Related categories

305 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 305
  1. added 2019-01-14
    Humeanism, Best System Laws, and Emergence.Olivier Sartenaer - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.
    To this day, debates on ontological emergence have been almost exclusively carried out within non-humean power-based or law-based metaphysics, the main underlying stake being indeed whether or not irreducible causal powers, or irreducible governing laws, can happen to come into being under specific circumstances. It is therefore unsurprising that humeanists themselves never felt that attracted by emergence, consistently with Lewis’ own dismissal of "suchlike rubbish". In the present paper, I argue, contrary to this received wisdom, that humeanism and ontological emergence (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2018-11-21
    Without Hierarchy: The Scale Freedom of the Universe.Mariam Thalos - 2013 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    A venerable tradition in the metaphysics of science commends ontological reduction: the practice of analysis of theoretical entities into further and further proper parts, with the understanding that the original entity is nothing but the sum of these. This tradition implicitly subscribes to the principle that all the real action of the universe (also referred to as its "causation") happens at the smallest scales-at the scale of microphysics. A vast majority of metaphysicians and philosophers of science, covering a wide swath (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2018-10-26
    Non-Reductive Physicalism Cannot Appeal to Token Identity.Susan Schneider - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):719-728.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. added 2018-09-28
    Grounding-Based Formulations of Physicalism.Jessica M. Wilson - 2016 - Topoi (3):1-18.
    I problematize Grounding-based formulations of physicalism. More specifically, I argue, first, that motivations for adopting a Grounding-based formulation of physicalism are unsound; second, that a Grounding-based formulation lacks illuminating content, and that attempts to imbue Grounding with content by taking it to be a strict partial order are unuseful and problematic ; third, that conceptions of Grounding as constitutively connected to metaphysical explanation conflate metaphysics and epistemology, are ultimately either circular or self-undermining, and controversially assume that physical dependence is incompatible (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  5. added 2018-09-06
    The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism.Jonathan J. Loose, Angus John Louis Menuge & J. P. Moreland - 2018 - Oxford, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell.
  6. added 2018-08-13
    Physicalism Deconstructed: Levels of Reality and the Mind–Body Problem.Kevin Morris - 2018 - Cambridge University Press.
    How should thought and consciousness be understood within a view of the world as being through-and-through physical? Many philosophers have proposed non-reductive, levels-based positions, according to which the physical domain is fundamental, while thought and consciousness are higher-level processes, dependent on and determined by physical processes. In this book, Kevin Morris's careful philosophical and historical critique shows that it is very difficult to make good metaphysical sense of this idea - notions like supervenience, physical realization, and grounding all fail to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2018-06-07
    Multiple Realization and Compositional Variation.Kevin Morris - forthcoming - Synthese:1-19.
    It has often been thought that compositional variation across systems that are similar from the point of view of the special sciences provides a key point in favor of the multiple realization of special science kinds and in turn the broadly nonreductive consequences often thought to follow from multiple realization. Yet in a series of articles, and culminating in The Multiple Realization Book, Tom Polger and Larry Shapiro argue that an account of multiple realization demanding enough to yield such nonreductive (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. added 2018-06-01
    Flat Emergence.Olivier Sartenaer - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):225-250.
    The main contention of this article is that current approaches to ontological emergence are not comprehensive, in that they share a common bias that make them blind to some conceptual space available to emergence. In this article, I devise an alternative perspective on ontological emergence called ‘flat emergence’, which is free of such a bias. The motivation is twofold: not only does flat emergence constitute another viable way to fulfill the initial emergentist promise, but it also allows for making sense (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. added 2018-05-30
    Recent Work on Physicalism.Justin Tiehen - forthcoming - Analysis.
    A review of recent work on physicalism, focusing on what it means to say nothing exists over and above the physical, how "the physical" should be defined, and the causal argument for physicalism.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. added 2018-05-10
    The Correlation Argument for Reductionism.Christopher Clarke - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (1):76-97.
    Reductionists say things like: all mental properties are physical properties; all normative properties are natural properties. I argue that the only way to resist reductionism is to deny that causation is difference making (thus making the epistemology of causation a mystery) or to deny that properties are individuated by their causal powers (thus making properties a mystery). That is to say, unless one is happy to deny supervenience, or to trivialize the debate over reductionism. To show this, I argue that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. added 2018-03-19
    Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naive Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind.Katalin Balog & Jennifer Hornsby - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):562.
    Hornsby is a defender of a position in the philosophy of mind she calls “naïve naturalism”. She argues that current discussions of the mind-body problem have been informed by an overly scientistic view of nature and a futile attempt by scientific naturalists to see mental processes as part of the physical universe. In her view, if naïve naturalism were adopted, the mind-body problem would disappear. I argue that her brand of anti-physicalist naturalism runs into difficulties with the problem of mental (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  12. added 2018-02-27
    Mental Causation Via Neuroprosthetics? A Critical Analysis.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2018 - Synthese (12):5159-5174.
    Some recent arguments defending the genuine causal efficacy of the mental have been relying on empirical research on neuroprosthetics. This essay presents a critical analysis of these arguments. The problem of mental causation, and the basic idea and results of neuroprosthetics are reviewed. It is shown how appealing to the research on neuroprosthetics can be interpreted to give support to the idea of mental causation. However, it does so only in a rather deflationary sense: by holding the mental identical with (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. added 2018-02-17
    Unsimple Truths: Science, Complexity, and Policy.Sandra D. Mitchell - 2009 - University of Chicago Press.
    The world is complex, but acknowledging its complexity requires an appreciation for the many roles context plays in shaping natural phenomena. In _Unsimple Truths, _Sandra Mitchell argues that the long-standing scientific and philosophical deference to reductive explanations founded on simple universal laws, linear causal models, and predict-and-act strategies fails to accommodate the kinds of knowledge that many contemporary sciences are providing about the world. She advocates, instead, for a new understanding that represents the rich, variegated, interdependent fabric of many levels (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  14. added 2018-02-17
    The Non-Reductionist's Troubles with Supervenience.Robert Francescotti - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 89 (1):105-124.
    I argue that there is a tension between three popular views in the philosophy of mind: (1) mental properties are not identical with physical properties (a version of nonreductionism), but (2) mental properties are had solely by virtue of physical properties (physicalism regarding the mind), which requires that (3) mental properties supervene on physical properties. To earn the title "physicalist," one must hold a sufficiently strong version of the supervenience thesis. But this, I argue, will be a version that undermines (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15. added 2018-02-17
    Emergence or Reduction?: Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism.Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim - 1992 - International Phenomenological Society.
    Introduction — Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism A Short Survey of Six Decades of Philosophical Discussion Including an Attempt to Formulate a Version ...
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  16. added 2018-02-06
    Levels: Descriptive, Explanatory, and Ontological.Christian List - 2016 - Noûs.
    Scientists and philosophers frequently speak about levels of description, levels of explanation, and ontological levels. In this paper, I propose a unified framework for modelling levels. I give a general definition of a system of levels and show that it can accommodate descriptive, explanatory, and ontological notions of levels. I further illustrate the usefulness of this framework by applying it to some salient philosophical questions: (1) Is there a linear hierarchy of levels, with a fundamental level at the bottom? And (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (14 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. added 2018-01-28
    Dismantling Bodily Resurrection Arguments Against Mind-Body Dualism.Brandon Rickabaugh - 2018 - In R. Keith Loftin & Joshua Farris (eds.), Christian Physicalism? Philosophical Theological Criticisms. Lanham: Lexington Books. pp. 295-317.
    According to the Christian doctrine of bodily resurrection, human persons will have an embodied existence in eternity. Many Christian materialists, especially Lynne Rudder Baker, Trenton Merricks, and Kevin Corcoran, argue that the doctrine of bodily resurrection creates serious problems for substance dualism (dualism). These critiques argued that bodily resurrection is made trivial by dualism, that dualism makes it difficult if not impossible to explain why we need to be embodied, or that dualism should be rejected as bodily resurrection is better (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. added 2018-01-28
    Neuroscience, Spiritual Formation, and Bodily Souls: A Critique of Christian Physicalism.Brandon Rickabaugh & C. Stephen Evans - 2018 - In R. Keith Loftin & Joshua Farris (eds.), Christian Physicalism? Philosophical Theological Criticisms. Lanham: Lexington. pp. 231-256.
    The link between human nature and human flourishing is undeniable. "A healthy tree cannot bear bad fruit, nor can a diseased tree bear good fruit" (Matt. 7:18). The ontology of the human person will, therefore, ground the nature of human flourishing and thereby sanctification. Spiritual formation is the area of Christian theology that studies sanctification, the Spirit-guided process whereby disciples of Jesus are formed into the image of Jesus (Rom. 8:28-29; 2 Cor. 3:18; 2 Peter 3:18). Until the nineteenth century, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. added 2018-01-27
    Christian Physicalism?: Philosophical Theological Criticisms.Loftin R. Keith & R. Farris Joshua (eds.) - 2017 - Lexington Books.
    On the heels of the advance since the twentieth-century of wholly physicalist accounts of human persons, the influence of materialist ontology is increasingly evident in Christian theologizing. To date, the contemporary literature has tended to focus on anthropological issues (e.g., whether the traditional soul / body distinction is viable), with occasional articles treating physicalist accounts of such doctrines as the Incarnation and Resurrection of Jesus cropping up, as well. Interestingly, the literature to date, both for and against this influence, is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. added 2018-01-25
    What's Wrong with Microphysicalism?Andreas Hüttemann - 2004 - Routledge.
    'Microphysicalism', the view that whole objects behave the way they do in virtue of the behaviour of their constituent parts, is an influential contemporary view with a long philosophical and scientific heritage. In _What's Wrong With Microphysicalism?_ Andreas Hüttemann offers a fresh challenge to this view. Hüttemann agrees with the microphysicalists that we can explain compound systems by explaining their parts, but claims that this does not entail a fundamentalism that gives hegemony to the micro-level. At most, it shows that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  21. added 2017-12-11
    Groundwork for an Emergentist Account of the Mental.Timothy O'Connor - 2003 - Progress in Complexity, Information, and Design 2:1-14.
    As striking as conscious experience, thought, and deliberate action are, their irreducibility to physical processes within their subjects is hotly debated. I shall ignore these debates entirely, as my purpose in this essay is constructive. Assuming that these mental qualities and processes are indeed irreducible to impersonal, non-purposive physical phenomena, I want to propose the very general form a non-reductive explanatory account of their underpinnings and dynamics should take. A suggestive label for my proposal is ontological emergence.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. added 2017-09-19
    How to Define Consciousness—and How Not to Define Consciousness.Prof Max Velmans - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (5):139-156.
    Definitions of consciousness need to be sufficiently broad to include all examples of conscious states and sufficiently narrow to exclude entities, events and processes that are not conscious. Unfortunately, deviations from these simple principles are common in modern consciousness studies, with consequent confusion and internal division in the field. The present paper gives example of ways in which definitions of consciousness can be either too broad or too narrow. It also discusses some of the main ways in which pre-existing theoretical (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  23. added 2017-09-15
    Is the Mind Conscious, Functional or Both?Max Velmans - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):629-630.
    What, in essence, characterizes the mind? According to Searle, the potential to be conscious provides the only definitive criterion. Thus, conscious states are unquestionably "mental"; "shallow unconscious" states are also "mental" by virtue of their capacity to be conscious (at least in principle); but there are no "deep unconscious mental states" - i.e. those rules and procedures without access to consciousness, inferred by cognitive science to characterize the operations of the unconscious mind are not mental at all. Indeed, according to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   102 citations  
  24. added 2017-09-04
    Interactive, Inclusive Substance Dualism.Jeff Engelhardt - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1149-1165.
    This paper argues that a certain kind of substance dualism can adopt the ‘Compatibilist’ solution to the problem of causal exclusion. After sketching a non-Cartesian substance dualism akin to E.J. Lowe’s account, 5-23, 2006, 2008) and considering its shortcomings with respect to mental causation in section one, section two outlines an alternative account of mental causation and argues that this account solves the exclusion problem. Finally, section three considers a challenge to the proposed solution. With the exception of Lowe’s efforts, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. added 2017-06-21
    Introduction: The Character of Physicalism.Andreas Elpidorou - 2018 - Topoi 37 (3):435-455.
    The aim of this editorial introduction is twofold. First, Sects. 1–8 offer a critical introduction to the metaphysical character of physicalism. In those sections, I present and evaluate different ways in which proponents of physicalism have made explicit the metaphysical dependence that is said to hold between the non-physical and the physical. Some of these accounts are found to be problematic; others are shown to be somewhat more promising. In the end, some important lessons are drawn and different options for (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. added 2017-06-15
    Fisicismo Não-Reducionista: Uma atitude sem conteúdo congnitivo? Sobre o desafio de Bas Van Fraassen.W. Mendonça - 2010 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 11 (2):171-186.
    De acordo com a concepção dominante de causação, eventos espácio-temporalmente localizáveis que podem ser designados por termos singulares e descrições definidas são os únicos relata genuínos da relação causal. Isto dá apoio e é apoiado pela dicotomia aceita entre a explicação causal, concebida como uma relação intensional entre fatos ou verdades, e a relação natural e extensional da causação. O ensaio questiona este modo de ver e argumenta pela legitimidade da noção de causação por fatos: os relata de muitas relações (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. added 2017-05-24
    Review of The Multiple Realization Book by Thomas W. Polger & Lawrence A. Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press). [REVIEW]Tuomas K. Pernu - 2017 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 21.
  28. added 2017-03-20
    Grounding Language in the Brain.Friedemann Pulvermuller - 2008 - In Manuel de Vega, Arthur Glenberg & Arthur Graesser (eds.), Symbols and Embodiment: Debates on Meaning and Cognition. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  29. added 2017-03-20
    VII—Reductionism and Emergent Properties.Richard Spencer-Smith - 1995 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95 (1):113-130.
  30. added 2017-03-19
    Themes in My Philosophical Work.Terence E. Horgan - 2002 - In Johannes L. Brandl (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan. Atlanta: Rodopi. pp. 1-26.
    I invoked the notion of supervenience in my doctoral disseration, Microreduction and the Mind-Body Problem, completed at the University of Michigan in 1974 under the direction of Jaegwon Kim. I had been struck by the appeal to supervenience in Hare (1952), a classic work in twentieth century metaethics that I studied at Michigan in a course on metaethics taught by William Frankena; and I also had been struck by the brief appeal to supervenience in Davidson (1970). Kim was already, in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. added 2017-02-21
    The Unsolvability of the Mind-Body Problem Liberates the Will.Scheffel Jan - manuscript
    The mind-body problem is analyzed in a physicalist perspective. By combining the concepts of emergence and algorithmic information theory in a thought experiment employing a basic nonlinear process, it is argued that epistemically strongly emergent properties may develop in a physical system. A comparison with the significantly more complex neural network of the brain shows that also consciousness is epistemically emergent in a strong sense. Thus reductionist understanding of consciousness appears not possible; the mind-body problem does not have a reductionist (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. added 2017-02-16
    Right-Making, Reference, and Reduction.Michael Byron - 2014 - Disputatio 6 (38):139-145.
    The causal theory of reference (CTR) provides a well-articulated and widely-accepted account of the reference relation. On CTR the reference of a term is fixed by whatever property causally regulates the competent use of that term. CTR poses a metaethical challenge to realists by demanding an account of the properties that regulate the competent use of normative predicates. CTR might pose a challenge to ethical theorists as well. Long argues that CTR entails the falsity of any normative ethical theory. First-order (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. added 2017-02-14
    Physicalism, Chaos and Reductionism.Alwyn Scott - 2006 - In J. Tuszynski (ed.), The Emerging Physics of Consciousness. Springer Verlag. pp. 171--191.
  34. added 2017-02-14
    Arguably, Therefore, Nonreductive Materialism Can Respond Effectively to the Most Serious Arguments Made Against It Over the Last Forty Years, and as a Result, It Remains a Viable Position About the Nature of the Mental. See Also Functionalism; Mind-Body Problem; Multiple.Derk Pereboom - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95:67-98.
  35. added 2017-02-13
    Property Identity and Reductive Explanation.Ansgar Beckermann - 2012 - In Hill Christopher & Gozzano Simone (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press. pp. 66.
  36. added 2017-02-13
    Is Non-Reductive Physicalism Viable Within a Causal Powers Metaphysic?Timothy O'Connor & John Ross Churchill - 2010 - In Graham Macdonald & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind. Oxford University Press.
  37. added 2017-02-13
    Three Levels of Emergent Phenomena.Terence Deacon - 2007 - In Nancey C. Murphy & William R. Stoeger (eds.), Evolution and Emergence: Systems, Organisms, Persons. Oxford University Press. pp. 88--110.
  38. added 2017-02-13
    Modes of Irreductibility of Emergent Properties.Charbel Niño El-Hani & João Queiroz - 2005 - Scientiae Studia 3 (1):9-41.
  39. added 2017-02-13
    Higher-Level Descriptions: Why Should We Preserve Them.Charbel Nino El-Hani & Antonio Marcos Pereira - 2000 - In P. B. Andersen, Claus Emmeche, N. O. Finnemann & P. V. Christiansen (eds.), Downward Causation. University of Aarhus Press.
  40. added 2017-02-12
    Without Hierarchy: The Scale Freedom of the Universe By Mariam Thalos.George Botterill - 2014 - Analysis 74 (3):556-558.
  41. added 2017-02-12
    Beyond Program Explanation. Cynthia & Graham Macdonald - 2007 - In Geoffrey Brennan, Robert Goodin, Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Common Minds: Themes From the Philosophy of Philip Pettit. Clarendon Press.
  42. added 2017-02-12
    Emergent Biological Principles and the Computational Properties of the Universe: Explaining It or Explaining It Away.P. C. W. Davies - 2004 - Complexity 10 (2):11-15.
  43. added 2017-02-11
    Moral Philosophy After 9/11 by Joseph Zalman Margolis: A Review, a Reaction, Some Reflections.Peter A. Muckley - 2005 - A Parte Rei 38:9.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. added 2017-02-10
    Occasionalism and Non-Reductive Physicalism: Another Look at the Continuous Creation Argument.Daniel Lim - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (1):39-57.
    Malebranche’s so-called conservation is continuous creation (CCC) argument has been celebrated as a powerful and persuasive argument for Occasionalism—the claim that only God has and exercises causal powers. In this paper I want to examine the CCC argument for Occasionalism by comparing it to Jaegwon Kim’s so-called Supervenience argument against non-reductive physicalism. Because the arguments have deep similarities it is interesting and fruitful to consider them in tandem. First I argue that both the CCC argument and the Supervenience argument turn (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. added 2017-02-10
    Two Routes to Expertise in Mental Rotation.Alexander Provost, Blake Johnson, Frini Karayanidis, Scott D. Brown & Andrew Heathcote - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (7):1321-1342.
    The ability to imagine objects undergoing rotation (mental rotation) improves markedly with practice, but an explanation of this plasticity remains controversial. Some researchers propose that practice speeds up the rate of a general-purpose rotation algorithm. Others maintain that performance improvements arise through the adoption of a new cognitive strategy—repeated exposure leads to rapid retrieval from memory of the required response to familiar mental rotation stimuli. In two experiments we provide support for an integrated explanation of practice effects in mental rotation (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. added 2017-02-09
    Thomas Aquinas and Nonreductive Physicalism.Kevin W. Sharpe - 2005 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 79:217-227.
    Eleonore Stump has recently argued that Thomas Aquinas’s philosophy of mind is consistent with a nonreductive physicalist approach to human psychology. Iargue that by examining Aquinas’s account of the subsistence of the rational soul we can see that Thomistic dualism is inconsistent with physicalism of every variety. Specifically, his reliance on the claim that the mind has an operation per se spells trouble for any physicalist interpretation. After offering Stump’s reading of Aquinas and her case for the supposed consistency with (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. added 2017-02-08
    How Does Downward Causation Exist?—A Comment on Kim’s Elimination of Downward Causation.Xiaoping Chen - 2010 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5 (4):652-665.
    The importance of downward causation lies in showing that it shows that functional properties such as mental properties are real, although they cannot be reduced to physical properties. Kim rejects nonreductive physicalism, which includes leading functionalism, by eliminating downward causation, and thereby returns to reductionism. In this paper, I make a distinction between two aspects of function—functional meaning and functional structure and argue that functional meaning cannot be reduced to the physical level whereas functional structure can. On this basis, I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. added 2017-02-07
    Demystifying Emergence.David Yates - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3:809-841.
    Are the special sciences autonomous from physics? Those who say they are need to explain how dependent special science properties could feature in irreducible causal explanations, but that’s no easy task. The demands of a broadly physicalist worldview require that such properties are not only dependent on the physical, but also physically realized. Realized properties are derivative, so it’s natural to suppose that they have derivative causal powers. Correspondingly, philosophical orthodoxy has it that if we want special science properties to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  49. added 2017-02-01
    Adams on Theoretical Reduction.MichaelA Day - 1985 - Erkenntnis 23 (2):161 - 184.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  50. added 2017-01-29
    Supervenience, Reduction, and Mental Causation: The Dim Prospects of Nonreductive Materialism.Sang-Hoon Song - 1999 - Dissertation, Columbia University
    This dissertation attempts to assess the prospects of nonreductive materialism, particularly the supervenience thesis. Inspired by the dazzling success of modern science, philosophers have adopted materialism and have tried to figure out the mind's place in the world. Nonreductive materialists believe that it is possible to retain mental items in our ontological inventory and to save the autonomous science of psychology within the framework of materialism. The supervenience thesis is one such doctrine. ;Recently, Jaegwon Kim has produced a series of (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 305