Neuroethics

Edited by L. Syd M Johnson (SUNY Upstate Medical University)
About this topic
Summary Neuroethics is a nascent subdiscipline that has emerged out of bioethics and neuroscience to consider the ethical issued raised by developments in neuroscience, particularly recent developments in neuroetechnologies. The scope of neuroethics is broad and heterogeneous. In her seminal 2002 paper, philosopher and neuroscientist Adina Roskies bisected the field of neuroethics into two broad sectors: the ethics of neuroscience, and the neuroscience of ethics. The ethics of neuroscience overlaps significantly with traditional issues in biomedical ethics, including the ethics of neuroscientific research, and the ethical, legal, and social implications of new developments and discoveries in neuroscience. The “neuroscience of ethics”  engages with traditional ethical questions, and (controversially) overlaps with neurophilosophical, metaphysical inquiries concerning free will and personal identity as they inform and interact with important ethical and social issues. Specific areas of neuroethical interest include: cognitive enhancement, disorders of consciousness and neurological impairment, psychiatric disorders, brain imaging, free will/moral responsibility, and addiction, and the neuroscientific study of morality and decision-making.
Key works The broad scope of neuroethics defies a concise bibliography. Moreover, while there is overlap in some foci of neuroethics, there are also regions that stand apart. This article reflects neuroethics' origins as a subdiscipline of bioethics by examining ethical issues in clinical neuroscience (Glannon 2011). The moral significance of consciousness (Kahane & Savulescu 2009), and the role of neuroscience in illuminating the "problem of other minds" with respect to brain damage, and nonhuman animals (Farah 2008) is a subject with an extensive literature. Works on issues related to control, responsibility, freedom, and addiction include Hall 2003 and Glannon 2012Persson & Savulescu 2008 proposes both cognitive and moral enhancement. The neuroscience of ethics overlaps considerably with the work of experimental philosophers, e.g. Knobe 2003Greene unknown, and Appiah 2008.
Introductions For a general introductions to neuroethics, see Illes & Sahakian 2011 and Levy 2009 and Roskies 2002.
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  1. Disorders of Consciousness: An Embedded Ethnographic Approach to Uncovering the Specific Influence of Functional Neurodiagnostics of Consciousness in Surrogate Decision Making.Lise Marie Andersen, Hanne Bess Boelsbjerg & Mette Terp Høybye - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-6.
    A recent qualitative study published in Neuroethics by Schembs and colleagues explores how functional neurodiagnostics of consciousness inform surrogate decision making in cases of disorders of consciousness. In this commentary, we argue that the chosen methodology significantly limits the scope of the potential conclusions and suggest an embedded ethnographic approach of co-presence as an alternative.
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  2. In Defence of the Hivemind Society.John Danaher & Steve Petersen - forthcoming - Neuroethics.
    The idea that humans should abandon their individuality and use technology to bind themselves together into hivemind societies seems both farfetched and frightening – something that is redolent of the worst dystopias from science fiction. In this article, we argue that these common reactions to the ideal of a hivemind society are mistaken. The idea that humans could form hiveminds is sufficiently plausible for its axiological consequences to be taken seriously. Furthermore, far from being a dystopian nightmare, the hivemind society (...)
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  3. Neuro-Doping and Fairness.Thomas Søbirk Petersen & Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-12.
    In this article, we critically discuss different versions of the fairness objection to the legalisation of neuro-doping. According to this objection, legalising neuro-doping will result in some enjoying an unfair advantage over others. Basically, we assess four versions. These focus on: 1) the unequal opportunities of winning for athletes who use neuro-doping and for those who do not; 2) the unfair advantages specifically for wealthy athletes; 3) the unfairness of athletic advantages not derived from athletes’ own training ; and 4) (...)
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  4. Extrapolating From Laboratory Behavioral Research on Nonhuman Primates Is Unjustified.Parker Crutchfield - 2020 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 37 (4):628-645.
    Conducting research on animals is supposed to be valuable because it provides information on how human mechanisms work. But for the use of animal models to be ethically justified, it must be epistemically justified. The inference from an observation about an animal model to a conclusion about humans must be warranted for the use of animals to be moral. When researchers infer from animals to humans, it’s an extrapolation. Often non-human primates are used as animal models in laboratory behavioral research. (...)
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  5. Neuro-Doping – a Serious Threat to the Integrity of Sport?Verner Møller & Ask Vest Christiansen - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-10.
    The formation of the World Anti-Doping Agency in 1999 was spurred by the 1998 revelation of widespread use in professional cycling of erythropoietin. The drug was supposedly a real danger. The long-term consequences were unknown, but rumor said it made athletes’ blood thick as jam with clots and other circulatory fatalities likely consequences. Today the fear of EPO has dampened. However, new scientific avenues such as ‘neuro-doping’ have replaced EPO as emergent and imagined threats to athletes and to the integrity (...)
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  6. Neuroenhancement, Coercion, and Neo-Luddism.Alexandre Erler - 2020 - In Nicole A. Vincent, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Allan McCay (eds.), Neurointerventions and the Law: Regulating Human Mental Capacity. New York, NY, USA: pp. 375-405.
    This chapter addresses the claim that, as new types of neurointervention get developed allowing us to enhance various aspects of our mental functioning, we should work to prevent the use of such interventions from ever becoming the “new normal,” that is, a practice expected—even if not directly required—by employers. The author’s response to that claim is that, unlike compulsion or most cases of direct coercion, indirect coercion to use such neurointerventions is, per se, no more problematic than the pressure people (...)
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  7. The Ethics of Motivational Neuro-Doping in Sport: Praiseworthiness and Prizeworthiness. Bowman-Smart, Hilary, Savulescu & Julian - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-11.
    Motivational enhancement in sport – a form of ‘neuro-doping’ – can help athletes attain greater achievements in sport. A key question is whether or not that athlete deserves that achievement. We distinguish three concepts – praiseworthiness, prizeworthiness, and admiration – which are closely related. However, in sport, they can come apart. The most praiseworthy athlete may not be the most prizeworthy, and so on. Using a model of praiseworthiness as costly commitment to a valuable end, and situating prizeworthiness within the (...)
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  8. Neuro-Doping as a Means to Avert Fascistoid Ideology in Elite Sport.Torbjörn Tännsjö - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-10.
    Assume that neuro-doping is safe and efficient. This means that the use of it, and similar future safe methods of enhancement in sport, may help those who are naturally weak to catch up with those who are naturally strong and sometimes even defeat them. The rationale behind anti-doping measures seem to presuppose that this is unfair. But the idea that those who are naturally strong should defeat those who are naturally weak rests on a fascistoid ideology that sport had better (...)
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  9. Neuroethics, Justice and Autonomy: Public Reason in the Cognitive Enhancement Debate, Veljko Dubljević, 2019 Cham, Springer Nature Switzerland Xv + 138 Pp., £70.00. [REVIEW]Yoann Della Croce - 2020 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 37 (3):502-504.
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  10. Correction to: Pragmatismand the Importance of Interdisciplinary Teams in Investigating Personality Changes Following DBS.Cynthia S. Kubu, Paul J. Ford, Joshua A. Wilt, Amanda R. Merner, Michelle Montpetite, Jaclyn Zeigler & Eric Racine - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-1.
    The article Pragmatismand the Importance of Interdisciplinary Teams in Investigating Personality Changes Following DBS.
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  11. First Epileptic Seizure and Initial Diagnosis of Juvenile Myoclonus Epilepsy (JME) in a Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS) Study– Ethical Analysis of a Clinical case.Anna Sierawska, Vera Moliadze, Maike Splittgerber, Annette Rogge, Michael Siniatchkin & Alena Buyx - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (3):347-351.
    We discuss an epileptic incident in an undiagnosed 13-year old girl participating in a clinical study investigating the effects of transcranial direct current stimulation in healthy children and adolescents. This incident poses important research ethics questions with regard to study design, especially pertaining to screening and gaining informed consent. Potential benefits and problems of the incident also need to be considered. The ethical analysis of the case presented in this paper has been informed by an in-depth interview conducted after the (...)
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  12. “Fueling up” Gamers. The Ethics of Marketing Energy Drinks to Gamers.Francisco Javier Lopez Frias - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-11.
    In this article, I investigate whether states should regulate energy-drink marketing practices targeting gamers. Energy drinks are high-sugar, high-caffeine, non-alcoholic beverages that allegedly improve energy, stamina, cognitive performance, and concentration. First, I define what “gamer” means and identify the market agents that play a crucial role in the gaming community, including the energy-drink industry. In doing so, I analyze energy-drink marketing practices and explore calls for regulating them. Second, I draw parallels between regulation of energy-drink marketing and marketing of products (...)
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  13. Impact of the Japanese Disability Homecare System on ALS Patients’ Decision to Receive Tracheostomy with Invasive Ventilation.Yumiko Kawaguchi - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (2):239-247.
    Research has documented the influence of ALS patients families’ attitudes on patients’ decision to accept or reject TIV, a treatment that in many cases will allow them to live long enough to experience locked-in syndrome ; under Japanese law the use of a ventilator cannot be terminated once it is essential to a patient’s survival, so to choose TIV means to choose the possibility of entering a locked-in state. Previous studies have not, however, elucidated the changes in family members’ attitudes (...)
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  14. Impact of the Japanese Disability Homecare System on ALS Patients’ Decision to Receive Tracheostomy with Invasive Ventilation.Yumiko Kawaguchi - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (2):239-247.
    Research has documented the influence of ALS patients families’ attitudes on patients’ decision to accept or reject TIV, a treatment that in many cases will allow them to live long enough to experience locked-in syndrome ; under Japanese law the use of a ventilator cannot be terminated once it is essential to a patient’s survival, so to choose TIV means to choose the possibility of entering a locked-in state. Previous studies have not, however, elucidated the changes in family members’ attitudes (...)
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  15. The history of BCI: From a vision for the future to real support for personhood in people with locked-in syndrome.Andrea Kübler - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (2):163-180.
    The history of brain-computer interfaces developed from a mere idea in the days of early digital technology to today’s highly sophisticated approaches for signal detection, recording, and analysis. In the 1960s, electroencephalography was tied to the laboratory due to equipment and recording requirements. Today, amplifiers exist that are built in the electrode cap and are so resistant to movement artefacts that data collection in the field is no longer a critical issue. Within 60 years, the field has moved from simple (...)
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  16. More than our Body: Minimal and Enactive Selfhood in Global Paralysis.Miriam Kyselo - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (2):203-220.
    This paper looks to phenomenology and enactive cognition in order to shed light on the self and sense of self of patients with locked-in syndrome. It critically discusses the concept of the minimal self, both in its phenomenological and ontological dimension. Ontologically speaking, the self is considered to be equal to a person’s sensorimotor embodiment. This bodily self also grounds the minimal sense of self as being a distinct experiential subject. The view from the minimal bodily self presupposes that sociality (...)
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  17. Phenomenology of the Locked-In Syndrome: an Overview and Some Suggestions.Fernando Vidal - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (2):119-143.
    There is no systematic knowledge about how individuals with Locked-in Syndrome experience their situation. A phenomenology of LIS, in the sense of a description of subjective experience as lived by the ill persons themselves, does not yet exist as an organized endeavor. The present article takes a step in that direction by reviewing various materials and making some suggestions. First-person narratives provide the most important sources, but very few have been discussed. LIS barely appears in bioethics and neuroethics. Research on (...)
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  18. Locked-In Syndrome: a Challenge to Standard Accounts of Selfhood and Personhood?Dan Zahavi - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (2):221-228.
    A point made repeatedly over the last few years is that the Locked-in Syndrome offers unique real-life material for revisiting and challenging certain ingrained philosophical assumptions about the nature of personhood and personal identity. Indeed, the claim has been made that a closer study of LIS will call into question some of the traditional conceptions of personhood that primarily highlight the significance of consciousness, self-consciousness and autonomy and suggest the need for a more interpersonal account of the person. I am (...)
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  19. A History of the Locked-In-Syndrome: Ethics in the Making of Neurological Consciousness, 1880-Present.Stephen T. Casper - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (2):145-161.
    Extensive scholarship has described the historical and ethical imperatives shaping the emergence of the brain death criteria in the 1960s and 1970s. This essay explores the longer intellectual history that shaped theories of neurological consciousness from the late-nineteenth century to that period, and argues that a significant transformation occurred in the elaboration of those theories in the 1960s and after, the period when various disturbances of consciousness were discovered or thoroughly elaborated. Numerous historical conditions can be identified and attributed to (...)
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  20. Phenomenological Analysis of a Japanese Professional Caregiver Specialized in Patients with Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis.Yasuhiko Murakami - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (2):181-191.
    The present article is based on a interview with a Japanese experienced caregiver who specializes in patients with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, which generally leads to the locked-in syndrome. Professional caregivers for ALS patients with ventilator experience two particular temporalities in their practice. First, they must monitor the patient continuously during a seven-hour stay. Because a single problem in the ventilator can have fatal consequences, the care of an ALS patient with a ventilator requires long periods of sustained concentration. Second, trying (...)
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  21. Attitudes Towards Personhood in the Locked-in Syndrome: From Third- to First- Person Perspective and to Interpersonal Significance.Marie-Christine Nizzi, Veronique Blandin & Athena Demertzi - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (2):193-201.
    Personhood is ascribed on others, such that someone who is recognized to be a person is bestowed with certain civil rights and the right to decision making. A rising question is how severely brain-injured patients who regain consciousness can also regain their personhood. The case of patients with locked-in syndrome is illustrative in this matter. Upon restoration of consciousness, patients with LIS find themselves in a state of profound demolition of their bodily functions. From the third-person perspective, it can be (...)
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  22. Medical Decision Making by Patients in the Locked-in Syndrome.James L. Bernat - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (2):229-238.
    The locked-in syndrome is a state of profound paralysis with preserved awareness of self and environment who typically results from a brain stem stroke. Although patients in LIS have great difficulty communicating, their consciousness, cognition, and language usually remain intact. Medical decision-making by LIS patients is compromised, not by cognitive impairment, but by severe communication impairment. Former systems of communication that permitted LIS patients to make only “yes” or “no” responses to questions was sufficient to validate their consent for simple (...)
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  23. Determinism and Destigmatization: Mitigating Blame for Addiction.Thomas W. Clark - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-12.
    The brain disease model of addiction is widely endorsed by agencies concerned with treating behavioral disorders and combatting the stigma often associated with addiction. However, both its accuracy and its effectiveness in reducing stigma have been challenged. A proposed alternative, the “choice” model, recognizes the residual rational behavior control capacities of addicted individuals and their ability to make choices, some of which may cause harm. Since harmful choices are ordinarily perceived as blameworthy, the choice model may inadvertently help justify stigma. (...)
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  24. Born Which Way? ADHD, Situational Self-Control, and Responsibility.Polaris Koi - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-14.
    Debates concerning whether Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder mitigates responsibility often involve recourse to its genetic and neurodevelopmental etiology. For such arguments, individuals with ADHD have diminished self-control, and hence do not fully satisfy the control condition for responsibility, when there is a genetic or neurodevelopmental etiology for this diminished capacity. In this article, I argue that the role of genetic and neurobiological explanations has been overstated in evaluations of responsibility. While ADHD has genetic and neurobiological causes, rather than embrace the essentialistic (...)
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  25. Deflating the Deep Brain Stimulation Causes Personality Changes Bubble: The Authors Reply.Frederic Gilbert, John Noel M. Viana & C. Ineichen - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-12.
    To conclude that there is enough or not enough evidence demonstrating that deep brain stimulation causes unintended postoperative personality changes is an epistemic problem that should be answered on the basis of established, replicable, and valid data. If prospective DBS recipients delay or refuse to be implanted because they are afraid of suffering from personality changes following DBS, and their fears are based on unsubstantiated claims made in the neuroethics literature, then researchers making these claims bear great responsibility for prospective (...)
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  26. Retributivism, Justification and Credence: The Epistemic Argument Revisited.Sofia M. I. Jeppsson - 2020 - Neuroethics:1-14.
    Harming other people is prima facie wrong. Unless we can be very certain that doing so is justified under the circumstances, we ought not to do it. In this paper, I argue that we ought to dismantle harsh retributivist criminal justice systems for this reason; we cannot be sufficiently certain that the harm is justified. Gregg Caruso, Ben Vilhauer and others have previously argued for the same conclusion; however, my own version sidesteps certain controversial premises of theirs. Harsh retributivist criminal (...)
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  27. Neurostimulation, doping, and the spirit of sport.Jonathan Pugh & Christopher Pugh - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-18.
    There is increasing interest in using neuro-stimulation devices to achieve an ergogenic effect in elite athletes. Although the World Anti-Doping Authority does not currently prohibit neuro-stimulation techniques, a number of researchers have called on WADA to consider its position on this issue. Focusing on trans-cranial direct current stimulation as a case study of an imminent so-called ‘neuro-doping’ intervention, we argue that the emerging evidence suggests that tDCS may meet WADA’s own criteria for a method’s inclusion on its list of prohibited (...)
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  28. Respect, Punishment and Mandatory Neurointerventions.Sebastian Jon Holmen - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-10.
    The view that acting morally is ultimately a question of treating others with respect has had a profound influence on moral and legal philosophy. Not surprisingly, then, some scholars forcefully argue that the modes of punishment that the states mete out to offenders should not be disrespectful, and, furthermore, it has been argued that obliging offenders to receive neurological treatment is incompatible with showing them their due respect. In this paper, I examine three contemporary accounts of what showing respect for (...)
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  29. Brain-Computer Interfaces and the Translation of Thought into Action.Tom Buller - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-11.
    A brain-computer interface designed to restore motor function detects neural activity related to intended movement and thereby enables a person to control an external device, for example, a robotic limb, or even their own body. It would seem legitimate, therefore, to describe a BCI as a system that translates thought into action. This paper argues that present BCI-mediated behavior fails to meet the conditions of intentional physical action as proposed by causal and non-causal theories of action. First, according to the (...)
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  30. Autism Spectrum Condition, Good and Bad Motives of Offending, and Sentencing.Jukka Varelius - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-11.
    It has been proposed that the ways in which the criminal justice system treats offenders with Autism spectrum condition should duly account for how the condition influences the offenders’ behavior. While the recommendation appears plausible, what adhering to it means in practice remains unclear. A central feature of ASC is seen to be that people with the condition have difficulties with understanding and reacting to the mental states of others in what are commonly considered as adequate ways. This article aims (...)
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  31. Justice Without Retribution: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Stakeholder Views and Practical Implications.Farah Focquaert, Gregg Caruso, Elizabeth Shaw & Derk Pereboom - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (1):1-3.
    Within the United States, the most prominent justification for criminal punishment is retributivism. This retributivist justification for punishment maintains that punishment of a wrongdoer is justified for the reason that she deserves something bad to happen to her just because she has knowingly done wrong—this could include pain, deprivation, or death. For the retributivist, it is the basic desert attached to the criminal’s immoral action alone that provides the justification for punishment. This means that the retributivist position is not reducible (...)
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  32. Determinism, Moral Responsibility and Retribution.Elizabeth Shaw & Robert Blakey - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (1):99-113.
    In this article, we will identify two issues that deserve greater attention from those researching lay people’s attitudes to moral responsibility and determinism. The first issue concerns whether people interpret the term “moral responsibility” in a retributive way and whether they are motivated to hold offenders responsible for pre-determined behaviour by considerations other than retributivism, e.g. the desires to condemn the action and to protect society. The second issue concerns whether explicitly rejecting moral responsibility and retributivism, after reading about determinism, (...)
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  33. Incapacitation, Reintegration, and Limited General Deterrence.Derk Pereboom - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (1):87-97.
    The aim of this article is to set out a theory for treatment of criminals that rejects retributive justification for punishment; does not fall afoul of a plausible prohibition on using people merely as means; and actually works in the real world. The theory can be motivated by free will skepticism. But it can also be supported without reference to the free will issue, since retributivism faces ethical challenges in its own right. In past versions of the account I’ve emphasized (...)
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  34. Forensic Practitioners’ Views on Stimulating Moral Development and Moral Growth in Forensic Psychiatric Care.Jona Specker, Farah Focquaert, Sigrid Sterckx & Maartje H. N. Schermer - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (1):73-85.
    In the context of debates on psychiatry issues pertaining to moral dimensions of psychiatric health care are frequently discussed. These debates invite reflection on the question whether forensic practitioners have a role in stimulating patients’ moral development and moral growth in the context of forensic psychiatric and psychological treatment and care. We conducted a qualitative study to examine to what extent forensic practitioners consider moral development and moral growth to be a part of their current professional practices and to what (...)
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  35. Justice, Reciprocity and the Internalisation of Punishment in Victims of Crime.John S. Callender - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (1):43-54.
    This paper is published as part of special issue on the theme of ‘justice without retribution’. Any attempt to consider how justice may be achieved without retribution has to begin with a consideration of what we mean by justice. The most powerful pleas for justice usually come from those who feel that they have been harmed by the wrongful acts of others. This paper will explore this intuition about justice and will argue that it arises from the central importance of (...)
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  36. Benign Biological Interventions to Reduce Offending.Olivia Choy, Farah Focquaert & Adrian Raine - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (1):29-41.
    A considerable body of evidence now documents, beyond reasonable doubt, biological and health risk factors for crime and violence. Nevertheless, intervention and prevention efforts with offenders have avoided biological interventions, in part due to past misuses of biological research and the challenges that biological predispositions to crime raise. This article reviews the empirical literature on two biological intervention approaches, omega-3 supplementation and transcranial direct current stimulation. Emerging research on these relatively benign interventions suggests that increased omega-3 intake through dietary intervention (...)
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  37. Biocriminal Justice: Exploring Public Attitudes to Criminal Rehabilitation Using Biomedical Treatments.Robin Whitehead & Jennifer A. Chandler - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (1):55-71.
    Biomedical interventions, such as pharmacological and neurological interventions, are increasingly being offered or considered for offer to offenders in the criminal justice system as a means of reducing recidivism and achieving offender rehabilitation through treatment. An offender’s consent to treatment may affect decisions about diversion from the criminal justice system, sentence or parole, and so hope for a preferable treatment in the criminal justice system may influence the offender’s consent. This thematic analysis of three focus group interviews conducted in Canada (...)
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  38. Justice without Retribution: An Epistemic Argument against Retributive Criminal Punishment.Gregg D. Caruso - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (1):13-28.
    Within the United States, the most prominent justification for criminal punishment is retributivism. This retributivist justification for punishment maintains that punishment of a wrongdoer is justified for the reason that she deserves something bad to happen to her just because she has knowingly done wrong—this could include pain, deprivation, or death. For the retributivist, it is the basic desert attached to the criminal’s immoral action alone that provides the justification for punishment. This means that the retributivist position is not reducible (...)
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  39. Beyond Moral Responsibility to a System That Works.Bruce N. Waller - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (1):5-12.
    Moving beyond the retributive system requires clearing away some of the basic assumptions that form the foundation of that system: most importantly, the assumption of moral responsibility, which is held in place by deep and destructive belief in a just world. Efforts to justify moral responsibility typically appeal to some version of self-making, and that appeal is only plausible through limits on inquiry. Eliminating moral responsibility removes a major impediment to deeper inquiry and understanding of the biological, social, and environmental (...)
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  40. Autonomy, Rationality, and Contemporary Bioethics.Jonathan Pugh - 2020 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    Personal autonomy is often lauded as a key value in contemporary Western bioethics. Though the claim that there is an important relationship between autonomy and rationality is often treated as uncontroversial in this sphere, there is also considerable disagreement about how we should cash out the relationship. In particular, it is unclear whether a rationalist view of autonomy can be compatible with legal judgments that enshrine a patient's right to refuse medical treatment, regardless of whether the reasons underpinning the choice (...)
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  41. A Dilemma For Neurodiversity.Kenneth Shields & David Beversdorf - 2020 - Neuroethics:1-17.
    One way to determine whether a mental condition should be considered a disorder is to first give necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be a disorder and then see if it meets these conditions. But this approach has been criticized for begging normative questions. Concerning autism, a neurodiversity movement has arisen with essentially two aims: advocate for the rights and interests of individuals with autism, and de-pathologize autism. We argue that denying autism’s disorder status could undermine autism’s exculpatory role (...)
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  42. Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience: A Philosophical Introduction.Benjamin D. Young & Carolyn Dicey Jennings (eds.) - forthcoming - Routledge.
    Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience: A Philosophical Introduction is specifically designed for interdisciplinary audiences. The textbook will offer a comprehensive overview of a wide range of contemporary topics that are relevant to the study of mind. Each chapter will situate current philosophical research and neuroscientific findings within historically relevant debates in philosophy of cognitive science. By situating cutting-edge research within the theoretical trajectory of the field, students will gain a fundamental understanding of the cognitive neurosciences, as well as the progressive nature (...)
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  43. Some Ethics of Deep Brain Stimulation.Joshua August Skorburg & Walter Sinnott Armstrong - 2020 - In Dan Stein & Ilina Singh (eds.), Global Mental Health and Neuroethics. London, UK: pp. 117-132.
    Case reports about patients undergoing Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) for various motor and psychiatric disorders - including Parkinson’s Disease, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, and Treatment Resistant Depression - have sparked a vast literature in neuroethics. Questions about whether and how DBS changes the self have been at the fore. The present chapter brings these neuroethical debates into conversation with recent research in moral psychology. We begin in Section 1 by reviewing the recent clinical literature on DBS. In Section 2, we consider (...)
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  44. Bottom Up Ethics - Neuroenhancement in Education and Employment.Hub Zwart, Márton Varju, Vincent Torre, Helge Torgersen, Winnie Toonders, Han Somsen, Ilina Singh, Simone Seyringer, Júlio Santos, Judit Sándor, Núria Saladié, Gema Revuelta, Alexandre Quintanilha, Salvör Nordal, Anna Meijknecht, Sheena Laursen, Nicole Kronberger, Christian Hofmaier, Elisabeth Hildt, Juergen Hampel, Peter Eduard, Rui Cunha, Agnes Allansdottir, George Gaskell & Imre Bard - 2018 - Neuroethics 11 (3):309-322.
    Neuroenhancement involves the use of neurotechnologies to improve cognitive, affective or behavioural functioning, where these are not judged to be clinically impaired. Questions about enhancement have become one of the key topics of neuroethics over the past decade. The current study draws on in-depth public engagement activities in ten European countries giving a bottom-up perspective on the ethics and desirability of enhancement. This informed the design of an online contrastive vignette experiment that was administered to representative samples of 1000 respondents (...)
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  45. Nonconscious Pain, Suffering, and Moral Status.Bernardo Aguilera - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (3):337-345.
    Pain is an unwanted mental state that is often considered a sufficient ground for moral status. However, current science and philosophy of mind suggest that pains, like other perceptual states, might be nonconscious. This raises the questions of whether the notion of nonconscious pain is coherent and what its moral significance might be. In this paper I argue that the existence of nonconscious pain is conceptually coherent; however as a matter of fact our brains might always represent pains consciously. I (...)
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  46. How Does Functional Neurodiagnostics Inform Surrogate Decision-Making for Patients with Disorders of Consciousness? A Qualitative Interview Study with Patients’ Next of Kin.Leah Schembs, Maria Ruhfass, Eric Racine, Ralf J. Jox, Andreas Bender, Martin Rosenfelder & Katja Kuehlmeyer - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-20.
    BackgroundFunctional neurodiagnostics could allow researchers and clinicians to distinguish more accurately between the unresponsive wakefulness syndrome and the minimally conscious state. It remains unclear how it informs surrogate decision-making.ObjectiveTo explore how the next of kin of patients with disorders of consciousness interpret the results of a functional neurodiagnostics measure and how/why their interpretations influence their attitudes towards medical decisions.Methods and SampleWe conducted problem-centered interviews with seven next of kin of patients with DOC who had undergone a functional HD-EEG examination at (...)
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  47. Responsibility, Determinism, and the Objective Stance: Using IAT to Evaluate Strawson’s Account of our ‘Incompatibilist’ Intuitions.Daniel Blair Cohen, Jeremy Goldring & Lauren Leigh Saling - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-14.
    People who judge that a wrongdoer’s behaviour is determined are disposed, in certain cases, to judge that the wrongdoer cannot be responsible for his behaviour. Some try to explain this phenomenon by arguing that people are intuitive incompatibilists about determinism and moral responsibility. However, Peter Strawson argues that we excuse determined wrongdoers because judging that someone is determined puts us into a psychological state – ‘the objective stance’ – which prevents us from holding them responsible, not because we think that (...)
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  48. How Will Families React to Evidence of Covert Consciousness in Brain-Injured Patients?Andrew Peterson - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-4.
    This commentary critically examines a recent qualitative study, published in this issue of Neuroethics, on the attitudes of family caregivers toward evidence of covert consciousness in brain-injured patients.
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  49. Pragmatism and the Importance of Interdisciplinary Teams in Investigating Personality Changes Following DBS.Cynthia S. Kubu, Paul J. Ford, Joshua A. Wilt, Amanda R. Merner, Michelle Montpetite, Jaclyn Zeigler & Eric Racine - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-10.
    Gilbert and colleagues point out the discrepancy between the limited empirical data illustrating changes in personality following implantation of deep brain stimulating electrodes and the vast number of conceptual neuroethics papers implying that these changes are widespread, deleterious, and clinically significant. Their findings are reminiscent of C. P. Snow’s essay on the divide between the two cultures of the humanities and the sciences. This division in the literature raises significant ethical concerns surrounding unjustified fear of personality changes in the context (...)
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  50. Changes in Personality Associated with Deep Brain Stimulation: A Qualitative Evaluation of Clinician Perspectives.Cassandra J. Thomson, Rebecca A. Segrave & Adrian Carter - forthcoming - Neuroethics:1-16.
    Gilbert et al. argue that the neuroethics literature discussing the putative effects of Deep Brain Stimulation on personality largely ignores the scientific evidence and presents distorted claims that personality change is induced by the DBS stimulation. This study contributes to the first-hand primary research on the topic exploring DBS clinicians’ views on post-DBS personality change among their patients and its underlying cause. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with sixteen clinicians from various disciplines working in Australian DBS practice for movement disorders and/or (...)
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