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Summary Many philosophers think that conscious experience is always accompanied by a minimal, nonconceptual, or pre-reflective sense of self and, further, that we have to appeal to such a minimal sense of self in order to account for higher forms of self-consciousness.
Key works Bermudez 1998 makes a case for the necessity to appeal to nonconceptual forms of self-consciousness in order to be able to explain the ability to think conceptual 'I'-thought and discusses various different forms of nonconceptual self-consciousness. Zahavi 2005 discusses pre-reflective self-consciousness from a contemporary phenomenological perspective.
Introductions Gallagher & Zahavi 2008 give an introduction of phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness, with a focus on pre-reflective self-consciousness.
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  1. Adrian Alsmith (2012). What Reason Could There Be to Believe in Pre-Reflective Bodily Self-Consciousness. In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in interaction: The role of the natural and social environment in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins Press.
  2. David M. Armstrong (2006). Minimal Consciousness. In Maureen Eckert (ed.), Theories of Mind: An Introductory Reader. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 213.
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  3. L. R. Baker (2013). From Consciousness to Self-Consciousness. Grazer Philosophische Studien 84:19--38.
  4. Lynne Rudder Baker (2012). From Consciousness to Self-Consciousness. Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):19-38.
  5. Berm (1998). Ecological Perception and the Notion of a Nonconceptual Point of View. In The Body and the Self. Cambridge: MIT Press.
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  6. J. L. Bermudez (1998). Nelkin, N.-Consciousness and the Origins of Thought. Philosophical Books 39:258-259.
  7. José Luis Bermúdez (2016). The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264):631-634.
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  8. Jose Luis Bermudez (2000). The Cognitive Neuroscience of Primitive Self-Consciousness. Psycoloquy 11 (35).
    Myin, Erik (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (2)Bermúdez, José Luis (2000) Concepts and the Priority Principle (10)Bermúdez, José Luis (2000) Circularity, "I"-Thoughts and the Linguistic Requirement for Concept Possession (11)Meeks, Roblin R. (2000) Withholding Immunity: Misidentification, Misrepresentation, and Autonomous Nonconceptual Proprioceptive First-Person Content (12)Newen, Albert (2001) Kinds of Self-Consciousness (13)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Direct Self-Consciousness (4)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) Prelinguistic Self-Consciousness (5)Gallese, Vittorio (2000) The Brain and the Self: Reviewing the Neuroscientific Evidence (6)Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000) The Cognitive Neuroscience of Primitive Self-Consciousness (...)
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  9. Jose Luis Bermudez (1998). The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. MIT Press.
  10. Jose Luis Bermudez & Peter Carruthers (1999). Reviews-The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (3):483-486.
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  11. José Luis Bermúdez & I. V. Objections (2011). Bodily Awareness and Self-Consciousness. In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press.
    This article argues that bodily awareness is a basic form of self-consciousness through which perceiving agents are directly conscious of the bodily self. It clarifies the nature of bodily awareness, categorises the different types of body-relative information, and rejects the claim that we can have a sense of ownership of our own bodies. It explores how bodily awareness functions as a form of self-consciousness and highlights the importance of certain forms of bodily awareness that share an important epistemological property with (...)
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  12. Michel Bitbol & Claire Petitmengin (2011). On Pure Reflection. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (2):24-37.
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  13. Johannes Brandl (2013). What is Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness? Brentano's Theory of Inner Consciousness Revisited. In D. Fisette & G. Frechette (eds.), Themes from Brentano. Rodopi. pp. 44--41.
  14. R. Breeur (1999). Sartre over bewustzijn en het ego, vrijheid en zelfbetrokkenheid. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 61 (2):271 - 309.
    This article deals with Sartre's idea of the self and of its tense relation to what he calls "pure consciousness". Everything seems to occur as if the self were produced by spontaneous consciousness, in such a way that consciousness thereby disguises its "monstrous spontaneity". But what is this spontaneity and how does it constitute an Ego? In order to answer this question, we must also make explicit what type of self-consciousness this Ego guarantees. The article, finally, aims to explore to (...)
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  15. Ingar Brinck (2000). José Luis Bermúdez, the Paradox of Self-Consciousness. Theoria 66 (3):299-306.
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  16. Ingar Brinck (1997). The Indexical 'I' the First Person in Thought and Language. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    The subjct of this book is the first person in thought and language. The main question is what we mean when we say 'I'. Related to it are questions about what kinds of self-consciousness and self-knowledge are needed in order for us to have the capacity to talk about ourselves. The emphasis is on theories of meaning and reference for 'I', but a fair amount of space is devoted to 'I'-thoughts and the role of the concept of the self in (...)
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  17. Ingar Brinck & Peter Gärdenfors (1999). Representation and Self-Awareness in Intentional Agents. Synthese 118 (1):89 - 104.
    Several conditions for being an intrinsically intentional agent are put forward. On a first level of intentionality the agent has representations. Two kinds are described: cued and detached. An agent with both kinds is able to represent both what is prompted by the context and what is absent from it. An intermediate level of intentionality is achieved by having an inner world, that is, a coherent system of detached representations that model the world. The inner world is used, e.g., for (...)
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  18. Arnon Cahen & Kristina Musholt (forthcoming). Perception, Nonconceptual Content, and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. Inquiry:1-21.
    The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we clarify the notion of immunity to error through misidentification with respect to the first-person pronoun. In particular, we set out to dispel the view that for a judgment to be IEM it must contain a token of a certain class of predicates. Rather, the importance of the IEM status of certain judgments is that it teaches us about privileged ways of coming to know about ourselves. We then turn to examine how (...)
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  19. Glenn Carruthers (2011). The Nature of Representation and the Experience of Oneself: A Critical Notice on Gottfried Vosgerau's Mental Representation and Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):411 - 425.
  20. P. Carruthers (2000). Review of The Paradox of Self-Consciousness by José Luis Bermúdez. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (3):483-486.
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  21. P. Carruthers (1999). Review. Jose Luis Bermudez. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (3):483-486.
  22. Peter Carruthers (2005). Reply to Bermúdez. Anthropology and Philosophy 6 (1/2):81-83.
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  23. Esteban Céspedes, There Are Replicas and Replicas.
    In a recent article, José Luis Bermúdez challenged David Lewis’s argument about Newcomb’s problem and the prisoner’s dilemma being the same. I show briefly that Bermúdez’s counterargument is not sound and that Lewis’s original position is correct.
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  24. Kalina Christoff, Diego Cosmelli, Dorothée Legrand & Evan Thompson (2011). Specifying the Self for Cognitive Neuroscience. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):104-112.
  25. Giovanna Colombetti (2011). Varieties of Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness: Foreground and Background Bodily Feelings in Emotion Experience. Inquiry 54 (3):293 - 313.
    How do we feel our body in emotion experience? In this paper I initially distinguish between foreground and background bodily feelings, and characterize them in some detail. Then I compare this distinction with the one between reflective and pre-reflective bodily self-awareness one finds in some recent philosophical phenomenological works, and conclude that both foreground and background bodily feelings can be understood as pre-reflective modes of bodily self-awareness that nevertheless differ in degree of self-presentation or self-intimation. Finally, I use the distinction (...)
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  26. Katja Crone, Kristina Musholt & Anna Strasser (2012). Towards an Integrated Theory of Self-Consciousness. Grazer Philosophische Studien 84.
  27. Katja Crone, Kristina Musholt & Anna Strasser (eds.) (2012). Facets of Self-Consciousness. Rodopi.
    This special issue of Grazer Philosophische Studien brings together a number of carefully selected and timely articles that explore the discussion of different facets of self-consciousness from multiple perspectives. The selected articles mainly focus on three topics of the current debate: the relationship between conceptual and nonconceptual ways of self-representation; the role of intersubjectivity for the development of self-consciousness; the temporal structure of self-consciousness. A number of previously underexposed, yet important connections between different approaches are explored. The articles not only (...)
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  28. Javier De Lorenzo (1987). José Gallego-Díaz, Matemático. Theoria 3 (1):555-563.
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  29. F. de Vignemont (2013). The Mark of Bodily Ownership. Analysis 73 (4):643-651.
    I am aware that this hand is my own. But is the sense of ownership of my hand manifested to me in a more primitive form than judgements? On the deflationary view recently defended by Martin and Bermúdez in their works, the sense of bodily ownership has no counterpart at the experiential level. Here I present a series of cases that the deflationary account cannot easily accommodate, including belief-independent illusions of ownership and experiences of disownership despite the presence of bodily (...)
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  30. Arnaud Dewalque, Cartesian Self-Consciousness Revisited.
    When you are in a joyful mood, how do you know that it is so? On a Cartesian picture, the answer is that you’ve got some immediate, noninferential apprehension of your being joyful, such as this noninferential apprehension is analogous to sense perception, and unlike sense perception, it makes it unquestionable or evident to you that you presently are in a joyful mood. In this paper, I defend this view against some classical objections, arguing that pre-reflective self-consciousness actually is analogous (...)
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  31. Eva-Maria Engelen (2014). Vom Leben Zur Bedeutung: Philosophische Studien zum Verhältnis von Gefühl, Bewusstsein und Sprache. De Gruyter.
    Wie entwickelt sich ein ich-loses Selbstgefühl? Wie vollzieht sich der Schritt zum Selbstbewusstsein? Und wie wird aus einer emotionalen Reaktion ein Werturteil? „Vom Leben zur Bedeutung“ beschreibt die Übergänge zwischen verschiedenen Erscheinungsformen des Geistigen. Die Rolle der Sprache wird dabei ebenso reflektiert wie das Konzept des Intentionalen als Element der Theorie der Emotionen, der Theorie sprachlicher Bedeutung und der Philosophie des Geistes. -/- 1. Die wichtigsten aktuellen Debatten in Kognitions- und Kulturwissenschaften werden aufgegriffen: Einbezug der Tiere, Emotionsforschung, Leiblichkeit. 2. Bislang (...)
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  32. Eva-Maria Engelen (2014). Das Gefühl des Lebendigseins. In Vom Leben Zur Bedeutung: Philosophische Studien Zum Verhältnis von Gefühl, Bewusstsein Und Sprache. De Gruyter. pp. 5-42.
    Wie ist zu erklären, dass wir uns lebendig fühlen und nicht lediglich lebendig sind? Es werden Voraussetzungen dafür erörtert, was es bedarf, damit sich ein Lebewesen lebendig fühlt. Denn fühlt es sich lebendig, verfügt es über eine rudimentäre, einfache Form des Bewusstseins, die die Schwelle zwischen Leben und Erleben darstellt. Es geht um ein präreflexives Selbst-Gewahrseins des lebendigen Körpers, das die erste Stufe einer Entwicklungsreihe bezüglich des Bewusstseins darstellt. Überlegungen zu einer solchen Form des empfindenden Selbstgewahrseins erlauben es zugleich zeitgenössische (...)
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  33. E. Fivaz-Depeursinge, N. Favez & F. Frascarolo (2004). Threesome Intersubjectivity in Infancy: A Contribution to the Development of Self-Awareness. In Dan Zahavi, T. Grunbaum & Josef Parnas (eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. John Benjamins.
  34. M. Frank (1995). Mental Familiarity and Epistemic Self-Ascription. Common Knowledge 4:30--50.
  35. M. Frank (1993). Selbstbewusstseinstheorien von Fichte Bis Sartre. Suhrkamp.
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  36. M. Frank (1991). Selbstbewusstsein Und Selbsterkenntnis: Essays Zur Analytischen Philosophie der Subjektivitã¤T. P. Reclam Jun..
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  37. Manfred Frank (2012). Ansichten der Subjektivität. Suhrkamp.
    Als »Subjektphilosophie« hat man das neuzeitliche Denken insgesamt charakterisiert. Diese Auszeichnung verdankt das Subjekt der verwegenen Hoffnung, es eigne sich zum ultimativen Prinzip der Wissensbegründung. Das Interesse an einer Aufklärung seiner Struktur wurde dadurch jedoch in den Hintergrund gedrängt. Diese Struktur steht im Zentrum von Manfred Franks jüngstem Buch, das einen Blick auf die moderne Geschichte der Subjekttheorien mit Analysen der inneren Beschaffenheit und der Zeitlichkeit des Subjekts sowie seines Verhältnisses zur Intersubjektivität und einer Auseinandersetzung mit klassischen und neuesten analytischen (...)
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  38. Manfred Frank (2007). Non-Objectal Subjectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):152-173.
    The immediate successors of Kant in classical German philosophy considered a subjectivity irreducible to objecthood as the core of personhood. The thesis of an irreducible subjectivity has, after the German idealists, been advocated by the phenomenological movement, as well as by analytical philosophers of self-consciousness such as Hector-Neri Castaneda and Sydney Shoemaker. Their arguments together show that self-consciousness cannot be reduced to a relation whereby a subject grasps itself as an object, but that there must be a core of subjectivity (...)
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  39. Manfred Frank (1992). Is Self-Consciousness a Case of Presence À Soi? Towards a Meta-Critique of the Recent French Critique of Metaphysics. In David Wood (ed.), Derrida: A Critical Reader. Blackwell. pp. 218--34.
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  40. Guillaume Frechette (2013). Searching for the Self: Early Phenomenological Accounts of Self-Consciousness From Lotze to Scheler. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (5):1-26.
    Phenomenological accounts of self-consciousness are often said to combine two elements by means of a necessary connection: the primitive and irre- ducible subjective character of experiences and the idealist transcendental constitution of consciousness. In what follows I argue that this connection is not necessary in order for an account of self-consciousness to be phenomenological, as shown by early phenomenological accounts of self- consciousness – particularly in Munich phenomenology. First of all, I show that the account of self-consciousness defended by these (...)
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  41. S. Gallagher (2000). Review of Jose Luis Bermudez's' The Paradox of Self-Consciousness'. [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):45-50.
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  42. Shaun Gallagher (2012). The Body in Social Context: Some Qualifications on the'Warmth and Intimacy'of Bodily Self-Consciousness. Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):91-121.
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  43. Shaun Gallagher (2010). Defining Consciousness: The Importance of Non-Reflective Self-Awareness. Pragmatics and Cognitionpragmatics and Cognition 18 (3):561-569.
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  44. Shaun Gallagher (2007). Phenomenological Approaches to Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 686--696.
    On the phenomenological view, a minimal form of self-consciousness is a constant structural feature of conscious experience. Experience happens for the experiencing subject in an immediate way and as part of this immediacy, it is implicitly marked as my experience. For the phenomenologists, this immediate and first-personal givenness of experiential phenomena must be accounted for in terms of a pre-reflective self-consciousness. In the most basic sense of the term, selfconsciousness is not something that comes about the moment one attentively inspects (...)
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  45. Shaun Gallagher (2005). How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford University Press UK.
    How the Body Shapes the Mind is an interdisciplinary work that addresses philosophical questions by appealing to evidence found in experimental psychology, neuroscience, studies of pathologies, and developmental psychology. There is a growing consensus across these disciplines that the contribution of embodiment to cognition is inescapable. Because this insight has been developed across a variety of disciplines, however, there is still a need to develop a common vocabulary that is capable of integrating discussions of brain mechanisms in neuroscience, behavioural expressions (...)
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  46. Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi (2008). Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    On the phenomenological view, a minimal form of self-consciousness is a constant structural feature of conscious experience. Experience happens for the experiencing subject in an immediate way and as part of this immediacy, it is implicitly marked as my experience. For the phenomenologists, this immediate and first-personal givenness of experiential phenomena must be accounted for in terms of a pre-reflective self-consciousness. In the most basic sense of the term, selfconsciousness is not something that comes about the moment one attentively inspects (...)
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  47. Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi (2007). The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. Routledge.
    The Phenomenological Mind is the first book to properly introduce fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. Key questions and topics covered include: What is phenomenology? naturalizing phenomenology and the empirical cognitive sciences phenomenology and consciousness consciousness and self-consciousness, including perception and action time and consciousness, including William James intentionality the embodied mind action knowledge of other minds situated and extended minds phenomenology and personal identity Interesting and important examples are used throughout, including phantom limb syndrome, blindsight (...)
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  48. Rocco Gangle (2009). Laruelle for Levinas. Philosophy Today 53 (Supplement):250-256.
    A comparison and contrast of the notions of subjectivity and otherness in Levinasian phenomenology and Laruelle's non-philosophy.
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  49. Juana García Romero (2015). Villacañas, José Luis, Ramiro de Maeztu y El Ideal de la Burguesía En España. Endoxa 34:491.
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  50. Rocco J. Gennaro (2015). The 'Of' of Intentionality and the 'Of' of Acquaintance. In S. Miguens, G. Preyer & C. Morando (eds.), Pre-Reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 317-341.
    I first provide some background on Sartre’s theory of consciousness and prereflective self-awareness, especially with respect to how it might be favorably compared to my own version of HOT theory. I then critically examine a few initial attempts to understand the ‘acquaintance’ relation and to link it with Sartre’s notion of prereflective self-awareness. I then briefly address a related problem often raised against HOT theory, namely, the problem of misrepresentation. I also critique several further attempts to explain the acquaintance relation (...)
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