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  1. Bertrand Russell's Neutral Monism.Mafizuddin Ahmed - 1989 - Mittal Publications.
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  2. Neural Correlate of Consciousness in a Single Electron: Radical Answer to “Quantum Theories of Consciousness”.Victor Argonov - 2012 - Neuroquantology 12 (2):276-285.
    We argue that human consciousness may be a property of single electron in the brain. We suppose that each electron in the universe has at least primitive consciousness. Each electron subjectively “observes” its quantum dynamics (energy, momentum, “shape” of wave function) in the form of sensations and other mental phenomena. However, some electrons in neural cells have complex “human” consciousnesses due to complex quantum dynamics in complex organic environment. We discuss neurophysiological and physical aspects of this hypothesis and show that: (...)
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  3. Dual-Aspect Monism À la Pauli and Jung.Harald Atmanspacher - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (9-10):9-10.
    Dual-aspect monism and neutral monism offer interesting alternatives to mainstream positions concerning the mind-matter problem. Both assume a domain underlying the mind-matter distinction, but they also differ in definitive ways. In the twentieth century, variants of both positions have been advanced by a number of protagonists. One of these variants, the dual-aspect monism due toWolfgang Pauli and Carl Gustav Jung, will be described and commented on in detail. As a unique feature in the Pauli-Jung conception, the duality of mental and (...)
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  4. The Realistic Empiricism of Mach, James, and Russell: Neutral Monism Reconceived.Erik C. Banks - 2014 - Cambridge University Press.
    The book revives the neutral monism of Mach, James, and Russell and applies the updated view to the problem of redefining physicalism, explaining the origins of sensation, and the problem of deriving extended physical objects and systems from an ontology of events.
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  5. Sympathy for the Devil: Reconsidering Ernst Mach's Empiricism. [REVIEW]Erik C. Banks - 2012 - Metascience 21 (2):321-330.
    A 2012 review article for Metascience which explains Mach's realistic brand of empiricism, contrasting it with the common phenomenalist reading of Mach by John Blackmore in two recent books.
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  6. Neutral Monism Reconsidered.Erik C. Banks - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (2):173-187.
    Neutral monism is a position in metaphysics defended by Mach, James, and Russell in the early twentieth century. It holds that minds and physical objects are essentially two different orderings of the same underlying neutral elements of nature. This paper sets out some of the central concepts, theses and the historical background of ideas that inform this doctrine of elements. The discussion begins with the classic neutral monism of Mach, James, and Russell in the first part of the paper, then (...)
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  7. Ernst Mach's World Elements.Erik C. Banks - 2003 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    A consideration of Mach's elements, his philosophy of neutral monism, and philosophy of physics, especially space and time, much of it based on unpublished writings from the Nachlass and other original sources. The historical connection between Mach and logical positivism is shown to be superficial at best, and Mach's elements are shown to be mind independent natural qualities (world-elements) with dynamic force, not limited to human sensations.
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  8. What Is Consciousness?Rodney Bartlett - 2015 - Vixra.Org/Author/Rodney_bartlett.
    On the Australian Broadcasting Corporation's current affairs program "7.30 Report" (29/01/2015), presenter Leigh Sales asked Canadian psychiatrist and author Norman Doidge "What is the difference between the mind and the brain?" Dr. Doidge's reply - "Well, the brain is thought to be roughly three pounds of physical material and nobody, to my mind, has adequately defined and established what the contours of mind are - and that includes all the neuroscientists I know, with respect." -/- I’ve recently read interesting thoughts (...)
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  9. Dual‐Aspect Monism.Jiri Benovsky - 2016 - Philosophical Investigations 39 (4):335-352.
    In this article, I am interested in dual-aspect monism as a solution to the mind-body problem. This view is not new, but it is somewhat under-represented in the contemporary debate, and I would like to help it make its way. Dual-aspect monism is a parsimonious, elegant and simple view. It avoids problems with “mental causation”. It naturally explains how and why mental states are correlated with physical states while avoiding any mysteries concerning the nature of this relation. It fits well (...)
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  10. Dual‐Aspect Monism.Jiri Benovsky - 2015 - Philosophical Investigations 38 (4):335-352.
    In this article, I am interested in dual-aspect monism as a solution to the mind-body problem. This view is not new, but it is somewhat under-represented in the contemporary debate, and I would like to help it make its way. Dual-aspect monism is a parsimonious, elegant and simple view. It avoids problems with “mental causation”. It naturally explains how and why mental states are correlated with physical states while avoiding any mysteries concerning the nature of this relation. It fits well (...)
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  11. Ernst Mach: Neutral Monism.Manjulekha Bhattacharya - 1972 - Studi Internazionali Di Filosofia 4:145-182.
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  12. 'Pure Experience' and the External World.Boyd H. Bode - 1905 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (5):128-133.
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  13. The Concept of Pure Experience.Boyd H. Bode - 1905 - Philosophical Review 14 (6):684-695.
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  14. Pure Experience and Reality: A Reassertion.Bradley McGilvary Evander - 1907 - Philosophical Review 16 (4):422-424.
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  15. Is Psycho-Physical Emergentism Committed to Dualism? The Causal Efficacy of Emergent Mental Properties.Godehard Brüntrup - 1998 - Erkenntnis 48 (2):133-151.
  16. Consciousness and The Prospects of Physicalism. [REVIEW]Coleman Sam - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):824-827.
    © 2013 The Editors of The Philosophical QuarterlyThis is a very good, very helpful book. In describing two possible outgrowths of contemporary physicalism, Pereboom performs a feat of time‐travel: he takes us forward to see the fruits ultimately to be produced by current seeds of thought. One of these branches—based on the ‘qualitative inaccuracy’ thesis—almost represents a parody of prevailing physicalist epistemic treatments of consciousness, to the extent that I can't shake the feeling that the book's first half may be (...)
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  17. Panpsychism and Neutral Monism: How to Make Up One's Mind.Sam Coleman - forthcoming - In Jaskolla Brüntrup (ed.), Panpsychism. Oxford University Press.
  18. The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and Emergence.Sam Coleman - 2013 - Erkenntnis (1):1-26.
    Taking their motivation from the perceived failure of the reductive physicalist project concerning consciousness, panpsychists ascribe subjectivity to fundamental material entities in order to account for macro-consciousness. But there exists an unresolved tension within the mainstream panpsychist position, the seriousness of which has yet to be appreciated. I capture this tension as a dilemma, and offer advice to panpsychists on how to resolve it. The dilemma is as follows: Panpsychists take the micro-material realm to feature phenomenal properties, plus micro-subjects to (...)
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  19. Review of 'The Mental as Fundamental' Ed. Michael Blamauer. [REVIEW]Sam Coleman - 2012 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  20. William James's Theory of Mind.W. E. Cooper - 1990 - Journal of the History of Philosophy (October) 571 (October):571-593.
    Neutral monist, panpsychist, naturalist, and phenomenological interpretations of James's theory of mind are canvassed. Culling the true tenets from each, I make a case for a reconciling view on the basis of a distinction between mental and proto-mental properties. The resulting interpretation is compared to two forms of panpsychism identified by T Nagel in his essay of that name.
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  21. Radical Empiricism and Phenomenology: Philosophy and the Pure Stuff of Experience.John E. Drabinski - 1993 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 7 (3):226-242.
  22. Whither Neutral Monism?Marius Dumitru - 2013 - In Gabriel Vacariu & Gheorghe Stefanov (eds.), Problema minte-creier in neurostiinta cognitiei. Bucharest University Press. pp. 127-134.
    The core insight of neutral monism is that there might be something underlying both mind and matter which is neither and of which mind and matter could be seen as particular manifestations. In this paper, I shall present some directions for developing neutral monism as a metaphysical position on the mind-brain problem and argue that its core insight may be applied to other debates in philosophy of mind, in particular debates about the metaphysics of phenomenologies, such as the phenomenology of (...)
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  23. Against Constitutive Russellian Monism.Philip Goff - forthcoming - In Yujin Nagasawa (ed.), Consciousness and the Physical World. Oxford University Press.
  24. The Phenomenal Bonding Solution to the Combination Problem.Philip Goff - forthcoming - In L. Jaskolla (ed.), Panpsychism. Oxford University Press.
  25. Ernst Mach and the Elimination of Subjectivity.Andy Hamilton - 1990 - Ratio 3 (2):117-135.
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  26. Panpsychism, Physicalism, Neutral Monism and the Russellian Theory of Mind.Emmett Holman - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (5):48-67.
    As some see it, an impasse has been reached on the mind- body problem between mainstream physicalism and mainstream dualism. So lately another view has been gaining popularity, a view that might be called the 'Russellian theory of mind' (RTM) since it is inspired by some ideas once put forth by Bertrand Russell. Most versions of RTM are panpsychist, but there is at least one version that rejects panpsychism and styles itself as physicalism, and neutral monism is also a possibility. (...)
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  27. How Two Minds Can Know One Thing.William James - 1905 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (7):176-181.
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  28. A World of Pure Experience.William James - 1904 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 1 (21):533-543.
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  29. A World of Pure Experience. II.William James - 1904 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 1 (21):561-570.
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  30. Essays in Radical Empiricism.William James & Ralph Barton Perry (eds.) - 1912 - Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
    William James believed that events could not be catalogued simply as a series of facts, but had to be considered through the lens of experience.
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  31. Review of Erik Banks: Realistic Empiricism (2014). [REVIEW]Mostyn W. Jones - forthcoming - Journal of Consciousness Studies.
    Erik Banks does several things in this slender yet substantial book on realistic empiricism (aka neutral monism). First, he encapsulates the main ideas of this tradition. While he goes into greater depth on some of these ideas than other introductions do, these pages are still accessible to nonspecialists. Second, he traces the the history of this tradition through the Austrian scientist, Ernst Mach, the American psychologist, William James, the British philosopher, Bertrand Russell, and others. These four chapters are a valuable (...)
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  32. Pessimism About Russellian Monism.Amy Kind - 2015 - In Torin Alter & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism. pp. 401-421.
    From the perspective of many philosophers of mind in these early years of the 21st Century, the debate between dualism and physicalism has seemed to have stalled, if not to have come to a complete standstill. There seems to be no way to settle the basic clash of intuitions that underlies it. Recently however, a growing number of proponents of Russellian monism have suggested that their view promises to show us a new way forward. Insofar as Russellian monism might allow (...)
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  33. What Was Russell's Neutral Monism?Michael Lockwood - 1981 - Midwest Studes in Philosophy 6 (1):143-58.
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  34. In Commemoration Of William James: 1842-1942.Victor Lowe (ed.) - 1942 - Columbia University Press.
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  35. William James' Pluralistic Metaphysics of Experience.Victor Lowe - 1942 - In In Commemoration Of William James: 1842-1942. Ny: Columbia University Press.
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  36. Experience as Pure and Consciousness as Meaning.McGilvary Evander Bradley - 1911 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 8 (19):511-525.
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  37. James, Perception and the Miller-Bode Objections.Mark S. Moller - 2001 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 37 (4):609-626.
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  38. The Combination Problem: Subjects and Unity.Kevin Morris - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (1):103-120.
    Panpsychism has often been motivated on the grounds that any attempt to account for experience and consciousness in organisms in purely physical, nonexperiential terms faces severe difficulties. The “combination problem” charges that attributing phenomenal properties to the basic constituents of organisms, as panpsychism proposes, likewise fails to provide a satisfactory basis for experience in humans and other organisms. This paper evaluates a recent attempt to understand, and solve, the combination problem. This approach, due to Sam Coleman, is premised on a (...)
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  39. Russellian Physicalism, Bare Structure, and Swapped Inscrutables.Kevin Morris - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (9-10):180-198.
    This paper discusses and evaluates a recent argument for the conclusion that an attractive variety of Russellian monism ought to be regarded as a form of physicalism. According to this line of thought, if the Russellian’s “inscrutable” properties are held to ground not only experience, but also the physical structure of the world—and in this sense are not “experience-specific”—they thereby have an unproblematic place in physicalist metaphysics. I argue, in contrast, that there can be a sense in which the Russellian’s (...)
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  40. Skrbina's *Mind That Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millennium*. [REVIEW]Gregory Nixon - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (9):116-121.
    Is the great god Pan reborn? For a while there, it seemed every intellectual movement began with the prefix ‘post’, implying non-totality, but now there are indications that ‘pan’ (all) is returning to provide another answer to one of the most basic of ontological questions: What is the relationship of mind to matter? In this important book with 17 different authors, panpsychism is given its due.
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  41. Consciousness as Existence as a Form of Neutral Monism.Ingmar Persson - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 7-8):128-146.
    I shall here raise and attempt to answer -- given the constraints of space, rather dogmatically -- some fundamental questions as regards the fertile and far-reaching doctrine Ted Honderich has in the past called Consciousness as Existence.
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  42. The Primacy of Perception: Towards a Neutral Monism.Ingmar Persson - 1985 - C.W.K. Gleerup.
  43. William James's Concrete Analysis of Experience.Charlene H. Seigfried - 1992 - The Monist 75 (4):538-550.
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  44. The Nature of Experience.Roy Wood Sellars - 1907 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 4 (1):14-18.
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  45. Mind and Being: The Primacy of Panpsychism.Galen Strawson - 2016 - In Godehard Brüntrup & Ludwig Jaskolla (eds.), Panpsychism: Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 000-00.
    I endorse a 12-word metaphysics. [1] Stoff ist Kraft ≈ being is energy. [2] Wesen ist Werden ≈ being is becoming. [3] Sein ist Sosein ≈ being is qualit[ativit]y. [4] Ansichsein ist Fürsichsein ≈ being is mind. [1]–[3] are plausible metaphysical principles and unprejudiced consideration of what we know about concrete reality obliges us to favor [4], i.e. panpsychism or panexperientialism, above all other positive substantive proposals. For [i] panpsychism is the most ontologically parsimonious view, given that the existence of (...)
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  46. Neutral Monism.Leopold Stubenberg - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  47. Pure Experience: The Response to William James.Eugene Taylor & Robert H. Wozniak - 1996 - In E. I. Taylor & R. H. Wozniak (eds.), Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society. Bristol: Thoemmes Press. pp. 338-341.
    The radical empiricism of William James was first formally presented in his seminal papers of 1904, 'Does Consciousness Exist?' and 'A World of Pure Experience'. In James's view, pure experience was to serve as the source for psychology's primary data and radical empiricism was to launch an effective critique of experimentalism in psychology, a critique from which the problem of experimentalism within science could be addressed more broadly. This collection of papers presents James's formal statements on radical empiricism and a (...)
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  48. Three Studies of Russell's Neutral Monism.R. E. Tully - 1993 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 13 (1):5-35.
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  49. Russell's Neutral Monism.Robert Tully - 1988 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 8 (1):209-224.
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  50. The Mystery of the Physical and the Matter of Qualities: A Paper for Professor Shaffer.Peter Unger - 1999 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):75-99.
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