Nietzsche: Philosophy of History

This paper argues that we can better distinguish and evaluate right and left forms of contemporary populism with the help of two Nietzschean claims: first, that “slave morality” is a distinctly non-political form of revolt and, second, that it is not the work of “slaves” or the “masses”—it is initiated by a “priestly” subclass of the ruling class rather than by the underclass, which it manipulates in its own interest. I first suggest that contemporary right-wing populism is mistakenly interpeted as (...) a division of the right against against the left, modernity, and progressivism, when it is better understood as a division within the modern economic right, a reaction against the rise of the neoliberal, technocratic form of capitalism that materially disrupts and culturally devalues earlier conservative forms of identity and social life that were compatible with capitalism’s earlier industrial form. Novel conditions of capitalism’s growth and development produce a new cultural hierarchy and morality that valorizes international over national identity and interests; urban over rural life; technological, scientific, and secular worldviews over cultural and religious ones; and identities defined by education and profession over family and community. Neoliberalism’s material disruption of the conditions of old conservative forms of social life, identity, and self-worth produces a deep sense of social inferiority among conservatives of all classes, leading to a moral revolt in which the old economic masters harness the resentment of the underclass to avenge themselves against the moral hierarchy of new economic masters who are quickly overpowering them, leaving them with a lesser, “priestly” rather than “knightly” form of aristocratic superiority over the populace—that is, national and regional, cultural and religious power rather than the international economic and political superiority wielded by the “knightly” neoliberal class. Right-populism is, consequently, a false populism, a master morality in the guise of a slave revolt that is directed, funded by, and ultimately serves the moral interests of a conservative priestly subset of the ruling class. Unable to regain material superiority, the priestly class seeks to regain its social capital over the knightly class by channeling the populace’s resentment away from the destructive consequences of capitalism (the shared politics of both factions), toward marginalized segments of the underclass and toward the socially-liberal morality of neoliberalism—a morality that is anti-conservative only to the degree compatible with capitalism, defending the marginalized only within the interests of the growth and protection of its economic power. This accounts for its paradoxical character as a slavish-master morality, blending privilege and resentment, the material status of master with the evaluative mode and social status of slave. (Consider, for example, that many Trump supporters not only were not working class but wealthy, and that a surprising percentage were neither white nor male.) At the same time, right-populism is also a false politics, aiming not primarily at political but cultural power, targeting not neoliberal policy but only its cultural ideology insofar as it is independent of the demands of capitalism. Indeed, by falsely divorcing the social liberalism of neoliberal morality from its conservative, capitalist politics, right-populism indirectly promotes the knightly-neoliberal class’s politics of privatization, deregulation, and austerity, furthering the decline of conservative forms of social life and further aggravating the conservative resentment it claims to remedy. Moreover, right-populism directly diminishes the success of left populism, of a truly populist, truly political resistance to neoliberalism, not only indirectly enabling the neoliberal class’s dismantling of social democracy and the welfare state, but also directly demonizing the left, conflating its anti-neoliberal politics with neoliberal morality and drawing the left’s energies away from political resistance toward culture wars that turn the left, and the general populace, against itself rather than against the ruling class, obscuring broader lines of discontent with, and potential political alignment against, neoliberalism. I conclude that it is the under-appreciated historical-materialist character of Nietzsche’s analysis of slave morality that offers particular insight into our present predicament. On one hand, he rightly stresses that slave revolt is not about material power alone but also about social recognition, a resentment over social status that infects the privileged as well as the marginalized. On the other hand, he insists that such reactionary social movements are effective only because their deeper cause is the real political power of a ruling class—reminding us that they are only effectively defeated through material rather than moral resistance, and through a politics that targets the ruling classes rather than the people they manipulate. Consequently, we should also suspect that anti-populism is not an effective or progressive politics but, like right-populism, merely a moral reaction to moral reaction, a slavish-master morality ultimately in the service of, and doomed to foster, the very conservative politics it pretends to oppose. (shrink)

This article shows how the triumph of Socratic optimism in Nietzsche’s first book, The Birth of Tragedy, is due to a slave revolt in morality that promulgates a religious faith in the value of scientific truth. This early argument parallels his critique of the ascetic ideal that infects science in The Genealogy of Morality. I draw out the resemblance between Socrates’s martyrdom in The Birth and Jesus’s crucifixion in the Genealogy in order to illuminate how ritual human sacrifice mythically immortalizes (...) both figures, together inaugurating the ascetic ideals that Christianity will eventually unite. I discuss Nietzsche’s understanding of religious martyrdom and his explanation for the success of Christian Platonism, whose ascetic ideals ground the European value system that he is known for attacking. (shrink)

In his book Foucault and Religion, Jeremy Carrette presents a compelling argument against Foucault’s genealogical method (what he terms “relations of force”). In brief, Carrette holds that while Foucault’s genealogical method effectively unmasked the origins of “rationality” and “madness,” it was less successful when explaining the materialization of “the spiritual.” Foucault’s analysis of spiritual practices is at best functional and, according to Carrette, fails to explain the psychophysical state of subjects engaged in religious customs. In the following paper, I argue (...) that Carrette is correct; there are limitations to Foucault’s genealogical method, especially when explaining subjectivization processes, such as conversion experiences. However, I demonstrate that we can perform a successful genealogical investigation of the spiritual by adding an additional lens of analysis to “the relations of power” and “the relations of meaning” Foucault employs. I call this lens “the relations of affect.” I use this tool to explain Augustine’s transformative process, as observed in the saint’s Confessions. (shrink)

Introduction -/- 1 Précis -/- 2 Methodology: Introducing digital humanities to the history of philosophy 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Core constructs 2.3 Operationalizing the constructs 2.4 Querying the Nietzsche Source 2.5 Cleaning the data 2.6 Visualizations and preliminary analysis 2.6.1 Visualization of the whole corpus 2.6.2 Book visualizations 2.7 Summary -/- Nietzsche’s Socio-Moral Framework -/- 3 From instincts and drives to types 3.1 Introduction 3.2 The state of the art on drives, instincts, and types 3.2.1 Drives 3.2.2 Instincts 3.2.3 Types 3.3 (...) The semantic neighborhood of drive, instinct, and type 3.4 A theory of (the relations among) instincts, drives, and types 3.4.1 Drives are act-directed rather than outcome-directed dispositions 3.4.2 The reflexive turn in Nietzsche’s drive psychology 3.4.3 Triggers of drive-displacement 3.4.4 Instincts are innate drives 3.4.5 Types are constellations of instincts and other drives 3.4.6 To what extent are types, instincts, and drives fixed? 3.5 Summary -/- 4 From types to virtues 4.1 Introduction 4.2 The state of the art on virtues and values 4.2.1 Virtues 4.2.2 Values 4.3 The semantic neighborhood of virtue and value 4.4 On (the relations among) instincts, drives, types, values, virtues, and values 4.4.1 Virtues are well-calibrated drives 4.4.2 Nietzsche’s type-relative unity of virtue thesis 4.4.3 The type of the criminal 4.4.4 Nietzschean exemplarism and his ad hominem attacks 4.5 Summary -/- 5 Socializing Nietzschean virtues 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Higher-order types 5.2.1 Social character construction 5.2.2 Reflexive character construction 5.3 Eponymous trait terms and Nietzschean summoning 5.3.1 Eponymous trait terms 5.3.2 Nietzschean summoning 5.4 Summary -/- Nietzschean virtues -/- 6 Curiosity 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Curiosity in virtue epistemology 6.3 Curiosity and its affiliated emotions 6.4 Curiosity, perspectivism, and inquiry 6.5 Curiosity as a virtue 6.5.1 A preliminary characterization 6.5.2 Curiosity in the middle through late works 6.6 Summary -/- 7 Courage 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Intellectual courage in contemporary virtue epistemology 7.3 Courage as a virtue 7.3.1 A preliminary characterization 7.3.2 Courage in the middle through late works 7.4 Summary -/- 8 Pathos of distance 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Contempt and disgust in contemporary moral psychology 8.3 The semantic neighborhood of contempt, disgust, and the pathos of distance 8.4 Nietzsche on contempt 8.4.1 Spernere mundum 8.4.2 Spernere neminem 8.4.3 Spernere se ipsum 8.4.4 Spernere se sperni 8.4.5 Nietzsche aims to induce what he considers fitting contempt in receptive readers 8.5 Nietzsche on disgust 8.5.1 The use of disgust: detaching from an ideal 8.5.2 The danger of disgust 8.6 The pathos of distance 8.7 Prospects for a Nietzschean democratic ethos 8.8 Summary -/- 9 Sense of humor 9.1 Introduction 9.2 The semantic neighborhood of laughter, humor, and comedy 9.3 The Nietzschean sense of humor and its functions 9.3.1 From episodic laughter to the sense of humor 9.3.2 Affirmation and inquiry 9.3.3 Negation and inquiry 9.3.4 Affiliation with like-minded inquirers 9.4 Summary -/- 10 Solitude 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Solitude in virtue theory and Nietzsche scholarship 10.3 The semantic neighborhood of solitude 10.4 An account of Nietzschean solitude 10.5 Summary -/- Conclusion -/- 11 Conscience & integrity 11.1 Introduction 11.2 Conscience and integrity in contemporary moral psychology and Nietzsche scholarship 11.2.1 Conscience and integrity in contemporary moral psychology 11.2.2 Conscience and integrity in Nietzsche commentary 11.3 The semantic neighborhood of conscience and integrity 11.4 Distinguishing conscience, good conscience, bad conscience, and intellectual conscience 11.4.1 Conscience 11.4.2 Good conscience 11.4.3 Bad conscience 11.4.4 Intellectual conscience and integrity 11.5 Summary -/- 12 Prospectus 12.1 Future directions in moral psychology 12.2 Future directions in Nietzsche scholarship 12.3 Future directions in digital humanities and the history of philosophy . (shrink)

Este artículo pretende establecer una relación entre la frase “Dios ha muerto” y el tema de la ciencia en Nietzsche. Para tal fin, se hará un análisis de la frase “Dios ha muerto” a la luz de la reciente interpretación hecha en el mundo alemán. En segundo lugar, nos ocuparemos de los conceptos de ausencia y caos para determinar si dichas nociones pueden ser consideradas como un paso ulterior a la “muerte de Dios”. Finalmente, revisaremos el tema de la ciencia: (...) las opiniones que Nietzsche tenía de la misma, las implicaciones que se desprenden de sus obras y, sobre todo, el nexo directo de la ciencia con dicha muerte. El vínculo entre estos temas permite una nueva comprensión del futuro de las investigaciones sobre el filósofo de Röcken. This article aims to establish a relationship between the phrase “God has died” and the theme of science in Nietzsche. For this purpose, an analysis of the phrase “God has died” will be made in the light of the recent interpretation made in the German world. Secondly, we will deal with the concepts of absence and chaos to determine if these notions can be considered as a further step to the “death of God”. Finally, we will review the subject of science: Nietzsche's views on it, the implications that stem from its works and, above all, the direct nexus of science with that death. The link between these themes leads to a new understanding of the future of research on the philosophy of Röcken. (shrink)

Interpretations of Nietzsche as a virtue theorist have proliferated in recent years as commentators have sought to read him as a modern eudaimonistic philosopher while also attempting to show what makes his contribution to this tradition valuable and distinctive.1While some commentators still contend that interpreting Nietzsche as a eudaimonist is antithetical to his overtly-stated philosophical aims,2 over the last decade there has been a upsurge of support for such readings, especially from commentators who emphasise what they claim is the pervasive (...) influence of the Hellenistic tradition on his work. Keith Ansell-Pearson has argued that Epicurus was a key influence on Nietzsche’s middle period, for example; whereas Michael Ure has claimed that the Stoic thought of Seneca and Epictetus was also highly influential.3 Nevertheless, even those commentators who agree that Nietzsche can be informatively situated, or is even best situated, within the Hellenistic tradition cannot agree on two seemingly-intractable puzzles which any virtue-theoretical reading must solve in order to give a full account of his moral philosophy. The puzzles can be stated as follows: Puzzle 1: Which character traits does Nietzsche endorse as virtues? Puzzle 2: What is Nietzsche’s ethical ideal? This article offers an exegetical strategy to shed light on both puzzles, especially the first one regarding which character traits Nietzsche endorses as virtues which, as we shall see, is tougher to answer by a straightforward appeal to his texts. To elucidate this puzzle, I will propose that his approving comments regarding excellence-based moral philosophy indicate that his own ethics is also structured in terms of an ethical ideal with a requisite set of virtues which, following his ancient philosophical influences, he views as fundamentally connected. As Julia Annas notes, one the most distinctive ‘assumptions which ancient theories make [is] the relationship of [our] virtues to our final end’,4 and given Nietzsche’s interest in, and apparent endorsement of, ancient eudaimonism – especially compared to his invariably scathing remarks on the modern deontological and utilitarian traditions – we have reason to think that he shares this view.5 What is significant for this article, however, is that Nietzsche’s commitment to a kind of eudaimonism modelled on the ancient world offers a potential way to solve both puzzles. If his virtues and ethical ideal are connected in a similar way to ancient eudaimonistic theories, then understanding his ethical ideal allows us to infer which character traits he endorses as virtues, and vice versa. Although it might be objected that a method tackling both puzzles in tandem would be unworkable if their solutions were contained in each other, in what follows I will show that Nietzsche’s extensive comments on his ethical ideal of ‘becoming what one is’ positions us in a strong position to infer which character traits he prizes most highly. I will call these character traits ‘virtues of self-cultivation’. (shrink)

This paper argues that Nietzsche is a critic of just the kind of genealogical debunking he is popularly associated with. We begin by showing that interpretations of Nietzsche which see him as engaging in genealogical debunking turn him into an advocate of nihilism, for on his own premises, any truthful genealogical inquiry into our values is going to uncover what most of his contemporaries deem objectionable origins and thus license global genealogical debunking. To escape nihilism and make room for naturalism (...) without indiscriminate subversion, we then argue, Nietzsche targets the way of thinking about values that permits genealogical debunking: far from trying to subvert values simply by uncovering their origins, Nietzsche is actively criticising genealogical debunking thus understood. Finally, we draw out the consequences of our reading for Nietzsche’s positive vision. (shrink)

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to claim Nietzsche’s place within the philosophical tradition of projectivism. Indeed, as will be shown, although Nietzsche is almost unanimously ignored by scholars working on projectivism, during the whole development of his philosophical thought, he holds a position which can be reasonably defined as “projectivist”. -/- Resumo: Este artigo tem por objetivo reivindicar o lugar da filosofia nietzschiana na tradição filosófica do projetivismo. Com efeito, como mostrarei, mesmo se Nietzsche é quase unanimemente ignorado (...) nas obras dos especialistas nessa tradição, ele mantém, ao longo de seu desenvolvimento filosófico, uma posição que se pode com razão definir como “projetivista”. (shrink)

Gone are the heady days when Bernard Williams (1993) could get away with saying that “Nietzsche is not a source of philosophical theories” (p. 4). The last two decades have witnessed a flowering of research that aims to interpret, elucidate, and defend Nietzsche’s theories about science, the mind, and morality. This paper is one more blossom in that efflorescence. What I want to argue is that Nietzsche theorized three important and surprising moral psychological insights that have been born out by (...) contemporary empirical psychology. The first Nietzschean insight is the disunity of the self. The second, connected, Nietzschean insight is the primacy of affect. This primacy is expressed by what I have called elsewhere (Alfano 2010, 2013a) the tenacity of the intentional, and what Nietzsche calls the Socratic equation (TI Socrates 4, 10; WP 2:432-3). The third major Nietzschean insight is the social construction of character, which presupposes a wild diversity within the extensions of trait-terms and the dual direction of fit of character trait attributions. This last point is somewhat in tension with the only other published defense of the empirical credentials of Nietzsche’s moral psychology (Knobe & Leiter 2007), so I will make a few remarks about the contrast between my view and theirs. (shrink)

In the present paper we analyze the approach that sustains that history´s study is useful for the political activities improvement. Nowadays it is considered that the historian must not elaborate his works thinking to achieve an influence on the politics. Nevertheless, during the XIX century and previously, has been a different approach. Our reflection focus on two conspicuous works of the nineteenth century about the historical discipline: Historik by Johann G. Droysen and On the use and abuse of history for (...) life by Friedrich Nietzsche. This article dives on the moral role given to the study of history, as well as dives on the causes, postulated by both thinkers, that explain why history leads to a personal overcoming. Overcoming that subsequently rebound on the political issue. (shrink)

In Nietzsche, ‘European nihilism’ has at its core valuelessness, meaninglessness and senselessness. This article argues that Nietzsche is not replacing God with the nothing, but rather that he regards ‘European nihilism’ as an ‘in-between state’ that is necessary for getting beyond Christian morality. An important characteristic of a Nietzschean philosopher is his ‘will to responsibility’. One of his responsibilities consists of the creation of the values and the concepts that are needed in order to overcome the intermediate state of nihilism. (...) For prevailing over nihilism in science, Nietzsche suggests drawing on philosophy for the creation of values and drawing on art in order to create beautiful surfaces that are based on these values. He regards science as a cultural system that rests on contingent grounds. Therefore, his work is concerned with the responsible construction of the narratives of science in such a way that they enhance agency and promote a life-affirming future. (shrink)

In this extraordinary contribution to Nietzsche studies, Robert Alejandro offers an original interpretation of Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy viewed as a complete whole. Alejandro painstakingly traces the different ways in which Nietzsche reconfigured and shifted his analyses of morality and of the human condition, until he was content with the final result: nothing was dispensable; everything was necessary. This is a philosophy of reconciliation--hardly nihilism--and it is a perspective that is not adequately addressed elsewhere in the literature on Nietzsche. Alejandro traces (...) the evolution of Nietzsche's thought by identifying the different layers of his philosophy, expressed in a complex array of stories and historical narratives. Alejandro analyzes the different stories of Nietzsche, places those stories within a tradition of genealogical theorizing, and interprets both the stories and the genealogy in terms of one of Nietzsche's unique features, his use of "historiobiography." According to Alejandro, historiobiography blends the idea of an attunement with all history and one's awareness of this attunement. As a mode of philosophizing, historiobiography allows Nietzsche to view all human history as if it runs through his own life and thoughts. Alejandro argues that Nietzsche deployed three strategies to find relief from his sense of the meaninglessness of life: his magnified concept of what he himself represented in human history, his doctrine of the eternal recurrence, and his philosophy of reconciliation. "I am confident that this book will be considered essential reading for any scholar doing serious research into Nietzsche's thought and its implications.... The author carefully traces the shifts and turns and occasionally the contradictions and dead-ends in the development of Nietzsche's major themes. I have never read an account of Nietzsche's thought as fully and convincingly supported by textual reference as this book. Others will disagree with the author's readings of Nietzsche, that is the nature of scholarship, but I cannot see how they could be ignored." --_Edward Portis, Texas A & M University_ "This is a major work on Nietzsche. Robert Alejandro offers us a reading of Nietzsche's Herculean efforts that Nietzsche scholars and scholars who write about modernity and postmodernity will be unable to ignore. This wide ranging and deep book addresses major issues in cultural history, psychoanalysis, cultural anthropology, and the vast literature on modernity and secularization. I expect this to be a book that generates debate and discussion for years to come." --_Robert Hollinger, Iowa State University_ "Robert Alejandro delivers a rich, lively account of Nietzsche's quest for meaning. By focusing on the theme of _historiobiography_, Alejandro illuminates Nietzsche's bold attempt to place himself at the center of a comprehensive account of the rise and fall of Western civilization. A thoughtful, well-crafted book, written very much in the spirit of Nietzsche himself." --_Daniel Conway, Texas A & M University_. (shrink)

Following Nietzsche’s call for a philosopher-physician and his own use of the bodily language of health and illness as tools to diagnose the ailments of the body politic, this book offers a reconstruction of the concept of political physiology in Nietzsche’s thought, bridging gaps between Anglo-American, German and French schools of interpretation.

The Genealogy takes a historical form. But does the history play an essential role in Nietzsche's critique of modern morality? In this essay, I argue that the answer is yes. The Genealogy employs history in order to show that acceptance of modern morality was causally responsible for producing a dramatic change in our affects, drives, and perceptions. This change led agents to perceive actual increases in power as reductions in power, and actual decreases in power as increases in power. Moreover, (...) it led agents to experience negative emotions when engaging in activities that constitute greater manifestations of power, and positive emotions when engaging in activities that reduce power. For these reasons, modern morality strongly disposes agents to reduce their own power. Given Nietzsche’s argument that power has a privileged normative status, these facts entail that we have a reason to reject modern morality. (shrink)

This concise overview of the perception of Islam in eight of the most important German thinkers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries allows a new and fascinating investigation of how these thinkers, within their own bodies of work, often espoused contradicting ideas about Islam and their nearest Muslim neighbors. Exploring a variety of 'neat compartmentalizations' at work in the representations of Islam, as well as distinct vocabularies employed by these key intellectuals, Ian Almond parses these vocabularies to examine the importance (...) of Islam in the very history of German thought. Almond further demonstrates the ways in which German philosophers such as Hegel, Kant, and Marx repeatedly ignored information about the Muslim world that did not harmonize with the particular landscapes they were trying to paint – a fact which in turn makes us reflect on what it means when a society possesses 'knowledge' of a foreign culture. (shrink)

L'éthique classique hérite avec Diogène de Sinope de l'idée maîtresse de simplicité, dont l'individu peut faire l'expérience dans l'existence, et dont la jarre est le symbole. L'école cynique, dont Diogène est le représentant, enseigne une pratique de l'absence de souffrance (apathia), caractérisitique d'une simplicité déterminée par la contrainte ou acquise par l'exercice volontaire de l'abandon de certains traits propres à notre identité locale, de ce qui nous entraîne à nous abuser nous-mêmes, et donc à nous décevoir sur le long terme; (...) c'est une réflexion et un engagement personnel vers une utopie, où nous nous attacherions à l'essentiel dans la vie. Ce qui est simple pour moi, devrait l'être aussi pour autrui, ce qui ne veut pas dire qu'il ne faille pas faire un effort pour réaliser une vie bonne, puisque l'homme est traversé par des désirs et des besoins, ceci depuis l'enfance. Nietzsche parle de Diogène comme d'un premier cosmopolite et bon Européen, puisque le cynique a saisi certaines composantes éthiques classiques de base, qui traverseront l'histoire des éthiques ultérieures non seulement de la Grèce et de la Macédoine, mais préfigurant une ligne directrice de l'éthique chrétienne, ayant des accents d'une sagesse hindoue et bouddhiste ancienne de l'Orient. (shrink)

Much of Ofelia Schutte's work has been focused on the question of liberation, especially for women and for colonized peoples. In this paper I discuss some of the important contributions she has made toward understanding the difficulty of dialogue across differences of culture and power, and toward thinking through the relationships of culture, identity, and social justice. Although I generally agree with Schutte's positions, I try here to initiate a dialogue about some conflicting tendencies I see in her positions. Specifically, (...) I challenge her reliance on Nietzsche in developing a general approach to the question of liberation. (shrink)

Critical notice of Bernard Williams, "Truthfulness".

Nietzsche is no longer a marginal figure in the study of philosophy. This collection of specially commissioned essays reflects the emergence of a serious interest amongst philosophers, sociologists and political theorists. By considering Nietzsche's ideas in the context of the modern philosophical tradition from which it emerged, his importance in contemporary thought is refined and reaffirmed. Modern German thought begins with Kant and has rarely escaped his influence. It is with respect to this Kantian heritage that this volume examines Nietzsche. (...) These essays critically consider Nietzsche's relation to Kant and the post-Kantian tradition. In broad terms it is his relation to the domains of knowledge, ethics and aesthetics, that is through the three Kantian critiques, that Nietzsche's thought is illuminated. This allows a surprising variety of areas and questions, both about Nietzsche and about philosophy to be investigated. (shrink)

If we peruse the Chuang Tzu (Zhuangzi) and the Nietzschean corpus, we will find numerous examples of evaluative statements. And yet, both Chuang Tzu and Nietzsche are well known for their critique of conventional value distinctions. Time and again they argue that our conventional value distinctions are invalid and sometimes even harmful. Are these two philosophers justified in making what appear to be self-negating claims? This essay offers a line of argument to justify their employment of evaluative language while at (...) the same time disclaiming its validity. My essential argument is that there are two levels of consciousness in both of these philosophers and that evaluative language is transcended at one of these levels but still possesses limited validity at the other. I assume, I believe correctly, that the purpose of philosophy for both philosophers is self-transformation. Given this functional direction of philosophizing, I divide the types of statements I will analyze into three standpoints: (1) “evaluative standpoint,” or statements which I take to be primarily evaluative in nature. “Class i” refers to the evaluative standpoint which is the standpoint not yet transcended and to be transcended; (2) “transevaluative standpoint”, or statements which I take to be primarily transevaluative in nature. “Class ii” refers to the transevaluative standpoint which is the standpoint to be achieved; (3) “transevaluative resultant values,” or statements which are primarily statements of the resultant value which are the product of a value free standpoint. “Class iii” refers to the resultant concrete values which are the product of following the transevaluative standpoint. My analyses lead to the conclusion that evaluative language is employed in its appropriate level of consciousness and transcended in the other level. In short, I propose that Chuang Tzu and Nietzsche can have their cake, and eat it, too. (shrink)

This book is a clear, comprehensive guide to the philosophic and religious concepts of the world's outstanding philosophers. Here are the great thoughts and ideas of the Western mind, selected and explained with magnificent precision by an eminent scholar. It is an illuminating portrait of man's intellectual and moral struggle to understand the world and the meaning of human life and destiny. Plato Aristotle Augustine Aquinas Luther Descartes Kant Rousseau Marx Nietzsche.