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About this topic
Summary Many philosophers think that conscious experience is always accompanied by a minimal, nonconceptual, or pre-reflective sense of self and, further, that we have to appeal to such a minimal sense of self in order to account for higher forms of self-consciousness.
Key works Bermudez 1998 makes a case for the necessity to appeal to nonconceptual forms of self-consciousness in order to be able to explain the ability to think conceptual 'I'-thought and discusses various different forms of nonconceptual self-consciousness. Zahavi 2005 discusses pre-reflective self-consciousness from a contemporary phenomenological perspective.
Introductions Gallagher & Zahavi 2008 give an introduction of phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness, with a focus on pre-reflective self-consciousness.
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170 found
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  1. What Reason Could There Be to Believe in Pre-Reflective Bodily Self-Consciousness.Adrian Alsmith - 2012 - In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in interaction: The role of the natural and social environment in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins Press.
  2. Minimal Consciousness.David M. Armstrong - 2006 - In Maureen Eckert (ed.), Theories of Mind: An Introductory Reader. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 213.
  3. From Consciousness to Self-Consciousness.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):19-38.
  4. Eliminativism, Objects, and Persons - The Virtues of Non-Existence.Jiri Benovsky - 2018 - Routledge.
    In this book, Jiri Benovsky defends the view that he doesn't exist. In this book, he also defends the view that this book itself doesn't exist. But this did not prevent him to write the book, and although in Benovsky's view you don't exist either, this does not prevent you to read it. Benovsky defends a brand of non-exceptionalist eliminativism. Some eliminativists, typically focusing on ordinary material objects such as chairs and hammers, make exceptions, for instance for blue whales (that (...)
  5. Ecological Perception and the Notion of a Nonconceptual Point of View. Berm - 1998 - In The Body and the Self. Cambridge: MIT Press.
  6. Nelkin, N.-Consciousness and the Origins of Thought.J. L. Bermudez - 1998 - Philosophical Books 39:258-259.
  7. Nonconceptual Self-Consciousness And Cognitive Science.José Bermúdez - 2001 - Synthese 129 (1):129-149.
  8. The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness.José Luis Bermúdez - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264):631-634.
  9. The Cognitive Neuroscience of Primitive Self-Consciousness.Jose Luis Bermudez - 2000 - Psycoloquy 11 (35).
    Myin, Erik (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (2)Bermúdez, José Luis (2000) Concepts and the Priority Principle (10)Bermúdez, José Luis (2000) Circularity, "I"-Thoughts and the Linguistic Requirement for Concept Possession (11)Meeks, Roblin R. (2000) Withholding Immunity: Misidentification, Misrepresentation, and Autonomous Nonconceptual Proprioceptive First-Person Content (12)Newen, Albert (2001) Kinds of Self-Consciousness (13)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (4)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Prelinguistic Self-Consciousness (5)Gallese, Vittorio (2000) The Brain and the Self: Reviewing the Neuroscientific Evidence (6)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) The Cognitive Neuroscience of Primitive Self-Consciousness (...)
  10. The Paradox of Self-Consciousness.Jose Luis Bermudez - 1998 - MIT Press.
  11. Reviews-The Paradox of Self-Consciousness.Jose Luis Bermudez & Peter Carruthers - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (3):483-486.
  12. Bodily Awareness and Self-Consciousness.José Luis Bermúdez & I. V. Objections - 2011 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press.
    This article argues that bodily awareness is a basic form of self-consciousness through which perceiving agents are directly conscious of the bodily self. It clarifies the nature of bodily awareness, categorises the different types of body-relative information, and rejects the claim that we can have a sense of ownership of our own bodies. It explores how bodily awareness functions as a form of self-consciousness and highlights the importance of certain forms of bodily awareness that share an important epistemological property with (...)
  13. Basic Self‐Awareness.Alexandre Billon - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).
    Basic self-awareness is the kind of self-awareness reflected in our standard use of the first-person. Patients suffering from severe forms of depersonalization often feel reluctant to use the first-person and can even, in delusional cases, avoid it altogether, systematically referring to themselves in the third-person. Even though it has been neglected since then, depersonalization has been extensively studied, more than a century ago, and used as probe for understanding the nature and the causal mechanisms of basic self-awareness. In this paper, (...)
  14. On Pure Reflection A Reply to Dan Zahavi.Michel Bitbol & C. Petitmengin - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (2):24-37.
  15. On Pure Reflection.Michel Bitbol & Claire Petitmengin - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (2):24-37.
  16. What is Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness? Brentano's Theory of Inner Consciousness Revisited.Johannes Brandl - 2013 - In D. Fisette & G. Frechette (eds.), Themes from Brentano. Rodopi. pp. 44--41.
  17. Sartre over bewustzijn en het ego, vrijheid en zelfbetrokkenheid.R. Breeur - 1999 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 61 (2):271 - 309.
    This article deals with Sartre's idea of the self and of its tense relation to what he calls "pure consciousness". Everything seems to occur as if the self were produced by spontaneous consciousness, in such a way that consciousness thereby disguises its "monstrous spontaneity". But what is this spontaneity and how does it constitute an Ego? In order to answer this question, we must also make explicit what type of self-consciousness this Ego guarantees. The article, finally, aims to explore to (...)
  18. Lessons From Sartre for the Analytic Philosophy of Mind.Manuel Bremer - 2005 - Analecta Husserliana 88:63-85.
    There are positive and negative lessons from Sartre: - Taking up some of his ideas one may arrive at a better model of consciousness in the analytic philosophy of mind; representing some of his ideas within the language and the models of a functionalist theory of mind makes them more accessible and inte¬grates them into the wider picture. - Sartre, as any philosopher, errs at some points, I believe; but these errors may be instruc¬tive, especially in as much as they (...)
  19. José Luis Bermúdez, the Paradox of Self-Consciousness.Ingar Brinck - 2000 - Theoria 66 (3):299-306.
  20. The Indexical 'I' the First Person in Thought and Language.Ingar Brinck - 1997 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    The subjct of this book is the first person in thought and language. The main question is what we mean when we say 'I'. Related to it are questions about what kinds of self-consciousness and self-knowledge are needed in order for us to have the capacity to talk about ourselves. The emphasis is on theories of meaning and reference for 'I', but a fair amount of space is devoted to 'I'-thoughts and the role of the concept of the self in (...)
  21. Representation and Self-Awareness in Intentional Agents.Ingar Brinck & Peter Gärdenfors - 1999 - Synthese 118 (1):89 - 104.
    Several conditions for being an intrinsically intentional agent are put forward. On a first level of intentionality the agent has representations. Two kinds are described: cued and detached. An agent with both kinds is able to represent both what is prompted by the context and what is absent from it. An intermediate level of intentionality is achieved by having an inner world, that is, a coherent system of detached representations that model the world. The inner world is used, e.g., for (...)
  22. Opowie Sci Niedyskretne Formy Autorefleksyjne W Prozie Polskiej Lat Dziewie Cdziesiatych.Wojciech Browarny - 2002
  23. Perception, Nonconceptual Content, and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Arnon Cahen & Kristina Musholt - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-21.
    The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we clarify the notion of immunity to error through misidentification with respect to the first-person pronoun. In particular, we set out to dispel the view that for a judgment to be IEM it must contain a token of a certain class of predicates. Rather, the importance of the IEM status of certain judgments is that it teaches us about privileged ways of coming to know about ourselves. We then turn to examine how (...)
  24. The Nature of Representation and the Experience of Oneself: A Critical Notice on Gottfried Vosgerau's Mental Representation and Self-Consciousness.Glenn Carruthers - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):411 - 425.
  25. Review of The Paradox of Self-Consciousness by José Luis Bermúdez. [REVIEW]P. Carruthers - 2000 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (3):483-486.
  26. Review. Jose Luis Bermudez.P. Carruthers - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (3):483-486.
  27. Reply to Bermúdez.Peter Carruthers - 2005 - Anthropology and Philosophy 6 (1/2):81-83.
  28. Fray Luis de San José: Alcantarino Inmaculista.Martiniano Casero Martin-Nieto - 2000 - Verdad y Vida 58 (229):589-604.
  29. Specifying the Self for Cognitive Neuroscience.Kalina Christoff, Diego Cosmelli, Dorothée Legrand & Evan Thompson - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):104-112.
  30. Varieties of Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness: Foreground and Background Bodily Feelings in Emotion Experience.Giovanna Colombetti - 2011 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 54 (3):293 - 313.
    How do we feel our body in emotion experience? In this paper I initially distinguish between foreground and background bodily feelings, and characterize them in some detail. Then I compare this distinction with the one between reflective and pre-reflective bodily self-awareness one finds in some recent philosophical phenomenological works, and conclude that both foreground and background bodily feelings can be understood as pre-reflective modes of bodily self-awareness that nevertheless differ in degree of self-presentation or self-intimation. Finally, I use the distinction (...)
  31. Facets of Self-Consciousness.Katja Crone, Kristina Musholt & Anna Strasser (eds.) - 2012 - Rodopi.
    This special issue of Grazer Philosophische Studien brings together a number of carefully selected and timely articles that explore the discussion of different facets of self-consciousness from multiple perspectives. The selected articles mainly focus on three topics of the current debate: the relationship between conceptual and nonconceptual ways of self-representation; the role of intersubjectivity for the development of self-consciousness; the temporal structure of self-consciousness. A number of previously underexposed, yet important connections between different approaches are explored. The articles not only (...)
  32. Towards an Integrated Theory of Self-Consciousness.Katja Crone, Kristina Musholt & Anna Strasser - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1).
  33. From Phenomenal Selves to Hyperselves.Barry Dainton - 2015 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:161-197.
    The claim that we are subjects of experience, i.e. beings whose nature is intimately bound up with consciousness, is in many ways a plausible one. There is, however, more than one way of developing a metaphysical account of the nature of subjects. The view that subjects are essentially conscious has the unfortunate consequence that subjects cannot survive periods of unconsciousness. A more appealing alternative is to hold that subjects are beings with the capacity to be conscious, a capacity which need (...)
  34. The Mark of Bodily Ownership.F. de Vignemont - 2013 - Analysis 73 (4):643-651.
    I am aware that this hand is my own. But is the sense of ownership of my hand manifested to me in a more primitive form than judgements? On the deflationary view recently defended by Martin and Bermúdez in their works, the sense of bodily ownership has no counterpart at the experiential level. Here I present a series of cases that the deflationary account cannot easily accommodate, including belief-independent illusions of ownership and experiences of disownership despite the presence of bodily (...)
  35. Cartesian Self-Consciousness Revisited.Arnaud Dewalque - unknown
    When you are in a joyful mood, how do you know that it is so? On a Cartesian picture, the answer is that you’ve got some immediate, noninferential apprehension of your being joyful, such as this noninferential apprehension is analogous to sense perception, and unlike sense perception, it makes it unquestionable or evident to you that you presently are in a joyful mood. In this paper, I defend this view against some classical objections, arguing that pre-reflective self-consciousness actually is analogous (...)
  36. Das unmittelbare Selbstverhältnis bei Søren Kierkegaard.Jörg Disse - 1992 - Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 17 (1):17-34.
    Inquires about the existence of a prereflective self-consciousness within Kierkegaard's theory of existence.
  37. A Comparative Analysis of Nishida and Sartre with Special Reference to Their Respective Ontologies.Brian Douglas Elwood - 1992 - Dissertation, The University of Tennessee
    This dissertation is a study in East-West comparative philosophy. It attempts for the first time to comparatively analyze the respective phenomenological ontologies of two noteworthy twentieth-century philosophers, namely Nishida Kitaro of Japan and Jean-Paul Sartre of France, and how they respond differently to the challenge of the German philosopher, Edmund Husserl. The major foci of the study are: consciousness and the world, pre-reflective and reflective consciousness, self-consciousness and the nature of the self, being and nothingness, and theories of religious consciousness. (...)
  38. Das Gefühl des Lebendigseins.Eva-Maria Engelen - 2014 - In Vom Leben Zur Bedeutung: Philosophische Studien Zum Verhältnis von Gefühl, Bewusstsein Und Sprache. De Gruyter. pp. 5-42.
    Wie ist zu erklären, dass wir uns lebendig fühlen und nicht lediglich lebendig sind? Es werden Voraussetzungen dafür erörtert, was es bedarf, damit sich ein Lebewesen lebendig fühlt. Denn fühlt es sich lebendig, verfügt es über eine rudimentäre, einfache Form des Bewusstseins, die die Schwelle zwischen Leben und Erleben darstellt. Es geht um ein präreflexives Selbst-Gewahrseins des lebendigen Körpers, das die erste Stufe einer Entwicklungsreihe bezüglich des Bewusstseins darstellt. Überlegungen zu einer solchen Form des empfindenden Selbstgewahrseins erlauben es zugleich zeitgenössische (...)
  39. Is Consciousness Reflexively Self‐Aware? A Buddhist Analysis.Bronwyn Finnigan - 2018 - Ratio 31 (4):389-401.
    This article examines contemporary Buddhist defences of the idea that consciousness is reflexively aware or self-aware. Call this the Self-Awareness Thesis. A version of this thesis was historically defended by Dignāga but rejected by Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika Buddhists. Prāsaṅgikas historically advanced four main arguments against this thesis. In this paper I consider whether some contemporary defence of the Self-Awareness Thesis can withstand these Prāsaṅgika objections. A problem is that contemporary defenders of the Self-Awareness Thesis have subtly different accounts with different assessment (...)
  40. Threesome Intersubjectivity in Infancy: A Contribution to the Development of Self-Awareness.E. Fivaz-Depeursinge, N. Favez & F. Frascarolo - 2004 - In Dan Zahavi, T. Grunbaum & Josef Parnas (eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. John Benjamins.
  41. Review of Bermudez's Thinking Without Words[REVIEW]Jerry A. Fodor - forthcoming - The Guardian.
  42. Kant and the Problem of Self-Knowledge.Luca Forgione - 2018 - New York, Stati Uniti: Routledge.
    This book addresses the problem of self-knowledge in Kant’s philosophy. As Kant writes in his major works of the critical period, it is due to the simple and empty representation ‘I think’ that the subject’s capacity for self-consciousness enables the subject to represent its own mental dimension. This book articulates Kant’s theory of self-knowledge on the basis of the following three philosophical problems: 1) a semantic problem regarding the type of reference of the representation ‘I’; 2) an epistemic problem regarding (...)
  43. Mental Familiarity and Epistemic Self-Ascription.M. Frank - 1995 - Common Knowledge 4:30--50.
  44. Selbstbewusstseinstheorien von Fichte Bis Sartre.M. Frank - 1993 - Suhrkamp.
  45. Selbstbewusstsein Und Selbsterkenntnis: Essays Zur Analytischen Philosophie der Subjektivitã¤T.M. Frank - 1991 - P. Reclam Jun..
  46. Ansichten der Subjektivität.Manfred Frank - 2012 - Suhrkamp.
    Als »Subjektphilosophie« hat man das neuzeitliche Denken insgesamt charakterisiert. Diese Auszeichnung verdankt das Subjekt der verwegenen Hoffnung, es eigne sich zum ultimativen Prinzip der Wissensbegründung. Das Interesse an einer Aufklärung seiner Struktur wurde dadurch jedoch in den Hintergrund gedrängt. Diese Struktur steht im Zentrum von Manfred Franks jüngstem Buch, das einen Blick auf die moderne Geschichte der Subjekttheorien mit Analysen der inneren Beschaffenheit und der Zeitlichkeit des Subjekts sowie seines Verhältnisses zur Intersubjektivität und einer Auseinandersetzung mit klassischen und neuesten analytischen (...)
  47. Non-Objectal Subjectivity.Manfred Frank - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):152-173.
    The immediate successors of Kant in classical German philosophy considered a subjectivity irreducible to objecthood as the core of personhood. The thesis of an irreducible subjectivity has, after the German idealists, been advocated by the phenomenological movement, as well as by analytical philosophers of self-consciousness such as Hector-Neri Castaneda and Sydney Shoemaker. Their arguments together show that self-consciousness cannot be reduced to a relation whereby a subject grasps itself as an object, but that there must be a core of subjectivity (...)
  48. Is Self-Consciousness a Case of Presence À Soi? Towards a Meta-Critique of the Recent French Critique of Metaphysics.Manfred Frank - 1992 - In David Wood (ed.), Derrida: A Critical Reader. Blackwell. pp. 218--34.
  49. Searching for the Self: Early Phenomenological Accounts of Self-Consciousness From Lotze to Scheler.Guillaume Frechette - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (5):1-26.
    Phenomenological accounts of self-consciousness are often said to combine two elements by means of a necessary connection: the primitive and irre- ducible subjective character of experiences and the idealist transcendental constitution of consciousness. In what follows I argue that this connection is not necessary in order for an account of self-consciousness to be phenomenological, as shown by early phenomenological accounts of self- consciousness – particularly in Munich phenomenology. First of all, I show that the account of self-consciousness defended by these (...)
  50. Minds That Matter: Seven Degrees of Moral Standing.Julian Friedland - 2004 - Between the Species 13 (4).
    Prominent non-speciesist attempts to determine the amount of moral standing properly attributable to conscious beings argue that certain non-human animals should be granted the highest consideration as self-conscious persons. Most of these theories also include a lesser moral standing for the sentient, or merely conscious, non-person. Thus, the standard approach has been to advocate a two-tiered theory—'sentience' or 'consciousness' and 'self-consciousness' or 'personhood'. While the first level seems to present little interpretative difficulty, the second has recently been criticized as a (...)
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