Normative Ethics

Study of Batman´s villain Scarecrow through the lens of ancient Stoicism, particularly according to the Stoic theory of passions.

Why do we have social norms—of fairness, cooperation, trust, property, or gender? Modern-day Humeans, as I call them, believe these norms are best accounted for in cultural evolutionary terms, as adaptive solutions to recurrent problems of social interaction. In this paper, I discuss a challenge to this "Humean Program." Social norms involve widespread behaviors, but also distinctive psychological attitudes and dispositions. According to the challenge, Humean accounts of norms leave their psychological side unexplained. They explain, say, why we share equally, (...) but not why we disapprove of those who don’t. I defend the Humean Program against this challenge. In particular, I suggest an idea for how to extend the Program to account for the psychological side of norms. Socially adaptive behaviors aren’t just likely to emerge in a group; They’re also likely to be widely taught within it. The transmission of these behaviors through instruction explains why they're associated with distinctive normative attitudes and dispositions. These attitudes play a pedagogical role in helping transmit these behaviors to children and newcomers. (shrink)

Research integrity (RI) is defined as adherence to ethical principles, deontological duties, and professional standards necessary for responsible conduct of scientific research. Early training on RI, especially for early-career researchers, could be useful to help develop good standards of conduct and prevent research misconduct (RM).The aim of this study is to assess the effectiveness of a training course on RI, by mapping the attitudes of early-career researchers on this topic through a questionnaire built upon the revised version of the Scientific (...) Misconduct Questionnaire and administered to all participants at the beginning and at the end of the course.Results show that after the course, participants reporting a high understanding of the rules and procedures related to RM significantly increased (pre-course: 38.5%, post-course: 61.5%), together with the percentage of those reporting a lack of awareness on the extent of misconduct (pre-course: 46.2%, post-course: 69.2%), and of those who believe that the lack of research ethics consultation services strongly affects RM (pre-course: 15.4%, post-course: 61.5%). Early-career researchers agree on the importance to share with peers and superiors any ethical concern that may arise in research, and to create a work environment that fosters RI awareness.As a whole, results suggest the effectiveness of the course. Institutions should introduce RI training for early-career researchers, together with research methodology, integrity and ethics consultation services to support them. Senior scientists should promote RI into their research practices, and should stimulate engagement in peer-to-peer dialogue to develop good practices based on RI principles. (shrink)

Introduction: A general trend in the psychological literature suggests that guilt contributes to morality more than shame does. Unlike shame-prone individuals, guilt-prone individuals internalize the causality of negative events, attribute responsibility in the first person, and engage in responsible behavior. However, it is not known how guilt- and shame-proneness interact with the attribution of responsibility to others. -/- Methods: In two Web-based experiments, participants reported their attributions of moral culpability (i.e., responsibility, causality, punishment and decision-making) about morally ambiguous acts of (...) killing in different conditions. In Study 1 the vignettes were presented in the 1st person, while in Study 2 in the 3rd person. To test proneness to guilt and shame, we utilized the GASP scale, which differentiates between the affective and behavioral components of each emotion. Statistical analyses were performed in Matlab and R. -/- Results: We found that guilt- and shame-proneness were associated with the severity of attributions in both the first and the third person, but the effect was strong only in the guilt case (both subtypes) and shame-affect case, and not in the shame-behavior case. We call this the Moralizing Effect. -/- Discussion: We wonder whether our finding that guilt-prone people tend to attribute a higher degree of culpability to others is really consistent with the view that guilt motivates people to choose the “moral paths in life”. This echoes views about the harmful aspects of guilt, which have been expressed historically in philosophy, for example, by Friedrich Nietzsche. (shrink)

Introduction: This study delves into the ethical dimensions surrounding autonomous vehicles (AVs), with a specific focus on decision-making algorithms. Termed the “Trolley problem,” an ethical quandary arises, necessitating the formulation of moral algorithms grounded in ethical principles. To address this issue, an online survey was conducted with 460 participants in China, comprising 237 females and 223 males, spanning ages 18 to 70. -/- Methods: Adapted from Joshua Greene’s trolley dilemma survey, our study employed Yes/No options to probe participants’ choices and (...) Likert scales to gauge moral acceptance. The primary objective was to assess participants’ inclinations toward four distinct algorithmic strategies—Utilitarianism, Rawlsianism, Egoism, and a Hybrid approach—in scenarios involving AVs -/- Results: Our findings revealed a significant disparity between participants’ preferences in scenarios related to AV design and those focused on purchase decisions. Notably, over half of the respondents expressed reluctance to purchase AVs equipped with an “egoism” algorithm, which prioritizes the car owner’s safety. Intriguingly, the rejection rate for “egoism” was similar to that of “utilitarianism,” which may necessitate self-sacrifice. -/- Discussion: The hybrid approach, integrating “Utilitarianism” and “Egoism,” garnered the highest endorsement. This highlights the importance of balancing self-sacrifice and harm minimization in AV moral algorithms. The study’s insights are crucial for ethically and practically advancing AV technology in the continually evolving realm of autonomous vehicles. (shrink)

-/- Feminist philosophers Barrett Emerick and Audrey Yap bring theoretical arguments about personhood and moral repair into conversation with the work of activists and the experiences of incarcerated people to make the case that prisons ought to be abolished. They argue that contemporary carceral systems in the United States and Canada fail to treat people as genuine moral agents in ways that also fail victims and their larger communities. Such carceral systems are a form of what Emerick and Yap call (...) “institutionalized moral abandonment”. Instead, they argue that we should create communities of moral solidarity which open up space for wrongdoers to make up for their wrongs. -/- As part of this argument, the book directly addresses one of the paradigm cases of wrongdoing often used to justify carceral systems: rape. Carceral systems that treat perpetrators of sexual violence as irredeemable monsters both obscure the reality of sexual violence and are harmful to everyone involved. -/- As an alternative to carceral systems, Emerick and Yap argue for an orientation towards justice that is grounded in moral repair. This incorporates elements of restorative justice, mutual aid, and harm reduction. Instead of advocating for one specific and universal approach, the authors argue for multigenerational collective action that aims to build resilient communities that support the wellbeing of everyone. (shrink)

Many think that a specific aspect of phenomenal consciousness – valenced or affective experience – is essential to consciousness’s moral significance (valence sentientism). They hold that valenced experience is necessary for well-being, or moral status, or psychological intrinsic value (or all three). Some think that phenomenal consciousness generally is necessary for non-derivative moral significance (broad sentientism). Few think that consciousness is unnecessary for moral significance (non-necessitarianism). In this paper I consider the prospects for these views. I first consider the prospects (...) for valence sentientism in light of Vulcans, beings who are conscious but without affect or valence of any sort. I think Vulcans pressure us to accept broad sentientism. But I argue that a consideration of explanations for broad sentientism opens up possible explanations for non-necessitarianism about the moral significance of consciousness. That is, once one leans away from valence sentientism because of Vulcans, one should feel pressure to accept a view on which consciousness is not necessary for well-being, moral status, or psychological intrinsic value. (shrink)

This paper is focused on the ways of expressing trust and distrust in financial institutions represented in the language and speech culture of the population of the Lipetsk region. Based on 55 semi-structured interviews of three generations (centennials, millennials, elder generations) living in rural and urban settlements, issues of understanding and interpretation of financial institutions, features of trust, positive and negative experiences of interaction with various financial institutions were analyzed. The use of the constructivism made it possible to interpret trust (...) as an internal component of the practices of an agent involved in the current financial situation. The study showed that in regions with an average standard of living, an average level of financial culture and the dominance of a conservative model of financial behaviour, the difference between generations is less noticeable against the backdrop of a significant difference between residents of rural and urban settlements. The analysis of interviews with three generations of residents of the region showed that the conservative model of financial behaviour continues to be reproduced in the speech culture of the informants, where banks and insurance organizations remain the most trustworthy. The images of financial institutions, represented in the language of the interviews, revealed a high level of resentment associated with the experience of past events (the collapse of the USSR, privatization). The content analysis revealed the image of the state as a “collector of payments”, and to a lesser extent, a “helper” supporting a person in his relationship with financial institutions. (shrink)

This paper presents some impossibility results for certain views about what you should do when you are uncertain about which moral theory is true. I show that under reasonable and extremely minimal ways of defining what a moral theory is, it follows that the concept of expected moral choiceworthiness is undefined, and more generally that any theory of decision-making under moral uncertainty must generate pathological results.

Judith Jarvis Thomson (1929-2020), philosophe américaine parmi les figures les plus marquantes dans l’étude de la normativité et de l’éthique, s’est éteinte ce 20 novembre à l’âge de 91 ans. Professeure émérite au MIT, sa carrière s’est étendue sur cinq décennies consacrées à la recherche, à l’enseignement et à la publication de plusieurs articles et ouvrages sur la nature des valeurs, des normes et des droits. Parmi ses ouvrages les plus importants, nous rappelons The Realm of Rights (1990), Goodness and (...) Advice (2001) et Normativity (2008). (shrink)

Advocates of the Person-Centered Healthcare (PCH) approach say that PCH is a response to a failure of caring for patients as persons. Nevertheless, there are many human subjects falling to fulfill the requirements of a traditional philosophical definition of personhood. Hence, if we take, PCH seriously, a greater clarification of the key terminology of PCH is urgently needed. It seems necessary, for instance, that the concept of the person should be extended in order to include those individuals with insipient or (...) immature levels of consciousness, as well as those who are severely and permanently mentally handicapped. In this article, we will depart from some well-known philosophical concepts of what it means to be a person and try to offer a broader and more inclusive meaning. We suggest that persons are human beings with a socially recognized biography, which implies to recognize as persons individuals with necessities, but also with narratives about their interests and claims, expressed sometimes by other people related to them. This is particularly the case of individuals that suffer from severe disorders of consciousness. For those, is not only care that matters; respect matters too. Caregivers should therefore not only sympathetically care for the well-being of these people; they should also be concerned to respect their interests and claims by interpreting them empathetically, in the light of their biographical story. Our conclusion is that, in order to be coherent, PCH must consider individuals with severe disorders of consciousness as persons and we think that our revised concept of personhood fits with this requirement. (shrink)

Philosophy strives to give us a firmer hold on our concepts. But what about their hold on us? Why place ourselves under the sway of a concept and grant it the authority to shape our thought and conduct? Another conceptualization would carry different implications. What makes one way of thinking better than another? This book develops a framework for concept appraisal. Its guiding idea is that questioning the authority of concepts asks for reasons of a special kind: reasons for concept (...) use, which tell us which concepts to adopt, adhere to, or abandon, thereby shoring up—or undercutting—the reasons for action and belief that guide our deliberations. Traditionally, reasons for concept use have been sought either in timeless rational foundations or in concepts’ inherent virtues, such as precision and consistency. Against this, the book advances two main claims: that we find reasons for concept use in the conceptual needs we discover when we critically distance ourselves from a concept by viewing it from the autoethnographic stance; and that sometimes, concepts that conflict, or exhibit other vices such as vagueness or superficiality, are just what we need. By considering not what concepts are absolutely best, but what concepts we now need, we can reconcile ourselves to the contingency of our concepts, determine the proper place of efforts to tidy up thought, and adjudicate between competing ways of understanding contested notions like liberty or free will. A needs-based approach separates helpful clarification from hobbling tidy-mindedness, and authoritative definition from conceptual gerrymandering. (shrink)

Imagine a person with a compulsive illness that leads her to frequently wash her hands. She will scrub her hands under all sorts of bizarre conditions, such as seeing a garbage truck drive down the road or hearing the word ‘trash’ on television. Sometimes her hands do need to be cleaned but this is usually a fortunate coincidence. This person does not have control over her behavior because she cannot help herself from washing her hands (unless dire consequences were to (...) follow, such as the threat of imminent death, poisonous gassing of her children, and so on). Because she lacks control over her behavior, most people are inclined to think that she is not responsible for her compulsive washing or any harm that comes of it. We might even think that it is inappropriate to blame her if she cannot stop washing when she ought to. Importantly, the impact of her illness extends beyond the issues of responsibility and blame since it impacts the degree to which she is autonomous. After all, if she experiences extreme discomfort or alienation from her washing then it seems reasonable to suppose that her compulsive behavior does not truly represent her (or her deeper self). -/- This is the story that many philosophers of agency who have written about obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) tell. These theorists tend to depict those with OCD as lacking control over their behavior to such a degree that their moral responsibility and capacity for self-governance are impaired or obviated. So understood, people with OCD are of interest to philosophers of agency only insofar as they provide a colorful counterexample to one theory or another. But this story is false. In fact, it is really a caricature of the disorder that not only obscures its nature but, and more importantly, obscures the serious implications that OCD (properly understood) has for our understanding of core agential concepts, such as moral responsibility or identification with an attitude. In my dissertation I both correct this long-standing and entrenched misunderstanding of OCD in philosophical literature and work out the implications it carries for our understanding of human agency. -/- On my approach, an accurate understanding of OCD requires examining leading psychiatric literature on the disorder as well as consulting the words and experiences of people living with OCD. Although the disorder is formally defined in terms of experiencing thoughts, images, or impulses (obsessions) alongside rituals the person feels pressure to complete (compulsions), the thematic presentation of these symptoms can vary widely. For example, in Story of a Soul, St. Therese of Liseaux describes “a terrible disease of the scruples” that filled her with seemingly sinful thoughts, driving her to repeatedly pray and visit confession with little relief. In contrast, J. J. Keeler describes painful obsessions about unknowingly causing a fatal traffic collision, leading to hours spent retracing her route, scouring the news for reports of a hit-and-run, and so on. Yet despite this diversity, nearly all manifestations of OCD involve dysfunctional beliefs. These beliefs typically over-represent the chance of harm associated with an action and the person’s responsibility for preventing or causing harm. Consequently, they make those with OCD more likely to experience exaggeration of certain features of their environment or stimuli, skewing and disrupting their thinking and deliberation, leading them to engage in, as I argue, voluntary and intentional compulsive rituals aimed at averting harm and relieving anxiety. St. Therese’s sinful thoughts involve her dysfunctional beliefs about perfection, about what harms or helps her relationship with God, and about her responsibility for having those thoughts. She is driven to voluntarily pray as an attempt to relieve her anxiety and to make good with God. By comparison, Keeler obsesses that she may have caused or will cause a death and so checks her behavior on the road constantly and reduces ‘dangerous activities’ (such as driving on highways). In these memoirs we see that the pattern of beliefs at work in OCD can lead agents like Therese and Keeler to interpret certain acts as courting disaster when they are not especially risky, or certain thoughts and ideas as blasphemous when they are not representative of who that person is. -/- As noted, when philosophers discuss OCD in the context of moral responsibility, their depictions tend to stress a lack of control over one’s behavior. In reason-responsive theories, the person with OCD is thought to be unable to properly react to sufficient reasons for action even if she is able to recognize that they exist and have bearing. This is termed a failure of reason-reactivity. This is how one theorist, Michael Mckenna, frames his example of Handy the compulsive handwasher. Handy is a purported counterexample to Fischer & Ravizza’s reason-responsive theory (semicompatibilism) because Handy can recognize and react to at least one sufficient reason to refrain from washing his hands (despite ostensibly being a compelled agent). McKenna caricatures OCD by under-describing Handy’s mental states and over-emphasizing his limited ability to abstain from washing his hands in the presence of powerful countervailing considerations (e.g., to save the life of his child). McKenna’s example of Handy chiefly ignores the robust cognitive features of the disorder described above, specifically the agent’s beliefs about her own obsessions and compulsions and how they relate to the world around her. In contrast to this depiction of OCD, I argue that people with OCD are overly receptive to apparent reasons for action, seeing reasons where there are none or distorting the weight certain reasons have in deliberation. Furthermore, an accurate picture of OCD reveals that most people with the disorder do possess guidance control and are thus morally responsible. If we wish to argue that these agents are blameless, we must refine our understanding of what it means to ‘resist’ a compulsion. Instead, we must understand the difficulty associated with resisting the dysfunctional beliefs at the heart of OCD. -/- The fact that people with OCD are overly receptive to apparent reasons for action has implications not just for responsibility and freedom but also for other core concepts in agency like identification and autonomy. Identification generally refers to attitudes that ‘stand for’ an agent and so have the authority to represent her. Some philosophers argue that internal attitudes (those the agent identifies with) must be explicitly endorsed by the agent in some kind of reflective process, while others argue that more fundamental attitudes (such as our cares) are internal. Stretching back to Frankfurt’s first description of identification, obsessions have long been considered external to the agent, usually because obsessive thoughts are experienced as unwanted or upsetting. For example, Keeler’s thought that she has caused a fatal hit-and-run is distressing because the thought of having harmed someone so much is unbearable. Similarly, the rituals Keeler engages in, like checking the news for accident reports or searching the exterior of her car for blood, are upsetting to her even though they are aimed at relieving her distress. However, the same features of the disorder that lead people with OCD to become overwhelmed by reasons also appear to lead some to develop caring-like behaviors. For example, when Keeler experiences obsessions about the risk of hitting someone with her car, she becomes particularly attuned to situations in which she perceives her behavior as a threat to others on the road. In response Keeler takes serious steps to change her driving habits, including driving on surface roads rather than highways or traveling well under the speed limit. This behavior closely tracks the way agents behave when they care about something (whether it is a person, a value, an outcome). This means that, contrary to the way philosophers have hitherto understood clinical obsessions, obsessions can be internal to the agent and speak for her in a meaningful way. As I argue this is a feature and not a bug. In fact, it is a very significant, and from a therapeutic point of view, very worrying feature. This is because those cases of OCD that most resemble caring are also those in which the person lacks significant insight into her own disorder. The disorder is hidden from her own insight precisely because it is expressed in what she most cares about. Such individuals are often the most ill in terms of symptom severity and recovery trajectory. Reframing this behavior as dysfunctional caring explains why these obsessions take on ever greater significance to the agent and take up increasing space in her deliberative horizon. This finding, in turn, may indicate that therapies aimed at externalizing obsessions and removing them from one’s deliberative agenda could wear away at otherwise recalcitrant obsessions and compulsive rituals. -/- Mischaracterizations of OCD in philosophy of agency have driven a number of problematic depictions of the disorder, and the arguments built around such mischaracterizations are necessarily deficient. Depicting OCD as largely about control has yoked our discussions of the disorder’s symptoms to older, inaccurate conceptions of psychological compulsion as a kind of force. This has been to our theoretical detriment since it has concealed the degree to which compulsion in OCD is both voluntary and purposeful as well as driven significantly by dysfunctional beliefs. Recognizing these features of OCD and their impact on agency has significant implications for the way we theorize about concepts like responsibility and identification. For example, if people with OCD do possess guidance control then we must reassess our intuition that they are excused from blame, or else modify our understanding of what the relevant excusing conditions are. Similarly, understanding that seriously ill people with OCD may display caring-like behavior may inform our understanding of internality’s role in agency as well as potential treatment methods. (shrink)

Engagement with genomic medicine and research has increased globally during the past few decades, including rapid developments in Sri Lanka. Genomic research is carried out in Sri Lanka on a variety of scales and with different aims and perspectives. However, there are concerns about participants' understanding of genomic research, including the validity of informed consent. This article reports a qualitative study aiming to explore the understanding, knowledge, and attitudes of the Sri Lankan public towards genomic medicine and to inform the (...) development of an effective and appropriate process for informed consent in that setting. Purposive sampling was employed. Participants were recruited from a sub-group of the public in Colombo, Sri Lanka who had either consented or refused to donate genetic material for a biobank. Data were collected using face-to-face semi-structured interviews. Interview data were transcribed verbatim and translated into English. Conventional content analysis was used. The analysis developed three key themes: a) ‘Scientific literacy’ describes an apparent lack of scientific knowledge that seems to affect a participant’s ability to understand the research, b) ‘Motivation’ describes narratives about why participants chose (not) to take part in the research, despite not understanding it, and c) ‘Trust’ describes how trust served to mitigate the apparent ethical deficit created by not being fully informed. In this article, we argue that informed trust is likely an acceptable basis for consent, particularly in settings where scientific literacy might be low. However, researchers must work to be worthy of that trust and ensure that misconceptions are actively addressed. (shrink)

Drawing on early work on ethical leadership, we argue that when leaders engage in leader moral hypocrisy (i.e., ethical promotion without ethical demonstration), followers can experience psychological reactance—a negative response to a perceived restriction of freedom—which can have negative downstream consequences. In a survey of employee–manager dyads (study 1), we demonstrate that leader moral hypocrisy is positively associated with follower psychological reactance, which increases follower deviance. In two subsequent laboratory experiments, we find similar patterns of results (study 2) and explore (...) potential alternative mechanisms (study 3). We demonstrate in a final experiment with working adults that the relationship between leader moral hypocrisy and psychological reactance is partly explained by increased perceptions of a leader’s use of power (study 4). We discuss the implications of our findings and advocate for further understanding of the risks associated with psychological reactance in response to leaders and other workplace situations. (shrink)

***This paper will be published along with Professor Amy Coplan's commentary, "Response to "Empathy, Timeliness, and Virtuous Hearing," which gives constructive feedback on my analysis of empathy and virtuous hearing in terms of testimonial timing *** This paper aims to demonstrate how the notion of timeliness enriches our understanding of empathy and its associated virtuous hearing, as discussed in liberatory virtue epistemology. I begin by showing how timeliness is relevant to empathy. Next, I apply this insight to the idea of (...) virtuous hearing, in which empathy plays a significant role. I thus broaden the liberatory-epistemological conception of virtuous hearing as a corrective to timing-related injustice. Finally, I connect virtuous hearing with the ancient Greek concept of kairos, clarifying the conditions under which virtuous hearers must be sensitive to another’s opportune timing to testify. (shrink)

Nothing was more important to Tolstoy than character development. For him, the purpose of life is to grow morally. The purpose of literature — as all art — is to aid that growth. Abstract philosophy and pedantic scholarship are therefore redundant. Indeed, even the psychological novel is a distraction. Moral truths are self-evident. They are always simple. They are expressed by the humble. They are known by the meek. To become good, all we need to do is peel back the (...) layers of hypocrisy and deceit that have overwrought us. Moral truths are known all over the world, but they are forgotten or covered up. There is nothing like a folktale, a pithy aphorism, or the words of a farm laborer or child to point this out. We may be surprised by what we already know and how deceived we were. All Tolstoy's varied endeavors, his literature, pedagogic theory and philosophy, center on moral conversion and its only legitimate motivation: love. Tolstoy's affront on modern civilization, documented vehemently in his later works sought to teach this lesson. This was a view of character development that had wide ranging impact all over the world, influencing many of the most famous thinkers, educators, and activists of the twentieth century. Tolstoy's stories continue to enthrall and inspire moral transformation. In this article Daniel Moulin explains why. (shrink)

Nuestro objetivo consiste en caracterizar la ontología corporal de las mujeres indígenas mapuce desde el esquema epistemológico sujeto-sujeto, propio de las teorías decoloniales. En este aspecto, nos interesa desnaturalizar ciertos mecanismos de subalternización, en tanto huellas de la colonialidad, que siguen operando no solo en la construcción de sentidos, sino también como reproductores de la opresión interseccional que experimentan estas mujeres. Preliminarmente, para este planteo, nos enfocaremos en la delimitación del concepto de interseccionalidad. Luego, intentaremos articular, desde un planteo feminista (...) decolonial, diversas narrativas de estas mujeres mapuce, vinculadas a la precarización de sus vidas y su salud, como parte de las violencias instituidas por la cultura hegemónica. Finalmente, nos resulta fundamental poner de relieve la resiliencia de las culturas subalternizadas, como forma horizontalizada de narrativizar un sentir decolonial desde la memoria performativa del cuerpo, contra ciertos dispositivos de subalternización, a partir de la clara referencia a las luchas y re-existencias de las mujeres indígenas mapuce, en el marco de una perspectiva situada en la decolonización, la emancipación y la liberación de los pueblos oprimidos. (shrink)

Neo-Aristotelian views of goodness hold that the goodness of something is strictly connected with its goal(s). In this article, I shall present a power-based, Neo-Aristotelian view of goodness. I shall claim that there are certain powers (i.e., Goodness-Conferring Powers, or GC-powers in short) that confer goodness upon their bearers and upon the resulting actions. And I shall suggest that GC-powers are strongly teleological tendencies. In Section 1, I shall present the kernel of Neo-Aristotelian conceptions of goodness. In Section 2, I (...) shall introduce strongly teleological powers and tendencies. In Section 3, GC-powers will be characterized. I shall also examine a number of options with regard to their number and features and how to single out their goodness value. In Section 4, I shall focus on good agents and on three distinct ways in which they may be good: tendential goodness, actual goodness, and purely actual goodness. Relatedly, among the actions connected with a certain GC-power, I shall also distinguish between primary and secondary actions and between pure and impure actions. In Section 5, good actions will be examined. Actions may be good in three distinct ways. Indeed, actions may be endowed with primary goodness, secondary goodness and preventative goodness. In Section 6, I shall face the remaining problems. (shrink)

The article by Doernberg and Truog (2023) suggests that five different medical spheres have five distinctive sets of moral norms based on the ends of those spheres, implying that different roles in...

This article will address the considerations that must be examined in the design of public policies and government programs to achieve an intercultural approach to the health of the Pu Mapuce Zomo (Mapuce women). In this sense, the proposed objective is to formulate three essential aspects that serve as a basis to promote adequate frameworks for public health policies oriented towards an intercultural approach. For this, methodologically, from a qualitative approach, the ethical, gender(s) and epistemic aspects that must be considered (...) in the configuration of health programs that favor the health care of indigenous women will be investigated. With this purpose, it begins by delimiting the unavoidable ethical-normative and gender approach to highlight the basic needs of Mapuce women. This approach seeks to establish a parameter about the obligations that States have in relation to the development of human capabilities. Finally, three aspects will be presented that the State must replicate in its health proposals to guarantee the construction of an intercultural approach to health, appropriate to the basic needs of Mapuce women in Argentina. (shrink)

Doernberg and Truog (2023) offer a “spheres of morality framework” (11) to illuminate ethical conflicts and improve ethical decision making in healthcare. A sphere of morality is the collection of...

Afin d’examiner la définition du courage chez Aristote, cet article pose un certain nombre de questions de procédure. (i) Comment Aristote s’y prend-il pour construire la définition du courage dans sa philosophie morale et politique? Suit-il réellement la procédure de rassemblement et de division qu’il a héritée de Platon, mais qu’il a aussi révisée et continué à prôner dans ses développements théoriques sur la définition? (ii) La définition du courage que pose Aristote a-t-elle la structure qu’il recommande, sur laquelle il (...) insiste même, dans ses écrits théoriques? Je soutiens que tel est bien le cas, en demandant dès lors (iii) pourquoi Aristote inclut, dans chacune de ses discussions sur le courage, une section qui porte sur la manière de distinguer les états moraux qui peuvent ressembler au courage – qui pourraient même être appelés courage par certaines personnes (malavisées) – du courage à proprement parler. Une question finale est ainsi suggérée: (iv) la manière dont Aristote procède démontre-t-elle qu’il s’assigne pour tâche, en définissant le courage, d’expliquer comment ses contemporains utilisaient le concept et le terme dans les faits? En d’autres termes, Aristote décrit-il simplement l’usage contemporain du terme (offrant ainsi, pourrait-on dire, une définition nominale), ou est-il en train de produire la justification d’un idéal normatif? (shrink)

The Cultural Power of Personal Objects seeks to understand the value and efficacy of objects, places, and times that take on cultural power and reverence to such a degree that they are treated (whether metaphorically or actually) as "persons," or as objects with "personality"—they are living objects. Featuring both historical and theoretical sections, the volume details examples of this practice, including the wampum of certain Native American tribes, the tsukumogami of Japan, the sacred keris knives of Java, the personality of (...) seagoing ships, the ritual objects of Hinduism and Ancient Egypt, and more. The theoretical contributions aim to provide context for the existence and experience of personal objects, drawing from a variety of disciplines. Offering a variety of new philosophical perspectives on the theme, while grounding the discussion in a historical context, The Cultural Power of Personal Objects broadens and reinvigorates our understanding of cultural meaning and experience. (shrink)

En este artículo se plantean las bases del marco ético-normativo que intervienen en la atención sanitaria de las mujeres en general, y de las mujeres mapuce, en particular. Posteriormente, se realiza un abordaje de las mujeres indígenas analizando su situación concreta, a partir de considerar de manera crítica la confluencia intersectorial de distintos sistemas opresivos que articulan las relaciones de género, clase y etnia. Para ello, el planteo se centrará en el estudio de esta problemática desde la perspectiva feminista latinoamericana, (...) que será, seguidamente, retomada y contrastada desde la voz propia de mujeres que se autoidentifican como mapuce. El objetivo del artículo se centra en poner de manifiesto las múltiples dificultades que presentan las mujeres indígenas en el acceso a la salud, con el propósito de justificar la necesidad de articular políticas públicas que promuevan la democratización del acceso sanitario, en tanto derecho humano. Para ello, realizaremos un abordaje teórico-normativo que ponga en evidencia las responsabilidades éticas y políticas del Estado, como ente garante del acceso a la salud de sus ciudadanos, en particular de los más vulnerados, como lo son las mujeres de comunidades indígenas en nuestro país. (shrink)

En el presente ensayo abordaremos el conflicto que se plantea entre las políticas de la redistribución y las del reconocimiento en el marco de la justicia de género. Para ello, analizaremos la propuesta bidimensional de la filósofa estadounidense Nancy Fraser. En efecto, plantearemos la necesidad de reflexionar sobre las implicancias de este planteo en el plano de las injusticias de género. De esta manera, el análisis estará centrado en la relación que se produce entre las injusticias ligadas a cuestiones de (...) reconocimiento y las injusticias vinculadas a la redistribución económica. (shrink)

Education, gender, family or professional responsibilities, and the abrupt nature of certain lived experiences, often push people to conceal their emotions. Suppression represents a self-preservation or survival strategy. In some cases, inhibition goes as far as completely blocking the bodily expression of emotion. Over the centuries, many philosophers and wise thinkers have seen emotion as an affliction of the inner soul, troubled by excessive and irrational proclivities that lead it to wander off the path of the good life. The remedies (...) are manifold but tend to a culture of the self that exalts impassibility and perfect peace of mind. Yet emotion is what motivates us and gears us up for action. It enables us to connect with and adapt to the outside world. Inspired by a holistic vision of cognition, this book invites the reader to explore, through philosophical texts, a cultivation of the self that neither minimizes nor negates emotion. (shrink)

Ethical Theory in Global Perspective provides an easy-to-teach introduction to ethical theory from a uniquely global perspective. In addition to key Western ethical theories—such as virtue ethics, consequentialism, various deontological theories, and care ethics—moral theories from a range of East Asian, South Asian, and African philosophical traditions and schools are also discussed, including Akan philosophy, Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism, and both orthodox and heterodox schools of classical Indian philosophy. In short, this book is a key resource for educators who want to (...) diversify their ethical theory curricula but are not sure how, as well as those currently teaching comparative ethics looking for a single textbook that covers a range of philosophical traditions in a clear, approachable way. (shrink)

According to First-Person Realism, one's own first-person perspective on the world is metaphysically privileged in some way. After clarifying First-Person Realism by reference to parallel debates in the metaphysics of modality and time, I survey eight different arguments in favor of First-Person Realism.

Ancient philosophical schools developed and discussed perspectives and practices on the emotion of anger useful in contemporary philosophical practice with clients, groups, and organizations. This paper argues the case for incorporating these insights from four main philosophical schools (Platonist, Aristotelian, Epicurean, and Stoic) sets out eight practices drawn from these schools, and discusses how these insights can be used by philosophical practitioners with clients.

Contemporary literature criticises a necessary link between empathy and actions that demonstrate genuine moral worth. If there is such a necessary link, many argue, it must come in the developmental stages of our moral capacities, rather than being found in the mental states that make up our motivating reasons. This paper goes against that trend, arguing that critics have not considered how wide-ranging the mental states are that make up a person’s reasons. In particular, it argues that empathy can play (...) a role in moral motivation when it is to some extent unconscious or it occurs far prior to the moral action itself. (shrink)

Even a morally good practical agent does not act solely from the recog- nition of the abstract demands of moral duty. Often, she acts to satisfy desires for particular ends that are not intrinsically moral. But if freedom, as Kant claims, consists in acting from universal principles one adopts from respect for the moral law, how can agents freely act to satisfy desires for particular ends? The standard answer to this question, the so-called Incorporation Thesis, is, I argue, unsatisfactory both (...) as an interpretation of Kant and on philosophical grounds. I propose instead that, for Kant, the capacity to act freely for the sake of a particular, non-intrinsically moral end is not exhausted by the ability to step back, reflect and decide whether a desire is or can provide a reason to act. Rather, Kant shows, the place for the pursuit of particular ends is determined by practically rational agents’ spontaneous constitution of their moral character, whereby they subordi- nate the pursuit of material, particular ends to the pursuit of formal, moral ones or vice versa. (shrink)

The main purpose of this work is to examine John Rawls’ views on guilt and shame, as well as briefly review the relationship between his theory of moral development and the problem of stability. First of all, in order to fully reveal the subject, it is important to outline the central views on moral emotions developed in Ethics. So, in the first part of the work, four families of moral emotions developed by Jonathan Haidt and the principal differences between shame (...) and guilt will be studied. The second part will examine John Rawls’ theory of the development of the moral sense of guilt, as well as his reflections on shame. In the final part of the work, Rawls’ theory of the moral development of individuals and the prerequisites for acquiring a sense of justice in conjunction with the problem of stability will be studied in main terms. (shrink)

Since their emergence in the 1980s, environmental virtue ethics (EVEs) have aimed to provide an alternative to deontological and consequentialist approaches for guiding ecological actions in the context of the global environmental crisis. The deterioration of the ecological situation and the challenges in addressing collective action problems caused by global changes have heightened interest in these ethics. They offer a framework for meaningful individual actions independently of the commitment of other actors. However, by shifting the focus onto individuals, EVEs appear (...) to grapple with the tension between anthropocentrism and respect for nature, as well as between self-flourishing and concern for other living beings. This article argues that this difficulty is rooted in the neglect within EVEs of the communitarian aspect of ancient virtue ethics. Drawing from Baird Callicott’s ecocentric approach and Val Plumwood’s works, this paper explores the possibility of conceiving ecological communities as collective frameworks in which both public and private virtues are defined and practiced. (shrink)

Whereas Aristotle defended the appropriateness of slavery and Seneca derided only its cruelty, Dio Chrysostom vehemently opposed any argument in favor of keeping slaves. And he did it in the 1st Century CE Greco-Roman world, a society comfortable with slavery. This paper analyzes Dio’s dialogue _The Tenth Discourse: Diogenes or on Servants_ to try to understand how Cynics addressed the wrongs of slavery when so many other philosophers did not. The paper argues that Cynic commitments to self-sufficiency, freedom, and nature (...) helped them to recognize the immorality and injustice of owning slaves. And Dio’s work, which derided injustices that most others defended, shows that philosophers should resist excusing thinkers as mere products of their time, especially canonical figures such as Aristotle and Seneca. Not only were Aristotle and Seneca wrong, but so are contemporary philosophers if they do not hold such historical figures to account by acknowledging and discussing their limitations and faults as thinkers in relation to the historical circumstances they faced. (shrink)

Kant is probably one of the most misunderstood philosophers in the history of Western thought. Some of the most well-known and pervasive objections to Kant’s practical philosophy often rest on considerable misunderstandings of his central theses or a poor and superficial reading of his work. A common misconception is that in Kant’s practical philosophy there is no place or role for human happiness. In Happiness in Kant’s Practical Philosophy: Morality, Indirect Duties, and Welfare Rights, Alice Pinheiro Walla dispels this misunderstanding (...) by elucidating Kant’s conception of happiness (understood in broadly hedonist terms) and showing that, for Kant, the pursuit of happiness plays an important role in our personal and collective lives. This means that, far from endorsing an ascetic ideal of the moral agent, as it is commonly thought, Kant’s system embraces an ideal of the human life in which there is significant space, and even a duty, to pursue pleasurable endeavours. Somehow surprisingly, in Pinheiro Walla’s reading, Kant’s ethics is arguably less demanding than standard interpretations of Aristotelian and Utilitarian ethical theories. (shrink)

Trust indicates positive effects on mental and social health in the work environment. In this study it was aimed to analyze the bidirectionality of trust and knowledge sharing variables over time. Results showed that there is a time pattern in the relationship between the two measures, where in time 1 (initial stage) participants have higher trust through knowledge sharing. In time 2 (middle stage) trust decreases and finally in time 3 (matured stage) it again increases. Finally, implications of the study (...) and how knowledge sharing can be an antecedent to trust building atleast in the initial stage is discussed. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to show that, if Kant’s universalization formulations of the Categorical Imperative are our only standards for judging right from wrong and permissible from impermissible, then we have no obligations. I shall do this by examining five different views of how obligations can be derived from the universalization formulations and arguing that each one fails. I shall argue that the first view rests on a misunderstanding of the universalization formulations; the second on a misunderstanding of (...) the concept of an obligation; the third on a misunderstanding of the concept of a maxim; the fourth on a misunderstanding of the limits of action description; and the fifth on a misunderstanding of the universalization formulations again. (shrink)

Multidimensional concepts are everywhere, and they are important. Examples include moral value, welfare, scientific confirmation, democracy, and biodiversity. How, if at all, can we aggregate the underlying dimensions of a multidimensional concept F to yield verdicts about which things are Fer than which overall? Social choice theory can be used to model and investigate this aggregation problem. Here, we focus on a particularly thorny problem made salient by this social choice-theoretic framework: the underlying dimensions of a given concept might be (...) measurable on different types of scales—e.g., some ordinal and some cardinal. An underappreciated impossibility theorem due to Anna Khmelnitskaya shows that seemingly plausible constraints on aggregation across scale types are inconsistent. This impossibility threatens to render the notion of overall Fness incoherent. We attempt to defuse this threat, arguing that the impossibility depends on an overly restrictive conception of measurement and of how measurement constrains aggregation. Adopting a more flexible—and, we think, more perspicuous—conception of measurement opens an array of possibilities for aggregation across disparate scale types. (shrink)

The Buddhist denial of the world seems hard to defend if it is confronted with empirical data. Surveys on subjective life satisfaction consistently report that the majority is satisfied with their lives. Is the desire to escape from the cycle of rebirth a sign of risk-aversion or even irrationality? How would an impartial observer evaluate the world? -/- An impartial view is achieved by interpreting the surveys on life satisfaction as probability distributions for life’s risks and chances. It turns out (...) that there is no indisputable metric for measuring risks and no reliable forecast. Given this uncertainty the denial of the world cannot easily be dismissed as being irrational. (shrink)

This paper explores whether people recognise inconsistency in their own and others’ judgments when they are explicitly prompted to review them. It reports two pre-registered experimental online studies with samples broadly representative of the UK population (N = 814 and N = 1,623). In Study 1, people are more likely to recognise inconsistency in others’ moral (and non-moral) judgments than in their own (positive OTHER-OWN difference). Study 2 replicates this finding and test three explanations of the observed effect offered by (...) previous literature: motivated reasoning, selective cognitive effort, and limited insight into others’ reasoning. It finds that the effect is not moderated by social accountability, which implies that if there is motivated reasoning at play, it must operate outside of a person’s awareness. While a small part of the effect is mediated by the time spent on the consistency assessment task (a proxy for cognitive effort), the study finds no support for the limited insight hypothesis. The core finding that people are better at recognizing inconsistency in others’ moral judgments aligns with interactionist accounts of reasoning; more research is needed to fully uncover the cognitive mechanisms behind this effect. (shrink)