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  1. Infallibility in the Newcomb Problem.Arif Ahmed - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (2):261-273.
    It is intuitively attractive to think that it makes a difference in Newcomb’s problem whether or not the predictor is infallible, in the sense of being certainly actually correct. This paper argues that that view is irrational and manifests a well-documented cognitive illusion.
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  2. The Newxin Puzzle.Chrisoula Andreou - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):415-422.
    A variety of thought experiments suggest that, if the standard picture of practical rationality is correct, then practical rationality is sometimes an obstacle to practical success. For some, this in turn suggests that there is something wrong with the standard picture. In particular, it has been argued that we should revise the standard picture so that practical rationality and practical success emerge as more closely connected than the current picture allows. In this paper, I construct a choice situation—which I refer (...)
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  3. Conditional Preference and Causal Expected Utility.Brad Armendt - 1988 - In William Harper & Brian Skyrms (eds.), Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 3-24.
    Sequel to Armendt 1986, ‘A Foundation for Causal Decision Theory.’ The representation theorem for causal decision theory is slightly revised, with the addition of a new restriction on lotteries and a new axiom (A7). The discussion gives some emphasis to the way in which appropriate K-partitions are characterized by relations found among the agent’s conditional preferences. The intended interpretation of conditional preference is one that embodies a sensitivity to the agent’s causal beliefs.
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  4. Impartiality and Causal Decision Theory.Brad Armendt - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:326 - 336.
    Defenders of sophisticated evidential decision theory (EDT) have argued (1) that its failure to provide correct recommendations in problems where the agent believes himself asymmetrically fallible in executing his choices is no flaw of the theory, and (2) that causal decision theory gives incorrect recommendations in certain examples unless it is supplemented with an additional metatickle or ratifiability deliberation mechanism. In the first part of this paper, I argue that both positions are incorrect. In the second part of the paper, (...)
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  5. A Foundation for Causal Decision Theory.Brad Armendt - 1986 - Topoi 5 (1):3-19.
    The primary aim of this paper is the presentation of a foundation for causal decision theory. This is worth doing because causal decision theory (CDT) is philosophically the most adequate rational decision theory now available. I will not defend that claim here by elaborate comparison of the theory with all its competitors, but by providing the foundation. This puts the theory on an equal footing with competitors for which foundations have already been given. It turns out that it will also (...)
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  6. Newcomb's Problem: The $1,000,000 Solution.Kent Bach - 1987 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):409 - 425.
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  7. Newcomb's Paradox Revisited.Maya Bar-Hillel & Avishai Margalit - 1972 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (4):295-304.
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  8. Rationality, Dispositions, and the Newcomb Paradox.R. Eric Barnes - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 88 (1):1-28.
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  9. Newcomb's Paradox and Compatibilism.Yemima Ben-Menahem - 1986 - Erkenntnis 25 (2):197 - 220.
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  10. Newcomb's 'Paradox'.T. M. Benditt & David J. Ross - 1976 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (2):161-164.
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  11. Strategic Vs. Parametric Choice in Newcomb’s Problem and the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Reply to Walker.José Luis Bermúdez - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):787-794.
    In Bermúdez 2013 I argued against David Lewis’s well-known and widely accepted claim that Newcomb’s problem and the prisoner’s dilemma are really notational variants of a single problem. Mark Walker’s paper in this journal takes issue with my argument. In this note I show how Walker’s criticisms are misplaced. The problems with Walker’s argument point to more general and independently interesting conclusions about, first, the relation between deliberation and decision and, second, the differences between the prisoner’s dilemma, which is a (...)
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  12. The Meta-Newcomb Problem.Nick Bostrom - 2001 - Analysis 61 (4):309–310.
    There are two boxes in front of you and you are asked to choose between taking only box B or taking both box A and box B. Box A contains $ 1,000. Box B will contain either nothing or $ 1,000,000. What B will contain is (or will be) determined by Predictor, who has an excellent track record of predicting your choices. There are two possibilities. Either Predictor has already made his move by predicting your choice and putting a million (...)
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  13. Decision-Theoretic Paradoxes as Voting Paradoxes.Rachael Briggs - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):1-30.
    It is a platitude among decision theorists that agents should choose their actions so as to maximize expected value. But exactly how to define expected value is contentious. Evidential decision theory (henceforth EDT), causal decision theory (henceforth CDT), and a theory proposed by Ralph Wedgwood that this essay will call benchmark theory (BT) all advise agents to maximize different types of expected value. Consequently, their verdicts sometimes conflict. In certain famous cases of conflict—medical Newcomb problems—CDT and BT seem to get (...)
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  14. An Economic Newcomb Problem.John Broome - 1989 - Analysis 49 (4):220 - 222.
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  15. Newcomb's Problem and its Conditional Evidence: A Common Cause of Confusion.Simon Burgess - 2012 - Synthese 184 (3):319-339.
    This paper aims to make three contributions to decision theory. First there is the hope that it will help to re-establish the legitimacy of the problem, pace various recent analyses provided by Maitzen and Wilson, Slezak and Priest. Second, after pointing out that analyses of the problem have generally relied upon evidence that is conditional on the taking of one particular option, this paper argues that certain assumptions implicit in those analyses are subtly flawed. As a third contribution, the piece (...)
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  16. The Newcomb Problem: An Unqualified Resolution.Simon Burgess - 2004 - Synthese 138 (2):261 - 287.
    The Newcomb problem is analysed here as a type of common cause problem. In relation to such problems, if you take the dominated option your expected outcome will be good and if you take the dominant option your expected outcome will be not so good. As is explained, however, these arenot conventional conditional expected outcomes but `conditional evidence expected outcomes' and while in the deliberation process, the evidence on which they are based is only hypothetical evidence.Conventional conditional expected outcomes are (...)
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  17. Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner's Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem.Richmond Campbell & Lanning Snowden (eds.) - 1985 - University of British Columbia Press.
    1 Background for the Uninitiated RICHMOND CAMPBELL Paradoxes are intrinsically fascinating. They are also distinctively ...
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  18. Newcomb's Paradox.James Cargile - 1975 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26 (3):234-239.
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  19. Fischer on Backtracking and Newcomb's Problem.Erik Carlson - 1998 - Analysis 58 (3):229–231.
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  20. Causation, Decision Theory, and Bell's Theorem: A Quantum Analogue of the Newcomb Problem.Eric G. Cavalcanti - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (3):569-597.
    I apply some of the lessons from quantum theory, in particular from Bell’s theorem, to a debate on the foundations of decision theory and causation. By tracing a formal analogy between the basic assumptions of causal decision theory (CDT)—which was developed partly in response to Newcomb’s problem— and those of a local hidden variable theory in the context of quantum mechanics, I show that an agent who acts according to CDT and gives any nonzero credence to some possible causal interpretations (...)
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  21. Reeling and a-Reasoning: Surprise Examinations and Newcomb's Tale.Peter Cave - 2004 - Philosophy 79 (4):609-616.
    Certain paradoxes set us reeling endlessly. In surprise examination paradoxes, pupils' reasonings lead them to reel between expecting an examination and expecting none. With Newcomb's puzzle, choosers reel between reasoning in favour of choosing just one box and choosing two. The paradoxes demand an answer to what it is rational to believe or do. Highlighting other reelings and puzzles, this paper shows that the paradoxes should come as no surprise. The paradoxes demand an end to our reasoning when the conditions (...)
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  22. The Dr. Psycho Paradox and Newcomb's Problem.Michael Clark & Nicholas Shackel - 2006 - Erkenntnis 64 (1):85 - 100.
    Nicholas Rescher claims that rational decision theory “may leave us in the lurch”, because there are two apparently acceptable ways of applying “the standard machinery of expected-value analysis” to his Dr. Psycho paradox which recommend contradictory actions. He detects a similar contradiction in Newcomb’s problem. We consider his claims from the point of view of both Bayesian decision theory and causal decision theory. In Dr. Psycho and in Newcomb’s Problem, Rescher has used premisses about probabilities which he assumes to be (...)
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  23. Newcomb's Problem.John Collins - unknown
    Newcomb’s problem is a decision puzzle whose difficulty and interest stem from the fact that the possible outcomes are probabilistically dependent on, yet causally independent of, the agent’s options. The problem is named for its inventor, the physicist William Newcomb, but first appeared in print in a 1969 paper by Robert Nozick [12]. Closely related to, though less well-known than, the Prisoners’ Dilemma, it has been the subject of intense debate in the philosophical literature. After three decades, the issues remain (...)
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  24. Review of Doris Olin's Paradox. [REVIEW]John R. Cook - 2005 - Philosophy in Review (6):422-424.
    Doris Olin's Paradox is a very helpful book for those who want to be introduced to the philosophical treatment of paradoxes, or for those who already have knowledge of the general area and would like to have a helpful resource book.
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  25. Divine Foreknowledge and Newcomb's Paradox.William Lane Craig - 1987 - Philosophia 17 (3):331-350.
    Newcomb's Paradox thus serves as an illustrative vindication of the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. A proper understanding of the counterfactual conditionals involved enables us to see that the pastness of God's knowledge serves neither to make God's beliefs counterfactually closed nor to rob us of genuine freedom. It is evident that our decisions determine God's past beliefs about those decisions and do so without invoking an objectionable backward causation. It is also clear that in the context of (...)
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  26. A Cognitivist Solution to Newcomb's Problem.Raymond Dacey, Richard E. Simmons, David J. Curry & John W. Kennelly - 1977 - American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1):79 - 84.
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  27. Egan and Agents: How Evidential Decision Theory Can Deal with Egan’s Dilemma.Daniel Dohrn - 2015 - Synthese 192 (6):1883-1908.
    Andy Egan has presented a dilemma for decision theory. As is well known, Newcomb cases appear to undermine the case for evidential decision theory. However, Egan has come up with a new scenario which poses difficulties for causal decision theory. I offer a simple solution to this dilemma in terms of a modified EDT. I propose an epistemological test: take some feature which is relevant to your evaluation of the scenarios under consideration, evidentially correlated with the actions under consideration albeit, (...)
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  28. Monty Hall No Newcomb Problem.Joseph Ellin - unknown - Proceedings of the Heraclitean Society 17.
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  29. Newcomb's Paradox and Omniscience.R. Lance Factor - 1978 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (1):30 - 40.
  30. Ifs and Newcombs.Arthur E. Falk - 1985 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):449 - 481.
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  31. Newcomb’s Problem: A Reply to Carlson.John Martin Fischer - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):229–236.
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  32. Comments on Presting's “Computability and Newcomb's Problem”.Branden Fitelson - unknown
    • What’s essential to Newcomb’s problem? 1. You must choose between two particular acts: A1 = you take just the opaque box; A2 = you take both boxes, where the two states of nature are: S 1 = there’s $1M in the opaque box, S2 = there’s $0 in the opaque box.
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  33. Locke on Causation, Compatibilism and Newcomb's Problem.André Gallois - 1980 - Analysis 41 (1):42 - 46.
  34. How Not to Make a Newcomb Choice.André Gallois - 1979 - Analysis 39 (1):49 - 53.
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  35. In the Neighbourhood of the Newcomb-Predictor (Reflections on Rationality).David Gauthier - 1988 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89:179 - 194.
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  36. Essays on Paradoxes.Terence Horgan - 2016 - Oxford University Press USA.
    This volume brings together Terence Horgan's essays on paradoxes, both published and new. A common theme unifying these essays is that philosophically interesting paradoxes typically resist either easy solutions or solutions that are formally/mathematically highly technical. Another unifying theme is that such paradoxes often have deep-sometimes disturbing-philosophical morals.
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  37. Counterfactuals and Newcomb's Problem.Terence Horgan - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (6):331-356.
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  38. Newcomb's Problem as a Theistic Problem.James R. Horne - 1983 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (4):217 - 223.
  39. Decision Theory in Light of Newcomb's Problem.Paul Horwich - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (3):431-450.
    Should we act only for the sake of what we might bring about (causal decision theory); or is it enough for a decent motive that our action is highly correlated with something desirable (evidential decision theory)? The conflict between these points of view is embodied in Newcomb's problem. It is argued here that intuitive evidence from familiar decision contexts does not enable us to settle the issue, since the two theories dictate the same results in normal circumstances. Nevertheless, there are (...)
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  40. Newcomb's Perfect Predictor.Don Hubin & Glenn Ross - 1985 - Noûs 19 (3):439-446.
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  41. Schlesinger on the Newcomb Problem.James L. Hudson - 1979 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (2):145 – 156.
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  42. Counterfactuals and Newcomb's Paradox.Daniel Hunter & Reed Richter - 1978 - Synthese 39 (2):249 - 261.
    In their development of causal decision theory, Allan Gibbard and William Harper advocate a particular method for calculating the expected utility of an action, a method based upon the probabilities of certain counterfactuals. Gibbard and Harper then employ their method to support a two-box solution to Newcomb’s paradox. This paper argues against some of Gibbard and Harper’s key claims concerning the truth-values and probabilities of counterfactuals involved in expected utility calculations, thereby disputing their analysis of Newcomb’s Paradox. If we are (...)
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  43. A New Take From Nozick on Newcomb's Problem and Prisoners' Dilemma.S. L. Hurley - 1994 - Analysis 54 (2):65 - 72.
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  44. Newcomb's Problem, Prisoners' Dilemma, and Collective Action.S. L. Hurley - 1991 - Synthese 86 (2):173 - 196.
    Among various cases that equally admit of evidentialist reasoning, the supposedly evidentialist solution has varying degrees of intuitive attractiveness. I suggest that cooperative reasoning may account for the appeal of apparently evidentialist behavior in the cases in which it is intuitively attractive, while the inapplicability of cooperative reasoning may account for the unattractiveness of evidentialist behaviour in other cases. A collective causal power with respect to agreed outcomes, not evidentialist reasoning, makes cooperation attractive in the Prisoners' Dilemma. And a natural (...)
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  45. How Braess' Paradox Solves Newcomb's Problem.A. D. Irvine - 1993 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (2):141 – 160.
    Abstract Newcomb's problem is regularly described as a problem arising from equally defensible yet contradictory models of rationality. Braess? paradox is regularly described as nothing more than the existence of non?intuitive (but ultimately non?contradictory) equilibrium points within physical networks of various kinds. Yet it can be shown that Newcomb's problem is structurally identical to Braess? paradox. Both are instances of a well?known result in game theory, namely that equilibria of non?cooperative games are generally Pareto?inefficient. Newcomb's problem is simply a limiting (...)
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  46. Are Newcomb Problems Really Decisions?James M. Joyce - 2007 - Synthese 156 (3):537-562.
    Richard Jeffrey long held that decision theory should be formulated without recourse to explicitly causal notions. Newcomb problems stand out as putative counterexamples to this ‘evidential’ decision theory. Jeffrey initially sought to defuse Newcomb problems via recourse to the doctrine of ratificationism, but later came to see this as problematic. We will see that Jeffrey’s worries about ratificationism were not compelling, but that valid ratificationist arguments implicitly presuppose causal decision theory. In later work, Jeffrey argued that Newcomb problems are not (...)
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  47. What Is Newcomb's Problem About?Gregory S. Kavka - 1980 - American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (4):271 - 280.
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  48. Dominance Conditionals and the Newcomb Problem.Theodore Korzukhin - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.
    The dominance conditional 'If I drink the contents of cup A, I will drink more than if drink the contents of cup B' is true if we know that the first cup contains more than the second. In the first part of the paper, I show that only one kind of theory of indicative conditionals can explain this fact — a Stalnaker-type semantics. In the second part of the paper, I show that dominance conditionals can help explain a long-standing mystery: (...)
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  49. Eells and Jeffrey on Newcomb's Problem.Stephen Leeds - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (1):97 - 107.
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  50. Ensuring Two Bird Deaths with One Throw.John Leslie - 1991 - Mind 100 (1):73-86.
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