About this topic
Summary Neuroethics is divided into two main branches: the ethics of neuroscience and the neuroscience of ethics. The former encompasses questions similar to the field of applied ethics (e.g. Do brain reading technologies violate privacy? Can patients seeking drastic brain transformations properly consent to the procedure? Do we have an obligation to enhance ourselves by altering our brains?). The neuroscience of ethics (this category), however, concerns what results in neuroscience tell us about ethics.  This category covers topics more familiar to those working in normative ethics and metaethics. Core questions include: (1) Does neuroscience undermine free will or moral responsibility? (2) Does research on brain areas suggest that certain moral intuitions are unreliable? (3) What does the neurobiology of disorders, like psychopathy and autism, tell us about normal moral judgment and behavior? (4) Can people with brain disorders be held morally or criminally responsible?
Key works On freedom and responsibility: Libet 1999; Wegner 2004; Mele 2008. On moral intuitions: Greene 2007; Berker 2009.  On neurological disorders and ethics: Kennett 2002Roskies 2003; Schroeder et al 2010. On psychopathy and responsibility: Blair 2008; Fine & Kennett 2004; Maibom 2008.
Introductions Encyclopedia entry: Roskies 2016. Three key books: Levy 2007, Glannon 2011, and Farah 2010. Briefer introductions include: Roskies 2002 (the locus classicus), Levy 2008 (in Neuroethics), Levy 2009 (in Phil Compass). Two recent handbooks of neuroethics generally: Illes & Sahakian 2011 and Neil & Jens 2014.
Related categories

162 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 162
  1. added 2020-05-12
    Using fMRI in Experimental Philosophy: Exploring the Prospects.Rodrigo Díaz - 2019 - In Eugen Fischer & Mark Curtis (eds.), Methodological Advances in Experimental Philosophy. London: Bloomsbury.
    This chapter analyses the prospects of using neuroimaging methods, in particular functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), for philosophical purposes. To do so, it will use two case studies from the field of emotion research: Greene et al. (2001) used fMRI to uncover the mental processes underlying moral intuitions, while Lindquist et al. (2012) used fMRI to inform the debate around the nature of a specific mental process, namely, emotion. These studies illustrate two main approaches in cognitive neuroscience: Reverse inference and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2020-05-01
    The Neuroscience of Moral Judgment: Empirical and Philosophical Developments.Joshua May, Clifford I. Workman, Julia Haas & Hyemin Han - forthcoming - In Felipe De Brigard & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (eds.), Neuroscience and Philosophy. Cambridge, USA: MIT Press.
    We chart how neuroscience and philosophy have together advanced our understanding of moral judgment with implications for when it goes well or poorly. The field initially focused on brain areas associated with reason versus emotion in the moral evaluations of sacrificial dilemmas. But new threads of research have studied a wider range of moral evaluations and how they relate to models of brain development and learning. By weaving these threads together, we are developing a better understanding of the neurobiology of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2020-04-13
    No Need to Get Up From the Armchair (If You're Interested in Debunking Arguments in Metaethics).Dan Baras - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-16.
    Several authors believe that metaethicists ought to leave their comfortable armchairs and engage with serious empirical research. This paper provides partial support for the opposing view, that metaethics is rightly conducted from the armchair. It does so by focusing on debunking arguments against robust moral realism. Specifically, the article discusses arguments based on the possibility that if robust realism is correct, then our beliefs are most likely insensitive to the relevant truths. These arguments seem at first glance to be dependent (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2019-09-15
    Breaking Good: Moral Agency, Neuroethics, and the Spontaneity of Compassion.Christian Coseru - 2017 - In Jake H. Davis (ed.), A Mirror is for Reflection: Understanding Buddhist Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 109-128.
    This paper addresses two specific and related questions the Buddhist neuroethics program raises for our traditional understanding of Buddhist ethics: Does affective neuroscience supply enough evidence that contempla- tive practices such as compassion meditation can enhance normal cognitive functioning? Can such an account advance the philosophical debate concerning freedom and determinism in a profitable direction? In response to the first question, I argue that dispositions such as empathy and altruism can in effect be understood in terms of the mechanisms that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. added 2019-09-12
    Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them, Written by Joshua D. Greene. [REVIEW]Simon Rosenqvist - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (2):225-228.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. added 2019-09-08
    Two Problematic Foundations of Neuroethics and Pragmatist Reconstructions.Eric Racine & Matthew Sample - 2018 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 27 (4):566-577.
    Common understandings of neuroethics, i.e., of its distinctive nature, are premised on two distinct sets of claims: (1) neuroscience can change views about the nature of ethics itself and neuroethics is dedicated to reaping such an understanding of ethics; (2) neuroscience poses challenges distinct from other areas of medicine and science and neuroethics tackles those issues. Critiques have rightfully challenged both claims, stressing how the first may lead to problematic forms of reductionism while the second relies on debatable assumptions about (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  7. added 2019-06-17
    Response to the Commentaries.Julian Savulescu & Donna Dickenson - 1998 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 5 (3):263-266.
    Response to commentaries on Savulescu and Dickenson article on preferences and advance directives.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. added 2019-06-17
    Ethical Issues in Long-Term Psychiatric Management.D. Dickenson - 1997 - Journal of Medical Ethics 23 (5):300-304.
    Two general ethical problems in psychiatry are thrown into sharp relief by long term care. This article discusses each in turn, in the context of two anonymised case studies from actual clinical practice. First, previous mental health legislation soothed doubts about patients' refusal of consent by incorporating time limits on involuntary treatment. When these are absent, as in the provisions for long term care which have recently come into force, the justification for compulsory treatment and supervision becomes more obviously problematic. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  9. added 2019-06-06
    Eager for Fairness or for Revenge? Psychological Altruism in Economics: Christine Clavien and Rebekka A. Klein.Christine Clavien - 2010 - Economics and Philosophy 26 (3):267-290.
    To understand the human capacity for psychological altruism, one requires a proper understanding of how people actually think and feel. This paper addresses the possible relevance of recent findings in experimental economics and neuroeconomics to the philosophical controversy over altruism and egoism. After briefly sketching and contextualizing the controversy, we survey and discuss the results of various studies on behaviourally altruistic helping and punishing behaviour, which provide stimulating clues for the debate over psychological altruism. On closer analysis, these studies prove (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  10. added 2019-06-06
    Neuroeconomics and the Economic Sciences: Kevin A. McCabe.Kevin A. McCabe - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):345-368.
    Neuroeconomics is the newest of the economic sciences with a focus on how the embodied human brain interacts with its institutional and social environment to make economic decisions. This paper presents an overview of neuroeconomics methods and reviews a number of results in this emerging field of study.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  11. added 2019-06-06
    The Potential of Neuroeconomics: Colin F. Camerer.Colin F. Camerer - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):369-379.
    The goal of neuroeconomics is a mathematical theory of how the brain implements decisions, that is tied to behaviour. This theory is likely to show some decisions for which rational-choice theory is a good approximation, to provide a deeper level of distinction among competing behavioural alternatives, and to provide empirical inspiration for economics to incorporate more nuanced ideas about endogeneity of preferences, individual difference, emotions, endogeneous regulation of states, and so forth. I also address some concerns about rhetoric and practical (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  12. added 2019-06-06
    From Cognitive Science to Cognitive Neuroscience to Neuroeconomics: Steven R. Quartz.Steven R. Quartz - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):459-471.
    As an emerging discipline, neuroeconomics faces considerable methodological and practical challenges. In this paper, I suggest that these challenges can be understood by exploring the similarities and dissimilarities between the emergence of neuroeconomics and the emergence of cognitive and computational neuroscience two decades ago. From these parallels, I suggest the major challenge facing theory formation in the neural and behavioural sciences is that of being under-constrained by data, making a detailed understanding of physical implementation necessary for theory construction in neuroeconomics. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  13. added 2019-06-06
    Interactional Expertise Through The Looking Glass: A Peek at Mirror Neurons.Theresa Schilhab - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (4):741-747.
    Interactional expertise is here to stay. Undoubtedly, in some sense of the word, one can attain a linguistic expert level within a field without full scale practical immersion. In the context of the idea of embodied cognition, the claim is provocative. How can an interactional expert acquire full linguistic competence without the simultaneous bodily engagement and real life interaction needed to get the language right? How can one understand the concept of hammering if one has never seen a hammer or (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  14. added 2019-06-06
    What Makes Us Think?: A Neuroscientist and a Philosopher Argue About Ethics, Human Nature, and the Brain. [REVIEW]David Kaplan - 2004 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (1):115-118.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. added 2019-03-06
    Oxytocin, Empathy and Human Enhancement.Francisco Lara - 2017 - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 32 (3):367.
    This paper considers, firstly, to what extent the administration of oxytocin can augment the capacity of empathy in human beings; and secondly, whether or not such practice ought to be allowed. In relation to the latter, the author develops an argument in favour of this intervention by virtue of its consistency with the belief that, if a therapeutic treatment is to be considered acceptable, it is essential that it maximizes the well-being of those affected and that it does not compromise (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16. added 2019-01-08
    Cognitivism, Motivation, and Dual-Process Approaches to Normative Judgment.Brendan Cline - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.
    A central source of support for expressivist accounts of normative discourse is the intimate relationship between normative judgment and motivation. Expressivists argue that normative judgments must be noncognitive, desire-like states in order to be so tightly linked with motivation. Normative statements are then construed as expressions of these noncognitive states. In this paper, I draw on dual-process models in cognitive psychology to respond to this argument. According to my proposal, normative judgments are ordinary beliefs that are typically produced by two (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17. added 2019-01-01
    Resistance to Position Change, Motivated Reasoning, and Polarization.Matthew L. Stanley, Paul Henne, Brenda Yang & Felipe De Brigard - forthcoming - Political Behavior.
    People seem more divided than ever before over social and political issues, entrenched in their existing beliefs and unwilling to change them. Empirical research on mechanisms driving this resistance to belief change has focused on a limited set of well-known, charged, contentious issues and has not accounted for deliberation over reasons and arguments in belief formation prior to experimental sessions. With a large, heterogeneous sample (N = 3,001), we attempt to overcome these existing problems, and we investigate the causes and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. added 2018-12-11
    The Neuroscience of Moral Judgment.Joanna Demaree-Cotton & Guy Kahane - 2018 - In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology.
    This chapter examines the relevance of the cognitive science of morality to moral epistemology, with special focus on the issue of the reliability of moral judgments. It argues that the kind of empirical evidence of most importance to moral epistemology is at the psychological rather than neural level. The main theories and debates that have dominated the cognitive science of morality are reviewed with an eye to their epistemic significance.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. added 2018-11-01
    Does Neuroscience Undermine Morality?Paul Henne & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2018 - In Gregg D. Caruso & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.
  20. added 2018-10-04
    How to Debunk Moral Beliefs.Victor Kumar & Joshua May - 2019 - In Jussi Suikkanen & Antti Kauppinen (eds.), Methodology and Moral Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 25-48.
    Arguments attempting to debunk moral beliefs, by showing they are unjustified, have tended to be global, targeting all moral beliefs or a large set of them. Popular debunking arguments point to various factors purportedly influencing moral beliefs, from evolutionary pressures, to automatic and emotionally-driven processes, to framing effects. We show that these sweeping arguments face a debunker’s dilemma: either the relevant factor is not a main basis for belief or it does not render the relevant beliefs unjustified. Empirical debunking arguments (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  21. added 2018-09-17
    ‘Drugs That Make You Feel Bad’? Remorse-Based Mitigation and Neurointerventions.Jonathan Pugh & Hannah Maslen - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):499-522.
    In many jurisdictions, an offender’s remorse is considered to be a relevant factor to take into account in mitigation at sentencing. The growing philosophical interest in the use of neurointerventions in criminal justice raises an important question about such remorse-based mitigation: to what extent should technologically facilitated remorse be honoured such that it is permitted the same penal significance as standard instances of remorse? To motivate this question, we begin by sketching a tripartite account of remorse that distinguishes cognitive, affective (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22. added 2018-09-11
    Science and the Good: The Tragic Quest for the Foundations of Morality.James Davison Hunter & Paul Nedelisky - 2018 - Yale University Press.
    _Why efforts to create a scientific basis of morality are doomed to fail_ In this illuminating book, James Davison Hunter and Paul Nedelisky recount the centuries-long, passionate quest to discover a scientific foundation for morality. The "new moral science" led by such figures as E.O. Wilson, Patricia Churchland and Joshua Greene is only the newest manifestation of an effort that has failed repeatedly. Though claims for its accomplishments are often wildly exaggerated, this new iteration has been no more successful than (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. added 2018-09-09
    Judgment Before Principle: Engagement of the Frontoparietal Control Network in Condemning Harms of Omission. Cushman & Dylan Dodd - 2012 - Social, Cognitive, and Affective Neuroscience 7:888-895.
    Ordinary people make moral judgments that are consistent with philosophical and legal principles. Do those judgments derive from the controlled application of principles, or do the principles derive from automatic judgments? As a case study, we explore the tendency to judge harmful actions morally worse than harmful omissions (the ‘omission effect’) using fMRI. Because ordinary people readily and spontaneously articulate this moral distinction it has been suggested that principled reasoning may drive subsequent judgments. If so, people who exhibit the largest (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. added 2018-08-30
    I'm Not the Person I Used to Be: The Self and Autobiographical Memories of Immoral Actions.Matthew L. Stanley, Paul Henne, V. Iyengar, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Felipe De Brigard - 2017 - Journal of Experimental Psychology. General 146 (6).
    People maintain a positive identity in at least two ways: They evaluate themselves more favorably than other people, and they judge themselves to be better now than they were in the past. Both strategies rely on autobiographical memories. The authors investigate the role of autobiographical memories of lying and emotional harm in maintaining a positive identity. For memories of lying to or emotionally harming others, participants judge their own actions as less morally wrong and less negative than those in which (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25. added 2018-08-15
    Neuroethics and the Neuroscientific Turn.Jon Leefmann & Elisabeth Hildt - 2017 - In L. Syd M. Johnson & Karen S. Rommelfanger (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Neuroethics. New York City, New York, USA: pp. 14-32.
    Stimulated by a general salience of neuroscientific research and the declaration of neuroscience as one of the leading disciplines of the current century, a diversity of disciplines from the social sciences and the humanities have engaged in discussions about the role of the brain in various social and cultural phenomena. The general importance assigned to the brain in so many areas of academic and social life nowadays has been called the ‘neuroscientific turn’. One of the fields that gained particular attention (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  26. added 2018-06-27
    Current Controversies in Philosophy of Cognitive Science.Adam Lerner, Simon Cullen & Sarah-Jane Leslie (eds.) - forthcoming - Routledge.
    Cognitive science poses a variety of philosophical questions. In this forthcoming volume, leading researchers debate five core questions in the Philosophy of Cognitive Science: Is Universal Grammar required to explain our linguistic capacities? Are some of our concepts innate or are they all learned? What role do our bodies play in cognition? Can neuroscience help us understand the mind? Can cognitive science help us understand human morality? The volume contains two accessible essays on each topic, each advocating for an opposing (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. added 2018-06-13
    Moral Enhancement, Self-Governance, and Resistance.Pei-Hua Huang - 2018 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 43 (5):547-567.
    John Harris recently argues that the moral bioenhancement proposed by Persson and Savulescu can damage moral agency by depriving the recipients of their freedom to fall (freedom to make wrongful choices) and therefore should not be pursued. The link Harris makes between moral agency and the freedom to fall, however, implies that all forms of moral enhancement, including moral education, that aim to make the enhancement recipients less likely to “fall” are detrimental to moral agency. In this paper, I present (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28. added 2018-06-13
    Imaginative Value Sensitive Design: How Moral Imagination Exceeds Moral Law Theories in Informing Responsible Innovation.Steven Umbrello - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    Safe-by-Design (SBD) frameworks for the development of emerging technologies have become an ever more popular means by which scholars argue that transformative emerging technologies can safely incorporate human values. One such popular SBD methodology is called Value Sensitive Design (VSD). A central tenet of this design methodology is to investigate stakeholder values and design those values into technologies during early stage research and development (R&D). To accomplish this, the VSD framework mandates that designers consult the philosophical and ethical literature to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  29. added 2018-05-03
    Vigilance and Control.Samuel Murray & Manuel Vargas - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):825-843.
    We sometimes fail unwittingly to do things that we ought to do. And we are, from time to time, culpable for these unwitting omissions. We provide an outline of a theory of responsibility for unwitting omissions. We emphasize two distinctive ideas: (i) many unwitting omissions can be understood as failures of appropriate vigilance, and; (ii) the sort of self-control implicated in these failures of appropriate vigilance is valuable. We argue that the norms that govern vigilance and the value of self-control (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  30. added 2018-04-09
    Grounding Responsibility in Something (More) Solid.William Hirstein & Katrina Sifferd - 2018 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41.
    The cases that Doris chronicles of confabulation are similar to perceptual illusions in that, while they show the interstices of our perceptual or cognitive system, they fail to establish that our everyday perception or cognition is not for the most part correct. Doris's account in general lacks the resources to make synchronic assessments of responsibility, partially because it fails to make use of knowledge now available to us about what is happening in the brains of agents.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. added 2018-03-11
    Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind.Joshua May - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    The burgeoning science of ethics has produced a trend toward pessimism. Ordinary moral thought and action, we’re told, are profoundly influenced by arbitrary factors and ultimately driven by unreasoned feelings. This book counters the current orthodoxy on its own terms by carefully engaging with the empirical literature. The resulting view, optimistic rationalism, shows the pervasive role played by reason, and ultimately defuses sweeping debunking arguments in ethics. The science does suggest that moral knowledge and virtue don’t come easily. However, despite (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  32. added 2018-02-02
    Kwame Anthony Appiah, Experiments in Ethics Reviewed By.Darrell Arnold - 2010 - Philosophy in Review 30 (1):1-3.
  33. added 2017-07-17
    Evaluating Methods of Correcting for Multiple Comparisons Implemented in SPM12 in Social Neuroscience fMRI Studies: An Example From Moral Psychology.Hyemin Han & Andrea L. Glenn - 2018 - Social Neuroscience 13 (3):257-267.
    In fMRI research, the goal of correcting for multiple comparisons is to identify areas of activity that reflect true effects, and thus would be expected to replicate in future studies. Finding an appropriate balance between trying to minimize false positives (Type I error) while not being too stringent and omitting true effects (Type II error) can be challenging. Furthermore, the advantages and disadvantages of these types of errors may differ for different areas of study. In many areas of social neuroscience (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. added 2017-07-17
    Associations Between Psychopathic Traits and Brain Activity During Instructed False Responding.Andrea L. Glenn, Hyemin Han, Yaling Yang, Adrian Raine & Robert A. Schug - 2017 - Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging 266:123-137.
    Lying is one of the characteristic features of psychopathy, and has been recognized in clinical and diagnostic descriptions of the disorder, yet individuals with psychopathic traits have been found to have reduced neural activity in many of the brain regions that are important for lying. In this study, we examine brain activity in sixteen individuals with varying degrees of psychopathic traits during a task in which they are instructed to falsify information or tell the truth about autobiographical and non-autobiographical facts, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. added 2017-07-17
    Cultural Influences on the Neural Correlate of Moral Decision Making Processes.Hyemin Han, Gary H. Glover & Changwoo Jeong - 2014 - Behavioural Brain Research 259:215-228.
    This study compares the neural substrate of moral decision making processes between Korean and American participants. By comparison with Americans, Korean participants showed increased activity in the right putamen associated with socio-intuitive processes and right superior frontal gyrus associated with cognitive control processes under a moral-personal condition, and in the right postcentral sulcus associated with mental calculation in familiar contexts under a moral-impersonal condition. On the other hand, American participants showed a significantly higher degree of activity in the bilateral anterior (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  36. added 2017-05-10
    Moral Implications From Cognitive (Neuro)Science? No Clear Route.Micah Lott - 2016 - Ethics 127 (1):241-256.
    Joshua Greene argues that cognitive (neuro)science matters for ethics in two ways, the “direct route” and the “indirect route.” Greene illustrates the direct route with a debunking explanation of the inclination to condemn all incest. The indirect route is an updated version of Greene’s argument that dual-process moral psychology gives support for consequentialism over deontology. I consider each of Greene’s arguments, and I argue that neither succeeds. If there is a route from cognitive (neuro)science to ethics, Greene has not found (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  37. added 2017-05-10
    Recensão - Braintrust. What Neuroscience Tell Us About Morality.José António Alves - 2011 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 67 (4):817-825.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. added 2017-04-08
    How Can Neuroscience Contribute to Moral Philosophy, Psychology and Education Based on Aristotelian Virtue Ethics?Hyemin Han - 2016 - International Journal of Ethics Education 1 (2):201-217.
    The present essay discusses the relationship between moral philosophy, psychology and education based on virtue ethics, contemporary neuroscience, and how neuroscientific methods can contribute to studies of moral virtue and character. First, the present essay considers whether the mechanism of moral motivation and developmental model of virtue and character are well supported by neuroscientific evidence. Particularly, it examines whether the evidence provided by neuroscientific studies can support the core argument of virtue ethics, that is, motivational externalism. Second, it discusses how (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  39. added 2017-03-10
    Influence of the Cortical Midline Structures on Moral Emotion and Motivation in Moral Decision-Making.Hyemin Han, Jingyuan E. Chen, Changwoo Jeong & Gary H. Glover - 2016 - Behavioural Brain Research 302:237-251.
    The present study aims to examine the relationship between the cortical midline structures (CMS), which have been regarded to be associated with selfhood, and moral decision making processes at the neural level. Traditional moral psychological studies have suggested the role of moral self as the moderator of moral cognition, so activity of moral self would present at the neural level. The present study examined the interaction between the CMS and other moral-related regions by conducting psycho-physiological interaction analysis of functional images (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  40. added 2017-03-09
    Neural Correlates of Moral Sensitivity and Moral Judgment Associated with Brain Circuitries of Selfhood: A Meta-Analysis.Hyemin Han - 2017 - Journal of Moral Education 46 (2):97-113.
    The present study meta-analyzed 45 experiments with 959 subjects and 463 activation foci reported in 43 published articles that investigated the neural mechanism of moral functions by comparing neural activity between the moral-task and non-moral-task conditions with the Activation Likelihood Estimate method. The present study examined the common activation foci of morality-related task conditions. In addition, this study compared the neural correlates of moral sensibility with the neural correlates of moral judgment, which are the two functional components in the Neo-Kohlbergian (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  41. added 2017-02-28
    Discovering the Neural Nature of Moral Cognition? Empirical, Theoretical, and Practical Challenges in Bioethical Research with Electroencephalography (EEG).Nils-Frederic Wagner, Pedro Chaves & Annemarie Wolff - 2017 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 14 (2):1-15.
    In this article we critically review the neural mechanisms of moral cognition that have recently been studied via electroencephalography (EEG). Such studies promise to shed new light on traditional moral questions by helping us to understand how effective moral cognition is embodied in the brain. It has been argued that conflicting normative ethical theories require different cognitive features and can, accordingly, in a broadly conceived naturalistic attempt, be associated with different brain processes that are rooted in different brain networks and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. added 2017-02-28
    A Fallacious Jar? The Peculiar Relation Between Descriptive Premises and Normative Conclusions in Neuroethics.Nils-Frederic Wagner & Georg Northoff - 2015 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 36 (3):215-235.
    Ethical questions have traditionally been approached through conceptual analysis. Inspired by the rapid advance of modern brain imaging techniques, however, some ethical questions appear in a new light. For example, hotly debated trolley dilemmas have recently been studied by psychologists and neuroscientists alike, arguing that their findings can support or debunk moral intuitions that underlie those dilemmas. Resulting from the wedding of philosophy and neuroscience, neuroethics has emerged as a novel interdisciplinary field that aims at drawing conclusive relationships between neuroscientific (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  43. added 2017-02-13
    Moral Thinking, More and Less Quickly.G. Skorburg, Mark Alfano & C. Karns - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Education.
    Cushman, Young, & Greene (2010) urge the consolidation of moral psychology around a dual-system consensus. On this view, a slow, often-overstretched rational system tends to produce consequentialist intuitions and action-tendencies, while a fast, affective system produces virtuous (or vicious) intuitions and action-tendencies that perform well in their habituated ecological niche but sometimes disastrously outside of it. This perspective suggests a habit-corrected-by-reason picture of moral behavior. Recent research, however, has raised questions about the adequacy of dual-process theories of cognition and behavior, (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. added 2017-02-13
    Liao, S. Matthew , Moral Brains: The Neuroscience of Morality: New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. Paperback € 22,13, Pp. 384.Mark Alfano - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (3):671-674.
    Matthew Liao is to be commended for editing Moral Brains, a fine collection showcasing truly 12 excellent chapters by, among others, James Woodward, Molly Crocket, and Jana Schaich 13 Borg. In addition to Liao’s detailed, fair-minded, and comprehensive introduction, the book 14 has fourteen chapters. Of these, one is a reprint (Joshua Greene ch. 4), one a re-articulation of 15 previously published arguments (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ch. 14), and one a literature review 16 (Oliveira-Souza, Zahn, and Moll ch. 9). The rest (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. added 2016-12-27
    The Applicability of Psychological and Moral Distinctions in an Emerging Neuroscientific Framework.Nada Gligorov - 2016 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 7 (4):191-192.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. added 2016-12-08
    Is Deontology a Moral Confabulation?Emilian Mihailov - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (1):1-13.
    Joshua Greene has put forward the bold empirical hypothesis that deontology is a confabulation of moral emotions. Deontological philosophy does not steam from "true" moral reasoning, but from emotional reactions, backed up by post hoc rationalizations which play no role in generating the initial moral beliefs. In this paper, I will argue against the confabulation hypothesis. First, I will highlight several points in Greene’s discussion of confabulation, and identify two possible models. Then, I will argue that the evidence does not (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  47. added 2016-12-08
    Is Evidence From Social Psychology and Neuroscience Relevant to Philosophical Debates in Normative Ethics?Boris Rähme - 2014 - Annali di Studi Religiosi 14:145-165.
    This article presents some considerations concerning the relevance of empirical research from neuroscience and social psychology for philosophical debates in normative ethics. While many authors hold that there are findings and theories from those fields that are relevant to normative ethics, it often remains unclear precisely how this relevance relation is to be construed and spelled out. The article critically discusses various proposals which have recently been made in this regard by philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. added 2016-12-08
    Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin Libet.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Lynn Nadel (eds.) - 2010 - Oup Usa.
    We all seem to think that we do the acts we do because we consciously choose to do them. This commonsense view is thrown into dispute by Benjamin Libet's eyebrow-raising experiments, which seem to suggest that conscious will occurs not before but after the start of brain activity that produces physical action.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  49. added 2016-12-08
    The Cognitive Neuroscience of Psychopathy and Implications for Judgments of Responsibility.R. James R. Blair - 2008 - Neuroethics 1 (3):149-157.
    Psychopathy is a developmental disorder associated with specific forms of emotional dysfunction and an increased risk for both frustration-based reactive aggression and goal-directed instrumental antisocial behavior. While the full behavioral manifestation of the disorder is under considerable social influence, the basis of this disorder appears to be genetic. At the neural level, individuals with psychopathy show atypical responding within the amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Moreover, the roles of the amygdala in stimulus-reinforcement learning and responding to emotional expressions and vmPFC (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  50. added 2016-12-08
    Decision-Making: A Neuroeconomic Perspective.Benoit Hardy-Vallée - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (6):939–953.
    This article introduces and discusses from a philosophical point of view the nascent field of neuroeconomics, which is the study of neural mechanisms involved in decision-making and their economic significance. Following a survey of the ways in which decision-making is usually construed in philosophy, economics and psychology, I review many important findings in neuroeconomics to show that they suggest a revised picture of decision-making and ourselves as choosing agents. Finally, I outline a neuroeconomic account of irrationality.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 162