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  1. added 2020-04-14
    (April 2020 to 2014) The UNBELIEVABLE SIMILARITIES Between the Ideas of Some People (2011-2016) and My Ideas (2002-2008) in Physics (Quantum Mechanics, Cosmology), Cognitive Neuroscience, Philosophy of Mind, and Philosophy (This Manuscript Would Require a REVOLUTION in International Academy Environment!).Gabriel Vacariu - manuscript
    Many years later, many people (many countries, many domains, many of my ideas – some of them are “great” names from great USA and Germany universities!!) have published UNBELIVABLE similar ideas to my ideas Because so many “famous” people (Physics, Philosophy, Cognitive Science) have plagiarized my ideas, I should receive Noble prize for Physics and Medicine (Cognitive Neuroscience), but I will not receive it just because I am Romanian (this is the reason so many people from so many countries, from (...)
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  2. added 2020-04-11
    Penyebaban Sosial (Social Causation) dalam Individualisme Non-Reduktif R. Keith Sawyer.Banin Diar Sukmono - 2016 - Cogito: Jurnal Mahasiswa Filsafat 3 (1):23-48.
    Artikel ini bertujuan untuk memaparkan bagaimana penyebaban sosial dapat terjadi dalam perspektif individualisme non-reduktif (Non-reductive Individualism/NRI) R. Keith Sawyer. NRI adalah perluasan argumen fisikalisme non-reduktif dari filsafat akal budi untuk memberikan bingkai (framework) baru dalam melihat debat ontologis dan metodologis filsafat ilmu sosial. Cara yang digunakan adalah membasiskan landasan ontologis ilmu sosial pada eksistensi individu (individualisme ontologis), sekaligus mengiyakan dua level analisis properti, yakni level individual (bawah) dan sosial (atas) (dualisme properti). Mengingat posisi non-reduktif selalu dibayangi problem overdeterminasi dan epifenomena (...)
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  3. added 2020-02-12
    The Faces of Existence: An Essay in Nonreductive Metaphysics.Keith Campbell - 1988 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (2):358-362.
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  4. added 2020-02-11
    A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism.A. Botterell - 2003 - Philosophical Review 114 (1):125-128.
    A review of Andrew Melnyk's _A Physicalist Manifesto_ (Cambridge: CUP, 2003).
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  5. added 2020-01-20
    Narrative Naturalism: An Alternative Framework for Philosophy of Mind.Jessica Wahman - 2015 - Lexington Books.
    This book addresses the nature of consciousness and the relation of mind to brain, body, and the material world. Against mechanistic and physicalist approaches, it employs a literary worldview that accommodates plural narratives, including those of neuroscience, pharmacology, psychology, and everyday experience.
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  6. added 2020-01-20
    It Depends What the Meaning of 'Is' Is: Santayana, Identity Theory, and the Mind-Body Problem.Jessica Wahman - 2007 - In Under Any Sky: Contemporary Readings of George Santayana.
  7. added 2020-01-03
    The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind.Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.) - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    The study of the mind has always been one of the main preoccupations of philosophers, and has been a booming area of research in recent decades, with remarkable advances in psychology and neuroscience. Oxford University Press now presents the most authoritative and comprehensive guide ever published to the philosophy of mind. An outstanding international team of contributors offer 45 specially written critical surveys of a wide range of topics relating to the mind. The first two sections cover the place of (...)
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  8. added 2020-01-02
    Consciousness and Meaning: Selected Essays by Brian Loar.Katalin Balog & Stephanie Beardman - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    One of the most important problems of twentieth century analytic philosophy concern the place of the mind – and in particular, of consciousness and intentionality – in a physical universe. Brian Loar’s essays in the philosophy of mind in this volume include his major contributions in this area. His central concern was how to understand consciousness and intentionality from the subjective perspective, and especially, how to understand subjectivity in a physical universe. He was committed to the reality and reliability of (...)
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  9. added 2019-12-20
    Practical Realism About the Self.Carolyn Dicey Jennings - forthcoming - In Common Sense Metaphysics: Themes From the Philosophy of Lynne Rudder Baker. Routledge.
    In Explaining Attitudes, Baker argues that we should treat our everyday practices as relevant to metaphysical debates, resulting in a stance of realism with respect to intentional explanations. In this chapter I will argue that if one is going to be a practical realist about anything, it should be the self, or subject of attention. I will use research on attention combined with the stance of practical realism to argue in favor of a substantive self. That is, I will present (...)
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  10. added 2019-12-20
    Causal Exclusion and Physical Causal Completeness.Dwayne Moore - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (4):479-505.
    Nonreductive physicalists endorse the principle of mental causation, according to which some events have mental causes: Sid climbs the hill because he wants to. Nonreductive physicalists also endorse the principle of physical causal completeness, according to which physical events have sufficient physical causes: Sid climbs the hill because a complex neural process in his brain triggered his climbing. Critics typically level the causal exclusion problem against this nonreductive physicalist model, according to which the physical cause is a sufficient cause of (...)
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  11. added 2019-11-07
    The Ontology of Mind: Events, States and Processes.Daniel Stoljar & Helen Steward - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (3):418.
    The aim of this book is to argue that issues in metaphysics—in particular issues about the nature of states and causation—will have a significant impact in philosophy of mind. As Steward puts it: “the category of state has been so grossly misunderstood that some theories of mind which are supposed to encompass entities traditionally regarded as falling under the category, e.g., beliefs and desires, cannot so much as be sensibly formulated, once we are clearer about the nature of states”. According (...)
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  12. added 2019-10-29
    Mental Causation, Autonomy and Action Theory.Dwayne Moore - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    Nonreductive physicalism states that actions have sufficient physical causes and distinct mental causes. Nonreductive physicalism has recently faced the exclusion problem, according to which the single sufficient physical cause excludes the mental causes from causal efficacy. Autonomists respond by stating that while mental-to-physical causation fails, mental-to-mental causation persists. Several recent philosophers establish this autonomy result via similar models of causation :1031–1049, 2016; Zhong, J Philos 111:341–360, 2014). In this paper I argue that both of these autonomist models fail on account (...)
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  13. added 2019-10-29
    Autonomous Mental Causation and Mental‐Qua‐Mental Causation.Dwayne Moore - 2019 - Philosophical Forum 50 (2):245-267.
    Nonreductive physicalists endorse autonomous mental causation, the view that mental causes, as distinct from physical causes, bring about mental and physical effects. The causal exclusion problem has recently pressured nonreductive physicalists to replace autonomous mental causation with reduced mental causation, the view that mental causes, as physical causes, bring about mental and physical effects. Reduced mental causation, in turn, faces the problem of mental quausation, according to which reduced mental causation only delivers mental‐as‐physical causation, not the requisite mental‐as‐mental causation. Proponents (...)
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  14. added 2019-10-01
    Mental Causation as Joint Causation.Chiwook Won - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    This paper explores and defends the idea that mental properties and their physical bases jointly cause their physical effects. The paper evaluates the view as an emergentist response to the exclusion problem, comparing it with a competing nonreductive physicalist solution, the compatibilist solution, and argues that the joint causation view is more defensible than commonly supposed. Specifically, the paper distinguishes two theses of closure, Strong Closure and Weak Closure, two causal exclusion problems, the overdetermination problem and the supervenience problem, and (...)
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  15. added 2019-09-19
    Truthmaking and the Mysteries of Emergence.Kevin Morris - 2018 - In Elly Vintiadis & Constantinos Mekios (eds.), Brute Facts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    The concept of truthmaking, the idea that when a statement is true, there is typically something about the world in virtue of which it is true, has garnered much interest in recent metaphysics. Often, the motivation has been the thought that truthmaking can provide a new perspective on an important issue. This paper evaluates the claim that truthmaking can play a substantive role in defining an unproblematic notion of emergence. For despite playing an important role in philosophical discourse over the (...)
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  16. added 2019-09-13
    Mental Causation and Ontology.Sophie C. Gibb, Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson & E. Jonathan Lowe (eds.) - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This book demonstrates the importance of ontology for a central debate in philosophy of mind. Mental causation seems an obvious aspect of the world.
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  17. added 2019-08-29
    Mental Causation: A Counterfactual Theory.Thomas Kroedel - 2020 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Our minds have physical effects. This happens, for instance, when we move our bodies when we act. How is this possible? Thomas Kroedel defends an account of mental causation in terms of difference-making: if our minds had been different, the physical world would have been different; therefore, the mind causes events in the physical world. His account not only explains how the mind has physical effects at all, but solves the exclusion problem - the problem of how those effects can (...)
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  18. added 2019-08-12
    The Perils of Epistemic ReductionismTruth and Objectivity.Terence Horgan & Crispin Wright - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):891.
  19. added 2019-06-06
    Realization and the Formulation of Physicalism.Andrew Melnyk - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (1):127-155.
    Twenty years ago, Richard Boyd suggested that physicalism could be formulated by appeal to a notion of realization, with no appeal to the identity of the non-physical with the physical. In, I developed this suggestion at length, on the basis of one particular account of realization. I now ask what happens if you try to formulate physicalism on the basis of other accounts of realization, accounts due to LePore and Loewer and to Shoemaker. Having explored two new formulations of physicalism, (...)
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  20. added 2019-06-06
    Does the Argument From Realization Generalize? Responses to Kim.Carl Gillett & Bradley Rives - 2001 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):79-98.
    By quantifying over properties we cannot create new properties any more than by quantifying over individuals we can create new individuals. Someone murdered Jones, and the murderer is either Smith or Jones or Wang. That “someone”, who murdered Jones, is not a person in addition to Smith, Jones, and Wang, and it would be absurd to posit a disjunctive person, Smith-or-Jones-or-Wang, with whom to identify the murderer. The same goes for second-order properties and their realizers. (Kim (1997a), p.201).
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  21. added 2019-06-06
    Physicalism Without Reductionism: Toward a Scientifically, Philosophically, and Theologically Sound.Nancey Murphy - 1999 - Zygon 34 (4):551-571.
  22. added 2019-06-06
    Physicalism, Teleology and the Miraculous Coincidence Problem.Jonathan Knowles - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (195):164-181.
    I focus on Fodor’s model of the relationship between special sciences and basic physics, and on a criticism of this model, that it implies that the causal stability of, e.g., the mental in its production of behaviour is nothing short of a miraculous coincidence. David Papineau and Graham Macdonaldendorse this criticism. But it is far less clear than they assume that Fodor’s picture indeed involves coincidences, which in any case their injection of a teleological supplement cannot explain. Papineau’s and Macdonald’s (...)
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  23. added 2019-06-05
    Christian Physicalism?: Philosophical Theological Criticisms.R. Keith Loftin & Joshua R. Farris (eds.) - 2017 - Rowman & Littlefield.
    On the heels of the advance since the twentieth-century of wholly physicalist accounts of human persons, the influence of materialist ontology is increasingly evident in Christian theologizing. To date, the contemporary literature has tended to focus on anthropological issues (e.g., whether the traditional soul / body distinction is viable), with occasional articles treating physicalist accounts of such doctrines as the Incarnation and Resurrection of Jesus cropping up, as well. Interestingly, the literature to date, both for and against this influence, is (...)
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  24. added 2019-06-05
    Strong Emergence as a Defese of Non-Reductive Physicalism.Carl Gillett - 2002 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 6 (1):87-120.
    Jaegwon Kim, and others, have recently posed a powerful challenge to both emergentism and nom-reductive physicalism by providing arguments that these positions are committed to an untenable combination of both ‘upward’ and ‘dounward’ determination. In section 1, I illuminate how the nature of the realization relation underlies such skeptical arguments However, in section 2, I suggest that such conclusions involve a confusion between the implications of physicalism and those of a related thesis the ‘Completeness of Physics' I show that the (...)
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  25. added 2019-06-05
    Emergence or Reduction?—Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism.Ralf Stoecker, Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3):701.
    This book collects twelve original articles, arranged in three sections, plus an introduction.
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  26. added 2019-06-05
    Book Reviews : Persons and Minds: The Prospects of Nonreductive Materialism. By Joseph Margolis. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. Lvii Dordrecht—Holland/Boston—U.S.A.: D. Reidel, 1978. $26.00 , $11.95. [REVIEW]D. M. Armstrong - 1980 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 10 (2):227-229.
  27. added 2019-03-19
    Scientific Understanding.E. Brian Davies - unknown
    Many of those actively involved in the physical sciences adopt a reductionist point of view, in which all aspects of the world are ultimately controlled by physical laws that are expressed in terms of mathematical equations. In this article we adopt a pluralistic approach to human understanding in which mathematically expressed laws of nature are merely one way among several of describing a world that is too vast and complex for our minds to be able to grasp in its entirety.
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  28. added 2019-03-10
    The Hidden Premiss in the Causal Argument for Physicalism.Robert C. Bishop - 2005 - Analysis 66 (1):44-52.
    The causal argument for physicalism is anayzed and it's key premise--the causal closure of physics--is found wanting. Therefore, a hidden premise must be added to the argument to gain its conclusion, but the hidden premise is indistinguishable from the conclusion of the causal argument. Therefore, it begs the question on physicalism.
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  29. added 2019-03-09
    Elimination, Not Reduction: Lessons From the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) and Multiple Realisation.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42:e22.
    The thesis of multiple realisation that Borsboom et al. are relying on should not be taken for granted. In dissolving the apparent multiple realisation, the reductionist research strategies in psychopathology research (the Research Domain Criteria [RDoC] framework, in particular) are bound to lead to eliminativism rather than reductionism. Therefore, Borsboom et al. seem to be aiming at a wrong target.
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  30. added 2019-03-01
    Mental Causation and Intelligibility.David Robb - 2015 - Humana Mente 8 (29).
    I look at some central positions in the mental causation debate – reductionism, emergentism, and nonreductive physicalism – on the hypothesis that mental causation is intelligible. On this hypothesis, mental causes and their effects are internally related so that they intelligibly “fit”, analogous to the way puzzle pieces interlock, or shades of red fall into order within a color sphere. The assumption of intelligibility has what I take to be a welcome consequence: deciding among rivals in the mental causation debate (...)
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  31. added 2019-01-31
    ‘The Conceptual Link From Physical to Mental’, by Kirk, Robert: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, Pp. Xii + 228, £35 (Hardback). [REVIEW]Andrew Melnyk - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):596-599.
    Review of Robert Kirk's The Conceptual Link From Physical To Mental (Oxford University Press, 2013).
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  32. added 2019-01-28
    Causal Explanation in Psychiatry.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2019 - In Şerife Tekin & Robyn Bluhm (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophy of Psychiatry. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
  33. added 2019-01-14
    Humeanism, Best System Laws, and Emergence.Olivier Sartenaer - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (4):719-738.
    In the current article and contrary to a widespread assumption, I argue that Humeanism and ontological emergence can peacefully coexist. Such a coexistence can be established by reviving elements of John Stuart Mill’s philosophy of science, in which an idiosyncratic account of diachronic emergence is associated with extensions of the Humean mosaic and the correlative coming into being of new best system laws, which have the peculiarity of being temporally indexed. Incidentally, this reconciliation of Humeanism and emergence allows for conceiving (...)
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  34. added 2018-11-21
    Without Hierarchy: The Scale Freedom of the Universe.Mariam Thalos - 2013 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    A venerable tradition in the metaphysics of science commends ontological reduction: the practice of analysis of theoretical entities into further and further proper parts, with the understanding that the original entity is nothing but the sum of these. This tradition implicitly subscribes to the principle that all the real action of the universe (also referred to as its "causation") happens at the smallest scales-at the scale of microphysics. A vast majority of metaphysicians and philosophers of science, covering a wide swath (...)
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  35. added 2018-10-26
    Non-Reductive Physicalism Cannot Appeal to Token Identity.Susan Schneider - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):719-728.
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  36. added 2018-09-06
    The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism.Jonathan J. Loose, Angus John Louis Menuge & J. P. Moreland - 2018 - Oxford, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell.
  37. added 2018-08-13
    Physicalism Deconstructed: Levels of Reality and the Mind–Body Problem.Kevin Morris - 2018 - Cambridge University Press.
    How should thought and consciousness be understood within a view of the world as being through-and-through physical? Many philosophers have proposed non-reductive, levels-based positions, according to which the physical domain is fundamental, while thought and consciousness are higher-level processes, dependent on and determined by physical processes. In this book, Kevin Morris's careful philosophical and historical critique shows that it is very difficult to make good metaphysical sense of this idea - notions like supervenience, physical realization, and grounding all fail to (...)
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  38. added 2018-06-07
    Multiple Realization and Compositional Variation.Kevin Morris - forthcoming - Synthese:1-19.
    It has often been thought that compositional variation across systems that are similar from the point of view of the special sciences provides a key point in favor of the multiple realization of special science kinds and in turn the broadly nonreductive consequences often thought to follow from multiple realization. Yet in a series of articles, and culminating in The Multiple Realization Book, Tom Polger and Larry Shapiro argue that an account of multiple realization demanding enough to yield such nonreductive (...)
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  39. added 2018-06-01
    Flat Emergence.Olivier Sartenaer - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):225-250.
    The main contention of this article is that current approaches to ontological emergence are not comprehensive, in that they share a common bias that make them blind to some conceptual space available to emergence. In this article, I devise an alternative perspective on ontological emergence called ‘flat emergence’, which is free of such a bias. The motivation is twofold: not only does flat emergence constitute another viable way to fulfill the initial emergentist promise, but it also allows for making sense (...)
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  40. added 2018-05-30
    Recent Work on Physicalism.Justin Tiehen - forthcoming - Analysis.
    A review of recent work on physicalism, focusing on what it means to say nothing exists over and above the physical, how "the physical" should be defined, and the causal argument for physicalism.
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  41. added 2018-05-10
    The Correlation Argument for Reductionism.Christopher Clarke - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (1):76-97.
    Reductionists say things like: all mental properties are physical properties; all normative properties are natural properties. I argue that the only way to resist reductionism is to deny that causation is difference making (thus making the epistemology of causation a mystery) or to deny that properties are individuated by their causal powers (thus making properties a mystery). That is to say, unless one is happy to deny supervenience, or to trivialize the debate over reductionism. To show this, I argue that (...)
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  42. added 2018-03-19
    Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naive Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind.≪/Article-Title≫≪ Cont. [REVIEW]Katalin Balog & Jennifer Hornsby - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):562-565.
    Hornsby is a defender of a position in the philosophy of mind she calls “naïve naturalism”. She argues that current discussions of the mind-body problem have been informed by an overly scientistic view of nature and a futile attempt by scientific naturalists to see mental processes as part of the physical universe. In her view, if naïve naturalism were adopted, the mind-body problem would disappear. I argue that her brand of anti-physicalist naturalism runs into difficulties with the problem of mental (...)
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  43. added 2018-02-27
    Mental Causation Via Neuroprosthetics? A Critical Analysis.Tuomas Pernu - 2018 - Synthese (12):5159-5174.
    Some recent arguments defending the genuine causal efficacy of the mental have been relying on empirical research on neuroprosthetics. This essay presents a critical analysis of these arguments. The problem of mental causation, and the basic idea and results of neuroprosthetics are reviewed. It is shown how appealing to the research on neuroprosthetics can be interpreted to give support to the idea of mental causation. However, it does so only in a rather deflationary sense: by holding the mental identical with (...)
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  44. added 2018-02-17
    Unsimple Truths: Science, Complexity, and Policy.Sandra D. Mitchell - 2009 - University of Chicago Press.
    The world is complex, but acknowledging its complexity requires an appreciation for the many roles context plays in shaping natural phenomena. In _Unsimple Truths, _Sandra Mitchell argues that the long-standing scientific and philosophical deference to reductive explanations founded on simple universal laws, linear causal models, and predict-and-act strategies fails to accommodate the kinds of knowledge that many contemporary sciences are providing about the world. She advocates, instead, for a new understanding that represents the rich, variegated, interdependent fabric of many levels (...)
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  45. added 2018-02-17
    The Non-Reductionist's Troubles with Supervenience.Robert M. Francescotti - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 89 (1):105-124.
    I argue that there is a tension between three popular views in the philosophy of mind: (1) mental properties are not identical with physical properties (a version of nonreductionism), but (2) mental properties are had solely by virtue of physical properties (physicalism regarding the mind), which requires that (3) mental properties supervene on physical properties. To earn the title "physicalist," one must hold a sufficiently strong version of the supervenience thesis. But this, I argue, will be a version that undermines (...)
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  46. added 2018-02-17
    Emergence or Reduction?: Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism.Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim - 1992 - International Phenomenological Society.
    Introduction — Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism A Short Survey of Six Decades of Philosophical Discussion Including an Attempt to Formulate a Version ...
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  47. added 2018-02-06
    Levels: Descriptive, Explanatory, and Ontological.Christian List - 2016 - Noûs (4):852-883.
    Scientists and philosophers frequently speak about levels of description, levels of explanation, and ontological levels. In this paper, I propose a unified framework for modelling levels. I give a general definition of a system of levels and show that it can accommodate descriptive, explanatory, and ontological notions of levels. I further illustrate the usefulness of this framework by applying it to some salient philosophical questions: (1) Is there a linear hierarchy of levels, with a fundamental level at the bottom? And (...)
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  48. added 2018-01-28
    Neuroscience, Spiritual Formation, and Bodily Souls: A Critique of Christian Physicalism.Brandon Rickabaugh & C. Stephen Evans - 2018 - In R. Keith Loftin & Joshua Farris (eds.), Christian Physicalism? Philosophical Theological Criticisms. Lanham: Lexington. pp. 231-256.
    The link between human nature and human flourishing is undeniable. "A healthy tree cannot bear bad fruit, nor can a diseased tree bear good fruit" (Matt. 7:18). The ontology of the human person will, therefore, ground the nature of human flourishing and thereby sanctification. Spiritual formation is the area of Christian theology that studies sanctification, the Spirit-guided process whereby disciples of Jesus are formed into the image of Jesus (Rom. 8:28-29; 2 Cor. 3:18; 2 Peter 3:18). Until the nineteenth century, (...)
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  49. added 2018-01-28
    Dismantling Bodily Resurrection Arguments Against Mind-Body Dualism.Brandon Rickabaugh - 2018 - In R. Keith Loftin & Joshua Farris (eds.), Christian Physicalism? Philosophical Theological Criticisms. Lanham: Lexington Books. pp. 295-317.
    According to the Christian doctrine of bodily resurrection, human persons will have an embodied existence in eternity. Many Christian materialists, especially Lynne Rudder Baker, Trenton Merricks, and Kevin Corcoran, argue that the doctrine of bodily resurrection creates serious problems for substance dualism (dualism). These critiques argued that bodily resurrection is made trivial by dualism, that dualism makes it difficult if not impossible to explain why we need to be embodied, or that dualism should be rejected as bodily resurrection is better (...)
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  50. added 2018-01-25
    What's Wrong with Microphysicalism?Andreas Huttemann - 2004 - Routledge.
    'Microphysicalism', the view that whole objects behave the way they do in virtue of the behaviour of their constituent parts, is an influential contemporary view with a long philosophical and scientific heritage. In _What's Wrong With Microphysicalism?_ Andreas Hüttemann offers a fresh challenge to this view. Hüttemann agrees with the microphysicalists that we can explain compound systems by explaining their parts, but claims that this does not entail a fundamentalism that gives hegemony to the micro-level. At most, it shows that (...)
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