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  1. Is Classical Logic Monotonic?Matheus Silva - manuscript
    It is usually accepted that one of the properties of classical logic is monotonicity, which states that the validity of implication is not affected by the addition of new premises. In this piece, I will argue that this common notion is unjustified since it is motivated by a category mistake. The notion of monotonicity is primarily epistemic in character and can’t be meaningfully attributed to a system. This is acutely clear in the contrast of monotonicity with non-monotonicity, which we tend (...)
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  2. Elementary Iterated Revision and the Levi Identity.Jake Chandler & Richard Booth - forthcoming - In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Logic, Rationality and Interaction (LORI 2019).
    Recent work has considered the problem of extending to the case of iterated belief change the so-called `Harper Identity' (HI), which defines single-shot contraction in terms of single-shot revision. The present paper considers the prospects of providing a similar extension of the Levi Identity (LI), in which the direction of definition runs the other way. We restrict our attention here to the three classic iterated revision operators--natural, restrained and lexicographic, for which we provide here the first collective characterisation in the (...)
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  3. Knowability Relative to Information.Peter Hawke & Franz Berto - forthcoming - Mind.
    We present a formal semantics for epistemic logic, capturing the notion of knowability relative to information (KRI). Like Dretske, we move from the platitude that what an agent can know depends on her (empirical) information. We treat operators of the form K_AB (‘B is knowable on the basis of information A’) as variably strict quantifiers over worlds with a topic- or aboutness- preservation constraint. Variable strictness models the non-monotonicity of knowledge acquisition while allowing knowledge to be intrinsically stable. Aboutness-preservation models (...)
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  4. Misleading Higher-Order Evidence, Conflicting Ideals, and Defeasible Logic.Aleks Knoks - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    Thinking about misleading higher-order evidence naturally leads to a puzzle about epistemic rationality: If one’s total evidence can be radically misleading regarding itself, then two widely-accepted requirements of rationality come into conflict, suggesting that there are rational dilemmas. This paper focuses on an often misunderstood and underexplored response to this (and similar) puzzles, the so-called conflicting-ideals view. Drawing on work from defeasible logic, I propose understanding this view as a move away from the default metaepistemological position according to which rationality (...)
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  5. A Logic of Defeasible Argumentation: Constructing Arguments in Justification Logic.Stipe Pandžić - forthcoming - Argument and Computation:1-45.
    In the 1980s, Pollock’s work on default reasons started the quest in the AI community for a formal system of defeasible argumentation. The main goal of this paper is to provide a logic of structured defeasible arguments using the language of justification logic. In this logic, we introduce defeasible justification assertions of the type t : F that read as “t is a defeasible reason that justifies F”. Such formulas are then interpreted as arguments and their acceptance semantics is given (...)
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  6. Defeasibility in Epistemology.Aleks Knoks - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Maryland at College Park
    This work explores some ways in which logics for defeasible reasoning can be applied to questions in epistemology. It's naturally thought of as developing four applications: The first is concerned with simple epistemic rules, such as "If you perceives that X, then you ought to believe that X" and "If you have outstanding testimony that X, then you ought to believe that X." Anyone who thinks that such rules have a place in our accounts of epistemic normativity must explain what (...)
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  7. El lugar de la lógica en el razonamiento jurídico.Miguel Garcia-Godinez - 2019 - In Gerardo Ramirez & Manuel Jimenez (eds.), Ensayos de retórica jurídica. Mexico City, CDMX, Mexico: pp. 171-180.
  8. A Logic for Best Explanations.Jared Millson & Christian Straßer - 2019 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 29 (2):184-231.
    Efforts to formalize qualitative accounts of inference to the best explanation (IBE) confront two obstacles: the imprecise nature of such accounts and the unusual logical properties that explanations exhibit, such as contradiction-intolerance and irreflexivity. This paper aims to surmount these challenges by utilising a new, more precise theory that treats explanations as expressions that codify defeasible inferences. To formalise this account, we provide a sequent calculus in which IBE serves as an elimination rule for a connective that exhibits many of (...)
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  9. Simple Hyperintensional Belief Revision.F. Berto - 2018 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):559-575.
    I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM belief revision theory. belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivialization; and revision can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. Such results are obtained without resorting to (...)
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  10. Inferentialist-Expressivism for Explanatory Vocabulary.Jared A. Millson, Kareem Khalifa & Mark Risjord - 2018 - In Ondřej Beran, Vojtěch Kolman & Ladislav Koreň (eds.), From rules to meanings. New essays on inferentialism. Routledge.
    In this essay, we extend earlier inferentialist-expressivist treatments of traditional logical, semantic, modal, and representational vocabulary (Brandom 1994, 2008, 2015; Peregrin 2014) to explanatory vocabulary. From this perspective, Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) appears to be an obvious starting point. In its simplest formulation, IBE has the form: A best explains why B, B; so A. It thereby captures one of the central inferential features of explanation. An inferentialist-expressivist treatment of “best explains” would treat it as a logical operator. (...)
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  11. The Logic of Reasons.Shyam Nair & John Horty - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press. pp. 67-84.
    In this chapter, we begin by sketching in the broadest possible strokes the ideas behind two formal systems that have been introduced with to goal of explicating the ways in which reasons interact to support the actions and conclusions they do. The first of these is the theory of defeasible reasoning developed in the seminal work of Pollock; the second is a more recent theory due to Horty, which adapts and develops the default logic introduced by Reiter to provide an (...)
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  12. The Logic of Epistemic Justification.Martin Smith - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3857-3875.
    Theories of epistemic justification are commonly assessed by exploring their predictions about particular hypothetical cases – predictions as to whether justification is present or absent in this or that case. With a few exceptions, it is much less common for theories of epistemic justification to be assessed by exploring their predictions about logical principles. The exceptions are a handful of ‘closure’ principles, which have received a lot of attention, and which certain theories of justification are well known to invalidate. But (...)
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  13. Monotonic and Non-Monotonic Embeddings of Anselm’s Proof.Jacob Archambault - 2017 - Logica Universalis 11 (1):121-138.
    A consequence relation \ is monotonic iff for premise sets \ and conclusion \, if \, \, then \; and non-monotonic if this fails in some instance. More plainly, a consequence relation is monotonic when whatever is entailed by a premise set remains entailed by any of its supersets. From the High Middle Ages through the Early Modern period, consequence in theology is assumed to be monotonic. Concomitantly, to the degree the argument formulated by Anselm at Proslogion 2–4 is taken (...)
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  14. The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning.Samuel Asarnow - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):614-636.
    According to the Reasoning View about normative reasons, facts about normative reasons for action can be understood in terms of facts about the norms of practical reasoning. I argue that this view is subject to an overlooked class of counterexamples, familiar from debates about Subjectivist theories of normative reasons. Strikingly, the standard strategy Subjectivists have used to respond to this problem cannot be adapted to the Reasoning View. I think there is a solution to this problem, however. I argue that (...)
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  15. Impossible Worlds and the Logic of Imagination.Francesco Berto - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (6):1277-1297.
    I want to model a finite, fallible cognitive agent who imagines that p in the sense of mentally representing a scenario—a configuration of objects and properties—correctly described by p. I propose to capture imagination, so understood, via variably strict world quantifiers, in a modal framework including both possible and so-called impossible worlds. The latter secure lack of classical logical closure for the relevant mental states, while the variability of strictness captures how the agent imports information from actuality in the imagined (...)
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  16. Modelling Belief Revision Via Belief Bases Using Situation Semantics.Ayse Sena Bozdag - 2017 - Dissertation, Bogazici University
    The belief base approach to belief representation and belief dynamics is developed as an alternative to the belief set approaches, which are pioneered by the AGM model. The belief base approach models collections of information and expectations of an agent as possibly incomplete and possibly inconsistent foundations for her beliefs. Nevertheless, the beliefs of an agent are always consistent; this is ensured by a sophisticated inference relation. Belief changes take place on the information base instead of on the belief set, (...)
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  17. When Structural Principles Hold Merely Locally.Ulf Hlobil - 2017 - In Pavel Arazim & Tomáš Lávička (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2016. London: College Publications. pp. 53-67.
    In substructural logics, structural principles may hold in some fragments of a consequence relation without holding globally. I look at this phenomenon in my preferred substructural logic, in which Weakening and Cut fail but which is supra-intuitionistic. I introduce object language operators that keep track of the admissibility of Weakening and of intuitionistic implications. I end with some ideas about local transitivity.
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  18. Hard and Soft Logical Information.Allo Patrick - 2017 - Journal of Logic and Computation:1-20.
    In this paper I use the distinction between hard and soft information from the dynamic epistemic logic tradition to extend prior work on informational conceptions of logic to include non-monotonic consequence-relations. In particular, I defend the claim that at least some non-monotonic logics can be understood on the basis of soft or “belief-like” logical information, and thereby question the orthodox view that all logical information is hard, “knowledge-like”, information.
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  19. Logic, Reasoning and Revision.Patrick Allo - 2016 - Theoria 82 (1):3-31.
    The traditional connection between logic and reasoning has been under pressure ever since Gilbert Harman attacked the received view that logic yields norms for what we should believe. In this article I first place Harman's challenge in the broader context of the dialectic between logical revisionists like Bob Meyer and sceptics about the role of logic in reasoning like Harman. I then develop a formal model based on contemporary epistemic and doxastic logic in which the relation between logic and norms (...)
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  20. A Nonmonotonic Sequent Calculus for Inferentialist Expressivists.Ulf Hlobil - 2016 - In Pavel Arazim & Michal Dančák (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2015. College Publications. pp. 87-105.
    I am presenting a sequent calculus that extends a nonmonotonic consequence relation over an atomic language to a logically complex language. The system is in line with two guiding philosophical ideas: (i) logical inferentialism and (ii) logical expressivism. The extension defined by the sequent rules is conservative. The conditional tracks the consequence relation and negation tracks incoherence. Besides the ordinary propositional connectives, the sequent calculus introduces a new kind of modal operator that marks implications that hold monotonically. Transitivity fails, but (...)
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  21. Brandom’s Account of Reasoning.Reiner Schaefer - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41:129-150.
    In most everyday instances of reasoning, reasoners can gain, lose, and reacquire entitlement to (or justification for) a possible commitment (or belief) as a result of their consecutively acquiring new commitments. For example, we might initially conclude that ‘Tweety can fly’ from ‘Tweety is a bird,’ but later have to reject this conclusion as a result of our coming to learn that Tweety is a penguin. We could, even later, reacquire entitlement to ‘Tweety can fly’ if we became committed (and (...)
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  22. Qualitative Probabilistic Inference Under Varied Entropy Levels.Paul D. Thorn & Gerhard Schurz - 2016 - Journal of Applied Logic 19 (2):87-101.
    In previous work, we studied four well known systems of qualitative probabilistic inference, and presented data from computer simulations in an attempt to illustrate the performance of the systems. These simulations evaluated the four systems in terms of their tendency to license inference to accurate and informative conclusions, given incomplete information about a randomly selected probability distribution. In our earlier work, the procedure used in generating the unknown probability distribution (representing the true stochastic state of the world) tended to yield (...)
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  23. The Inheritance of Defaults in the Case of Exceptional Subclasses.Paul D. Thorn - 2015 - The Reasoner 9 (11):93.
  24. Qualitative Probabilistic Inference with Default Inheritance.Paul D. Thorn, Christian Eichhorn, Gabriele Kern-Isberner & Gerhard Schurz - 2015 - In Christoph Beierle, Gabriele Kern-Isberner, Marco Ragni & Frieder Stolzenburg (eds.), Proceedings of the Ki 2015 Workshop on Formal and Cognitive Reasoning. pp. 16-28.
    There are numerous formal systems that allow inference of new conditionals based on a conditional knowledge base. Many of these systems have been analysed theoretically and some have been tested against human reasoning in psychological studies, but experiments evaluating the performance of such systems are rare. In this article, we extend the experiments in [19] in order to evaluate the inferential properties of c-representations in comparison to the well-known Systems P and Z. Since it is known that System Z and (...)
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  25. A Primer on Rational Consequence Relations, Popper Functions, and Their Ranked Structures.James Hawthorne - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (4):731-749.
    Rational consequence relations and Popper functions provide logics for reasoning under uncertainty, the former purely qualitative, the latter probabilistic. But few researchers seem to be aware of the close connection between these two logics. I’ll show that Popper functions are probabilistic versions of rational consequence relations. I’ll not assume that the reader is familiar with either logic. I present them, and explicate the relationship between them, from the ground up. I’ll also present alternative axiomatizations for each logic, showing them to (...)
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  26. Two Concepts of Plausibility in Default Reasoning.Hans Rott - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S6):1219–1252.
    In their unifying theory to model uncertainty, Friedman and Halpern (1995–2003) applied plausibility measures to default reasoning satisfying certain sets of axioms. They proposed a distinctive condition for plausibility measures that characterizes “qualitative” reasoning (as contrasted with probabilistic reasoning). A similar and similarly fundamental, but more general and thus stronger condition was independently suggested in the context of “basic” entrenchment-based belief revision by Rott (1996–2003). The present paper analyzes the relation between the two approaches to formalizing basic notions of plausibility (...)
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  27. A Utility Based Evaluation of Logico-Probabilistic Systems.Paul D. Thorn & Gerhard Schurz - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (4):867-890.
    Systems of logico-probabilistic (LP) reasoning characterize inference from conditional assertions interpreted as expressing high conditional probabilities. In the present article, we investigate four prominent LP systems (namely, systems O, P, Z, and QC) by means of computer simulations. The results reported here extend our previous work in this area, and evaluate the four systems in terms of the expected utility of the dispositions to act that derive from the conclusions that the systems license. In addition to conforming to the dominant (...)
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  28. Perspectives in the Interpretation of Defeasible Reasoning.Giacomo Turbanti - 2014 - The Logica Yearbook 2013 2013:239-254.
    Non-monotonicity in logic is a symptom that may have many causes. In the formalisation of defeasible reasoning, an epistemic diagnosis has largely prevailed according to which some inferences are non-monotonic because they are provisionally drawn in the absence of relevant or complete information. The Gabbay-Makinson rules for cumulative consequence relations are a paradigmatic example of this epistemic approach. In this paper a different approach to defeasible reasoning is introduced, based on the idea of inferential perspectives. According to this approach, some (...)
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  29. Defeat Reconsidered and Repaired.Gregory Wheeler - 2014 - The Reasoner 8 (2):15-15.
  30. Adaptive Logic as a Modal Logic.Patrick Allo - 2013 - Studia Logica 101 (5):933-958.
    Modal logics have in the past been used as a unifying framework for the minimality semantics used in defeasible inference, conditional logic, and belief revision. The main aim of the present paper is to add adaptive logics, a general framework for a wide range of defeasible reasoning forms developed by Diderik Batens and his co-workers, to the growing list of formalisms that can be studied with the tools and methods of contemporary modal logic. By characterising the class of abnormality models, (...)
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  31. Arguments Whose Strength Depends on Continuous Variation.James Franklin - 2013 - Informal Logic 33 (1):33-56.
    Both the traditional Aristotelian and modern symbolic approaches to logic have seen logic in terms of discrete symbol processing. Yet there are several kinds of argument whose validity depends on some topological notion of continuous variation, which is not well captured by discrete symbols. Examples include extrapolation and slippery slope arguments, sorites, fuzzy logic, and those involving closeness of possible worlds. It is argued that the natural first attempts to analyze these notions and explain their relation to reasoning fail, so (...)
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  32. Substantive Assumptions in Interaction: A Logical Perspective.Olivier Roy & Eric Pacuit - 2013 - Synthese 190 (5):891-908.
    In this paper we study substantive assumptions in social interaction. By substantive assumptions we mean contingent assumptions about what the players know and believe about each other’s choices and information. We first explain why substantive assumptions are fundamental for the analysis of games and, more generally, social interaction. Then we show that they can be compared formally, and that there exist contexts where no substantive assumptions are being made. Finally we show that the questions raised in this paper are related (...)
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  33. Ampliative Inference Under Varied Entropy Levels.Paul D. Thorn & Gerhard Schurz - 2013 - In Christoph Beierle & Gabriele Kern-Isberner (eds.), Proceedings of the 4th Workshop on Dynamics of Knowledge and Belief (DKB-2013). Fakultät für Mathematik und Informatik, FernUniversität in Hagen. pp. 77-88.
  34. A Contextual Type Theory with Judgemental Modalities for Reasoning From Open Assumptions.Giuseppe Primiero - 2012 - Logique and Analyse 220:579-600.
    Contextual type theories are largely explored in their applications to programming languages, but less investigated for knowledge representation purposes. The combination of a constructive language with a modal extension of contexts appears crucial to explore the attractive idea of a type-theoretical calculus of provability from refutable assumptions for non-monotonic reasoning. This paper introduces such a language: the modal operators are meant to internalize two different modes of correctness, respectively with necessity as the standard notion of constructive verification and possibility as (...)
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  35. Reward Versus Risk in Uncertain Inference: Theorems and Simulations.Gerhard Schurz & Paul D. Thorn - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):574-612.
    Systems of logico-probabilistic reasoning characterize inference from conditional assertions that express high conditional probabilities. In this paper we investigate four prominent LP systems, the systems _O, P_, _Z_, and _QC_. These systems differ in the number of inferences they licence _. LP systems that license more inferences enjoy the possible reward of deriving more true and informative conclusions, but with this possible reward comes the risk of drawing more false or uninformative conclusions. In the first part of the paper, we (...)
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  36. A Theory of Knowledge and Belief Change - Formal and Experimental Perspectives.Masaharu Mizumoto - 2011 - Hokkaido University Press.
    This work explores the conceptual and empirical issues of the concept of knowledge and its relation to the pattern of our belief change, from formal and experimental perspectives. Part I gives an analysis of knowledge (called Sustainability) that is formally represented and naturalistically plausible at the same time, which is claimed to be a synthesized view of knowledge, covering not only empirical knowledge, but also knowledge of future, practical knowledge, mathematical knowledge, knowledge of general facts. Part II tries to formalize (...)
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  37. Odd Choices: On the Rationality of Some Alleged Anomalies of Decision and Inference.Hans Rott - 2011 - Topoi 30 (1):59-69.
    This paper presents a number of apparent anomalies in rational choice scenarios, and their translation into the logic of everyday reasoning. Three classes of examples that have been discussed in the context of probabilistic choice since the 1960s (by Debreu, Tversky and others) are analyzed in a non-probabilistic setting. It is shown how they can at the same time be regarded as logical problems that concern the drawing of defeasible inferences from a given information base. I argue that initial appearances (...)
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  38. Advances in Belief Dynamics: Introduction.F. Liu & O. Roy - 2010 - Synthese 173 (2):123-126.
    This is the introduction of the special issue,.
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  39. Pollock's Theory of Defeasible Reasoning.Jonathan Weisberg - 2010
    An introduction to the motivations and mechanics of John Pollock's theory of defeasible reasoning, from a lecture at the Northern Institute of Philosophy in 2010.
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  40. Levels of Belief in Nonmonotonic Reasoning.David C. Makinson - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer. pp. 341--354.
    Reviews the connections between different kinds of nonmonotonic logic and the general idea of varying degrees of belief.
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  41. O is Not Enough.J. B. Paris & R. Simmonds - 2009 - Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (2):298-309.
    We examine the closure conditions of the probabilistic consequence relation of Hawthorne and Makinson, specifically the outstanding question of completeness in terms of Horn rules, of their proposed (finite) set of rules O. We show that on the contrary no such finite set of Horn rules exists, though we are able to specify an infinite set which is complete.
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  42. Degrees All the Way Down: Beliefs, Non-Beliefs and Disbeliefs.Hans Rott - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer. pp. 301--339.
    This paper combines various structures representing degrees of belief, degrees of disbelief, and degrees of non-belief (degrees of expectations) into a unified whole. The representation uses relations of comparative necessity and possibility, as well as non-probabilistic functions assigning numerical values of necessity and possibility. We define all-encompassing necessity structures which have weak expectations (mere hypotheses, guesses, conjectures, etc.) occupying the lowest ranks and very strong, ineradicable ('a priori') beliefs occupying the highest ranks. Structurally, there are no differences from the top (...)
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  43. Seltsame Wahlen. Zur Rationalität vermeintlicher Anomalien beim Entscheiden und Schlussfolgern.Hans Rott - 2009 - Studia Philosophica: Jahrbuch Der Schweizerischen Philosoph Ischen Gesellschaft, Annuaire de la Société Suisse de Philosphie 68:43-64.
    This paper discusses a number of apparent anomalies in rational choice scenarios, and their translation into the logic of everyday reasoning. Three classes of examples that have been discussed in the context of probabilistic choice since the 1960s are analyzed in a nonprobabilistic setting. It is shown how they can at the same time be regarded as logical problems that concern the drawing of defeasible inferences from a given information base. I argue that initial appearances notwithstanding, these cases should not (...)
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  44. Preference-Based Belief Revision for Rule-Based Agents.Natasha Alechina, Mark Jago & Brian Logan - 2008 - Synthese 165 (2):159-177.
    Agents which perform inferences on the basis of unreliable information need an ability to revise their beliefs if they discover an inconsistency. Such a belief revision algorithm ideally should be rational, should respect any preference ordering over the agent’s beliefs (removing less preferred beliefs where possible) and should be fast. However, while standard approaches to rational belief revision for classical reasoners allow preferences to be taken into account, they typically have quite high complexity. In this paper, we consider belief revision (...)
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  45. Non-Monotonic Logic.G. Aldo Antonelli - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The term "non-monotonic logic" covers a family of formal frameworks devised to capture and represent defeasible inference , i.e., that kind of inference of everyday life in which reasoners draw conclusions tentatively, reserving the right to retract them in the light of further information. Such inferences are called "non-monotonic" because the set of conclusions warranted on the basis of a given knowledge base does not increase (in fact, it can shrink) with the size of the knowledge base itself. This is (...)
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  46. Toulmin's Rhetorical Logic: What's the Warrant for Warrants?William M. Keith & David E. Beard - 2008 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 41 (1):22-50.
  47. Information Structures in Belief Revision.Hans Rott - 2008 - In Johan Van Benthem & Pieter Adriaans (eds.), Philosophy of Information, Vol. 8 of the Handbook of the Philosophy of Science. Amsterdam: Elsevier. pp. 457–482.
    This is a survey paper. Contents: 1 Introduction ― 2 Preliminary remarks on information, truth and mind - 2.1 Remarks on information and truth - 2.2 Some clues from the philosophy of mind - 2.3 Functionalism as applied to belief revision - 2.4 Filling in the parameters ― 3 Belief change = revision + reflection - 3.1 Foundationalism - 3.2 Coherentism ― 4 Inference operations for simple change operations: three examples - 4.1 Example 1: flat data bases - 4.2 Example (...)
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  48. Causality, Modality, and Explanation.Graham White - 2008 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 49 (3):313-343.
    We start with Fodor's critique of cognitive science in "The mind doesn't work that way: The scope and limits of computational psychology": he argues that much mental activity cannot be handled by the current methods of cognitive science because it is nonmonotonic and, therefore, is global in nature, is not context-free, and is thus not capable of being formalized by a Turing-like mental architecture. We look at the use of nonmonotonic logic in the artificial intelligence community, particularly with the discussion (...)
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  49. A Theory of Presumption for Everyday Argumentation.David M. Godden & Douglas N. Walton - 2007 - Pragmatics and Cognition 15 (2):313-346.
    The paper considers contemporary models of presumption in terms of their ability to contribute to a working theory of presumption for argumentation. Beginning with the Whatelian model, we consider its contemporary developments and alternatives, as proposed by Sidgwick, Kauffeld, Cronkhite, Rescher, Walton, Freeman, Ullmann-Margalit, and Hansen. Based on these accounts, we present a picture of presumptions characterized by their nature, function, foundation and force. On our account, presumption is a modal status that is attached to a claim and has the (...)
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  50. The Quantitative/Qualitative Watershed for Rules of Uncertain Inference.James Hawthorne & David Makinson - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):247-297.
    We chart the ways in which closure properties of consequence relations for uncertain inference take on different forms according to whether the relations are generated in a quantitative or a qualitative manner. Among the main themes are: the identification of watershed conditions between probabilistically and qualitatively sound rules; failsafe and classicality transforms of qualitatively sound rules; non-Horn conditions satisfied by probabilistic consequence; representation and completeness problems; and threshold-sensitive conditions such as `preface' and `lottery' rules.
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