Related categories

107 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 107
  1. added 2020-05-25
    The Interpretive-Sensory Access Theory of Self-Knowledge: Simplicity and Coherence with Surrounding Theories.Paulius Rimkevičius - 2019 - Problemos 96:148-159.
    The interpretive-sensory access theory of self-knowledge claims that one knows one’s own mind by turning one’s capacity to know other minds onto oneself. Previously, researchers mostly debated whether the theory receives the most support from the results of empirical research. They have given much less attention to the question whether the theory is the simplest of the available alternatives. I argue that the question of simplicity should be considered in light of the well-established theories surrounding the ISA theory. I claim (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2020-05-25
    Non-Cognitive Values and Methodological Learning in the Decision-Oriented Sciences.Oliver Todt & José Luis Luján - 2017 - Foundations of Science 22 (1):215-234.
    The function and legitimacy of values in decision making is a critically important issue in the contemporary analysis of science. It is particularly relevant for some of the more application-oriented areas of science, specifically decision-oriented science in the field of regulation of technological risks. Our main objective in this paper is to assess the diversity of roles that non-cognitive values related to decision making can adopt in the kinds of scientific activity that underlie risk regulation. We start out, first, by (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2020-05-25
    Foolishness, Stupidity, and Cognitive Values.Kevin Mulligan - 2014 - The Monist 97 (1):66-85.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  4. added 2020-05-25
    Non-Cognitive Values and Objectivity in Scientific Explanation: Egalitarianism and the Case of the Movius Line.Raoul Gervais - 2013 - Perspectives on Science 21 (4):429-452.
    In the debate about values in science, it is a time-honored tradition to distinguish between the normative question of whether non-cognitive values should play a role in science and the descriptive question of whether they in fact do so or not.1 Among philosophers of science, it is now an accepted view that the descriptive question has been settled. That is, it is no longer disputed that non-cognitive values play a role in science. Hence, all that is left to do on (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  5. added 2020-05-25
    The Value(s) of a Story: Theories, Models and Cognitive Values.Isabelle Peschard - 2007 - Principia 11 (2):151-169.
    This paper aims 1) to introduce the notion of theoretical story as a resource and source of constraint for the construction and assessment of models of phenomena; 2) to show the relevance of this notion for a better understanding of the role and nature of values in scientific activity. The reflection on the role of values and value judgments in scientific activity should be attentive, I will argue, to the distinction between models and the theoretical story that guides and constrains (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  6. added 2020-05-25
    Cognitive Values in the Arts: Marking the Boundaries.Peter Lamarque - 2006 - In Matthew Kieran (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art. Blackwell. pp. 127--39.
  7. added 2020-05-25
    Is There a Significant Distinction Between Cognitive and Social Values?Hugh Lacey - 2004 - In Peter K. Machamer & Gereon Wolters (eds.), Science, Values, and Objectivity. University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 24--51.
  8. added 2020-05-25
    A Discussion with Thomas S. Kuhn. In Idem.T. S. Kuhn - 2000 - In Thomas Kuhn (ed.), The Road Since Structure. University of Chicago Press. pp. 253--324.
  9. added 2020-05-25
    Simplicity as Evidence of Truth.Richard Swinburne - 1997
  10. added 2020-05-25
    Feminist Values and Cognitive Virtues.Lynn Hankinson Nelson & Jack Nelson - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:120 - 129.
    We consider Helen Longino's proposal that "ontological heterogeneity", "complexity of relationship", and "the non-disappearance of gender" are criteria for good science and cannot be separated into cognitive and social virtues. Using a research program in neuroendocrinology investigating a hormonal basis for sex-differentiated lateralization as a case study, the authors disagree concerning whether the first two criteria can be construed as criteria for good science. Concerning the non-disappearance of gender criterion, we argue that its appropriateness is context specific, and that its (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  11. added 2020-05-25
    Challenging the Dichotomy of Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Values: Feminist Values and Evolutionary Psychology.Silvia Ivani & Jan Sprenger - unknown
    Philosophy of science has seen a passionate debate over the influence of non-cognitive values on theory choice. In this paper, we argue against a dichotomous divide between cognitive and non-cognitive values and for the possibility of a dual role for feminist values. By analyzing the influence of feminist values on evolutionary psychology and evolutionary biology, we show how they have cognitive and non-cognitive functions at the same time.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. added 2020-03-13
    In Pursuit of the Non-Trivial.Colin R. Caret - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.
    This paper is about the underlying logical principles of scientific theories. In particular, it concerns ex contradictione quodlibet the principle that anything follows from a contradiction. ECQ is valid according to classical logic, but invalid according to paraconsistent logics. Some advocates of paraconsistency claim that there are ‘real’ inconsistent theories that do not erupt with completely indiscriminate, absurd commitments. They take this as evidence in favor of paraconsistency. Michael calls this the non-triviality strategy. He argues that this strategy fails in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. added 2020-03-10
    The Dangers of Pragmatic Virtue.Daniel Nolan - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6):623-644.
    Many people want to hold that some theoretical virtues—simplicity, elegance, familiarity or others—are only pragmatic virtues. That is, these features do not give us any more reason to think a theory is true, or close to true, but they justify choosing one theoretical option over another because they are desirable for some other, practical purpose. Using pragmatic virtues in theory choice apparently brings with it a dilemma: if we are deciding what to accept on the basis of considerations that are (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  14. added 2020-03-10
    Is Fertility Virtuous in its Own Right?Daniel Nolan - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (2):265-282.
    the virtues which are desirable for scientific theories to possess. In this paper I discuss the several species of theoretical virtues called 'fertility', and argue in each case that the desirability of 'fertility' can be explicated in terms of other, more fundamental theoretical virtues.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  15. added 2020-03-01
    A Review of 'Theoretical Virtues in Science' by S. Schindler. [REVIEW]Darren Bradley - 2019 - Metascience 28 (2):261-264.
  16. added 2020-03-01
    Systematizing the Theoretical Virtues.Michael Keas - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2761-2793.
    There are at least twelve major virtues of good theories: evidential accuracy, causal adequacy, explanatory depth, internal consistency, internal coherence, universal coherence, beauty, simplicity, unification, durability, fruitfulness, and applicability. These virtues are best classified into four classes: evidential, coherential, aesthetic, and diachronic. Each virtue class contains at least three virtues that sequentially follow a repeating pattern of progressive disclosure and expansion. Systematizing the theoretical virtues in this manner clarifies each virtue and suggests how they might have a coordinated and cumulative (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  17. added 2020-03-01
    Quantitative Parsimony: Probably for the Better.Lina Jansson & Jonathan Tallant - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (3):781–803.
    ABSTRACT Our aim in this article is to offer a new justification for preferring theories that are more quantitatively parsimonious than their rivals. We discuss cases where it seems clear that those involved opted for more quantitatively parsimonious theories. We extend previous work on quantitative parsimony by offering an independent probabilistic justification for preferring the more quantitatively parsimonious theories in particular episodes of theory choice. Our strategy allows us to avoid worries that other considerations, such as pragmatic factors of computational (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  18. added 2020-03-01
    Aesthetic and Other Theoretical Virtues in Science.Jason Simus - 2009 - American Society for Aesthetics Graduate E-Journal 1 (2):9-16.
    I first provide an introduction to a neglected topic in contemporary aesthetics: intellectual beauty. I then review James McAllister’s critique of autonomism and reductionism regarding the relation between empirical and aesthetic criteria in scientific theory evaluation. Finally, I critique McAllister’s “aesthetic induction” and defend an alternative model that emphasizes the holistic coherence of aesthetic and other theoretical virtues in scientific theorizing.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. added 2020-03-01
    Prediction Versus Accommodation and the Risk of Overfitting.Christopher Hitchcock & Elliott Sober - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1):1-34.
    an observation to formulate a theory, it is no surprise that the resulting theory accurately captures that observation. However, when the theory makes a novel prediction—when it predicts an observation that was not used in its formulation—this seems to provide more substantial confirmation of the theory. This paper presents a new approach to the vexed problem of understanding the epistemic difference between prediction and accommodation. In fact, there are several problems that need to be disentangled; in all of them, the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   53 citations  
  20. added 2020-02-23
    Kevin C. Elliott. A Tapestry of Values: An Introduction to Values in Science. [REVIEW]David Montminy & François Papale - forthcoming - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science.
  21. added 2020-02-23
    Value-Entanglement and the Integrity of Scientific Research.David B. Resnik & Kevin C. Elliott - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 75:1-11.
  22. added 2020-02-23
    From Tapestry to Loom: Broadening the Perspective on Values in Science.Heather Douglas - 2018 - Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 10 (8).
    After raising some minor philosophical points about Kevin Elliott’s A Tapestry of Values (2017), I argue that we should expand on the themes raised in the book and that philosophers of science need to pay as much attention to the loom of science (i.e., the institutional structures which guide the pursuit of science) as the tapestry of science. The loom of science includes such institutional aspects as patents, funding sources, and evaluation regimes that shape how science gets pursued, and that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  23. added 2020-02-23
    Science, Values, and Citizens.Heather Douglas - 2017 - In Oppure Si Mouve: Doing History and Philosophy of Science with Peter Machamer. pp. 83-96.
    Science is one of the most important forces in contemporary society. The most reliable source of knowledge about the world, science shapes the technological possibilities before us, informs public policy, and is crucial to measuring the efficacy of public policy. Yet it is not a simple repository of facts on which we can draw. It is an ongoing process of evidence gathering, discovery, contestation, and criticism. I will argue that an understanding of the nature of science and the scientific process (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  24. added 2020-02-23
    Exploring Inductive Risk: Case Studies of Values in Science.Kevin C. Elliott & Ted Richards (eds.) - 2017 - Oup Usa.
    This book brings together eleven case studies of inductive risk-the chance that scientific inference is incorrect-that range over a wide variety of scientific contexts and fields. The chapters are designed to illustrate the pervasiveness of inductive risk, assist scientists and policymakers in responding to it, and productively move theoretical discussions of the topic forward.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  25. added 2020-02-23
    Current Controversies in Values and Science.Kevin C. Elliott & Daniel Steel (eds.) - 2016 - Routledge.
    _Current Controversies in Values and Science_ asks ten philosophers to debate five questions that are driving contemporary work in this important area of philosophy of science. The book is perfect for the advanced student, building up her knowledge of the foundations of the field while also engaging its most cutting-edge questions. Introductions and annotated bibliographies for each debate, preliminary descriptions of each chapter, study questions, and a supplemental guide to further controversies involving values in science help provide clearer and richer (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  26. added 2020-02-23
    Science, Policy, Values: Exploring the Nexus.Heather E. Douglas - 2016 - Perspectives on Science 24 (5):475-480.
    The importance of science for guiding policy decisions has been an increasingly central feature of policy-making for much of the past century. But which science we have available to us and what counts as adequate science for policy-making shapes substantially the specific impact science has on policy decisions. Policy influences which science we pursue and how we pursue it in practice, as well as how science ultimately informs policy. Values inform our choices in these areas, as values shape the research (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  27. added 2020-02-23
    Values in Science.Heather Douglas - 2016 - In Paul Humphreys (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science. New York, NY, USA: pp. 609-630.
  28. added 2020-02-23
    Distinguishing Between Legitimate and Illegitimate Values in Climate Modeling.Kristen Intemann - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (2):217-232.
    While it is widely acknowledged that science is not “free” of non-epistemic values, there is disagreement about the roles that values can appropriately play. Several have argued that non-epistemic values can play important roles in modeling decisions, particularly in addressing uncertainties ; Risbey 2007; Biddle and Winsberg 2010; Winsberg : 111-137, 2012); van der Sluijs 359-389, 2012). On the other hand, such values can lead to bias ; Bray ; Oreskes and Conway 2010). Thus, it is important to identify when (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  29. added 2020-02-23
    Inductive Risk and the Contexts of Communication.Stephen John - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):79-96.
    In recent years, the argument from inductive risk against value free science has enjoyed a revival. This paper investigates and clarifies this argument through means of a case-study: neonicitinoid research. Sect. 1 argues that the argument from inductive risk is best conceptualised as a claim about scientists’ communicative obligations. Sect. 2 then shows why this argument is inapplicable to “public communication”. Sect. 3 outlines non-epistemic reasons why non-epistemic values should not play a role in public communicative contexts. Sect. 4 analyses (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  30. added 2020-02-23
    Nonepistemic Values and the Multiple Goals of Science.Kevin Elliott & Daniel McKaughan - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (1):1-21.
    Recent efforts to argue that nonepistemic values have a legitimate role to play in assessing scientific models, theories, and hypotheses typically either reject the distinction between epistemic and nonepistemic values or incorporate nonepistemic values only as a secondary consideration for resolving epistemic uncertainty. Given that scientific representations can legitimately be evaluated not only based on their fit with the world but also with respect to their fit with the needs of their users, we show in two case studies that nonepistemic (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  31. added 2020-02-23
    The Value of Cognitive Values.Heather Douglas - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):796-806.
    Traditionally, cognitive values have been thought of as a collective pool of considerations in science that frequently trade against each other. I argue here that a finer-grained account of the value of cognitive values can help reduce such tensions. I separate the values into groups, minimal epistemic criteria, pragmatic considerations, and genuine epistemic assurance, based in part on the distinction between values that describe theories per se and values that describe theory-evidence relationships. This allows us to clarify why these values (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  32. added 2020-02-23
    Douglas on Values: From Indirect Roles to Multiple Goals.Kevin C. Elliott - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):375-383.
    In recent papers and a book, Heather Douglas has expanded on the well-known argument from inductive risk, thereby launching an influential contemporary critique of the value-free ideal for science. This paper distills Douglas’s critique into four major claims. The first three claims provide a significant challenge to the value-free ideal for science. However, the fourth claim, which delineates her positive proposal to regulate values in science by distinguishing direct and indirect roles for values, is ambiguous between two interpretations, and both (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  33. added 2020-02-23
    Values in Science.Ernan McMullin - 2012 - Zygon 47 (4):686-709.
    In this essay, which was his presidential address to the Philosophy of Science Association, Ernan McMullin argued that the watershed between “classic” philosophy of science and the “new” philosophy of science can best be understood by analyzing the change in our perception of the role played by values in science. He begins with some general remarks about the nature of value, goes on to explore some of the historical sources for the claim that judgement in science is value‐laden, and concludes (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  34. added 2020-02-23
    The Role of Scientific Societies in Promoting Research Integrity.Mark S. Frankel & Stephanie J. Bird - 2003 - Science and Engineering Ethics 9 (2):139-140.
  35. added 2020-02-23
    Inductive Risk and Values in Science.Heather Douglas - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559-579.
    Although epistemic values have become widely accepted as part of scientific reasoning, non-epistemic values have been largely relegated to the "external" parts of science (the selection of hypotheses, restrictions on methodologies, and the use of scientific technologies). I argue that because of inductive risk, or the risk of error, non-epistemic values are required in science wherever non-epistemic consequences of error should be considered. I use examples from dioxin studies to illustrate how non-epistemic consequences of error can and should be considered (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   151 citations  
  36. added 2020-02-23
    Popper, Kuhn and Laudan on the Rationality of Science. A Shared View.Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik - 1997 - In Julian Nida-Rümelin & Georg Meggle (eds.), Analyomen 2, Volume I: Logic, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science. De Gruyter. pp. 421-430.
  37. added 2020-02-23
    Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1977 - In The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change. University of Chicago Press. pp. 320--39.
  38. added 2020-02-23
    Second Thoughts on Paradigms.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1977 - In F. Suppe (ed.), The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change. University of Chicago Press. pp. 293--319.
  39. added 2020-02-23
    The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
  40. added 2020-02-23
    Dealing with Values in Science: Kinds, Roles and/or Procedures.Jeroen Van Bouwel - unknown
    In this paper, we inquire how the eternal tension between science and values has been tackled in philosophy of science by analysing three different strategies that have been used: focussing on different kinds of values and allowing some of these kinds to be present in science ; stipulating the role values are allowed to play ; and, specifying a social procedure in order to deal with values in science. Recently, the distinction between the direct and indirect role values could play (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. added 2020-01-20
    The Risk of Using Inductive Risk to Challenge the Value-Free Ideal.Inmaculada de Melo-Martín & Kristen Intemann - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (4):500-520.
    The argument from inductive risk has been embraced by many as a successful account of the role of values in science that challenges the value-free ideal. We argue that it is not obvious that the argument from inductive risk actually undermines the value-free ideal. This is because the inductive risk argument endorses an assumption held by proponents of the value-free ideal: that contextual values never play an appropriate role in determining evidence. We show that challenging the value-free ideal ultimately requires (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  42. added 2020-01-20
    Social Values Influence the Adequacy Conditions of Scientific Theories: Beyond Inductive Risk.Ingo Brigandt - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):326-356.
    The ‘death of evidence’ issue in Canada raises the spectre of politicized science, and thus the question of what role social values may have in science and how this meshes with objectivity and evidence. I first criticize philosophical accounts that have to separate different steps of research to restrict the influence of social and other non-epistemic values. A prominent account that social values may play a role even in the context of theory acceptance is the argument from inductive risk. It (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  43. added 2020-01-20
    Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal. [REVIEW]Jesús Zamora Bonilla - 2010 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 25 (1):96-99.
  44. added 2020-01-20
    Ampliative Abduction.James Blachowicz - 1996 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (2):141 – 157.
    Abstract In Peirce's and Hanson's characterization of abductive inference, the abducted hypothesis (but not others) is present in the premises, so that the inference can hardly be taken as ampliative. Abduction has consequently been treated as part of the process whereby already generated hypotheses are judged in terms of their plausibility, simplicity, etc. I propose an interpretation of abduction which supports an ampliative view. It relies on a distinction between two logical stages in the generation of hypotheses, one ?factual? and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45. added 2020-01-20
    Discovery Logics.Thomas Nickles - 1990 - Philosophica 45 (1):7-32.
  46. added 2020-01-03
    Inquiry Tickets: Values, Pursuit, and Underdetermination.Marina DiMarco & Kareem Khalifa - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (5).
    We offer a new account of the role of values in theory choice that captures a temporal dimension to the values themselves. We argue that non-epistemic values sometimes serve as “inquiry tickets,” justifying scientists’ pursuit of certain questions in the short run, while the answers to those questions mitigate transient underdetermination in the long run. Our account of inquiry tickets shows that the role of non-epistemic values need not be restricted to belief or acceptance in order to be relevant to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. added 2020-01-03
    Commentary: Social Theory and Underdetermination: A Philosophical History and Reconstruction.Stephen Turner - 2019 - In Michiru Nagatsu & A. Ruzzenne (eds.), Contemporary Philosophy and Social Science: An Interdisciplinary Dialogue. Bloomsbury Academic.
  48. added 2019-08-15
    Doubts for Dawid's Non-Empirical Theory Assessment.Cristin Chall - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 63:128-135.
    Dawid's account of non-empirical theory assessment is meant to complement traditional theory assessments. I contend that his arguments don't provide support for this account. His three arguments, the no alternatives argument, the unexpected explanatory connections argument, and the meta-inductive argument from prior theories' success, are all problematic, particularly for an assessment of string theory. In particular, I argue that the meta-inductive argument is idle, because it's role in underwriting the future predictive success of a theory is subsumed by the normal (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. added 2019-05-28
    Overcoming the Underdetermination of Specimens.Caitlin Wylie - 2019 - Biology and Philosophy 34 (2):24.
    Philosophers of science are well aware that theories are underdetermined by data. But what about the data? Scientific data are selected and processed representations or pieces of nature. What is useless context and what is valuable specimen, as well as how specimens are processed for study, are not obvious or predetermined givens. Instead, they are decisions made by scientists and other research workers, such as technicians, that produce different outcomes for the data. Vertebrate fossils provide a revealing case of this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  50. added 2019-05-28
    Unspoken Rules: Resolving Underdetermination With Closure Principles.Shaun Nichols & Jerry Gaus - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (8):2735-2756.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 107