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  1. Goodman's Paradox, Hume's Problem, Goodman-Kripke Paradox: Three Different Issues.Beppe Brivec - manuscript
    This paper reports (in section 1 “Introduction”) some quotes from Nelson Goodman which clarify that, contrary to a common misunderstanding, Goodman always denied that “grue” requires temporal information and “green” does not require temporal information; and, more in general, that Goodman always denied that grue-like predicates require additional information compared to what green-like predicates require. One of the quotations is the following, taken from the first page of the Foreword to chapter 8 “Induction” of the Goodman’s book “Problems and Projects”: (...)
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  2. A Comprehensive Theory of Induction and Abstraction, Part II.Cael Hasse - manuscript
    This is part II in a series of papers outlining Abstraction Theory, a theory that I propose provides a solution to the characterisation or epistemological problem of induction. Logic is built from first principles severed from language such that there is one universal logic independent of specific logical languages. A theory of (non-linguistic) meaning is developed which provides the basis for the dissolution of the `grue' problem and problems of the non-uniqueness of probabilities in inductive logics. The problem of counterfactual (...)
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  3. A Comprehensive Theory of Induction and Abstraction, Part I.Cael L. Hasse - manuscript
    I present a solution to the epistemological or characterisation problem of induction. In part I, Bayesian Confirmation Theory (BCT) is discussed as a good contender for such a solution but with a fundamental explanatory gap (along with other well discussed problems); useful assigned probabilities like priors require substantive degrees of belief about the world. I assert that one does not have such substantive information about the world. Consequently, an explanation is needed for how one can be licensed to act as (...)
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  4. Mind Changes and Testability: How Formal and Statistical Learning Theory Converge in the New Riddle of Induction.Daniel Steel - manuscript
    This essay demonstrates a previously unnoticed connection between formal and statistical learning theory with regard to Nelson Goodman’s new riddle of induction. Discussions of Goodman’s riddle in formal learning theory explain how conjecturing “all green” before “all grue” can enhance efficient convergence to the truth, where efficiency is understood in terms of minimizing the maximum number of retractions or “mind changes.” Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) dimension is a central concept in statistical learning theory and is similar to Popper’s notion of degrees of (...)
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  5. Why Emeralds Are Not Grue: A Case for Pragmatic Simplicity.Piotr Boltuc - unknown - Eidos: The Canadian Graduate Journal of Philosophy 15.
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  6. The Riddle Of The Incommensurable Root In The School Of Isfahan.Ahad Gharamaleki - unknown - Kheradnameh Sadra Quarterly 11.
    The discussion of the problem of the riddle of the incommensurable root has passed through a history full of trials and tribulations among the philosophers and theologians of Isfahan. Most of the philosophers who have dealt with this issue belong to the School of Mulla Rajabali Tabrizi. By the philosophers of Isfahan we do not merely mean those who belonged to Isfahan but we have taken into consideration those who are either one of the important members of the philosophical school (...)
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  7. The Riddle of Incommensurable Root in Shiraz Philosophical Center.Dr A. Qaramalaki - unknown - Kheradnameh Sadra Quarterly 4.
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  8. The Riddle of Incommensurable Root According to Theologians.Dr A. Qaramalaki - unknown - Kheradnameh Sadra Quarterly 5.
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  9. "The Colour Out of Space": Lovecraft on Induction.Kieran Setiya - forthcoming - Philosophy and Literature.
    Argues for a reading of H. P. Lovecraft’s 1927 short story, "The Colour out of Space," as an affective response to the problem of induction. Lovecraft weighs the meaning of our epistemic frailty, drawing on George Santayana’s "Scepticism and Animal Faith." His writing elicits inductive vertigo, the fear that our concepts fail to carve nature at the joints.
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  10. The Causal Structure of Natural Kinds.Olivier Lemeire - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 85:200-207.
    One primary goal for metaphysical theories of natural kinds is to account for their epistemic fruitfulness. According to cluster theories of natural kinds, this epistemic fruitfulness is grounded in the regular and stable co- occurrence of a broad set of properties. In this paper, I defend the view that such a cluster theory is insufficient to adequately account for the epistemic fruitfulness of kinds. I argue that cluster theories can indeed account for the projectibility of natural kinds, but not for (...)
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  11. L'énigme de Goodman face à l'indistinction nomologique.Julien Tricard - 2019 - Lato Sensu, Revue de la Société de Philosophie des Sciences 6 (1):1-15.
    When Goodman put forward his “New Riddle of Induction”, he distinguished if from the old problem of justifying the so-called “Principle of Uniformity of Nature”: proving that the future will resemble the past, and that still standing lawful regularities will continue to hold. He intended to break with these ancient questions, while asking about lawlike generalizations and projectible predicates instead: how are we to separate those generalizations which are rightfully confirmed by their observed instances (i.e. nomological) and those accidental ones (...)
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  12. Goodman e o projeto de uma definição construtiva de “indução válida”.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2018 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 22 (3):439-460.
    In Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Nelson Goodman claims that the problem of justifying induction is not something over and above the problem of describing valid induction. Such claim, besides suggesting his commitment to the collapse of the distinction between the context of description and the context of justification, seems to open the possibility that the new riddle of induction could be addressed empirically. Discoveries about psychological preferences for projecting certain classes of objects could function as a criterion for determining which (...)
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  13. Bet Accepted: A Reply to Freitag.Christopher Dorst - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270):175-183.
    Wolfgang Freitag claims to have developed a proposal that solves Goodman's famous New Riddle of Induction. His proposal makes use of the notion of ‘derivative defeat’; the claim is that in certain circumstances, the projection of some predicates is derivatively defeated, i.e., it is inductively invalid. Freitag develops the proposal using some compelling examples, and then shows that it likewise applies to the argument at the basis of the New Riddle. There, he alleges, the projection of ‘grue’ is derivatively defeated, (...)
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  14. Routes for Roots: A Mapping Shorthand Symbolism with Reference to Nelson Goodman’s Hidden Ars Combinatoria.Gerald Moshammer - 2017 - History and Philosophy of Logic 38 (3):263-281.
    A shorthand symbolism for the relational mapping of categories is introduced and developed on the basis of Nelson Goodman's structural methodology. Through a reconstruction of extensional isomorphism that Goodman introduces as a criterion for definitional accuracy, and a brief reminder of the argument structure behind his ‘new riddle of induction’, Goodman's radical ontological relativism is turned into a protological principle of what I call ‘domain constituting philosophy’. MSS is demonstrated with reference to Goodman's symbol theory, particularly his notion of exemplification, (...)
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  15. Evidence, Significance, and Counterfactuals: Schramm on the New Riddle of Induction.Chris Dorst - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (1):143-154.
    In a recent paper in this journal, Schramm presents what he takes to be an answer to Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction. His solution relies on the technical notion of evidential significance, which is meant to distinguish two ways that evidence may bear on a hypothesis: either via support or confirmation. As he puts his view in slogan form: “confirmation is support by significant evidence”. Once we make this distinction, Schramm claims, we see that Goodman’s famous riddle is dissolved, and (...)
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  16. The Disjunctive Riddle and the Grue‐Paradox.Wolfgang Freitag - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (2):185-200.
    The paper explores the disjunctive riddle for induction: If we know the sample Ks to be P, we also know that they are P or F. Assuming that we also know that the future Ks are non-P, we can conclude that they are F, if only we can inductively infer the evidentially supported P-or-F hypothesis. Yet this is absurd. We cannot predict that future Ks are F based on the knowledge that the samples, and only they, are P. The ensuing (...)
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  17. The New Riddle of Induction and the New Riddle of Deduction.Gal Yehezkel - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (1):31-41.
    Many believe that Goodman’s new riddle of induction proves the impossibility of a purely syntactical theory of confirmation. After discussing and rejecting Jackson’s solution to Goodman’s paradox, I formulate the “new riddle of deduction,” in analogy to the new riddle of induction. Since it is generally agreed that deductive validity can be defined syntactically, the new riddle of induction equally does not show that inductive validity cannot be defined syntactically. I further rely on the analogy between induction and deduction in (...)
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  18. I Bet You'll Solve Goodman's Riddle.Wolfgang Freitag - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259):254-267.
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  19. Induction, Reliability and Predicates of Type Grue.Luiz Helvécio Marques Segundo - 2015 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 19 (1):33-47.
    Collin Howson (2000) challenges van Cleve’s reliabilist defense of induction (1984) based on an adaptation of Goodman Paradox (or new riddle of induction). I will try to show that Howson’s argument does not succeed once it is self-defeating. Nevertheless, I point out another way which Howson could have employed the new riddle to undermine the reliabilist defense.
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  20. Grueing Gettier.Giovanni Mion - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (4):467-470.
    The paper aims to stress the structural similarities between Nelson Goodman’s ‘new riddle of induction’ and Edmund Gettier’s counterexamples to the standard analysis of knowledge.
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  21. Evidence, Hypothesis, and Grue.Alfred Schramm - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):571-591.
    Extant literature on Goodman’s ‘New Riddle of Induction’ deals mainly with two versions. I consider both of them, starting from the (‘epistemic’) version of Goodman’s classic of 1954. It turns out that it belongs to the realm of applications of inductive logic, and that it can be resolved by admitting only significant evidence (as I call it) for confirmations of hypotheses. Sect. 1 prepares some ground for the argument. As much of it depends on the notion of evidential significance, this (...)
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  22. Goodman's Riddle (Unsuccessfully?) Resolved: A Respond to R. Maco.Lukas Bielik - 2013 - Filozofia 68 (4):343-350.
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  23. On the Presentation of the Raven Paradox and the New Riddle of Induction. A Reply to Eugen Zelenak.Lukas Bielik - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (2):251-261.
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  24. 8 Of the Vision and the Riddle.Elodie Boublil - 2013 - In Christine Daigle & Élodie Boublil (eds.), Nietzsche and Phenomenology: Power, Life, Subjectivity. Indiana University Press. pp. 141.
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  25. Goodman e o equilíbrio reflexivo.Eros Moreira Carvalho - 2013 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 58 (3):467-481.
    Goodman sustentou que o ajuste mútuo entre inferências indutivas particulares e princípios indutivos constitui a única justificação necessária para ambos. Porém, a sua caracterização desse ajuste, posteriormente denominado de “equilíbrio reflexivo”, foi superficial. Isso levantou dúvida sobre a sua adequação. Neste artigo, argumento que o equilíbrio reflexivo, corretamente caracterizado, fornece a única justificação necessária e a melhor que podemos dar para a prática indutiva.
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  26. An Old Approach to a New Riddle – Kantian Purposiveness and Goodman’s Projectibility.Linda C. Palmer - 2013 - In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des Xi. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter. pp. 185-196.
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  27. The Twin Towers Riddle.Roy Sorensen - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (1):109-117.
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  28. Meta-Induction and the Wisdom of Crowds. Comment on Paul D. Thorn and Gerhard Schurz.Christian J. Feldbacher - 2012 - Analyse & Kritik 34 (2):367--382.
    In their paper on the influence of meta-induction to the wisdom of the crowd, Paul Thorn and Gerhard Schurz argue that adding meta-inductive methods to a group influences the group positively, whereas replacing independend methods of a group with meta-inductive ones may have a negative impact. The first fact is due to an improvement of average ability of a group, the second fact is due to an impairment of average diversity within a group by meta-induction. In this paper some critical (...)
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  29. Reply to Israel on the New Riddle of Induction.Robert Kowalenko - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):549-552.
    Israel 2004 claims that numerous philosophers have misinterpreted Goodman’s original ‘New Riddle of Induction’, and weakened it in the process, because they do not define ‘grue’ as referring to past observations. Both claims are false: Goodman clearly took the riddle to concern the maximally general problem of “projecting” any type of characteristic from a given realm of objects into another, and since this problem subsumes Israel’s, Goodman formulated a stronger philosophical challenge than the latter surmises.
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  30. Goodman's New Riddle of Induction.Dean Lubin - 2012 - Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):61-63.
    In this paper, I consider Goodman’s new riddle of induction and how we should best respond to it. Noticing that all the emeralds so far observed are green, we infer that all emeralds are green. However, all emeralds so far observed are also grue, so we could also infer that they are grue. Only one of these inductive inferences or projections could, however, be valid. For the hypothesis that all emeralds are green predicts that the next observed emerald will be (...)
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  31. Explanation and the New Riddle of Induction.Barry Ward - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):365-385.
    I propose a novel solution to Goodman's new riddle of induction, one on which aspects of scientific methodology preclude significant confirmation of the Grue Hypothesis. The solution appeals to intuitive constraints on the confirmation of explanatory hypotheses, and can be construed as a fragment of a theory of Inference to the Best Explanation. I give it an objective Bayesian formalisation, and contrast it with Goodman's and Sober's solutions, which make appeal to both methodological and non-methodological considerations, and those of Jackson, (...)
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  32. " The New Riddle of Induction" and Testing of Qualities.Lukas Bielik - 2011 - Filozofia 66 (8):746-754.
    The paper deals with the New Riddle of Induction set forth by N. Goodman in his Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. The problem is introduced through the definition of grue-predicate. The relation between the grue-hypothesis and empirical evidence is examined. Goodman’s underlying thesis about the neutrality of empirical evidence is undermined. The intelligibility of the idea that disjunctive properties such as Grue can be observed and seen is questioned. A solution of Goodman’s riddle is outlined by means of the definition of (...)
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  33. 2 Induction, Samples, and Kinds.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2011 - In Michael O'Rourke, Joseph Keim Campbell & Matthew H. Slater (eds.), Carving Nature at its Joints: Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science. MIT Press. pp. 33.
  34. Symmetry and Evidential Support.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2011 - Symmetry 3 (3):680--698.
  35. Humanities for Humanity 2.0: The Problem of ‘Human’ as a Projectible Predicate.Steve Fuller - 2009 - Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 44 (1):103-107.
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  36. Art and the Riddle of Being. [REVIEW]Ovidiu Gacea - 2009 - Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy 1 (1):188-193.
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  37. Technology and Goodman’s Paradox.Ingemar Nordin - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (3):345-354.
    Goodman’s paradox gives rise to a cluster of problems, problems that are in need of different answers. I will discuss some variants of the grue hypothesis applied to the technological context. One conclusion in this paper is that there is room for rational decisions, and that solutions to the paradoxes in technology can be found in the practical choice situation. *Received April 2008. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Medical and Health Sciences, Linköping University, SE‐581 83 Linköping, (...)
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  38. Goodman's Extensional Isomorphism and Syntactical Interpretations.Marek Polański - 2009 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 24 (2):203-211.
    The aim of the present paper is to provide a model-theoretic explication of Goodman's concept of extensional isomorphism. After some conceptual clarifications Goodman's concept of isomorphy turns out to be closely related to some variant of set-theoretic definability and some variants of syntactical interpretability.
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  39. The Riddle of Nonverbal Thought.Eli Rozik - 2009 - The European Legacy 14 (6):727-730.
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  40. Contextualist References in Nelson Goodman's Solution to the “New Riddle of Induction”.Ansgar Seide - 2009 - In G. Ernst, J. Steinbrenner & O. Scholz (eds.), From Logic to Art: Themes From Nelson Goodman. Ontos. pp. 7--121.
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  41. Testability and Ockham’s Razor: How Formal and Statistical Learning Theory Converge in the New Riddle of Induction. [REVIEW]Daniel Steel - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (5):471 - 489.
    Nelson Goodman’s new riddle of induction forcefully illustrates a challenge that must be confronted by any adequate theory of inductive inference: provide some basis for choosing among alternative hypotheses that fit past data but make divergent predictions. One response to this challenge is to distinguish among alternatives by means of some epistemically significant characteristic beyond fit with the data. Statistical learning theory takes this approach by showing how a concept similar to Popper’s notion of degrees of testability is linked to (...)
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  42. Testability and Ockham’s Razor: How Formal and Statistical Learning Theory Converge in the New Riddle of Induction.Daniel Steel - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (5):471-489.
    Nelson Goodman's new riddle of induction forcefully illustrates a challenge that must be confronted by any adequate theory of inductive inference: provide some basis for choosing among alternative hypotheses that fit past data but make divergent predictions. One response to this challenge is to distinguish among alternatives by means of some epistemically significant characteristic beyond fit with the data. Statistical learning theory takes this approach by showing how a concept similar to Popper's notion of degrees of testability is linked to (...)
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  43. Goodman’s “New Riddle‘.Branden Fitelson - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (6):613-643.
    First, a brief historical trace of the developments in confirmation theory leading up to Goodman's infamous "grue" paradox is presented. Then, Goodman's argument is analyzed from both Hempelian and Bayesian perspectives. A guiding analogy is drawn between certain arguments against classical deductive logic, and Goodman's "grue" argument against classical inductive logic. The upshot of this analogy is that the "New Riddle" is not as vexing as many commentators have claimed. Specifically, the analogy reveals an intimate connection between Goodman's problem, and (...)
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  44. The Riddle of the Valley.Roger L. Geiger - 2008 - Minerva 46 (1):127-132.
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  45. Robustness and the New Riddle Revived.Adina L. Roskies - 2008 - Ratio 21 (2):218–230.
    The problem of induction is perennially important in epistemology and the philosophy of science. In response to Goodman's 'New Riddle of Induction', Frank Jackson made a compelling case for there being no new riddle, by arguing that there are no nonprojectible properties. Although Jackson's denial of nonprojectible properties is correct, I argue here that he is mistaken in thinking that he thereby shows that there is no new riddle of induction, and demonstrate that his solution to the grue paradox fails (...)
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  46. Toward a Concept of Pluralistic, Inter-Relational Semiosis.Floyd Merrell - 2007 - Sign Systems Studies 35 (1-2):9-68.
    Brief consideration of (1) Peirce’s ‘logic of vagueness’, (2) his categories, and (3) the concepts of overdetermination and underdetermination, vagueness and generality, and inconsistency and incompleteness, along with (4) the abrogation of classical Aristotelian principles of logic, bear out the complexity of all relatively rich sign systems. Given this complexity, there is semiotic indeterminacy, which suggests sign limitations, and at the same time it promises semiotic freedom, giving rise to sign proliferation the yield of which is pluralistic, inter-relational semiosis. This (...)
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  47. Projectibility and Explainability or How to Draw a New Picture of Inductive Practices.Rami Israel - 2006 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (2):269-286.
    Goodman published his "riddle" in the middle of the 20th century and many philosophers have attempted to solve it. These attempts almost all shared an assumption that, I shall argue, might be wrong, namely, the assumption that when we project from cases we have examined to cases we have not, what we project are predicates. I shall argue that this assumption, shared by almost all attempts at a solution, looks wrong, because, in the first place, what we project are generalizations (...)
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  48. How the Formal Equivalence of Grue and Green Defeats What is New in the New Riddle of Induction.John D. Norton - 2006 - Synthese 150 (2):185-207.
    That past patterns may continue in many different ways has long been identified as a problem for accounts of induction. The novelty of Goodman’s ”new riddle of induction” lies in a meta-argument that purports to show that no account of induction can discriminate between incompatible continuations. That meta-argument depends on the perfect symmetry of the definitions of grue/bleen and green/blue, so that any evidence that favors the ordinary continuation must equally favor the grue-ified continuation. I argue that this very dependence (...)
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  49. The Riddle of the Pre-Original.Fabio Ciaramelli - 2005 - In Claire Elise Katz & Lara Trout (eds.), Emmanuel Levinas. Routledge. pp. 1--67.
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  50. 'Thisgrue' and 'Thisemerald-Part': Reply to John Welch.Theo A. F. Kuipers - 2005 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):138-140.
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