This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories

130 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 130
  1. Mental Representation.Frederick R. Adams - 2002 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  2. Defending Non-Derived Content.Kenneth Aizawa & Frederick R. Adams - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669.
    In ‘‘The Myth of Original Intentionality,’’ Daniel Dennett appears to want to argue for four claims involving the familiar distinction between original (or underived) and derived intentionality.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  3. Nietzsche, Naturalism, and the Tenacity of the Intentional.Mark Alfano - 2013 - Journal of Nietzsche Studies 44 (3):457-464.
    In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche demands that “psychology shall be<br>recognized again as the queen of the sciences.” While one might cast a dubious glance at the “again,” many of Nietzsche’s insights were indeed psychological, and many of his arguments invoke psychological premises. In Genealogy, he criticizes the “English psychologists” for the “inherent psychological absurdity” of their theory of the origin of good and bad, pointing out the implausibility of the claim that the utility of unegoistic<br>actions would be forgotten. Tabling (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. The Tenacity of the Intentional Prior to the Genealogy.Mark Alfano - 2010 - Journal of Nietzsche Studies 40:29-46.
    I have argued elsewhere that the psychological aspects of Nietzsche’s later works are best understood from a psychodynamic point of view. Nietzsche holds a view I dubbed the tenacity of the intentional (T): when an intentional state loses its object, a new object replaces the original; the state does not disappear entirely. In this essay I amend and clarify (T) to (T``): When an intentional state with a sub-propositional object loses its object, the affective component of the state persists without (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  5. The Inessential Quasi-Indexical.Peter Alward - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):235 - 255.
    In this paper, I argue, contra Perry, that the existence of locating beliefs does not require the abandonment of the analysis of belief as a relation between subjects and propositions. I argue that what the "problem of the essential indexical" reveals is that a complete explanation of behaviour requires both an explanation of the type of behaviour the agent engaged in and an explanation of why she engaged in it in the circumstances that she did. And I develop an account (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. How to Argue Against (Some) Theories of Content.Michael V. Antony - 2006 - Iyyun 55 (July):265-286.
    An argument is offered against three naturalistic theories of intentional content: causal-covariation theories, teleological theories, and certain versions of conceptual role semantics. The strategy involves focusing on a normative problem regarding the practice of associating content expressions (e.g., that-clauses) with internal entities (states, symbol structures, etc.). The problem can be expressed thus: Which content expressions are the right ones to associate with internal entities? I argue, first, that an empirical solution to this problem—what I call the Normative Problem—will follow naturally (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Intentionality, Consciousness and Intentional Relations: From Constitutive Phenomenology to Cognitive Science.John Barresi - 2004 - In L. Embree (ed.), Gurwitsch's Relevance for Cognitive Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 79--93.
    In this chapter I look closely at the intentionality of consciousness from a naturalistic perspective. I begin with a consideration of Gurwitsch's suggestive ideas about the role of acts of consciousness in constituting both the objects and the subjects of consciousness. I turn next to a discussion of how these ideas relate to my own empirical approach to intentional relations seen from a developmental perspective. This is followed by a discussion of some recent ideas in philosophical cognitive science on the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. The Real Trouble with Intentionality.Wolfgang Barz - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (2):79 – 92.
    I argue that the project of naturalizing intentionality is misconceived. Intentionality should not be considered as a challenge to our naturalistic world-view, but rather as something which gives rise to a logical problem: how to save the principle of indiscernibility of identicals from apparent counterexamples arising from intensional discourse.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Naturalisierung der Intentionalität.Wolfgang Barz - 2006 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 54 (2):189-200.
    Der Beitrag versucht zu zeigen, dass Intentionalität nicht deshalb problematisch ist, weil sie unser naturalistisches Weltbild herausfordert, sondern deshalb, weil sie gegen gewisse logische Intuitionen zu verstoßen scheint, und dass die angemessene Reaktion auf dieses Problem nicht darin besteht, über die physikalische Realisierung intentionaler mentaler Zustände, sondern über die logische Form intensionaler Sätze nachzudenken. Als Zeuge führt der Autor Fred Dretske an, dessen Analyse der Intentionalität sich bei näherem Hinsehen als naturalistisch verbrämte Theorie der logischen Form intensionaler Sätze herausstellt.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. The Pragmatic Psyche.Radu J. Bogdan - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):157-158.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Content and Justification: Philosophical Papers.A. Boghossian Paul - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    This volume presents a series of influential essays by Paul Boghossian on the theory of content and on its relation to the phenomenon of a priori knowledge. The essays are organized under four headings: the nature of content; content and self-knowledge; knowledge, content, and the a priori; and colour concepts.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  12. Is Thought a Symbolic Process?Laurence BonJour - 1991 - Synthese 89 (3):331-52.
  13. The Representation Of Knowledge And Belief.Myles Brand (ed.) - 1986 - Tucson: University Of Arizona Press.
  14. Navigating Beyond “Here & Now” Affordances—on Sensorimotor Maturation and “False Belief” Performance.Maria Brincker - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
    How and when do we learn to understand other people’s perspectives and possibly divergent beliefs? This question has elicited much theoretical and empirical research. A puzzling finding has been that toddlers perform well on so-called implicit false belief (FB) tasks but do not show such capacities on traditional explicit FB tasks. I propose a navigational approach, which offers a hitherto ignored way of making sense of the seemingly contradictory results. The proposal involves a distinction between how we navigate FBs as (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  15. Fodor's New Theory of Content and Computation.Andrew Brook & Robert J. Stainton - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (3-4):459-74.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16. An Argument Against Causal Theories of Mental Content.Todd Buras - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):117-129.
    Some mental states are about themselves. Nothing is a cause of itself. So some mental states are not about their causes; they are about things distinct from their causes. If this argument is sound, it spells trouble for causal theories of mental content—the precise sort of trouble depending on the precise sort of causal theory. This paper shows that the argument is sound (§§1-3), and then spells out the trouble (§4).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  17. Doxastic Desire and Attitudinal Monism.Douglas I. Campbell - forthcoming - Synthese:1-23.
    How many attitudes must be posited at the level of reductive bedrock in order to reductively explain all the rest? Motivational Humeans hold that at least two attitudes are indispensable, belief and desire. Desire-As-Belief theorists beg to differ. They hold that the belief attitude can do the all the work the desire attitude is supposed to do, because desires are in fact nothing but beliefs of a certain kind. If this is correct it has major implications both for the philosophy (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Principles of Mental Representation.Donal E. Carlston & Eliot R. Smith - 1996 - In E. E. Higgins & A. Kruglanski (eds.), Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles. Guilford. pp. 184--210.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Stalking the Wild Epistemic Engine.Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland - 1983 - Noûs 17 (March):5-18.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   41 citations  
  20. Philosophy of Mental Representation.Hugh Clapin (ed.) - 2002 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Five leading figures in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science debate the central topic of mental representation. Each author's contribution is specially written for this volume, and then collectively discussed by the others. The editor frames the discussions and provides a way into the debates for new readers. An exciting feature of this collection is the transcribed discussion among all the contributors following each exchange. This is the latest thinking on mental representation carefully and critically analysed by the leading (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  21. Being Clear on Content - Commentary on Hutto and Satne.Dimitri Coelho Mollo - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):687-699.
    In the target article Hutto and Satne propose a new approach to studying mental content. Although I believe there is much to commend in their proposal, I argue that it makes no space for a kind of content that is of central importance to cognitive science, and which need not be involved in beliefs and desires: I will use the expression ‘representational content’ to refer to it. Neglecting representational content leads to an undue limitation of the contribution that the neo-Cartesian (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. The Nature and Implementation of Representation in Biological Systems.Mike Collins - 2009 - Dissertation, City University of New York
    I defend a theory of mental representation that satisfies naturalistic constraints. Briefly, we begin by distinguishing (i) what makes something a representation from (ii) given that a thing is a representation, what determines what it represents. Representations are states of biological organisms, so we should expect a unified theoretical framework for explaining both what it is to be a representation as well as what it is to be a heart or a kidney. I follow Millikan in explaining (i) in terms (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Interpretational Semantics.Robert Cummins - 1994 - In Steven P. Stitch & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), mental representation: a reader. Blackwell.
    This is a condensed version of the material in chapters 8-10 in Meaning and Mental Representation (MIT, 1989). It is an explanation and defence of a theory of content for the mind considered as a symbolic computational process. It is a view i abandoned shortly thereafter when I abandoned symbolic computatioalism as a viable theory of cognition.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  24. Haugeland on Representation and Intentionality.Robert C. Cummins - 2002 - In Hugh Clapin (ed.), Philosophy of Mental Representation. Oxford University Press.
    Haugeland doesn’t have what I would call a theory of mental representation. Indeed, it isn’t clear that he believes there is such a thing. But he does have a theory of intentionality and a correlative theory of objectivity, and it is this material that I will be discussing in what follows. It will facilitate the discussion that follows to have at hand some distinctions and accompanying terminology I introduced in Representations, Targets and Attitudes (Cummins, 1996; RTA hereafter). Couching the discussion (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Reply to Millikan.Robert C. Cummins - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):113-127.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  26. Representations, Targets, and Attitudes.Robert C. Cummins - 1996 - MIT Press.
    "This is an important new Cummins work.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   59 citations  
  27. Meaning and Mental Representation.Robert C. Cummins - 1989 - MIT Press.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   192 citations  
  28. Representation and Indication.Robert C. Cummins & Pierre Poirier - 2004 - In Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind. Elsevier. pp. 21--40.
    This paper is about two kinds of mental content and how they are related. We are going to call them representation and indication. We will begin with a rough characterization of each. The differences, and why they matter, will, hopefully, become clearer as the paper proceeds.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  29. Philosophy of Mental Representation.Daniel C. Dennett - 2002 - Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  30. Intentionality.Daniel C. Dennett - 2001 - In Richard L. Gregory (ed.), Southwestern Journal of Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 139-143.
    Intentionality is _aboutness_. Some things are about other things: a belief can be about icebergs, but an iceberg is not about anything; an idea can be about the number 7, but the number 7 is not about anything; a book or a film can be about Paris, but Paris is not about anything. Philosophers have long been concerned with the analysis of the phenomenon of intentionality, which has seemed to many to be a fundamental feature of mental states and events.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  31. Ways of Establishing Harmony.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  32. Granny's Campaign for Safe Science.Daniel C. Dennett - 1990 - In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.
    What do these various heresies have in common? From Fodor's point of view, two things, obviously: (1) they are all wrong, wrong, wrong! and (2) they are endorsed by people who are otherwise quite decent company. That would be thread enough to tie Fodor's targets together if he were right, but as one who finds more than a morsel of truth in each of the derided doctrines, I must seek elsewhere for a uniting principle, and I think I have found (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Naturalistic Representation. [REVIEW]Michael Devitt - 1991 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (3):425-443.
  34. More on the Interactive Indexing Semantic Theory.John Dilworth - 2010 - Minds and Machines 20 (3):455-474.
    This article further explains and develops a recent, comprehensive semantic naturalization theory, namely the interactive indexing (II) theory as described in my 2008 Minds and Machines article Semantic Naturalization via Interactive Perceptual Causality (Vol. 18, pp. 527–546). Folk views postulate a concrete intentional relation between cognitive states and the worldly states they are about. The II theory eliminates any such concrete intentionality, replacing it with purely causal relations based on the interactive theory of perception. But intentionality is preserved via purely (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Realistic Virtual Reality and Perception.John Dilworth - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):23-42.
    Realistic uses of Virtual Reality technology closely integrate user training on virtual objects with VR-assisted user interactions with real objects. This paper shows how the Interactive Theory of Perception may be extended to cover such cases. Virtual objects are explained as concrete models that have an inner generation mechanism, and the ITP is used to explain how VR users can both perceive such local CMs, and perceptually represent remote real objects. Also, concepts of modeling and representation are distinguished. The paper (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  36. Semantics Naturalized: Propositional Indexing Plus Interactive Perception.John Dilworth - 2009 - Language and Communication 29 (1):1-25.
    A concrete proposal is presented as to how semantics should be naturalized. Rather than attempting to naturalize propositions, they are treated as abstract entities that index concrete cognitive states. In turn the relevant concrete cognitive states are identified via perceptual classifications of worldly states, with the aid of an interactive theory of perception. The approach enables a broadly realist theory of propositions, truth and cognitive states to be preserved, with propositions functioning much as abstract mathematical constructs do in the nonsemantic (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  37. Semantic Naturalization Via Interactive Perceptual Causality.John Dilworth - 2008 - Minds and Machines 18 (4):527-546.
    A novel semantic naturalization program is proposed. Its three main differences from informational semantics approaches are as follows. First, it makes use of a perceptually based, four-factor interactive causal relation in place of a simple nomic covariance relation. Second, it does not attempt to globally naturalize all semantic concepts, but instead it appeals to a broadly realist interpretation of natural science, in which the concept of propositional truth is off-limits to naturalization attempts. And third, it treats all semantic concepts as (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  38. A Naturalistic, Reflexive Dispositional Approach to Perception.John Dilworth - 2005 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):583-601.
    This paper will investigate the basic question of the nature of perception, as theoretically approached from a purely naturalistic standpoint. An adequate theory must not only have clear application to a world full of pre-existing biological examples of perception of all kinds, from unicellular perception to conscious human perception, but it must also satisfy a series of theoretical or philosophical constraints, as enumerated and discussed in Section 1 below. A perceptual theory invoking _reflexive dispositions_--that is, dispositions directed toward the very (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  39. Perceptual Causality Problems Reflexively Resolved.John Dilworth - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (3):11-31.
    Causal theories of perception typically have problems in explaining deviant causal chains. They also have difficulty with other unusual putative cases of perception involving prosthetic aids, defective perception, scientifically extended cases of perception, and so on. But I show how a more adequate reflexive causal theory, in which objects or properties X cause a perceiver to acquire X-related dispositions toward that very same item X, can provide a plausible and principled perceptual explanation of all of these kinds of cases. A (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  40. The Reflexive Theory of Perception.John Dilworth - 2005 - Behavior and Philosophy 33 (1):17-40.
    ABSTRACT: The Reflexive Theory of Perception (RTP) claims that perception of an object or property X by an organism Z consists in Z being caused by X to acquire some disposition D toward X itself. This broadly behavioral perceptual theory explains perceptual intentionality and correct versus incorrect, plus successful versus unsuccessful, perception in a plausible evolutionary framework. The theory also undermines cognitive and perceptual modularity assumptions, including informational or purely epistemic views of perception in that, according to the RTP, any (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  41. Naturalized Perception Without Information.John Dilworth - 2004 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (4):349-368.
    The outlines of a novel, fully naturalistic theory of perception are provided, that can explain perception of an object X by organism Z in terms of reflexive causality. On the reflexive view proposed, organism Z perceives object or property X just in case X causes Z to acquire causal dispositions reflexively directed back upon X itself. This broadly functionalist theory is potentially capable of explaining both perceptual representation and perceptual content in purely causal terms, making no use of informational concepts. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  42. Aspects of Cognitive Representation.Fred Dretske - 1986 - In Myles Brand & Robert M. Harnish (eds.), The Representation of Knowledge and Belief. University of Arizona Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  43. Aworld Withoutmind: Comments on Terence Horgan's “Naturalism and Intentionality”.Frances Egan - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):327 - 338.
  44. How Neurons Mean: A Neurocomputational Theory of Representational Content.Chris Eliasmith - 2000 - Dissertation, Washington University in St. Louis
    Questions concerning the nature of representation and what representations are about have been a staple of Western philosophy since Aristotle. Recently, these same questions have begun to concern neuroscientists, who have developed new techniques and theories for understanding how the locus of neurobiological representation, the brain, operates. My dissertation draws on philosophy and neuroscience to develop a novel theory of representational content.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  45. Material and Mental Representation.Lars Elleström - 2014 - American Journal of Semiotics 30 (1/2):83-138.
    The aim of this article is to adapt Peirce’s semiotics to the study of media and arts. While some Peircean notions are criticized and rejected, constructive ways of understanding Peirce’s ideas are suggested, and a number of new notions, which are intended to highlight crucial aspects of semiosis, are then introduced. All these ideas and notions are systematically related to one another within the frames of a consistent terminology. The article starts with an investigation of Peirce’s three sign constituents and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  46. The Open-Endedness Objection Against Sophisticated Dispositionalism.Sergio Farias de SouzaFilho - 2014 - Perspectiva Filosófica 41 (1):49-56.
    Sophisticated dispositionalism proposes a naturalist reduction of mental content by claiming that the semantic content of a mental symbol is determined by the causes of the occurrence of this symbol under ideal conditions, i.e., conditions under which only the referent of a symbol can cause its tokening. However, Paul Boghossian developed the open-endedness objection in order to show that it is not possible to specify these ideal conditions in non-semantic terms, entailing that the naturalist reduction of mental content proposed by (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content.Hartry Field - 1994 - Mind 103 (411):249-285.
  48. Mental Representation.Hartry Field - 1978 - Erkenntnis 13 (July):9-61.
  49. Verbs and Minds.Carrie Figdor - 2014 - In Mark Sprevak Jesper Kallestrup (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind.
    I introduce and defend verbialism, a metaphysical framework appropriate for accommodating the mind within the natural sciences and the mechanistic model of explanation that ties the natural sciences together. Verbialism is the view that mental phenomena belong in the basic ontological category of activities. If mind is what brain does, then explaining the mind is explaining how it occurs, and the ontology of mind is verbialist -- at least, it ought to be. I motivate verbialism by revealing a kind of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. Representational Content and the Keys to Success.Justin Fisher - unknown
    I consider the question of whether success-linked theories of content – theories like those of Ramsey (1927), Millikan (1984) and Blackburn (2005) which take there to be a definitional link between representational content and behavioral success – are consistent with the plausible claim that we can use content-attributions to explain behavioral success. Peter Godfrey-Smith (1996) argues that success-linked theories of content are too closely linked to success to be able to explain it. Against this, I present a plausible account of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 130