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Normativity
Edited by Federico L. G. Faroldi (Universita' degli Studi di Pavia)
About this topic
| Summary | Defining 'normativity' is itself a normative task, and no clear agreement has been reached on the matter. The normative has often been contrasted with the descriptive; sometimes the normative is thought to be made up of deontic (e.g. 'oughts') and evaluative (e.g. 'good') concepts. 'Normativity' may have at least two senses: first, a nomophoric sense, if one refers to implicit or explicit rules (of various kinds); second, an axiological sense, if one refers to values. Few have defined normativity explicitly; many are interested in the normativity of something else (meaning and content, semantics, aesthetics, moral claims, epistemic norms, context, the law) rather than in normativity itself. When they do, normativity is usually explained (or explained away) with reference to "having reasons". |
| Key works | The contemporary debate on normativity has various threads. A recent, fundamental work dealing directly with 'normativity' tout court is Thomson 2008. The normativity of morality and reason is investigated in Korsgaard 1996. For the normativity of meaning and content, one classical piece is surely Kripke 1982. Fundamental works for the normativity of the law are Kelsen 1967 and Kelsen 1990. |
| Introductions | For an overview of contemporary work on normativity, see Finlay 2010 |
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Related
Subcategories
Aesthetic Normativity* (104)
Epistemic Normativity* (3,561 | 257)
Moral Normativity* (760 | 199)
Normativity of Law* (139)
Normativity, Misc (357)
Contents
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- The nature and normativity of anger types: A response to critics.Myisha Cherry - forthcoming - Southern Journal of Philosophy.My commentators have brought a set of claims and questions to bear on my analytical distinctions and normative arguments. Alice MacLachlan is interested in the relationship between Lordean rage and the other, more negative anger types that I describe, as well as the limits of the anger of rage renegades. Lidal Dror wonders if we should have Lordean rage, to what extent my account of resssentiment rage is in fact Lordean, and whether it is enough to only experience Lordean rage. (...)
- Kinds of Kinds: Normativity, Scope and Implementation in Conceptual Engineering.Sarah Sawyer - forthcoming - In Manuel Gustavo Isaac, Steffen Koch & Kevin Scharp (eds.), New Perspectives on Conceptual Engineering. Synthese Library.In this paper I distinguish three kinds of kinds: traditional philosophical kinds such as truth, knowledge, and causation; natural science kinds such as spin, charge and mass; and social kinds such as class, poverty, and marriage. The three-fold taxonomy I work with represents an idealised abstraction from the wide variety of kinds that there are and the messy phenomena that underlie them. However, the kinds I identify are discrete, and the three-fold taxonomy is useful when it comes to understanding claims (...)
- Tuomela on Social Norms and Group-Social Normativity.Olle Blomberg - 2023 - In Miguel Garcia-Godinez & Rachael Mellin (eds.), Tuomela on Sociality. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 219-241.In everyday life, as members of larger or smaller groups, we hold each other accountable with respect to social norms. For this practice to be intelligible, we must arguably by and large be justified in demanding that other group members comply with these norms. Other things being equal, it seems that we have a group membership-based pro tanto reason to comply with the social norms of our group. In this chapter, I examine how such demands and reasons for compliance can (...)$96.99 new (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct downloadExport citation
Bookmark - The Normativity of Meaning.David Liebesman - 2018 - In The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1015–1039.
- The Stuff That Matters.N. G. Laskowski - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 19. Oxford: Oxford University Press.On one way of talking about a traditional metaethical topic, realists accept that some items appear on the list of what exists in the moral or more broadly normative domain of inquiry. They then divide over whether those items are like what science and experience suggest that all other items on the list of what exists across all domains are like – naturalistic and secular. Reductive naturalists answer this further question affirmatively. Why don’t nonnaturalists? I explore the answer that it’s (...)
- Three Dogmas of Normativity.Ruth Chang - 2023 - Journal of Applied Philosophy (2):173-204.In this article, I identify and critically examine 3 dogmas of normativity that support a commonly accepted ‘Passivist View' of rational agency. I raise some questions about these dogmas, suggest what we should believe in their place, and moot an alternative ‘Activist View' of what it is to be a rational agent that grows out of rejection of the 3 dogmas. Underwriting the dogmas and the Passivist View, I suggest, is a deeply held but mistaken assumption that the normative domain (...)
- On Three Dogmas of Normativity.Philip Pettit - 2023 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 40 (2):205-210.Ruth Chang argues against three dogmas of normativity. Her argument, as least about the first two, is defensible, but defensible on a naturalistic account of normativity that she may not find congenial.
- Morality, Normativity, and Society. [REVIEW]Richmond Campbell - 1997 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):423-444.
- Is There Not a Truth of Vitalism? Vital Normativity in Canguilhem and Merleau-Ponty.Sebastjan Vörös - 2022 - In Christopher Donohue & Charles T. Wolfe (eds.), Vitalism and Its Legacy in Twentieth Century Life Sciences and Philosophy. Springer Verlag. pp. 153-172.The paper investigates the phenomenon of vitalism through the lens of vital normativity as expounded by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Georges Canguilhem. I argue that the two authors independently developed complementary critiques of the mechanical-behaviourist conception of life sciences, which culminated in a surprisingly similar notion of life construed as a normative (polarized) activity, i.e., an activity that is not indifferent to its own conditions of possibility. Such an alternative conception of life has far-reaching consequences for the epistemology of life sciences, (...)
- What Is Biological Normativity?Paul-Antoine Miquel - 2023 - In Giuseppe Bianco, Charles T. Wolfe & Gertrudis Van de Vijver (eds.), Canguilhem and Continental Philosophy of Biology. Springer. pp. 195-208.This essay focuses on two philosophical assumptions.According to the first one, biological normativity is not an irreducible property of the living, but rather the living is the historical result of its normative activity. There is therefore a logic of life at work in every living organism that makes it a subject and an agent. It is not the fact that it is already a subject that explains the presence of this logic. It is therefore not impossible to naturalise biological normativity, (...)
- Reductive Evidentialism and the Normativity of Logic.Nader Shoaibi - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy.Reductive Evidentialism seeks to explain away all structural requirements of rationality – including norms of logical coherence – in terms of substantive norms of rationality, i.e., responsiveness to evidence. While this view constitutes a novel take on the source of the normativity of logic, I argue that it faces serious difficulties. My argument, in a nutshell, is that, on the assumption that individuals with the same evidence can have different rational responses (interpersonal permissivism), the view lacks the resources to maintain (...)
- Normativity and Agency: Themes from the Philosophy of Christine M. Korsgaard.Tamar Schapiro, Kyla Ebels-Duggan & Sharon Street (eds.) - 2022 - Oxford University Press.Christine M. Korsgaard has had a profound influence on moral philosophy over the past forty years. Through her writing and teaching she has developed a distinctive, rigorous, and historically informed way of thinking about ethics, agency, and the normative dimension of human life more generally. The twelve original essays in this volume are written in her honor on the occasion of her retirement from teaching. They engage questions that recur in her work: Why are we obligated to do what morality (...)
- Against the First Views: Why None of Reasons, Fittingness, or Values are First.Andrew Reisner - 2023 - In Andrés G. Garcia, Mattias Gunnemyr & Jakob Werkmäster (eds.), Value, Morality and Social Reality. Lund: Department of Philosophy, Lund University. pp. 383-402.This paper argues against the correctness of the more popular -first views (fittingness first, reasons first, and value first). The aim of this paper is to argue that there are at least two categories of normative properties that are basic and that one of those categories is value. Although the emphasis of this paper is on reductionist -first accounts, most of the arguments work equally well against weaker views that are only committed to different categories of normative properties' being linked (...)
- Wittgenstein and the Cognitive Science of Religion: Interpreting Human Nature and the Mind.Robert Vinten (ed.) - forthcoming - Bloomsbury Academic.Advancing our understanding of one of the most influential 20th-century philosophers, Robert Vinten brings together an international line up of scholars to consider the relevance of Ludwig Wittgenstein's ideas to the cognitive science of religion. Wittgenstein's claims ranged from the rejection of the idea that psychology is a 'young science' in comparison to physics to challenges to scientistic and intellectualist accounts of religion in the work of past anthropologists. Chapters explore whether these remarks about psychology and religion undermine the frameworks (...)
- What is distinctive of political normativity? From domain view to role view.Eva Erman & Niklas Möller - 2023 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 49 (3):289-308.In the last couple of years, increased attention has been directed at the question of whether there is such a thing as a distinctively political normativity. With few exceptions, this question has so far only been explored by political realists. However, the discussion about a distinctively political normativity raises methodological and meta-theoretical questions of general importance for political theory. Although the terminology varies, it is a widely distributed phenomenon within political theory to rely on a normative source which is said (...)
- Normativity between Naturalism and Phenomenology.Thomas J. Spiegel - 2023 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30 (5):493-518.There is an unresolved stand-off between ontological naturalism and phenomenological thought regarding the question whether normativity can be reduced to physical entities. While the ontological naturalist line of thought is well established in analytic philosophy, the phenomenological reasoning for the irreducibility of normativity has been largely left ignored by proponents of naturalism. Drawing on the work of Husserl, Heidegger, Schütz, Stein and others, I reconstruct a phenomenological argument according to which natural science (as the foundation of naturalization projects) is itself (...)
- Moral Normativity: Naturalism vs. Theism.Ferhat Yöney - 2022 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 93 (1):3-23.It is widely assumed that theism is superior to metaphysical naturalism in explaining moral phenomena, especially with regard to the practical aspect of morality. In this article, I will firstly clarify what this practical aspect amounts to and present two challenges against metaphysical naturalism, by John Mackie and Richard Joyce. Then, I will critically engage with two main attempts to argue for the superiority of theism over metaphysical naturalism: One of them is the appeal to the existence of afterlife, and (...)
- Toward a pluralist and teleological theory of normativity.David Copp - 2009 - In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics. Wiley Periodicals.
- Warto czy należy?: studium na temat istoty i źródeł normatywności = Worth-while or due?: a study on the essence and sources of normativity.Ryszard Moń - 2011 - Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego.
- La riduzione sociologica della normatività. Tre osservazioni sull’argomento di Stephen Turner.Pietro Salis - 2022 - L'ircocervo 21 (2):110-130.Stephen Turner claims that social science can explain away normativity. By exploiting a non-normative view of rationality and a causal view of belief, he claimed that normativist views are akin to what he calls Good Bad Theories (GBT). GBT are false accounts that play a role of social coordination like primitive rituals (Taboo and the like). Hence, “norms”, “commitments”, and “obligations” are just like Taboo and can be explained away as GBT. Normativism, as a consequence, is doomed to disappear in (...)
- La riduzione sociologica della normatività. Tre osservazioni sull’argomento di Stephen Turner.Pietro Salis - 2022 - L'ircocervo 21 (2):110-130.Stephen Turner claims that social science can explain away normativity. By exploiting a non-normative view of rationality and a causal view of belief, he claimed that normativist views are akin to what he calls Good Bad Theories (GBT). GBT are false accounts that play a role of social coordination like primitive rituals (Taboo and the like). Hence, “norms”, “commitments”, and “obligations” are just like Taboo and can be explained away as GBT. Normativism, as a consequence, is doomed to disappear in (...)
- The normativity of multiple social identity: from motivation to legitimacy.Z. V. Shevchenko & N. A. Fialko - 2022 - Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research 22:58-66._Purpose._ The authors of this article aim to reveal how motivation and legitimacy ensure the normativity of the structuring and genesis of multiple social identity. _Theoretical basis._ Social constructivism was chosen as a research methodology. It reveals social identity as an identity constructed by its bearer on the basis of ready-made versions of social identity proposed by social groups and society. Social circles, identified by Georg Simmel, unite representatives of different social groups into a wider oneness, which can be interpreted (...)
- Goodness beyond Reason.Roberto Keller - 2022 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):78-85.Reasons-first theorists claim that facts about reasons for attitudes are normatively primitive, and that all other normative facts ultimately reduce to facts about reasons. According to their view, for example, the fact that something is good ultimately reduces to facts about reasons to favour it. I argue that these theories face a challenging dilemma due to the normativity of arational lifeforms, for instance the fact that water is good for plants. If all normative facts are, ultimately, facts about reasons for (...)
- The Normativity of Gender.R. A. Rowland - forthcoming - Noûs.There are important similarities between moral thought and talk and thought and talk about gender: disagreements about gender, like disagreements about morality, seem to be intractable and to outstrip descriptive agreement; and it seems coherent to reject any definition of what it is to be a woman in terms of particular social, biological, or other descriptive features, just as it seems coherent to reject any definition of what it is to be good or right in terms of any set of (...)
- A new bridge principle for the normativity of logic.Francesco Orilia - 2022 - Theoria 88 (6):1274-1292.Logic appears to be normative for rational belief. The thesis of the normativity of logic holds that indeed logic has such a normative status. Gilbert Harman has questioned it, thereby giving rise to what has been called “Harman's skeptical challenge”. MacFarlane has clarified that in order to answer this challenge and support the normativity of logic, one needs a “bridge principle” that appropriately connects logical entailments and norms for belief, as well as relevant desiderata for the evaluation of candidate bridge (...)
- Response‐dependence and normativity.Yifan Sun - 2022 - Theoria 88 (6):1128-1143.A non-normative, response-dependent view about morality can avoid metaphysical extravagance and explain why the extension of some non-normative concepts can non-accidentally match the extension of moral concepts. These features make it a plausible reductive account of moral properties. However, some philosophers believe that a response-dependent account of morality must contain an irreducibly normative component. I argue that it is impossible to defend such a position while retaining the response-dependent nature of morality in the ordinary sense. However, I believe that philosophers' (...)
- Bad Facts and Principles: Finding the Right Kind of Fact-Insensitivity.Jochen Bojanowski - forthcoming - Moral Philosophy and Politics.David Estlund holds that ultimate normative principles are insensitive to bad facts. This is a deliberately twisted appropriation of Jerry Cohen’s famous dictum that ultimate normative principles are fact-insensitive. In this paper, I will show why Estlund’s twist misses the point of Cohen’s argument. The fact-insensitivity claim is not a requirement to eliminate all facts from our normative theories because facts necessarily make these theories concessive. Instead, it may help us to locate the true origin of these concessions. In normative (...)
- Normative Primitivism and the Possibility of Practical Thought.Samuel David Steadman - 2022 - Dissertation, York UniversityReasons are essentially addressed to agents. Many contemporary efforts to illuminate this feature of reasons effectively reduce them to features of agents, e.g., to rationally-pruned desires, plans, or roles. Such reductive accounts neglect a second feature of reasons, namely, their capacity to transcend agential nature. They also neglect a feature of agents, namely, their orientation to normative entities as entities that transcend—and thus, that can guide and give shape to—agential nature. This dissertation offers a conception of the relation running from (...)
- The Single-Minded Animal: Shared Intentionality, Normativity, and the Foundations of Discursive Cognition. [REVIEW]Carl B. Sachs - 2022 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30 (4):446-452.Stovall’s overall project in The Single-Minded Animal is to develop a new theory of discursive normativity: our ability to judge what we ought to think and what we ought to do according to rules th...
- How to Feel About Climate Change? An Analysis of the Normativity of Climate Emotions.Julia Mosquera & Kirsti M. Jylhä - 2022 - Humana Mente 30 (3):357-380.Climate change evokes different emotions in people. Recently, climate emotions have become a matter of normative scrutiny in the public debate. This phenomenon, which we refer to as the normativization of climate emotions, manifests at two levels. At the individual level, people are faced with affective dilemmas, situations where they are genuinely uncertain about what is the right way to feel in the face of climate change. At the collective level, the public debate reflects disagreement about which emotions are appropriate (...)
- Choosing normativity after the “death of god”. Ethical implications of weak thought.Andrzej Kobyliński - 2020 - Studia Philosophiae Christianae 56 (S2):197-213.The article aims to analyse the concept of normativity within the philosophy of weak thought developed by Gianni Vattimo. Weak thought refers to the idea of weakening the existence in the era of metaphysical demise, as well as a challenge to the Cartesian concept of the subject. This philosophical tradition does not entirely abandon moral normativity. Vattimo proposes a weak notion of normativity, i.e. persuasion, without claims of universal applicability. Weak normativity derives from dialogue and respect for tradition, as well (...)
- Rorty and the Question of Normativity: Replies to Commentators on Reconstructing Pragmatism.Chris Voparil - 2022 - Contemporary Pragmatism 19 (4):430-459.This response to insightful commentaries on my book, from Richard Shusterman, Susan Dieleman, Raff Donelson, and Colin Koopman, takes up the recurring theme of the nature of normativity on a Rortyan view. To frame my individual replies, I revisit the Davidsonian account of epistemic interaction that influences Rorty’s mature view and suggest that the norms implicit in Davidsonian triangulation are insufficient to support Rorty’s antiauthoritarianism in ethics and epistemology. To address the resulting question of how to account for norms of (...)
- History and normativity in political theory: the case of Rawls.Richard Bourke - 2023 - In Richard Bourke & Quentin Skinner (eds.), History in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Cambridge University Press.$22.49 new (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this listExport citation Bookmark 1 citation
- Evidence and Epistemic Normativity.Daniel Buckley - 2022 - Dissertation, Indiana University, BloomingtonEvidence is often taken to be “normative” for doxastic agents. For instance, we are told to apportion our beliefs to the evidence, to not believe a claim without seeking out countervailing evidence, and so on. But what accounts for the normativity of evidence? This dissertation is devoted to answering this question. In order to answer it, I develop a novel approach to the theory of epistemic normativity. According to my approach, epistemic norms structure a social practice of epistemic accountability. This (...)
- Can pluralism account for the normativity of truth?Douglas Edwards - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (4):403-414.In this paper I assess whether truth pluralism can account for the normativity of truth. This is a key issue, as accommodating the idea that truth is normative is often presented as a main advantage that truth pluralism has over deflationism. The basis of the discussion is Engel’s critique of truth pluralism, which questions the view’s ability to account for the normativity of truth. I develop the ways truth pluralists of different sorts can respond to Engel’s critique, and explore the (...)
- Moderate truth pluralism and the structure of doxastic normativity.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (4):355-376.According to moderate truth pluralism, there is a single property that qualifies as truth for any domain whatsoever. However, propositions concerning different domains may possess this single truth property in virtue of different properties. Empirical propositions may be true in virtue of corresponding to reality while legal propositions may be true in virtue of cohering with the body of law. Moderate pluralists claim that truth is a completely general doxastic norm: for any p, the belief that p is correct if (...)
- Deliberation, action and normativity.Gustavo Ortiz Millán - 2013 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 36 (1):155-159.In this paper I comment on several aspects of Martin Seel’s paper “The Ability to Deliberate”, mainly on his claims that deliberation is a form of action, on his not very clear distinction between deliberation and thought, and on the relation between normativity and deliberation. There are also some comments on practical and theoretical reasoning, as well as on Seel’s characterization of reasons.
- Evidence, Reasons, and Knowledge in the Reasons-First Program.Paul Silva & Sven Bernecker - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.Mark Schroeder’s Reasons First is admirable in its scope and execution, deftly demonstrating the theoretical promise of extending the reasons-first approach from ethics to epistemology. In what follows we explore how (not) to account for the evidence-that relation within the reasons-first program owing to self-fulfilling and self-defeating beliefs, we explain how factive content views of evidence can be resilient in the face of Schroeder’s criticisms, and we explain how knowledge from falsehood threatens Schroeder’s view of knowledge. Along the way we (...)
- Conversational Pressure: Normativity in Speech Exchanges. [REVIEW]Sam Berstler - 2022 - Philosophical Review 131 (3):378-382.
- Precedent as a path laid down in walking: Grounding intrinsic normativity in a history of response.Joshua Rust - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-32.While developments of a shared intellectual tradition, the enactivist approach and the organizational account proffer importantly different accounts of organismic normativity. Where enactivists tend to follow Hans Jonas, Andres Weber, and Francisco Varela in grounding intrinsic affordance norms in existential concern, organizational theorists such as Alvaro Moreno, Matteo Mossio, and Leonardo Bich seek a more deflationary account of these normative phenomena. Critiques directed at both of these accounts of organismic normativity motivate the introduction of the precedential account of organismic normativity, (...)
- The Aporia of Justice: Constellations of Normativity in Honneth, Derrida, and Levinas.Sergej Seitz - 2021 - Levinas Studies 15:37-58.As Axel Honneth argues in his early essay “The Other of Justice,” Derrida and Levinas offer convincing arguments for offsetting practical philosophy’s traditional focus on justice with a focus on care. In Honneth, this leads to a strict dichotomy of justice (as equal treatment) and care (as singular responsibility). I show that Derrida and Levinas think of justice and responsibility not as dichotomic, but rather as aporetic. In all ethico-political conflicts, aspects of responsibility and justice are in play that are (...)
- The Aporia of Justice: Constellations of Normativity in Honneth, Derrida, and Levinas.Sergej Seitz - 2021 - Levinas Studies 15:37-58.As Axel Honneth argues in his early essay “The Other of Justice,” Derrida and Levinas offer convincing arguments for offsetting practical philosophy’s traditional focus on justice with a focus on care. In Honneth, this leads to a strict dichotomy of justice (as equal treatment) and care (as singular responsibility). I show that Derrida and Levinas think of justice and responsibility not as dichotomic, but rather as aporetic. In all ethico-political conflicts, aspects of responsibility and justice are in play that are (...)
- Towards a socio-legal understanding of normativity.Matthias Baier - 2013 - In Social and legal norms: towards a socio-legal understanding of normativity. Ashgate.Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- Institutions and norms in collaboration : towards a framework for analyzing law and normativity in inter-organizational collaboration.Susanna Johansson - 2013 - In Matthias Baier (ed.), Social and legal norms: towards a socio-legal understanding of normativity. Ashgate.Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- Social and legal norms: towards a socio-legal understanding of normativity.Matthias Baier (ed.) - 2013 - Burlington, VT, USA: Ashgate.This book offers empirical and theoretical research in the field of social and legal norms and provides inspiration for future debate and research in terms of internationalization and cross-national comparative studies. It presents a consistent picture of empirical research in different social and organizational areas and deepens the theoretical understanding regarding the interplay between social and legal norms. The contributors argue that normativity is a result of combinations between law in books, law in action, social norms and social practice. The (...)
- Freedom and normativity : varieties of free will.Barbara Merker - 2012 - In Michael Kühler & Nadja Jelinek (eds.), Autonomy and the Self. Springer.
- The normativity of what we care about: a love-based theory of practical reasons.Katrien Schaubroeck - 2013 - Leuven: Leuven University Press.A love-based reason theory as a new perspective in the debate on practical reasons. Reasons and obligations pervade our lives. The alarm clock gives us a reason to get up in the morning, the expectations of colleagues or clients give us a reason to do our jobs well, the misery in developing countries gives us a reason to donate money, headaches give us a reason to take an aspirin. Looking for unity in variety, philosophers wonder what makes a consideration count (...)
- ch. 37. Inferentialism and normativity.Jaroslav Peregrin - 2013 - In Michael Beaney (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of The History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
- Inquiring Further: Essays on Epistemic Normativity.Elise Woodard - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann ArborMy dissertation defends the importance of epistemic norms on what I call ‘inquiring further.’ Inquiring further is a familiar practice we engage in when we redeliberate, gather more evidence, or double-check our beliefs. Nonetheless, many philosophers have argued that norms governing further inquiry are at most practical or moral norms. Against this, I argue that norms on inquiring further are central to our understanding of responsible epistemic agency. I do this by appealing to both the roles of epistemic evaluations and (...)
- On unfamiliar moral territory : about variant embodiment, enhancement, and normativity.Jackie Leach Scully - 2014 - In Miriam Eilers, Katrin Grüber & Christoph Rehmann-Sutter (eds.), The human enhancement debate and disability: new bodies for a better life. Palgrave-Macmillan.Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
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