About this topic
Summary Neuroethics is divided into two main branches: the ethics of neuroscience and the neuroscience of ethics. The former encompasses questions similar to the field of applied ethics (e.g. Do brain reading technologies violate privacy? Can patients seeking drastic brain transformations properly consent to the procedure? Do we have an obligation to enhance ourselves by altering our brains?). The neuroscience of ethics (this category), however, concerns what results in neuroscience tell us about ethics.  This category covers topics more familiar to those working in normative ethics and metaethics. Core questions include: (1) Does neuroscience undermine free will or moral responsibility? (2) Does research on brain areas suggest that certain moral intuitions are unreliable? (3) What does the neurobiology of disorders, like psychopathy and autism, tell us about normal moral judgment and behavior? (4) Can people with brain disorders be held morally or criminally responsible?
Key works On freedom and responsibility: Libet 1999; Wegner 2004; Mele 2008. On moral intuitions: Greene 2008; Berker 2009.  On neurological disorders and ethics: Kennett 2002Roskies 2003; Schroeder et al 2010. On psychopathy and responsibility: Blair 2008; Fine & Kennett 2004; Maibom 2008.
Introductions Encyclopedia entry: Roskies 2016. Three key books: Levy 2007, Glannon 2011, and Farah 2010. Briefer introductions include: Roskies 2002 (the locus classicus), Levy 2008 (in Neuroethics), Levy 2009 (in Phil Compass). Two recent handbooks of neuroethics generally: Illes & Sahakian 2011 and Clausen 2014.
Related categories

138 found
1 — 50 / 138
  1. Liao, S. Matthew , Moral Brains: The Neuroscience of Morality.Mark Alfano - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (3):671-674.
  2. Recensão - Braintrust. What Neuroscience Tell Us About Morality.José António Alves - 2011 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 67 (4):817-825.
  3. More Experiments in Ethics.Kwame Anthony Appiah - 2010 - Neuroethics 3 (3):233-242.
    This paper responds to the four critiques of my book Experiments in Ethics published in this issue. The main theme I take up is how we should understand the relation between psychology and philosophy. Young and Saxe believe that “bottom line” evaluative judgments don’t depend on facts. I argue for a different view, according to which our evaluative and non-evaluative judgments must cohere in a way that makes it rational, sometimes, to abandon even what looks like a basic evaluative judgment (...)
  4. Kwame Anthony Appiah, Experiments in Ethics. [REVIEW]Darrell Arnold - 2010 - Philosophy in Review 30:1-3.
  5. Learning From Law's Past: A Call for Caution in Incorporating New Innovations in Neuroscience.Jennifer S. Bard - 2007 - American Journal of Bioethics 7 (9):73-75.
  6. The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience.Selim Berker - 2009 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (4):293-329.
    It has been claimed that the recent wave of neuroscientific research into the physiological underpinnings of our moral intuitions has normative implications. In particular, it has been claimed that this research discredits our deontological intuitions about cases, without discrediting our consequentialist intuitions about cases. In this paper I demur. I argue that such attempts to extract normative conclusions from neuroscientific research face a fundamental dilemma: either they focus on the emotional or evolved nature of the psychological processes underlying deontological intuitions, (...)
  7. Wanting and Liking: Observations From the Neuroscience and Psychology Laboratory.Kent C. Berridge - 2009 - Inquiry 52 (4):378 – 398.
    Different brain mechanisms seem to mediate wanting and liking for the same reward. This may have implications for the modular nature of mental processes, and for understanding addictions, compulsions, free will and other aspects of desire. A few wanting and liking phenomena are presented here, together with discussion of some of these implications.
  8. Potential for Bias in the Context of Neuroethics.Stephanie J. Bird - 2012 - Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (3):593-600.
    Neuroscience research, like all science, is vulnerable to the influence of extraneous values in the practice of research, whether in research design or the selection, analysis and interpretation of data. This is particularly problematic for research into the biological mechanisms that underlie behavior, and especially the neurobiological underpinnings of moral development and ethical reasoning, decision-making and behavior, and the other elements of what is often called the neuroscience of ethics. The problem arises because neuroscientists, like most everyone, bring to their (...)
  9. Neuro-Cognitive Systems Involved in Morality.James Blair, A. A. Marsh, E. Finger, K. S. Blair & J. Luo - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):13 – 27.
    In this paper, we will consider the neuro-cognitive systems involved in mediating morality. Five main claims will be made. First, that there are multiple, partially separable neuro-cognitive architectures that mediate specific aspects of morality: social convention, care-based morality, disgust-based morality and fairness/justice. Second, that all aspects of morality, including social convention, involve affect. Third, that the neural system particularly important for social convention, given its role in mediating anger and responding to angry expressions, is ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. Fourth, that the (...)
  10. The Cognitive Neuroscience of Psychopathy and Implications for Judgments of Responsibility.R. James R. Blair - 2008 - Neuroethics 1 (3):149-157.
    Psychopathy is a developmental disorder associated with specific forms of emotional dysfunction and an increased risk for both frustration-based reactive aggression and goal-directed instrumental antisocial behavior. While the full behavioral manifestation of the disorder is under considerable social influence, the basis of this disorder appears to be genetic. At the neural level, individuals with psychopathy show atypical responding within the amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Moreover, the roles of the amygdala in stimulus-reinforcement learning and responding to emotional expressions and vmPFC (...)
  11. Is Neuroeconomics Doomed by the Reverse Inference Fallacy?Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde - 2010 - Mind and Society 9 (2):229-249.
    Neuroeconomic studies are liable to fall into the reverse inference fallacy, a form of affirmation of the consequent. More generally neuroeconomics relies on two problematic steps, namely the inference from brain activities to the engagement of cognitive processes in experimental tasks, and the presupposition that such inferred cognitive processes are relevant to economic theorizing. The first step only constitutes the reverse inference fallacy proper and ways to correct it include a better sense of the neural response selectivity of the targeted (...)
  12. Man and His Values Considered Neurologically.Richard M. Brickner - 1944 - Journal of Philosophy 41 (9):225-243.
  13. Social Bonds, Motivational Conflict, and Altruism: Implications for Neurobiology.Stephanie L. Brown & R. Michael Brown - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (3):351-352.
    Depue & Morrone-Strupinsky (D&M-S) do not address how a reward system accommodates the motivational dilemmas associated with (a) the decision to approach versus avoid conspecifics, and (b) self versus other tradeoffs inherent in behaving altruistically toward bonded relationship partners. We provide an alternative evolutionary view that addresses motivational conflict, and discuss implications for the neurobiological study of affiliative bonds.
  14. Editorial: What Can Neuroscience Contribute to Ethics?T. Buller - forthcoming - Journal of Medical Ethics.
  15. Neuroscience of Rule-Guided Behavior.Silvia A. Bunge & Jonathan D. Wallis (eds.) - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    euroscience of Rule-Guided Behavior brings together, for the first time, the experiments and theories that have created the new science of rules. Rules are central to human behavior, but until now the field of neuroscience lacked a synthetic approach to understanding them. How are rules learned, retrieved from memory, maintained in consciousness and implemented? How are they used to solve problems and select among actions and activities? How are the various levels of rules represented in the brain, ranging from simple (...)
  16. Free Will and Responsibility. A Guide for Practitioners.John S. Callender - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    This book is aimed primarily at the practitioners of morals such as psychiatrists,lawyers and policy-makers. My professional background is clinical psychiatry It is divided into three parts. The first of these provides an overview of moral theory, morality in non-human species and recent developments in neuroscience that are of relevance to moral and legal responsibility. In the second part I offer a new paradigm of free action based on the overlaps between free will, moral value and art. In the overlap (...)
  17. The Potential of Neuroeconomics.Colin F. Camerer - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):369-379.
    The goal of neuroeconomics is a mathematical theory of how the brain implements decisions, that is tied to behaviour. This theory is likely to show some decisions for which rational-choice theory is a good approximation (particularly for evolutionarily sculpted or highly learned choices), to provide a deeper level of distinction among competing behavioural alternatives, and to provide empirical inspiration for economics to incorporate more nuanced ideas about endogeneity of preferences, individual difference, emotions, endogeneous regulation of states, and so forth. I (...)
  18. The Social Implications of Neurobiological Explanations of Resistible Compulsions.Adrian Carter & Wayne Hall - 2007 - American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):15 – 17.
    The authors comments on several articles on addiction. Research suggests that addicted individuals have substantial impairments in cognitive control of behavior. The authors maintain that a proper study of addiction must include a neurobiological model of addiction to draw the attention of bioethicists and addiction neurobiologists. They also state that more addiction neuroscientists like S. E. Hyman are needed as they understand the limits of their research. Accession Number: 24077921; Authors: Carter, Adrian 1; Email Address: adrian.carter@uq.edu.au Hall, Wayne 1; Affiliations: (...)
  19. Neuropeptides Influence Expression of and Capacity to Form Social Bonds.C. S. Carter, K. L. Bales & S. W. Porges - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (3):353-354.
    In the present commentary we expand on two concepts relevant to understanding affliliative bonding. Differences and similarities between the functions and actions of oxytocin and vasopressin are difficult to study but may be critical to an understanding of mechanisms for social bonding. What is termed here a “trait of affiliation” may reflect in part the capacity of these same peptides to program the developing nervous system.
  20. Neurobiology Supports Virtue Theory on the Role of Heuristics in Moral Cognition.William D. Casebeer - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):547-548.
    Sunstein is right that poorly informed heuristics can influence moral judgment. His case could be strengthened by tightening neurobiologically plausible working definitions regarding what a heuristic is, considering a background moral theory that has more strength in wide reflective equilibrium than “weak consequentialism,” and systematically examining what naturalized virtue theory has to say about the role of heuristics in moral reasoning.
  21. Intériorité Et Objectivation du Subjectif En Neurophysiologie.Paul Chauchard - 1957 - Acta Biotheoretica 12 (3):167-186.
    The problem of inferiority, of subjectivity, of conscience, is not only a metaphysical or psychological problem; it is susceptible to objective scientific study at the neurophysiological level. This study must not stop, however, at an analysis of cerebral function but must also recognize that conscience results from the self-being of the individual at himself in certain structures of his brain and that a cerebral process is or is not conscious according to whether or not it is integrated into the structure (...)
  22. Toward a Cognitive Neurobiology of the Moral Virtues.P. M. Churchland - 2010 - In James J. Giordano & Bert Gordijn (eds.), Topoi. Cambridge University Press. pp. 77.
  23. Human Dignity From a Neurophilosophical Perspective.Patricia S. Churchland - 2008 - In Adam Schulman (ed.), Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President's Council on Bioethics. [President's Council on Bioethics.
  24. Eager for Fairness or for Revenge? Psychological Altruism in Economics.Christine Clavien & Rebekka A. Klein - 2010 - Economics and Philosophy 26 (3):267-290.
    To understand the human capacity for psychological altruism, one requires a proper understanding of how people actually think and feel. This paper addresses the possible relevance of recent findings in experimental economics and neuroeconomics to the philosophical controversy over altruism and egoism. After briefly sketching and contextualizing the controversy, we survey and discuss the results of various studies on behaviourally altruistic helping and punishing behaviour, which provide stimulating clues for the debate over psychological altruism. On closer analysis, these studies prove (...)
  25. Does Empirical Moral Psychology Rest on a Mistake?Patrick Clipsham - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):215-233.
    Many philosophers assume that philosophical theories about the psychological nature of moral judgment can be confirmed or disconfirmed by the kind of evidence gathered by natural and social scientists (especially experimental psychologists and neuroscientists). I argue that this assumption is mistaken. For the most part, empirical evidence can do no work in these philosophical debates, as the metaphorical heavy-lifting is done by the pre-experimental assumptions that make it possible to apply empirical data to these philosophical debates. For the purpose of (...)
  26. Judgments About Moral Responsibility and Determinism in Patients with Behavioural Variant of Frontotemporal Dementia: Still Compatibilists.Florian Cova, Maxime Bertoux, Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde & Bruno Dubois - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):851-864.
    Do laypeople think that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism? Recently, philosophers and psychologists trying to answer this question have found contradictory results: while some experiments reveal people to have compatibilist intuitions, others suggest that people could in fact be incompatibilist. To account for this contradictory answers, Nichols and Knobe (2007) have advanced a ‘performance error model’ according to which people are genuine incompatibilist that are sometimes biased to give compatibilist answers by emotional reactions. To test for this hypothesis, we (...)
  27. Multi-System Moral Psychology.Fiery Cushman, Liane Young & Joshua D. Greene - 2010 - In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press.
  28. Neurobiological Bases of Aggression, Violence, and Cruelty.María Inés de Aguirre - 2006 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (3):228-229.
    Aggression, violence, and cruelty are symptoms of psychiatric illness. They reflect abnormalities in the regulation of the stress and emotion circuitries. The functioning of these circuitries depends upon the interaction between genetics and environment. Abuse and neglect during infancy, as well as maternal stress and poor quality of maternal care, are some of the causes that produce these types of abnormal behavior. Research on the neurobiological bases of emotion regulation will allow the detection of the population at risk.
  29. Does Neuroscience Undermine Deontological Theory?Richard Dean - 2010 - Neuroethics 3 (1):43-60.
    Joshua Greene has argued that several lines of empirical research, including his own fMRI studies of brain activity during moral decision-making, comprise strong evidence against the legitimacy of deontology as a moral theory. This is because, Greene maintains, the empirical studies establish that “characteristically deontological” moral thinking is driven by prepotent emotional reactions which are not a sound basis for morality in the contemporary world, while “characteristically consequentialist” thinking is a more reliable moral guide because it is characterized by greater (...)
  30. A Modest Intuitionist Reply to Greene's fMRI-Based Objections to Deontology.Dan Demetriou - 2009 - Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1):107-117.
    I argue that Greene’s research, although fascinating for many reasons, doesn’t undermine deontological moral philosophy. This is because both sentimentalist and rationalist moral epistemologies, applied to deontological value, predict exactly the data Greene has found. My discussion proceeds in three steps. In the first section I summarize Greene’s brief against deontology. In the second section I draw on standard accounts of moral emotions to suggest that there are ‘deontological emotions’ made rational by appearances of ‘deontological value.’ Finally, I outline a (...)
  31. Sex Differences and Neuroethics.Peggy DesAutels - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):95-111.
    Discussions in neuroethics to date have ignored an ever-increasing neuroscientific lilterature on sex differences in brains. If, indeed, there are significant differences in the brains of men versus women and in the brains of boys versus girls, the ethical and social implications loom very large. I argue that recent neuroscientific findings on sex-based brain differences have significant implications for theories of morality and for our understandings of the neuroscience of moral cognition and behavior.
  32. Anthropological Challenges Raised by Neuroscience: Some Ethical Reflections.Hubert Doucet - 2007 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 16 (2):219-226.
    The Nobel Laureate Illya Prigogine compares the recent breakthroughs in human biology to the major changes that occurred when the Neolithic period succeeded the Paleolithic, 12,000 years ago. Although there is disagreement about the meaning of these changes, most opposing views recognize that a “major transformation” took place. Some interpret the recent breakthroughs in neuroscience as the first step toward “our posthuman future” whereas others see the consequences of these achievements as the end of humankind. Genomics and neuroscience are the (...)
  33. Neuroscience's Uncertain Threat to Criminal Law.Rebecca Dresser - 2008 - Hastings Center Report 38 (6):9-10.
  34. Mirror Neurons and the Reenchantment of Bioethics.James Duffy - 2009 - American Journal of Bioethics 9 (9):2-4.
  35. The Empathic Emotions and Self-Love in Bishop Joseph Butler and the Neurosciences.Arthur J. Dyck & Carlos Padilla - 2009 - Journal of Religious Ethics 37 (4):577-612.
    In Joseph Butler, we have an account of human beings as moral beings that is, as this essay demonstrates, being supported by the recently emerging findings of the neurosciences. This applies particularly to Butler's portrayal of our empathic emotions. Butler discovered their moral significance for motivating and guiding moral decisions and actions before the neurosciences did. Butler has, in essence, added a sixth sense to our five senses: this is the moral sense by means of which we perceive what we (...)
  36. Neuroethics: An Introduction with Readings.Martha J. Farah - 2010 - MIT Press.
    Neuroscience increasingly allows us to explain, predict, and even control aspects of human behavior. The ethical issues that arise from these developments extend beyond the boundaries of conventional bioethics into philosophy of mind, psychology, theology, public policy, and the law. This broader set of concerns is the subject matter of neuroethics. In this book, leading neuroscientist Martha Farah introduces the reader to the key issues of neuroethics, placing them in scientific and cultural context and presenting a carefully chosen set of (...)
  37. Neurosentimentalism and Moral Agency.Philip Gerrans & Jeanette Kennett - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):585-614.
    Metaethics has recently been confronted by evidence from cognitive neuroscience that tacit emotional processes play an essential causal role in moral judgement. Most neuroscientists, and some metaethicists, take this evidence to vindicate a version of metaethical sentimentalism. In this paper we argue that the ‘dual process’ model of cognition that frames the discussion within and without philosophy does not do justice to an important constraint on any theory of deliberation and judgement. Namely, decision-making is the exercise of a capacity for (...)
  38. Deep Brain Stimulation for Treatment Resistant Depression: Postoperative Feelings of Self-Estrangement, Suicide Attempt and Impulsive–Aggressive Behaviours.Frederic Gilbert - 2013 - Neuroethics 6 (3):473-481.
    The goal of this article is to shed light on Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) postoperative suicidality risk factors within Treatment Resistant Depression (TRD) patients, in particular by focusing on the ethical concern of enrolling patient with history of self-estrangement, suicide attempts and impulsive–aggressive inclinations. In order to illustrate these ethical issues we report and review a clinical case associated with postoperative feelings of self-estrangement, self-harm behaviours and suicide attempt leading to the removal of DBS devices. Could prospectively identifying and excluding (...)
  39. Brain, Body, and Mind: Neuroethics with a Human Face.Walter Glannon - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    This book is a discussion of the most timely and contentious issues in the two branches of neuroethics: the neuroscience of ethics; and the ethics of neuroscience. Drawing upon recent work in psychiatry, neurology, and neurosurgery, it develops a phenomenologically inspired theory of neuroscience to explain the brain-mind relation. The idea that the mind is shaped not just by the brain but also by the body and how the human subject interacts with the environment has significant implications for free will, (...)
  40. The Applicability of Psychological and Moral Distinctions in an Emerging Neuroscientific Framework.Nada Gligorov - 2016 - AJOB Neuroscience 7 (4):191-192.
  41. Cognitive Control in Altruism and Self-Control: A Social Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective.Jeremy R. Gray & Todd S. Braver - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):260-260.
    The primrose path and prisoner's dilemma paradigms may require cognitive (executive) control: The active maintenance of context representations in lateral prefrontal cortex to provide top-down support for specific behaviors in the face of short delays or stronger response tendencies. This perspective suggests further tests of whether altruism is a type of self-control, including brain imaging, induced affect, and dual-task studies.
  42. Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them.Joshua Greene - 2013 - Penguin Press.
    Our brains were designed for tribal life, for getting along with a select group of others and for fighting off everyone else. But modern times have forced the world’s tribes into a shared space, resulting in epic clashes of values along with unprecedented opportunities. As the world shrinks, the moral lines that divide us become more salient and more puzzling. We fight over everything from tax codes to gay marriage to global warming, and we wonder where, if at all, we (...)
  43. The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul.Joshua Greene - 2008 - In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Vol. 3. MIT Press.
    In this essay, I draw on Haidt’s and Baron’s respective insights in the service of a bit of philosophical psychoanalysis. I will argue that deontological judgments tend to be driven by emotional responses, and that deontological philosophy, rather than being grounded in moral reasoning, is to a large extent3 an exercise in moral rationalization. This is in contrast to consequentialism, which, I will argue, arises from rather different psychological processes, ones that are more “cognitive,” and more likely to involve genuine (...)
  44. Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)Science Matters for Ethics.Joshua D. Greene - 2014 - Ethics 124 (4):695-726.
    In this article I explain why cognitive science (including some neuroscience) matters for normative ethics. First, I describe the dual-process theory of moral judgment and briefly summarize the evidence supporting it. Next I describe related experimental research examining influences on intuitive moral judgment. I then describe two ways in which research along these lines can have implications for ethics. I argue that a deeper understanding of moral psychology favors certain forms of consequentialism over other classes of normative moral theory. I (...)
  45. Wisdom: From Philosophy to Neuroscience.Stephen S. Hall - 2010 - Alfred A. Knopf.
    Wisdom defined (sort of) What is wisdom? ; The wisest man in the world : the philosophical roots of wisdom ; Heart and mind : the psychological roots of wisdom -- Eight neural pillars of wisdom. Emotional regulation : the art of coping ; Knowing what's important : the neural mechanism of establishing value and making a judgment ; Moral reasoning : the biology of judging right from wrong ; Compassion : the biology of loving-kindness and empathy ; Humility : (...)
  46. Neural Correlates of Moral Sensitivity and Moral Judgment Associated with Brain Circuitries of Selfhood: A Meta-Analysis.Hyemin Han - 2017 - Journal of Moral Education 46 (2):97-113.
    The present study meta-analyzed 45 experiments with 959 subjects and 463 activation foci reported in 43 published articles that investigated the neural mechanism of moral functions by comparing neural activity between the moral-task and non-moral-task conditions with the Activation Likelihood Estimate method. The present study examined the common activation foci of morality-related task conditions. In addition, this study compared the neural correlates of moral sensibility with the neural correlates of moral judgment, which are the two functional components in the Neo-Kohlbergian (...)
  47. How Can Neuroscience Contribute to Moral Philosophy, Psychology and Education Based on Aristotelian Virtue Ethics?Hyemin Han - 2016 - International Journal of Ethics Education 1 (2):201-217.
    The present essay discusses the relationship between moral philosophy, psychology and education based on virtue ethics, contemporary neuroscience, and how neuroscientific methods can contribute to studies of moral virtue and character. First, the present essay considers whether the mechanism of moral motivation and developmental model of virtue and character are well supported by neuroscientific evidence. Particularly, it examines whether the evidence provided by neuroscientific studies can support the core argument of virtue ethics, that is, motivational externalism. Second, it discusses how (...)
  48. Influence of the Cortical Midline Structures on Moral Emotion and Motivation in Moral Decision-Making.Hyemin Han, Jingyuan E. Chen, Changwoo Jeong & Gary H. Glover - 2016 - Behavioural Brain Research 302:237-251.
    The present study aims to examine the relationship between the cortical midline structures (CMS), which have been regarded to be associated with selfhood, and moral decision making processes at the neural level. Traditional moral psychological studies have suggested the role of moral self as the moderator of moral cognition, so activity of moral self would present at the neural level. The present study examined the interaction between the CMS and other moral-related regions by conducting psycho-physiological interaction analysis of functional images (...)
  49. Decision-Making: A Neuroeconomic Perspective.Benoit Hardy-Vallée - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (6):939–953.
    This article introduces and discusses from a philosophical point of view the nascent field of neuroeconomics, which is the study of neural mechanisms involved in decision-making and their economic significance. Following a survey of the ways in which decision-making is usually construed in philosophy, economics and psychology, I review many important findings in neuroeconomics to show that they suggest a revised picture of decision-making and ourselves as choosing agents. Finally, I outline a neuroeconomic account of irrationality.
  50. Neuroeconomics: A Rejoinder.Glenn W. Harrison - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):533-544.
    Nobody in this debate questions the point that neuroeconomics remains full of potential, and little else as yet. If so, that really is progress of sorts. I was getting afraid that we would have to open nominations for the Captain Ahab Award for obsessive work on the promotion of neuroeconomics.
1 — 50 / 138