Neoplatonists

Refutes the often-held view that Proclus - in line with other Neoplatonists - adheres to the idea of an essential harmony between Plato and Aristotle. Enables a reassessment of the reception and authority of Aristotle in late antiquity, a crucial period for the transmission of Aristotelian thought.

The second edition of the first English translation of the complete works of Plotinus in one volume in seventy years. Led by Lloyd P. Gerson, a team of experts present up-to-date translations which are based on the best available text, the edition minor of Henry and Schwyzer and its corrections.

In a series of specially commissioned essays, an international team of scholars examine both Platonism's metaphysical principles (the One or the Form of the Good and the Indefinite Dyad: the principles that account for unity and multiplicity) and the tradition's role as a source for ethical and political principles. In honor of Lloyd Gerson's remarkable contribution to Platonic scholarship, the full breadth of the tradition has been explored: from Plato's own manipulation of the wisdom that preceded him via his students (...) in the Old Academy, Speusippus and Aristotle, and on to the Middle Platonic (Alcinous) and Neoplatonic (Plotinus, Proclus, Damascius) phases. An extensive section on Christian Platonism examines the Platonic appropriations of Cyril of Alexandria, as well as the great mediator of Plato in the Latin West, Marsilio Ficino, while the volume traces the influence of Platonic principles up to Heidegger. Key topics in this volume include time and eternity, the origin of evil, the planetary orbits, the status of nature, and theurgy. This Festschrift includes Gerson's intellectual autobiography in the light of Platonic principles, particularly as a justification for libertarianism. (shrink)

Plotinus (AD 205-270) was the founder of Neoplatonism, whose thought has had a profound influence on medieval philosophy, and on Western philosophy more broadly. In this engaging book, Eyjólfur K. Emilsson introduces and explains the full spectrum of Plotinus' philosophy for those coming to his work for the first time. Beginning with a chapter-length overview of Plotinus' life and works which also assesses the Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic traditions that influenced him, Emilsson goes on to address key topics including: Plotinus' (...) originality the status of souls Plotinus' language the notion of the One or the Good intellect, including Plotinus' holism the physical world the soul and the body, including emotions and the self Plotinus' ethics Plotinus' influence and legacy. This second edition has been revised and updated throughout, and includes a new chapter on badness, freedom, providence and responsibility. Also including a chronology, glossary of terms, and suggestions for further reading, Plotinus is an ideal introduction to this major figure in Western philosophy, and essential reading for students of ancient philosophy and classics. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to examine and compare the use of the concept and image of divine Sophia in the works of Philo, the great Jewish scholar from Alexandria, and Origen, who was raised in the same city two centuries later and certainly read Philo’s texts in detail. Both authors describe two different aspects or phases of Wisdom: one that is more divine and transcendent, and the other that is closely related to creation. Our analysis of this twofold (...) orientation of Sophia will be eminently philosophical, since what interests us is to show how both authors apply logical and metaphysical principles from their contemporary Greek schools to divine Wisdom, while at the same time creating an original conception beyond those influences. The main hypothesis is that, when judged against Philo's thought and the Platonic and Neo-Pythagorean categories of Absolute (τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτό) and Relative (τὸ πρός τι), Origen’s notion of Sophia reveals unexplored and fundamental aspects of his Trinitarian doctrine and opens new questions for future research. In particular, the immanent relation between the Father and the Son may be conceived as a full and absolute unity, although not as an identity of essence or consubstantiality ‒according to later Nicene orthodoxy‒ but as a unique sort of Absolute-Relative. (shrink)

This chapter shows that Augustine’s “divine illumination theory of knowledge” is merely his belief that the human mind is capable of intellectual cognition because it naturally “participates” in the Divine Mind, as its image. Consequently, Bonaventure's and Gilson's claim that Augustine thought the human mind must be enlightened by special divine assistance in ordinary (non-mystical) intellectual cognition is erroneous. That is true of the whole of Augustine's writing career: earlier works such as On the Teacher and the Confessions agree with (...) his presentation in On the Trinity 12. This resolution of a long-standing debate about how to interpret Augustine becomes possible when we pay careful attention to the ancient philosophical problems “illumination” is meant to resolve, and when we use Plotinus and the early Christian Neoplatonist Marius Victorinus to interpret his vocabulary and claims. The recovery of this late antique context greatly clarifies Augustine’s epistemological theory and reveals its explanatory power. For the Plotinian basis of the account is a synthesis of Aristotelian and Platonic elements that can explain why our minds are uniquely suited to abstracting intelligibility from sensory data, and how they do so. (shrink)

In the Consolation of Philosophy, Lady Philosophy leads Boethius through a series of obstacles that prevent him from finding happiness within his prison cell: the role that luck and misfortune play in our affairs, the false paths to happiness in comparison with the true journey, the problem of evil and the disproportion between people’s lives and eschatological deserts, and, finally, whether God’s providential order necessitates our outcomes or if we can choose freely to pursue the happy life. As the pair (...) discuss each problem, the same argumentative move and countermove play out. Boethius, forgetful of what he had learned from Philosophy long ago on account of his grief, blames the very nature of reality itself for each of the problems that beset him. He thinks that Fortune has taken from him all that is good and that God’s providence only extends to the non-human world. Philosophy, by contrast, argues in each case that the problem at hand is, in fact, no problem at all when we see reality rightly. In each case, Philosophy shows that it isn’t reality that’s to blame for the problem at hand but instead human ignorance’s misunderstanding of the true nature of reality. Boethius’s conversation with Philosophy showcases a puzzling feature of self-knowledge: on the one hand, too much attention to the world (e.g., fortune’s wiles) is the problem and self-inquiry (e.g., the nature of one’s desires) is the solution, but on the other hand, too much attention to one’s self (e.g., attention to passions and limitations) is the problem and turning toward recognizing the true structure of the world is the solution. Philosophy seems to indicate that both poles are true, and the task is to determine how best to clarify how. After showcasing the dialogue’s argumentative pattern, I argue that, in Boethius’s case, each of his problems, as well as his misery in general, are caused by his ignorance and self-deception. Boethius’s ignorance is, in this case, the more proximate cause of his misery, but underlying his ignorance is an act of self-deception that causes him to be ignorant in the first place. As Philosophy tells Boethius early on, he already knows what she plans to teach him (more accurately, of what she plans to remind him). Nevertheless, he has forgotten what he has known and, as a result, is more the architect of his own misery than is Fortune or any of the events that have befallen him. Wounded by grief, he has allowed his affective response to his misfortune to becloud his understanding. As Philosophy says, he is unhappy because he has “forgotten what he is.” He has forgotten himself precisely because of the way in which he has allowed his affective responses to rule in his soul. Hence, while the ultimate cure for Boethius’s misery will be a newly rediscovered knowledge that reality itself is providentially structured, Philosophy must begin by soothing Boethius’s passions and undoing the damage that they have wrought on his understanding of the world. Philosophy cannot turn Boethius’s intellect until she has first turned his passions (cf. Republic 518b-d), which, while still wrongly-turned and governing the soul, are liable to lead to tremendous intellectual mistakes precisely because they are blind to the true nature of reality (cf. Phaedrus 247c). I argue in conclusion that the Consolation is unified by the theme of self-deception as the primary cause of philosophical misery. Boethius is upset primarily because he has convinced himself that he is otherwise than he is and that reality is otherwise than it is rather than because of what has happened to him, contrary to his own view of things. Philosophy’s argumentative strategy suggests that self-deception can only be undone by attending to it as a problem besetting the whole soul, not just the intellectual part of the soul. We thus have good warrant for thinking that simply rational responses to ignorance will be fruitless when ignorance is caused by or accompanied by a moral failing. (shrink)

The papers in this anthology, are collected from the papers given at the 20th annual conference of the International Society for Neoplatonic Studies in Catania, Sicily. The authors of the twenty chapters of this anthology cover a wide range of topics and of philosophers, including Plato, Plotinus, Iamblichus, the Emperor Julian, Hierocles, Proclus, Syrianus, Olympiodorus, Boethius, Albertus Magnus, Catherine of Genoa, Robert Grosseteste , and Carl Jung. -/- Edited by R. Loredana Cardullo, John F. Finamore and Chiara Militello. Other contributors: (...) Michele Abbate, Ryan M. Brown, Claudia Lo Casto, Jean-Michel Charrue, Piera De Piano, Kevin Corrigan, Paula Pico Estrada, Camille Guigon, Maja Kaleziæ, Tamar Khubulava, Marios Koutsoukos, Bruce MacLennan, Donka Markus, Aurelia Maruggi, Tomáš Nejeschleba, Ina Schall, Marcin Trepczyñski, Sergey Trostyanskiy. (shrink)

In Ennead I.8 Plotinus argues that evil is not intrinsic to the soul; the treatise includes an account of the metaphysical status of matter and a nuanced presentation of the way in which matter and the soul can together be responsible for moral evil.

Within a broadly Thomistic frame, this paper shows how simple apophaticism in the theology of Pseudo‐Dionysius the Areopagite is the more fitting mode of knowing the triune God, beyond the use of all divine names. Specifically, we will proceed using the work of Father Bernard Lonergan, SJ on theological fittingness. After setting forth Father Lonergan's understanding of fittingness, the paper will proceed through Dionysius's cataphatic names, apophatic names, and apophatic silence. The cataphatic and apophatic names, while true, useful, and fittingly (...) said of God, will be shown to be imperfectly applied to God. As such, their fittingness pales in comparison to the simple silence of the intellect orientated towards God, despite such pure apophaticism's dissimilarity to normal human intellectual operations. (shrink)

This book traces, for the first time, a revolution in philosophy which took place during the early centuries of our era. It reconstructs the philosophical basis of the Stoics' theory that fragments of an ancient and divine wisdom could be reconstructed from mythological traditions, and shows that Platonism was founded on an argument that Plato had himself achieved a full reconstruction of this wisdom, and that subsequent philosophies had only regressed once again in their attempts to 'improve' on his achievement. (...) The significance of this development is highlighted through parallel studies of the Hellenistic debate over the status of Jewish culture; and of the philosophical beginnings of Christianity, where the notions of 'orthodoxy' and 'heresy' in particular are shown to be tools in the construction of a unified history of Christian philosophy stretching back to primitive antiquity. (shrink)

The Neoplatonic philosopher Plotinus invites us to take part in his philosophizing when he encourages his readers to think about what they think they are, as living beings, human beings, as rational beings, ethical subjects and as philosophers. He is interested in what we say about ourselves in ordinary language and notices that such ordinary experience conflicts with what the Platonic tradition claims we (truly) are. This conflict does not lead him to turn away from the human terms and expressions, (...) but impels him to take seriously what we say about ourselves and to explain it philosophically. (shrink)

In 2021, a previously unknown treatise by Porphyry of Tyre, which has been preserved in a Syriac translation, was made available to historians of philosophy: Porphyry, On Principles and Matter (De Gruyter, 2021). This text not only enlarges our knowledge of the legacy of the most prominent disciple of Plotinus but also serves as an important witness to Platonist discussions of first principles and of Plato's concept of prime matter in the Timaeus. The aim of the present volume of collected (...) studies is two-fold. On the one hand, it brings up an update to the state of the art of our knowledge of Porphyry's philosophy and of his role in the transmission of the earlier philosophical materials, especially those of the Middle Platonic works. On the other hand, it focuses on the questions of the reception of Porphyry's legacy, both by Greek and Latin Platonists (with special interest in Calcidius) and by Christian Oriental authors (with particular focus on the Syriac tradition). The primary audience of the book will be scholars and graduate students in ancient and late ancient Greek philosophy, Orientalists and scholars interested in the Christian reception of Greek philosophy, in the studies of the Christian Orient, as well as in Greek, Latin, and Syriac philology. (shrink)

I argue that in his commentary on Epictetus’ Encheiridion, Simplicius derives a method by which his students can enter into the process of self-constitution, which is only achieved through completion of the study of Plato’s dialogues. The result of following the method is the attainment of a perspective consonant with the level of political virtue, which I call ‘political subjectivity’. This is a speculative interpretation of the effect the student would. experience in following the method, accomplished through analyses of Simplicius’ (...) interpretation of Epictetus’ concept of to eph’ hēmīn and the related prohairesis. I complement this with an analysis of the metaphysical foundation Simplicius gives the method in light of Charles Taylor’s notion of ‘strong evaluation’. In this way, I show how Simplicius adapts these concepts to his Neoplatonic psychology and virtue theory to make the method serve as preparation for the development of virtue prior to study of Plato. (shrink)

Part of the material contained in the present book was presented in the form of a lecture course given by me at the University of Oxford in I962 as a Fulbright Senior Lecturer. Scripps College and the Claremont Graduate School contributed to the cost of research and publication. The staff of the Honnold Library, Claremont, California, was extremely obliging in matters concerning inter-library loans. The page proofs were read in part by Professor Richard Walzer, the University of Oxford. Mr. Salih (...) Alich, Blaisdell Institute, Claremont, California, corrected many errors occurring in the transliteration from Arabic in Section V. To all these institutions and persons I express my most sincere thanks. The manuscript was essentially completed early in I960. Scripps College, Claremont, California. TABLES OF CONTENTS I GENERAL I Introduction 1-3 II Three neoaristotelian and neoplatonic concepts: mono­ psychism, mysticism, metaconsciousness III Three A verroistic problems I Collective immortality and collective perfection in A verroes and Dante 2 Ecstatic conjunction, death, and immortality in the individual 102 94- 3 The double truth theory and the problem of per­ sonal immortality in A verroes 102-II3 IV Collective consciousness, double consciousness, and metaconsciousness (unconscious consciousness) in Kant and some post-Kantians 114-137 V Select bibliography of translations of philosophical works by al-Kindi, al-Farabi, Avicenna, ibn-Bagga, and Averroes 138-150 VI Index of names 151-154 11 ANALYTICAL OF SECTION 11 I The starting point: Plotinus, Enn. V 1. Plotinus' principle l)'rL oux ~~c. u VOU 't"oc V01)'t"CX. (shrink)

My aim in this book is to formulate a comparativist, Buddhist-Neoplatonic interpretation of the idea of “logos” in the Prologue to the Gospel according to John. I proceed in three steps. I begin with Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of emptiness. Nāgārjuna thinks that that all things are empty because they depend on causes and conditions in a way that makes it impossible for them to genuinely exist. Nevertheless, they are not completely non-existent, for they possess the appearance of something that exists. This (...) corresponds to Vasubandhu’s reply to Nāgārjuna. Emptiness is not ultimate because there is the appearance of empty things. The place where this appearance unfolds is the mind, which, in an absolute sense, exists, but which, in the sense of external, objectifiable reality does not exist. Vasubandhu thus thinks of the mind as an entity that does not conform to the categories of ordinary existence. In turn, this corresponds to what Meister Eckhart says about God. God is a Mind (intellectus). But due to his fundamental ontological role, God transcends ordinary existence and cannot be compared to any specific being. God is the mind of which Vasubandhu states that it is non-dual, transcendent knowledge. To conclude, I use this triadic constellation of Buddhist and Neoplatonic concepts to read John’s Prologue. The Prologue describes the generation of a foundational concept, “logos,” by a primordial, divine Mind. Since this Mind is, in a Buddhist sense, “empty,” the concept that it generates can be said to be absolute. It has no beginning and no cause. Against this background of Buddhist and Neoplatonic ideas, John’s Prologue can thus be interpreted as a narrative describing the foundation of reality as an intellectual process. (shrink)

Table of Contents Preface Abbreviations 1 The Old Academy and the Themes of Middle Platonism 1 2 Antiochus of Ascalon: The Turn to Dogmatism 52 3 Platonism at Alexandria: Eudorus and Philo 114 4 Plutarch of Chaeroneia and the Origins of Second-Century Platonism 184 5 The Athenian School in the Second Century A.D. 231 6 The 'School of Gaius': Shadow and Substance 266 7 The Neopythagoreans 341 8 Some Loose Ends 384 Bibliography 416 Afterword 422 General Index 453 Index of (...) Platonic Passages 458 Modern Authorities Quoted 459. (shrink)

L'Isagoge est une introduction aux Categories. Porphyre y definit les cinq predicables (genre, espece, difference, propre et accident) et formule ce qui, grace a Boece, deviendra le principal probleme logique et metaphysique du Moyen Age occidental - le probleme des universaux -, ouvrant la querelle qui, jusqu'a la fin du XVe siecle, verra s'affronter realistes et nominalistes. La traduction francaise ici proposee est accompagnee du texte grec original et de la traduction latine de Boece.

In this essay, I argue for a new analysis of Porphyry’s argument for justice in On abstinence. I aim to show that (i) in addition to being an inner order of soul, justice is attributed to external actions and (ii) justice of actions consists in refraining from harming harmless living creatures, including animals and plants. The relevant harm, I argue, consists in taking the lives of living creatures and taking products from them by force or without care. I contend that (...) Porphyry extends moral concern for others to all living creatures, but not merely on the basis of animal suffering. Finally, I argue that that the hierarchy of godlikeness in On abstinence does not support the subordination of moral concern for animals and plants to higher virtues of purity and theory. (shrink)

This paper explores two related questions in late Athenian and Alexandrian Neoplatonism. First, how can a philosopher contemplate the eternal Forms while engaging in practical agency in the world? Second, do Neoplatonists provide a consistent account of the philosopher’s progress through the ‘stages of virtue’ (βαθμοί τῶν ἀρετῶν), the conceptual structure that underpins late antique philosophical curricula and hagiography? These questions interact, I suggest, because later Platonists appeal to the stages of virtue and divine maniai (βαθμοί τῶν μανίων) to explain (...) the philosopher’s ability to alternate gracefully between contemplation and embodied agency, and even to engage in both activities at the same moment. I argue that apparently contradictory evidence for the highest stages of virtue can be reconciled satisfactorily, shedding light on two models of ethical and perceptual transformation that are consistent throughout later Neoplatonism. In the first, 'painterly' model, we alternate between a vision of the paradigmatic model and its expression in the media of place and time; in the second, 'dancerly' model, we contemplate in action all at once, like a dancer moving to the music. (shrink)

Proclus (412-485 A.D.) was one of the last great philosophers of Antiquity. His legacy in the cultural history of the west can hardly be overestimated. This work is the most comprehensive guide to Proclus' life, thought and legacy that is currently available.

In The Platonizing Sethian Background of Plotinus's Mysticism, Zeke Mazur offers a radical reconceptualization of Plotinus with reference to Gnostic thought and praxis. A crucial element in the thought of the third-century CE philosopher Plotinus-his conception of mystical union with the One-cannot be understood solely within the conventional history of philosophy, or as the product of a unique, sui generis psychological propensity. This monograph demonstrates that Plotinus tacitly patterned his mystical ascent to the One on a type of visionary ascent (...) ritual that is first attested in Gnostic sources. These sources include the Platonizing Sethian tractates Zostrianos (NHC VIII,1) and Allogenes (NHC XI,3) of which we have Coptic translations from Nag Hammadi and whose Greek Vorlagen were known to have been read in Plotinus's school. (shrink)

The philosophical “problem of evil” goes back at least as far as Epicurus and has remained a powerful argument against the existence of God in contemporary philosophy. The argument is rooted in apparent contradictions between God’s divine attributes and various conditions of human existence. But these contradictions arise only given certain assumptions of what we should expect both God and the world to be like given God’s existence. In this paper, I argue that we can utilize the work of the (...) 20th century French philosopher Simone Weil to craft a coherent metaphysical picture of God, creation, and suffering which rejects these common assumptions. Further, I contend that this picture very plausibly follows from commonly-accepted tenets of traditional monotheism. Given this, I argue that this Weil-inspired framework provides serious reasons for reframing the problem of evil and its corresponding theodicies by presenting a radically different view of how God must relate to creation. Yet, this picture does not necessarily vindicate the theist. I argue that this picture may leave us with a new question about creation in the face of evil. Namely, is it possible to understand God’s initial creative act as Weil describes it—as an act of love? (shrink)

This chapter examines the notion of being in the Consolation of Philosophy and contrasts it with modern notions of existence. The notions in the Consolation relevant to this inquiry are those expressed by the verbs esse and exsistere. The chapter argues that the basic notion of exsistere in the Consolation should be understood as “to be manifest,” while the basic notion of esse should be understood as “to be something or other” or “to be intelligible.” Furthermore, the chapter demonstrates that (...) the notion of esse in the Consolation differs from typical modern notions of existence in two significant ways. First, unlike modern notions of existence, according to which there are things that do not exist, the notion of esse or being in the Consolation has no contrary. Everything that can be spoken of or thought about “is” in some way. Second, the notion of esse in the Consolation, as in Aristotle, is “said in many ways.” In this it differs from modern notions of existence, which tend to be univocal. The chapter shows that once the notions of exsistere and esse are properly understood, certain arguments in the Consolation that might initially appear confused turn out to be quite clear and highly plausible. (shrink)

Many philosophers in the ancient world shared a unitary vision of philosophy – meaning 'love of wisdom' – not just as a theoretical discipline, but as a way of life. Specifically, for the late Neoplatonic thinkers, philosophy began with self-knowledge, which led to a person's inner conversion or transformation into a lover, a human being erotically striving toward the totality of the real. This metamorphosis amounted to a complete existential conversion. It was initiated by learned guides who cultivated higher and (...) higher levels of virtue in their students, leading, in the end, to their vision of the Good, or the One. In this book, James M. Ambury closely analyses two central texts in this tradition: the commentaries by Proclus (412–485 AD) and Olympiodorus (495–560 AD) on the Platonic Alcibiades I. Ambury's powerful study illuminates the way philosophy was conceived during a crucial period of its history, in the lecture halls of late antiquity. (shrink)

In the newly-discovered “On Principles and Matter”—we can definitely ascertain by Porphyry—the author concludes that there must be two principles responsible for all beings, or at least all sensible beings: God (the active cause) and matter (the passive cause). In large part this agrees with Atticus’ position, which the text also quotes, and which we also know Porphyry engaged with vigorously, from Proclus’ Timaeus Commentary. However there is a something odd about this text’s Porphyry: we seem to have a positive (...) argument for much of Antiochus’ framework of two principles, while in Proclus’ testimony we have a negative argument for the very same position. In this paper I analyze in detail the positive argument for the two principles given in “On Principles”, and I consider the degree to which Porphyry may be supplying a dialectical argument at this point in the text, before eventually criticizing the same view elsewhere (as in Proclus’ testimony). I also consider other points of contact for the text’s two-principles framework with Porphyry’s other extant works and show some consequences for Porphyry’s overall position. (shrink)

This first complete study of Marsilio Ficino’s _Commentary on Plotinus_, published in 1492, will serve as the definitive analysis of Ficino’s late philosophy and also as an essential companion to Gersh’s edition-translation of the same work.

Proclus, successor of the School of Athens in the fifth century AD, is one of the last great voices of a pagan polytheistic world in crisis in the face of the gradual rise of Christianity. His writing bears witness not only to one of the most influential metaphysical representations for the constitution of the idea of a philosophical "system" based on a complex "language game" based on the conceptual sphere of "order" and "unity", but also of an attempt to reconcile (...) rhetorics with philosophy. In the three chapters in which the book is structured (style, system, unity), then, a conscious intention is evident in Proclus, to adapt the content of his systematic metaphysics to literary form. Hence there is a consistency traced in Proclus' stylistic choices, with the aesthetic norms of a rhetorical canon, probably established in the cycle of readings of the Neoplatonic school. His writing bears witness not only to one of the most influential metaphysical representations for the constitution of the idea of a philosophical "system" based on a complex "language game" based on the conceptual sphere of "order" and "unity", but also of an attempt to reconcile rhetorics with philosophy. In the three chapters in which the book is structured (style, system, unity), then, a conscious intention is evident in Proclus, to adapt the content of his systematic metaphysics to literary form. Hence there is a consistency traced in Proclus' stylistic choices, with the aesthetic norms of a rhetorical canon, probably established in the cycle of readings of the Neoplatonic school. The way in which expressive "art" is subordinated in Proclus to philosophy is one of the most emblematic examples of a development in late antiquity, that of the enkuklios paideia - the union of all the arts necessary for the formation of man - that would later constitute in the Latin world the cycle of liberal arts. (shrink)

Porphyrius (234 - 305), Plotinus' disciple and editor of his Enneads, addresses his letter to Marcella, an aging woman, whom he married late in life. He explains to her the reasons for leaving her, after only ten months of marriage. He invites her to leave passions behind to lead a philosophical life along the lines of the major ethical principles inspired by Plato. Porphyrius takes a strong stand as an apologist of traditional philosophical teachings. The Letter to Marcella provides a (...) unique account on the ways and principles along which a philosophical life should be led. The Letter to Marcella survives as a single manuscript that dates from the 15th century. It is here introduced, edited, translated and annotated. (shrink)