This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories

45 found
Order:
  1. added 2018-03-13
    One-Particularism in the Theory of Action.David-Hillel Ruben - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2677-2694.
    In this paper, I intend to introduce what I think is a novel proposal in the metaphysics of action: one-particularism. In order to do so, I must first explain two ideas: a concept in the semantics of English that many philosophers of action take to be of great importance in action theory, causative alternation; and the idea of an intrinsic event. By attempting to understand the role that intrinsic events are meant to play in action theory, I then introduce my (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2018-03-12
    8 Goal-Directed Action and Teleological Explanation.Scott R. Sehon - 2007 - In J. K. Campbell, M. O'Rourke & H. S. Silverstein (eds.), Causation and Explanation. MIT Press. pp. 4--155.
  3. added 2018-03-12
    Intentional Behavior.Frederick Stoutland - 1983 - Noûs 17 (1):76.
  4. added 2018-03-07
    Bodily Movement and Its Significance.Will Small - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (1):183-206.
    I trace the development of one aspect of Fred Stoutland’s thought about action by considering the central role given by contemporary philosophy of action to bodily movement. Those who tell the so-called standard story of action think that actions are bodily movements caused by beliefs and desires, that cause further effects in the world in virtue of which they can be described. Those who hold a disjunctive conception of bodily movement think that actions are bodily movements that involve intentions essentially, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. added 2017-08-25
    Acting and Understanding.Alexander Stathopoulos - 2016 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrews
    This thesis concerns the question of what it is for a subject to act. It answers this question in three steps. The first step is taken by arguing that any satisfactory answer must build on the idea that an action is something predicable of the acting subject. The second step is taken by arguing in support of an answer which does build on this idea, and does so by introducing the idea that acting is doing something which is an exercise (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2017-06-12
    Action Explanation and the Nature of Mental States.Scott Robert Sehon - 1994 - Dissertation, Princeton University
    A developing orthodoxy in the philosophy of mind makes two fundamental claims: that ordinary explanation of action is a species of causal explanation, and that mental states are the theoretical posits of a proto-scientific theory of the mind embodied by our common sense psychological practices. I contend that this approach is wrong on both counts. In the first part of the dissertation I argue against the causal theory of action, and I propose an alternative, teleological construal of ordinary action explanation. (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2017-05-29
    Springs of Action.Hugh J. McCann - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):979-982.
  8. added 2017-05-29
    Review of On Action, by Carl Ginet.Richard Malpas - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (1):134.
  9. added 2017-05-29
    Theory of Action.Charles Marks & Lawrence H. Davis - 1980 - Philosophical Review 89 (4):634.
  10. added 2016-12-12
    Subjects of Experience.E. J. Lowe - 2006 - Cambridge University Press.
    In this innovative study of the relationship between persons and their bodies, E. J. Lowe demonstrates the inadequacy of physicalism, even in its mildest, non-reductionist guises, as a basis for a scientifically and philosophically acceptable account of human beings as subjects of experience, thought and action. He defends a substantival theory of the self as an enduring and irreducible entity - a theory which is unashamedly committed to a distinctly non-Cartesian dualism of self and body. Taking up the physicalist challenge (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  11. added 2016-12-08
    Because She Wanted To.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (1):27-35.
    Carl Ginet has advanced an account of action explanation on which actions can be entirely uncaused and action explanations need not cite causal factors. Several objections have been raised against this view, and Ginet has recently defended the account. Here it is argued that Ginet’s defense fails to come to grips with the chief problems faced by his view.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. added 2016-12-05
    A Companion to the Philosophy of Action.Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.) - 2010 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    A Companion to the Philosophy of Action offers a comprehensive overview of the issues and problems central to the philosophy of action. The first volume to survey the entire field of philosophy of action (the central issues and processes relating to human actions). Brings together specially commissioned chapters from international experts. Discusses a range of ideas and doctrines, including rationality, free will and determinism, virtuous action, criminal responsibility, Attribution Theory, and rational agency in evolutionary perspective. Individual chapters also cover prominent (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. added 2016-10-15
    On Pereboom’s Disappearing Agent Argument.Alfred R. Mele - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):561-574.
    This article is a critical discussion of Derk Pereboom’s “disappearing agent objection” to event-causal libertarianism in his Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. This objection is an important plank in Pereboom’s argument for free will skepticism. It is intended to knock event-causal libertarianism, a leading pro-free-will view, out of contention. I explain why readers should not find the objection persuasive.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  14. added 2016-08-25
    Carl Ginet, On Action. [REVIEW]Karl Pfeifer - 1992 - Philosophy in Review 12:196-199.
  15. added 2016-08-09
    ANSCOMBE, G. E. M. -Intention. [REVIEW]K. W. Rankin - 1959 - Mind 68:261.
  16. added 2015-09-10
    The Instrumental Structure of Actions.Markos Valaris - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):64-83.
    According to current orthodoxy in the philosophy of action, intentional actions consist in intrinsically mindless bodily movements that stand in causal relations to appropriate mental states. This paper challenges this approach to intentional action, by arguing that there are not enough appropriate mental states around to ‘animate’ all of the bodily movements we intuitively count as intentional actions. In the alternative picture I suggest, the bodily movements that constitute our intentional actions are themselves to be thought of as cognitive events, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  17. added 2015-06-03
    ROWN, D. G.: Action. [REVIEW]R. E. Dowling - 1969 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47:404.
  18. added 2015-06-03
    "Action" and "Cause of Action".Philip E. Davis - 1962 - Mind 71 (281):93-95.
  19. added 2015-05-19
    The Conflicting Aspects of Hugh McCann's Theory of Action.Damir Čičić - 2011 - Filozofia 66 (9):918.
  20. added 2015-05-19
    On Action by Carl Ginet. [REVIEW]L. H. Davis - 1991 - Mind 100:390-394.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. added 2015-04-27
    Contemporary Action Theory.Ghita Holmström-Hintikka & Raimo Tuomela - 1997
  22. added 2015-04-07
    Agents and Their Actions.Johannes L. Brandl, Marian David & Leopold Stubenberg (eds.) - 2001 - Rodopi.
    IntroductionE.J. LOWE: Event Causation and Agent CausationRalf STOECKER: Agents in ActionGeert KEIL: How Do We Ever Get Up? On the Proximate Causation of Actions and EventsMaria ALVAREZ: Letting Happen, Omissions, and CausationFrederick STOUTLAND: Responsive Action and the Belief-Desire ModelMarco IORIO: How Are Agents Related to Their Actions? The Existentialist ResponseJens KULENKAMPFF: What Oedipus Did When He Married Jocasta or What Ancient Tragedy Tells Us About Agents, Their Actions, and the WorldRüdiger BITTNER: Agents as RulersMonika BETZLER: How Can an Agent Rationally (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. added 2015-03-28
    McCANN, HJ-The Works of Agency.J. Bishop - 2001 - Philosophical Books 42 (3):232-232.
  24. added 2015-03-25
    George Wilson, The Intentionality of Human Action Reviewed By.Gerald W. Barnes - 1990 - Philosophy in Review 10 (5):212-216.
  25. added 2015-01-27
    Reasons, Desires and Intentional Actions.Maria Alvarez - 2009 - In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave-Macmillan.
  26. added 2015-01-27
    Whither Action Theory.John M. Connolly - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:85-106.
    The problem of ‘wayward causal chains’ threatens any causal analysis of the concept of intentional human action. For such chains show that the mere causation of an action by the right sort of belief and/or desire does not make the action intentional, i.e. one done in order to attain the object of desire. Now if the ‘because’ in ‘wayward’ action-explanations is straightforwardly causal, that might be argued to indicate by contrast that the different ‘because’ of reasons-explanations (which both explain and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. added 2014-07-08
    Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action.Maria Alvarez - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    Understanding human beings and their distinctive rational and volitional capacities requires a clear account of such things as reasons, desires, emotions, and motives, and how they combine to produce and explain human behaviour. Maria Alvarez presents a fresh and incisive study of these concepts, centred on reasons and their role in human agency.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  28. added 2014-03-27
    Essays on Anscombe's Intention.Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.) - 2011 - Harvard University Press.
    This collection of ten essays elucidates some of the more challenging aspects of Anscombe’s work and affirms her reputation as one of our most original ...
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  29. added 2014-03-27
    Summary of Anscombe's Intention.Frederick Stoutland - 2011 - In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention. Harvard University Press.
  30. added 2014-03-27
    Actions in Their Circumstances.Jennifer Hornsby - 2011 - In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention. Harvard University Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  31. added 2014-03-27
    Introduction : Anscombe's Intention in Context.Frederick Stoutland - 2011 - In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention. Harvard University Press.
  32. added 2014-03-26
    Rational Causation.Eric Marcus - 2012 - Harvard University Press.
    Introduction -- Rational explanation of belief -- Rational explanation of action -- (Non-human) animals and their reasons -- Rational explanation and rational causation -- Events and states -- Physicalism.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  33. added 2014-03-20
    Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action.C. Andreou - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (3):411-413.
  34. added 2014-03-15
    Review: Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action. [REVIEW]J. Lenman - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):776-778.
  35. added 2014-03-09
    Neurosciences of Action and Noncausal Theories.Don Gustafson - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):367–374.
    Recent neuroscience and psychology of behavior have suggested that conscious decisions may have no causal role in the etiology of intentional action. Such results pose a threat to traditional philosophical analyses of action. On such views beliefs, desires and conscious willing are part of the causal structure of intentional action. But if the suggestions from neuroscience/psychology are correct, analyses of this kind are wrong. Conscious antecedents of action are epiphenomenal. This essay explores this consequence. It also notes that the traditional (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. added 2014-02-10
    Review of On Action, by Carl Ginet. [REVIEW]Alfred Mele - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):488-491.
  37. added 2013-03-07
    Reasons and Causes: Causalism and Non-Causalism in the Philosophy of Action.Giuseppina D'Oro & Constantine Sandis (eds.) - 2013 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    To mark the 50th anniversary of Donald Davidson's 'Actions, reasons and causes', eight philosophers with distinctive and contrasting views revisit and update the reasons/causes debate.Their essays are preceded by a historical introduction which traces current debates to their roots in the philosophy of history and social science, linking the rise of causalism to a metaphysical backlash against the linguistic turn. Both historically grounded and topical, this volume will be of great interest to both students and scholars in the philosophy of (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. added 2012-12-21
    Book Review: Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action. [REVIEW]Constantine Sandis - 2004 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (2):223-225.
  39. added 2012-10-25
    How to Respond to the Problem of Deviant Formal Causation.Stephen Davey - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):703-717.
    Recently, a new problem has arisen for an Anscombean conception of intentional action. The claim is that the Anscombean’s emphasis on the formally causal character of practical knowledge precludes distinguishing between an aim and a merely foreseen side effect. I propose a solution to this problem: the difference between aim and side effect should be understood in terms of the familiar Anscombean distinction between acting intentionally and the intention with which one acts. I also argue that this solution has advantages (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. added 2012-08-08
    The Intentionality of Human Action.George M. Wilson - 1989 - Stanford University Press.
    CHAPTER ONE Introduction Twenty-five years ago it was pretty widely held among Anglo- American philosophers that it was sheer confusion to suppose that an ...
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  41. added 2012-06-25
    Recent Work on Intentional Action.Alfred R. Mele - 1992 - American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (3):199 - 217.
  42. added 2012-05-03
    Practical Knowledge and Foreseen Side Effects.Niels van Miltenburg - 2011 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (1):1-7.
    On Anscombe's view, intentional actions are characterized by a specific type of knowledge (practical knowledge) possessed by the agents that perform them. Recently, interest in Anscombean action theory has been renewed. Sarah Paul argues that Anscombean action theory faces a serious problem: It fails to discriminate between an action’s intended aim or purpose and its foreseen side effects. Since Anscombeans conceive practical knowledge as the formal cause of intentional actions, Paul dubs this a problem of “deviant formal causation.” In this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  43. added 2012-02-19
    Reason's Explanation of Action.Carl Ginet - 1995 - In Timothy O'Connor (ed.), Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will. Oxford University Press.
  44. added 2011-06-30
    Basic Actions and Causality.Frederick Stoutland - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (16):467-475.
  45. added 2011-05-26
    Mind in Action.Bede Rundle - 1997 - Oxford University Press.
    Mind in Action challenges the dominant view in contemporary philosophy that human action is driven by thoughts and desires much as a machine is made to function by the operation of physical causes. Bede Rundle rejects the materialist view of mind and the causal theory of action; his alternative approach elucidates such key concepts as thought, belief, desire, intention, and freedom to give a fresh view of human behavior.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations