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Summary Many philosophers think that conscious experience is always accompanied by a minimal, nonconceptual, or pre-reflective sense of self and, further, that we have to appeal to such a minimal sense of self in order to account for higher forms of self-consciousness.
Key works Bermúdez 1998 makes a case for the necessity to appeal to nonconceptual forms of self-consciousness in order to be able to explain the ability to think conceptual 'I'-thought and discusses various different forms of nonconceptual self-consciousness. Zahavi 2005 discusses pre-reflective self-consciousness from a contemporary phenomenological perspective.
Introductions Gallagher & Zahavi 2008 give an introduction of phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness, with a focus on pre-reflective self-consciousness.
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  1. added 2020-02-13
    Varieties of Self-Apprehension.Anna Giustina - 2019 - In Marc Borner, Manfred Frank & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Senses of Self: Approaches to Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness. pp. 186-220.
    The Brentanian idea that every state of consciousness involves a consciousness or awareness of itself (Brentano 1874), which has been a central tenet of the phenomenological school, is a current topic in contemporary philosophical debates about consciousness and subjectivity, both in the continental and the analytic tradition. Typically, the self-awareness that accompanies every state of consciousness is characterized as pre-reflective. Most theorists of pre-reflective self-awareness seem to converge on a negative characterization: pre-reflective self-awareness is not a kind of reflective awareness. (...)
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  2. added 2019-12-09
    Perceiving Reality: Consciousness, Intentionality, and Cognition in Buddhist Philosophy.Christian Coseru - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    What turns the continuous flow of experience into perceptually distinct objects? Can our verbal descriptions unambiguously capture what it is like to see, hear, or feel? How might we reason about the testimony that perception alone discloses? Christian Coseru proposes a rigorous and highly original way to answer these questions by developing a framework for understanding perception as a mode of apprehension that is intentionally constituted, pragmatically oriented, and causally effective. By engaging with recent discussions in phenomenology and analytic philosophy (...)
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  3. added 2019-12-04
    Reasons and Conscious Persons.Christian Coseru - forthcoming - In Andrea Sauchelli (ed.), Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry. London: Routledge. pp. 160-186.
    What justifies holding the person that we are today morally responsible for something we did a year ago? And why are we justified in showing prudential concern for the future welfare of the person we will be a year from now? These questions cannot be systematically pursued without addressing the problem of personal identity. This essay considers whether Buddhist Reductionism, a philosophical project grounded on the idea that persons reduce to a set of bodily, sensory, perceptual, dispositional, and conscious elements, (...)
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  4. added 2019-09-24
    Presence of Mind: Consciousness and the Sense of Self.Christian Coseru - 2019 - In Manidipa Sen (ed.), Problem of the Self: Consciousness, Subjectivity, and the Other. New Delhi, India: Aatar Books. pp. 46–64.
    It is generally agreed that consciousness is a somewhat slippery term. However, more narrowly defined as 'phenomenal consciousness' it captures at least three essential features or aspects: subjective experience (the notion that what we are primarily conscious of are experiences), subjective knowledge (that feature of our awareness that gives consciousness its distinctive reflexive character), and phenomenal contrast (the phenomenality of awareness, absence of which makes consciousness intractable) (cf. Siewert 1998). If Buddhist accounts of consciousness are built, as it is claimed, (...)
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  5. added 2019-09-15
    Perception, Causally Efficacious Particulars, and the Range of Phenomenal Consciousness: Reply to Commentaries.Christian Coseru - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (9-10):55-82.
    This paper responds to critical commentaries on my book, Perceiving Reality (OUP, 2012), by Laura Guerrero, Matthew MacKenzie, and Anand Vaidya. Guerrero focuses on the metaphysics of causation, and its role in the broader question of whether the ‘two truths’ framework of Buddhist philosophy can be reconciled with the claim that science provides the best account of our experienced world. MacKenzie pursues two related questions: (i) Is reflexive awareness (svasaṃvedana) identical with the subjective pole of a dual-aspect cognition or are (...)
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  6. added 2019-09-14
    On Engaging Buddhism Philosophically.Christian Coseru - 2018 - Sophia 57 (4):535-545.
    This paper provides an outline and critical introduction to a symposium on Garfield’s Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy. The main issues addressed concern: (i) the problem of personal identity, specifically the issue of whether the no-self view can satisfactorily account for such phenomena as agency, responsibility, rationality, and subjectivity, and the synchronic unity of consciousness they presuppose; (ii) a critique of phenomenal realism, which is shown to rests on a false dilemma, namely: either we must take people’s introspective (...)
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  7. added 2019-07-25
    Breaking Out of One’s Head (& Awakening to the World).Gregory Nixon - 2019 - In Alex S. Kohav (ed.), Mysticism and Meaning: : Multidisciplinary Perspectives. St. Petersburg, FL: Three Pines Press. pp. 29-57.
    Herein, I review the shattering moment in my life when I awoke from the dream of self to find being as part of the living world and not in my head, discovering my perspectival center to be literally everywhere. Since awakening to the world takes one beyond thought and language thus also beyond the symbolic construction of time, it is strange to place this event and its aftermath as happening long ago in my life. It is forever present. This fact (...)
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  8. added 2019-04-15
    Béatrice Longuenesse, I, Me, Mine: Back to Kant, and Back Again Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017 Pp. Xx+257 ISBN 9780199665761 $45.00. [REVIEW]Curtis Sommerlatte - 2018 - Kantian Review 23 (3):504-510.
  9. added 2019-03-07
    Being Origins: The Way We Think About Ourselves.Florian Wüstholz - 2018 - Dissertation, Universität Freiburg
    De se thinking has several characteristic features which aren’t present in all instances of thinking about yourself but are at least potentially realised. As such, any feasible account needs to explain the potential for these features. Neither the two-dimensional accounts—stemming from the idea that mental states can be characterised using the notion of a proposition—nor the property theory—claiming that we self-ascribe a property in thinking—do full justice to the phenomenon at hand. Instead, we have to take the concept of primitive (...)
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  10. added 2019-01-31
    Perception, Nonconceptual Content, and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Kristina Musholt & Arnon Cahen - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (7):703-723.
    The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we clarify the notion of immunity to error through misidentification with respect to the first-person pronoun. In particular, we set out to dispel the view that for a judgment to be IEM it must contain a token of a certain class of predicates. Rather, the importance of the IEM status of certain judgments is that it teaches us about privileged ways of coming to know about ourselves. We then turn to examine how (...)
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  11. added 2018-12-05
    Kant and the Problem of Self-Knowledge.Luca Forgione - 2018 - New York, Stati Uniti: Routledge.
    This book addresses the problem of self-knowledge in Kant’s philosophy. As Kant writes in his major works of the critical period, it is due to the simple and empty representation ‘I think’ that the subject’s capacity for self-consciousness enables the subject to represent its own mental dimension. This book articulates Kant’s theory of self-knowledge on the basis of the following three philosophical problems: 1) a semantic problem regarding the type of reference of the representation ‘I’; 2) an epistemic problem regarding (...)
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  12. added 2018-09-07
    Eliminativism, Objects, and Persons - The Virtues of Non-Existence.Jiri Benovsky - 2018 - Routledge.
    In this book, Jiri Benovsky defends the view that he doesn't exist. In this book, he also defends the view that this book itself doesn't exist. But this did not prevent him to write the book, and although in Benovsky's view you don't exist either, this does not prevent you to read it. Benovsky defends a brand of non-exceptionalist eliminativism. Some eliminativists, typically focusing on ordinary material objects such as chairs and hammers, make exceptions, for instance for blue whales (that (...)
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  13. added 2018-07-27
    Representation and the Figure of the Observer.Vitor Silva Tschoepke - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research 9 (8):722-738.
    The theoretical use of representation faces, among others, two types of inconsistencies, namely: a representation requires the figure of the agent to which it will be representative, which leads either to circularity or to infinite return; and the resulting one, which is the difficulty in reconciling a description, in representative terms, with other more fundamental scientific categories. The proposal of the present study for the solution of these problems was the identification of a referential process starting from the correlation between (...)
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  14. added 2018-07-10
    "Enjoy Your Self": Lotze on Self-Concern and Self-Consciousness.Mark Textor - 2018 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 35 (2):157-79.
    Current work on first-person thought takes its distinctive feature to be epistemological. First-person thinking is non-observational and immune to errors to which other varieties of thought about us are open. In contrast, the nineteenth century philosopher Hermann Lotze (1817-81) put the distinctive concern we have for the object of first-person thought at the center of his account. His arguments suggest that first-person thought is essentially evaluative. In this paper I will reconstruct and defend the core of Lotze’s view of self-consciousness.
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  15. added 2018-03-12
    De Se Beliefs, Self-Ascription, and Primitiveness.Florian L. Wüstholz - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (46):401-422.
    De se beliefs typically pose a problem for propositional theories of content. The Property Theory of content tries to overcome the problem of de se beliefs by taking properties to be the objects of our beliefs. I argue that the concept of self-ascription plays a crucial role in the Property Theory while being virtually unexplained. I then offer different possibilities of illuminating that concept and argue that the most common ones are either circular, question-begging, or epistemically problematic. Finally, I argue (...)
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  16. added 2018-02-17
    Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective.Dan Zahavi - 2005 - Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
    The relationship of self, and self-awareness, and experience: exploring classical phenomenological analyses and their relevance to contemporary discussions in ...
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  17. added 2018-02-09
    Against Deflation of the Subject.Nesic Janko - 2017 - Filozofija I Društvo 28 (4):1102-1121.
    I will argue that accounts of mineness and pre-reflective self-awareness can be helpful to panpsychists in solving the combination problems. A common strategy in answering the subject combination problem in panpsychism is to deflate the subject, eliminating or reducing subjects to experience. Many modern panpsychist theories are deflationist or endorse deflationist accounts of subjects, such as Parfit’s reductionism of personal identity and G. Strawson’s identity view. To see if there can be deflation we need to understand what the subject/self is. (...)
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  18. added 2018-02-06
    Is Consciousness Reflexively Self‐Aware? A Buddhist Analysis.Bronwyn Finnigan - 2018 - Ratio 31 (4):389-401.
    This article examines contemporary Buddhist defences of the idea that consciousness is reflexively aware or self-aware. Call this the Self-Awareness Thesis. A version of this thesis was historically defended by Dignāga but rejected by Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika Buddhists. Prāsaṅgikas historically advanced four main arguments against this thesis. In this paper I consider whether some contemporary defence of the Self-Awareness Thesis can withstand these Prāsaṅgika objections. A problem is that contemporary defenders of the Self-Awareness Thesis have subtly different accounts with different assessment (...)
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  19. added 2017-12-14
    Minds That Matter: Seven Degrees of Moral Standing.Julian Friedland - 2004 - Between the Species 13 (4).
    Prominent non-speciesist attempts to determine the amount of moral standing properly attributable to conscious beings argue that certain non-human animals should be granted the highest consideration as self-conscious persons. Most of these theories also include a lesser moral standing for the sentient, or merely conscious, non-person. Thus, the standard approach has been to advocate a two-tiered theory—'sentience' or 'consciousness' and 'self-consciousness' or 'personhood'. While the first level seems to present little interpretative difficulty, the second has recently been criticized as a (...)
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  20. added 2017-09-18
    Being Somewhere. Egocentic Spatial Representation as Self-Representation.Ferdinand Pöhlmann - 2017 - Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler.
    Ferdinand Pöhlmann argues that a sense of one’s own basic abilities to move is a constitutive condition on the ability to perceive the world spatially. This constitutive relation explains why egocentric spatial representation is to be regarded as a kind of self-representation. In arguing for these claims, conceptual as well as empirical questions are discussed and an overview of accounts that take action as a constitutive condition on spatial representation is given. The picture that emerges is linked to the phenomenological (...)
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  21. added 2017-09-14
    Does Consciousness Necessitate Self-Awareness?Daniel R. Rodriguez-Navas - 2016 - In Sofia Miguens, Sofia Magueys & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Pre-reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Routledge.
    I offer a close reading of the first part of Sartre's The Transcendence of the Ego, arguing that contrary to widely held interpretation, one of Sartre's main goals in that text is to defend the view that consciousness does not necessitate self-awareness, that not all conscious states need be, ipso facto, states of self-awareness. In addition, I explain that this view about the conceptual relationship between consciousness and self-awareness has important methodological implications. One of the standard strategies for accounting for (...)
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  22. added 2017-07-30
    From Panexperientialism to Conscious Experience: The Continuum of Experience.Gregory M. Nixon - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 1 (3):216-233.
    When so much is being written on conscious experience, it is past time to face the question whether experience happens that is not conscious of itself. The recognition that we and most other living things experience non-consciously has recently been firmly supported by experimental science, clinical studies, and theoretic investigations; the related if not identical philosophic notion of experience without a subject has a rich pedigree. Leaving aside the question of how experience could become conscious of itself, I aim here (...)
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  23. added 2017-07-25
    Self-Consciousness.Joel Smith - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    -/- Human beings are conscious not only of the world around them but also of themselves: their activities, their bodies, and their mental lives. They are, that is, self-conscious (or, equivalently, self-aware). Self-consciousness can be understood as an awareness of oneself. But a self-conscious subject is not just aware of something that merely happens to be themselves, as one is if one sees an old photograph without realising that it is of oneself. Rather a self-conscious subject is aware of themselves (...)
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  24. added 2017-07-20
    Das unmittelbare Selbstverhältnis bei Søren Kierkegaard.Jörg Disse - 1992 - Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 17 (1):17-34.
    Inquires about the existence of a prereflective self-consciousness within Kierkegaard's theory of existence.
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  25. added 2017-05-29
    Sartre’s Case for Nonthetic Consciousness: The Ground of the Cartesian Cogito’s Certainty and the Methodological Basis for Phenomenological Ontology.Curtis Sommerlatte - 2017 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 99 (4):405-442.
    Sartre’s phenomenological view of consciousness gives primacy to the thesis that all consciousness is nonthetically aware of itself, i.e., pre-reflectively aware of itself but not as an object. Few commentators, however, have explained Sartre’s grounds for holding this thesis, despite his view that the thesis’s truth underwrites the certainty of the Cartesian cogito and thereby the method of Sartre’s own phenomenological ontology. I document three lines of support for the thesis, the most promising of which consists in a proof by (...)
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  26. added 2017-04-24
    Limits of the Conscious Control of Action.Michael Schmitz - 2011 - Social Psychology 42 (1):93-98.
    After outlining why the notion of conscious control of action matters to us and after distinguishing different challenges to that notion, the contribution focuses on the challenge posed by the literature on unconscious goal pursuit. Based on a conceptual clarification of the notion of consciousness, I argue that the understanding of consciousness in that literature is too restricted. The hypothesis that the behaviors reported can be accounted for by nonconceptual forms of consciousness, such as emotions and motor experiences, rather than (...)
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  27. added 2017-04-24
    How Primitive is Self-Consciousness?: Autonomous Nonconceptual Content and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.R. Meeks Roblin - unknown
  28. added 2017-03-08
    Emotions, Me, Myself and I.Fabrice Teroni - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):433-451.
    We are prone to think that the emotions someone undergoes are somehow revelatory of the sort of person she is, and philosophers working in the field have frequently insisted upon the existence of an intimate relation between a subject and her emotions. But how intimate is the relation between emotions and the self? I first explain why interesting claims about this relation must locate it at the level of emotional intentionality. Given that emotions have a complex intentional structure – they (...)
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  29. added 2017-02-27
    Close to Me: Multisensory Space Representations for Action and Pre-Reflexive Consciousness of Oneself-in-the-World.Dorothee Lang, Claudio Brozzoli, Yves Rossetti & Alessandro Farne - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):687-699.
    Philosophical considerations as well as several recent studies from neurophysiology, neuropsychology, and psychophysics converged in showing that the peripersonal space is structured in a body-centred manner and represented through integrated sensory inputs. Multisensory representations may deserve the function of coding peripersonal space for avoiding or interacting with objects. Neuropsychological evidence is reviewed for dynamic interactions between space representations and action execution, as revealed by the behavioural effects that the use of a tool, as a physical extension of the reachable space, (...)
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  30. added 2017-02-27
    Is Perspectival Self-Consciousness Non-Conceptual&Quest.Alva NoË - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):185-194.
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  31. added 2017-02-27
    Nonconceptual Self-Consciousness And Cognitive Science.José Luis Bermúdez - 2001 - Synthese 129 (1):129-149.
    This paper explores some of the areaswhere neuroscientific and philosophical issuesintersect in the study of self-consciousness. Taking aspoint of departure a paradox that appears to blockphilosophical elucidation of self-consciousness, thepaper illustrates how the highly conceptual forms ofself-consciousness emerge from a rich foundation ofnonconceptual forms of self-awareness. Attention ispaid in particular to the primitive forms ofnonconceptual self-consciousness manifested in visualperception, somatic proprioception, spatial reasoningand interpersonal psychological interactions. Thestudy of these primitive forms of self-consciousnessis an interdisciplinaryenterprise and the paper considers a range (...)
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  32. added 2017-02-14
    The Notion of a Conscious Subject and its Phenomenological Basis in Prereflexive Self-Awareness.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2013 - Rivista di Filosofia 104 (3):485-504.
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  33. added 2017-02-14
    The Prospects for an Empirical Theory of Concept Acquisition: Causal Cognition in Early Childhood.Billie Carol Skrenes - 2004 - Dissertation, University of California, Irvine
    Recent work in cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience has produced some surprising results that provide the materials for an empirical theory of concept acquisition which departs in significant ways from both radical nativism and classical empiricism. In this dissertation I develop a theory of how pre-linguistic infants acquire the capacity to construct causal concepts, in the period from 7 to 24 months of age. In humans the sophisticated modular capacity of the mammalian nervous system to track conditional frequencies of biologically (...)
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  34. added 2017-02-07
    Review of Bermudez's Thinking Without Words[REVIEW]Jerry A. Fodor - forthcoming - The Guardian.
  35. added 2017-02-07
    Self-Concernment Without Self-Reference.Roberto Sá Pereira - 2016 - Abstracta 9 (1).
    This paper is a new defense of the old orthodox view that self-consciousness requires self-concepts. My defense relies on two crucial constraints. The first is what I call Bermúdez’s Constraint, that is, the view that any attribution of content must account for the intentional behavior of the subject that reflects her own way of understanding the world. The second is the well-known Generality Constraint of Evans, which is also termed the recombinability constraint. The claim I want to support in this (...)
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  36. added 2017-02-07
    Pre-Reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind.Sofia Miguens, Gerhard Preyer & Clara Bravo Morando (eds.) - 2015 - Routledge.
    Pre-reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind delves into the relations between the current debates on consciousness within analytical philosophy and the debates taking place in continental philosophy in the twentieth century and in particular within the work of Sartre. Examining the return of the problem of subjectivity in philosophy of mind and the idea that phenomenal consciousness could not be reduced to functional or cognitive properties this volume aims to rethink borders between what counts as ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ (...)
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  37. added 2017-02-07
    On Pure Reflection A Reply to Dan Zahavi.Michel Bitbol & C. Petitmengin - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (2):24-37.
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  38. added 2017-02-07
    The No-Self Alternative.Thomas Metzinger - 2010 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press.
    This article explores the ‘no-self alternative’ in the debate on the metaphysical and phenomenological concept of the self. It suggests that the no-self alternative may not be an alternative at all and it could simply be the default assumption for all rational approaches to self-consciousness and subjectivity. It outlines several different anti-realist arguments about the self and explains why the idea that there are no selves is counter-intuitive. It shows why the intuitions of phenomenology are traceable to the contingent fact (...)
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  39. added 2017-02-07
    Nonconceptual Content.Josefa Toribio - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):445–460.
    Nonconceptualists maintain that there are ways of representing the world that do not reflect the concepts a creature possesses. They claim that the content of these representational states is genuine content because it is subject to correctness conditions, but it is nonconceptual because the creature to which we attribute it need not possess any of the concepts involved in the specification of that content. Appeals to nonconceptual content have seemed especially useful in attempts to capture the representational properties of perceptual (...)
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  40. added 2017-02-07
    Opowie Sci Niedyskretne Formy Autorefleksyjne W Prozie Polskiej Lat Dziewie Cdziesiatych.Wojciech Browarny - 2002
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  41. added 2017-02-07
    Norton Nelkin, Consciousness and the Origins of Thought Reviewed By.Robert J. Stainton - 1997 - Philosophy in Review 17 (6):434-436.
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  42. added 2017-02-07
    Norton Nelkin, Consciousness and the Origins of Thought. [REVIEW]Robert Stainton - 1997 - Philosophy in Review 17:434-436.
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  43. added 2017-01-28
    Review of Jose Luis Bermudez: Thinking Without Words. [REVIEW]Pessi Lyyra - 2005 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 11.
    Cognitive sciences such as developmental psychology, cognitive ethology and cognitive archaeology continuously produce evidence of high-level thinking in non-linguistic creatures. José Luis Bermúdez applies this evidence in formulating a philosophical theory of non-linguistic thought, the main elements of which I summarise here. While I agree with most of the positive aspects of his theory of non-linguistic thought, I argue that the negative aspects of his theory—according to which non-linguistic creatures are denied metacognitive capacities—fails to take into account the evidence from (...)
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  44. added 2017-01-27
    Review of Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony Marcel & Naomi Eilan (Eds)-The Body and the Self. [REVIEW]M. L. Johnson - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9:408-410.
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  45. added 2017-01-26
    Entrevista a José Luis Blázquez, Presidente de Agesvet.Charo Toribio - 2011 - In Ivano Dionigi & Guido Barbujani (eds.), Animalia. Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli. pp. 231--46.
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  46. added 2017-01-26
    El Pensamiento Ético-Moral de José Luis L. Aranguren.Enrique Bonete Perales - 2009 - In Manuel Garrido (ed.), El Legado Filosófico Español E Hispanoamericano Del Siglo Xx. Cátedra.
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  47. added 2017-01-25
    Basic Self‐Awareness.Alexandre Billon - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).
    Basic self-awareness is the kind of self-awareness reflected in our standard use of the first-person. Patients suffering from severe forms of depersonalization often feel reluctant to use the first-person and can even, in delusional cases, avoid it altogether, systematically referring to themselves in the third-person. Even though it has been neglected since then, depersonalization has been extensively studied, more than a century ago, and used as probe for understanding the nature and the causal mechanisms of basic self-awareness. In this paper, (...)
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  48. added 2017-01-25
    From Phenomenal Selves to Hyperselves.Barry Dainton - 2015 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:161-197.
    The claim that we are subjects of experience, i.e. beings whose nature is intimately bound up with consciousness, is in many ways a plausible one. There is, however, more than one way of developing a metaphysical account of the nature of subjects. The view that subjects are essentially conscious has the unfortunate consequence that subjects cannot survive periods of unconsciousness. A more appealing alternative is to hold that subjects are beings with the capacity to be conscious, a capacity which need (...)
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  49. added 2017-01-25
    Kantian Reflections on the Givenness of Zahavi’s Minimal Experiential Self.James R. O’Shea - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (5):619-625.
    At the core of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason was a decisive break with certain fundamental Cartesian assumptions or claims about consciousness and self-consciousness, claims that have nonetheless remained perennially tempting, from a phenomenological perspective, independently of any further questions concerning the metaphysics of mind and its place in nature. The core of this philosophical problem has recently been helpfully exposed and insightfully probed in Dan Zahavi’s book, Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame. In these remarks I suggest (...)
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  50. added 2017-01-25
    Nonidentity, Negative Experience and the Pre‐Reflective Cogito.Gillian Howie - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):589-607.
    This paper contributes to the current academic debate on the nature of embodied, intentional consciousness, specifically the attempt to inaugurate a rapprochement between phenomenological existentialism and critical theory. This is accomplished through a critical comparison of the concepts of negative experience and nonidentity in Theodor Adorno's negative dialectics and Jean-Paul Sartre's early phenomenology. By comparing how each engages with Hegel, I suggest that Sartre offers a broad, anthropological account of negative experience and nonidentity helpful to critical theorists but that there (...)
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