564.
    We respond to the central concerns raised by our commentators to our book, The Epistemological Spectrum. Casullo believes that our account of what we term “low-grade a priori” justification provides important clarification of a kind of philosophical reflection. However he objects to calling such reflection a priori. We explain what we think is at stake. Along the way, we comment on his idea of that there may be an epistemic payoff to making a distinction between assumptions and presumptions. In the (...)
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  49. A Naturalistic Epistemology: Selected Papers.Hilary Kornblith - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    This volume draws together influential work by Hilary Kornblith on naturalistic epistemology. This approach sees epistemology not as conceptual analysis, but as an explanatory project constrained and informed by work in cognitive science. These essays expound and defend Kornblith's distinctive view of how we come to have knowledge of the world.
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  50. The Epistemological Import of Morphological Content.Jack C. Lyons - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):537-547.
    Morphological content (MC) is content that is implicit in the standing structure of the cognitive system. Henderson and Horgan claim that MC plays a distinctive epistemological role unrecognized by traditional epistemic theories. I consider the possibilities that MC plays this role either in central cognition or in peripheral modules. I argue that the peripheral MC does not play an interesting epistemological role and that the central MC is already recognized by traditional theories.
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