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  1. added 2018-06-05
    Extended Cognition & Constitution: Re-Evaluating the Constitutive Claim of Extended Cognition.Michael Kirchhoff - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (2):258-283.
    This paper explores several paths by which the extended cognition thesis may overcome the coupling-constitution fallacy. In so doing, I address a couple of shortcomings in the contemporary literature. First, on the dimension of first-wave EC, I argue that constitutive arguments based on functional parity suffer from either a threat of cognitive bloat or an impasse with respect to determining the correct level of grain in the attribution of causal-functional roles. Second, on the dimension of second-wave EC, I argue that (...)
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  2. added 2018-05-27
    Going Wide: Extended Mind and Wittgenstein.Victor Loughlin - 2018 - Adaptive Behavior.
    Extended mind remains a provocative approach to cognition and mentality. However, both those for and against this approach have tacitly accepted that cognition or mentality can be understood in terms of those sub personal processes ongoing during some task. I label this a process view of cognition (PV). Using Wittgenstein’s philosophical approach, I argue that proponents of extended mind should reject PV and instead endorse a ‘wide view’ of mentality. This wide view clarifies why the hypothesis of extended mind (HEM) (...)
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  3. added 2018-05-27
    What Is Left of the Active Externalism Debate?Victor Loughlin & Karim Zahidi - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1614-1639.
    Since the publication of Clark and Chalmers' Extended Mind paper, the central claims of that paper, viz. the thesis that cognitive processes and cognitive or mental states extend beyond the brain and body, have been vigorously debated within philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science. Both defenders and detractors of these claims have since marshalled an impressive battery of arguments for and against “active externalism.” However, despite the amount of philosophical energy expended, this debate remains far from settled. We (...)
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  4. added 2018-01-25
    Extended Music Cognition.Luke Kersten - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (8):1078-1103.
    Discussions of extended cognition have increasingly engaged with the empirical and methodological practices of cognitive science and psychology. One topic that has received increased attention from those interested in the extended mind is music cognition. A number of authors have argued that music not only shapes emotional and cognitive processes, but also that it extends those processes beyond the bodily envelope. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the case for extended music cognition. Two accounts are examined in detail: (...)
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  5. added 2017-08-22
    Extended Cognition and Extended Consciousness.David Chalmers - forthcoming - In Matteo Colombo, Elizabeth Irvine & Mog Stapleton (eds.), Andy Clark and his Critics. Wiley-Blackwell.
  6. added 2017-08-21
    Keeping HEC in CHEC.Robert D. Rupert - manuscript
    According to the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC, hereafter), human cognitive processing extends beyond the boundary of the human organism.1 As I understand HEC, it is a claim in the..
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  7. added 2017-08-21
    Critical Study of Andy Clark's Supersizing the Mind.Robert D. Rupert - forthcoming - Journal of Mind and Behavior.
  8. added 2017-08-21
    Reasoning About the Mark of the Cognitive: A Response to Adams and Garrison. [REVIEW]Andreas Elpidorou - 2013 - Minds and Machines (2):1-11.
    I critically examine Adams and Garrison’s proposed necessary condition for the mark of the cognitive (Adams and Garrison in Minds Mach 23(3):339–352, 2013). After a brief presentation of their position, I argue not only that their proposal is in need of additional support, but also that it is too restrictive.
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  9. added 2017-08-21
    Overextended Cognition.Shannon Spaulding - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):469 - 490.
    Extended cognition is the view that some cognitive processes extend beyond the brain. One prominent strategy of arguing against extended cognition is to offer necessary conditions on cognition and argue that the proposed extended processes fail to satisfy these conditions. I argue that this strategy is misguided and fails to refute extended cognition. I suggest a better way to evaluate the case for extended cognition that should be acceptable to all parties, captures the intuitiveness of previous objections, and avoids the (...)
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  10. added 2017-08-21
    Belief Integration in Action: A Defense of Extended Beliefs.Miriam Kyselo & Sven Walter - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):245-260.
  11. added 2017-08-21
    Cognitive Systems and the Supersized Mind. [REVIEW]Robert D. Rupert - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (3):427 - 436.
    In Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension (Clark, 2008), Andy Clark bolsters his case for the extended mind thesis and casts a critical eye on some related views for which he has less enthusiasm. To these ends, the book canvasses a wide range of empirical results concerning the subtle manner in which the human organism and its environment interact in the production of intelligent behavior. This fascinating research notwithstanding, Supersizing does little to assuage my skepticism about the hypotheses (...)
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  12. added 2017-08-21
    Systems, Functions, and Intrinsic Natures: On Adams and Aizawa's The Bounds of Cognition. [REVIEW]Robert D. Rupert - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):113-123.
  13. added 2017-08-21
    Extended Cognition and Intrinsic Properties.Teed Rockwell - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (6):741-757.
    The hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) has been criticized as committing what is called the coupling?constitution fallacy, but it is the critic's use of this concept which is fallacious. It is true that there is no reason to deny that the line between the self and the world should be drawn at the skull and/or the skin. But the data used to support HEC reveal that there was never a good enough reason to draw the line there in the first (...)
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  14. added 2017-08-21
    The Alleged Coupling-Constitution Fallacy and the Mature Sciences.Don Ross & James Ladyman - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press.
    This chapter discusses the plausibility of the criticism against the thesis that external factors causally influence cognition and that they are, consequently, partly constitutive of cognition. The discussion should not be taken as implicitly proposing that the opposite theory is true, although the works of Adams and Aizawa suggest that they are defending internalism. This can be attributed to the fact that systems are, by definition, bounded; one must make assumptions about systems in developing cognitive models. This chapter defends the (...)
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  15. added 2017-08-21
    Extended Cognition and the Mark of the Cognitive.Mark Rowlands - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):1 – 19.
    According to the thesis of the extended mind (EM) , at least some token cognitive processes extend into the cognizing subject's environment in the sense that they are (partly) composed of manipulative, exploitative, and transformative operations performed by that subject on suitable environmental structures. EM has attracted four ostensibly distinct types of objection. This paper has two goals. First, it argues that these objections all reduce to one basic sort: all the objections can be resolved by the provision of an (...)
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  16. added 2017-08-21
    A Review of Frederick Adams and Kenneth Aizawa, the Bounds of Cognition. [REVIEW]Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):267-273.
    In The Bounds of Cognition, Fred Adams and Kenneth Aizawa treat the arguments for extended cognition to withering criticism. I summarize their main arguments and focus special attention on their distinction between the extended cognitive system hypothesis and the extended cognition hypothesis, as well as on their demand for a mark of the mental.
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  17. added 2017-08-21
    Fred Adams, Ken Aizawa: The Bounds of Cognition. [REVIEW]Sven Walter & Miriam Kyselo - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (2):277-281.
  18. added 2017-08-21
    Patrolling the Mind's Boundaries.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (2):265 - 276.
    Defenders of the extended mind thesis say that it is possible that some of our mental states may be constituted, in part, by states of the extra-bodily environment. Often they also add that such extended mentation is a commonplace phenomenon. I argue that extended mentation, while not impossible, is either nonexistent or far from widespread. Genuine beliefs as they occur in normal biologically embodied systems are informationally integrated with each other, and sensitive to changes in the person.
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  19. added 2017-08-21
    Attacking the Bounds of Cognition.Richard Menary - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):329-344.
    Recently internalists have mounted a counter-attack on the attempt to redefine the bounds of cognition. The counter-attack is aimed at a radical project which I call "cognitive integration," which is the view that internal and external vehicles and processes are integrated into a whole. Cognitive integration can be defended against the internalist counter arguments of Adams and Aizawa (A&A) and Rupert. The disagreement between internalists and integrationists is whether the manipulation of external vehicles constitutes a cognitive process. Integrationists think that (...)
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  20. added 2017-08-21
    Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition.Robert D. Rupert - 2004 - Journal of Philosophy 101 (8):389-428.
  21. added 2017-08-21
    The Mind: Embodied, Embedded, but Not Extended.Gerard O'Brien - 1998 - Metascience 7:8-83.
    This commentry focuses on the one major ecumenical theme propounded in Andy Clark's Being There that I find difficult to accept; this is Clark’s advocacy, especially in the third and final part of the book, of the extended nature of the embedded, embodied mind.
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  22. added 2017-08-20
    The Over-Extended Mind.U. M. D. Cole - unknown
    There’s a possibly more interesting general question: does technology transform and extend the mind and our mental powers? In a widely discussed 1998 paper titled “The Extended Mind”, Andy Clark and David Chalmers argue that mind and cognition can extend outside the head and can include items and processes in the world. In their thought experiment, Otto has alzheimer’s syndrome but does not lose his ability to function because he records information he learns in a notebook that he always carries. (...)
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  23. added 2017-08-20
    Andy Clark on Intrinsic Content and Extended Cognition.Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - manuscript
    This is a plausible reading of what Clark and Chalmers had in mind at the time, but it is not the radical claim at stake in the extended cognition debate.[1] It is a familiar functionalist view of cognition and the mind that it can be realized in a wide range of distinct material bases. Thus, for many species of functionalism about cognition and the mind, it follows that they can be realized in extracranial substrates.[2] And, in truth, even some non-functionalist (...)
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  24. added 2017-08-20
    Clark's Conditions on Extended Cognition Are Too Strong.Kenneth Aizawa - manuscript
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  25. added 2017-08-20
    Critical Notice: Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind by Robert Rupert.Colin Klein - unknown
    Robert Rupert is well-known as an vigorous opponent of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC). His Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind is a first-rate development of his “systems-based” approach to demarcating the mind. The results are impressive. Rupert’s account brings much-needed clarity to the often-frustrating debate over HEC: much more than just an attack on HEC, he gives a compelling picture of why the debate matters.
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  26. added 2017-08-20
    Clark Missed the Mark: Andy Clark on Intrinsic Content and Extended Cognition.Ken Aizawa - manuscript
    This is a plausible reading of what Clark and Chalmers had in mind at the time, but it is not the radical claim at stake in the extended cognition debate.[1] It is a familiar functionalist view of cognition and the mind that it can be realized in a wide range of distinct material bases. Thus, for many species of functionalism about cognition and the mind, it follows that they can be realized in extracranial substrates.[2] And, in truth, even some non-functionalist (...)
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  27. added 2017-08-20
    Challenges to Active Externalism.Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - forthcoming - In P. Robbins & Murat Aydede (eds.), Cambridge Handbook on Situated Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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  28. added 2017-08-20
    Why the Mind is Still in the Head.Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa - forthcoming - In P. Robbins & M. Aydede (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge University Press.
    Philosophical interest in situated cognition has been focused most intensely on the claim that human cognitive processes extend from the brain into the tools humans use. As we see it, this radical hypothesis is sustained by two kinds of mistakes, confusing coupling relations with constitutive relations and an inattention to the mark of the cognitive. Here we wish to draw attention to these mistakes and show just how pervasive they are. That is, for all that the radical philosophers have said, (...)
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  29. added 2017-08-20
    Extended Cognition and the Explosion of Knowledge.David Ludwig - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology (3):1-14.
    The aim of this article is to show that externalist accounts of cognition such as Clark and Chalmers' (1998) “active externalism” lead to an explosion of knowledge that is caused by online resources such as Wikipedia and Google. I argue that externalist accounts of cognition imply that subjects who integrate mobile Internet access in their cognitive routines have millions of standing beliefs on unexpected issues such as the birth dates of Moroccan politicians or the geographical coordinates of villages in southern (...)
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  30. added 2017-08-20
    Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind. [REVIEW]Bryce Huebner - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):315 - 318.
  31. added 2017-08-20
    Superdupersizing the Mind: Extended Cognition and the Persistence of Cognitive Bloat.Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):791-806.
    Extended Cognition (EC) hypothesizes that there are parts of the world outside the head serving as cognitive vehicles. One criticism of this controversial view is the problem of “cognitive bloat” which says that EC is too permissive and fails to provide an adequate necessary criterion for cognition. It cannot, for instance, distinguish genuine cognitive vehicles from mere supports (e.g. the Yellow Pages). In response, Andy Clark and Mark Rowlands have independently suggested that genuine cognitive vehicles are distinguished from supports in (...)
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  32. added 2017-08-20
    Social-Psychological Externalism and the Coupling/Constitution Fallacy.F. Thomas Burke & Stephen Everett - 2013 - In F. Thomas Burke & Krzysztof Piotr Skowronski (eds.), George Herbert Mead in the Twenty-first Century. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 107.
    The coupling/constitution fallacy has been a persistent annoyance if not a stumbling block for some proponents of externalist conceptions of mind (Menary 2010). It has been charged, namely, that anything to be accounted for by way of a conception of mind as being extended outside of the head—as being constituted in part by things external to the body—can just as well be accounted for by way of a more standard inside-the-head conception—with minds being tightly coupled to but not therefore constituted (...)
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  33. added 2017-08-20
    Simply Extended Mind.Alexander Auf der Straße - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):449-458.
    For more than one decade, Andy Clark has defended the now-famous extended mind thesis, the idea that cognitive processes leak into the world. In this paper I analyse Clark’s theoretical justification for the thesis: explanatory simplicity. I argue that his way of justifying the thesis leads into contradiction, either at the level of propositional attitude ascriptions or at the theoretical level. I evaluate three possible strategies of dealing with this issue, concluding that they are all likely to fail and that (...)
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  34. added 2017-08-20
    Robert D. Rupert: Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind. [REVIEW]Andreas Elpidorou - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (1):107-113.
  35. added 2017-08-20
    Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind - Robert D. Rupert. [REVIEW]Mirko Farina - 2011 - Humana Mente 4 (15).
  36. added 2017-08-20
    There Is No Argument That the Mind Extends.Sam Coleman - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (2):100-108.
    There is no Argument that the Mind Extends On the basis of two argumentative examples plus their 'parity principle', Clark and Chalmers argue that mental states like beliefs can extend into the environment. I raise two problems for the argument. The first problem is that it is more difficult than Clark and Chalmers think to set up the Tetris example so that application of the parity principle might render it a case of extended mind. The second problem is that, even (...)
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  37. added 2017-08-20
    The Value of Cognitivism in Thinking About Extended Cognition.Kenneth Aizawa - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):579-603.
    This paper will defend the cognitivist view of cognition against recent challenges from Andy Clark and Richard Menary. It will also indicate the important theoretical role that cognitivism plays in understanding some of the core issues surrounding the hypothesis of extended cognition.
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  38. added 2017-08-20
    Defending the Bounds of Cognition.Fred Adams & Ken Aizawa - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press. pp. 67--80.
    This chapter discusses the flaws of Clark’s extended mind hypothesis. Clark’s hypothesis assumes that the nature of the processes internal to an object has nothing to do with whether that object carries out cognitive processing. The only condition required is that the object is coupled with a cognitive agent and interacts with it in a certain way. In making this tenuous connection, Clark commits the most common mistake extended mind theorists make; alleging that an object becomes cognitive once it is (...)
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  39. added 2017-08-20
    Coupling, Constitution and the Cognitive Kind.Andy Clark - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press.
    Adams and Aizawa, in a series of recent and forthcoming papers ((2001), (In Press), (This Volume)) seek to refute, or perhaps merely to terminally embarrass, the friends of the extended mind. One such paper begins with the following illustration: "Question: Why did the pencil think that 2+2=4? Clark's Answer: Because it was coupled to the mathematician" Adams and Aizawa (this volume) ms p.1 "That" the authors continue "about sums up what is wrong with Clark's extended mind hypothesis". The example of (...)
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  40. added 2017-08-20
    Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension – Andy Clark.Kenneth Aizawa - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):662-664.
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  41. added 2017-08-20
    Defending the Bounds of Cognition.Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press.
    That about sums up what is wrong with Clark.
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  42. added 2017-08-20
    Coupling, Constitution and the Cognitive Kind: A Reply to Adams and Aizawa.Andy Clark - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press. pp. 81-99.
    Adams and Aizawa, in a series of recent and forthcoming papers,, ) seek to refute, or perhaps merely to terminally embarrass, the friends of the extended mind. One such paper begins with the following illustration: "Question: Why did the pencil think that 2+2=4? Clark's Answer: Because it was coupled to the mathematician" Adams and Aizawa ms p.1 "That" the authors continue "about sums up what is wrong with Clark's extended mind hypothesis". The example of the pencil, they suggest, is just (...)
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  43. added 2017-08-20
    Memento's Revenge : The Extended Mind Extended.Andy Clark - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press. pp. 43--66.
    In the movie, Memento, the hero, Leonard, suffers from a form of anterograde amnesia that results in an inability to lay down new memories. Nonetheless, he sets out on a quest to find his wife’s killer, aided by the use of notes, annotated polaroids, and (for the most important pieces of information obtained) body tattoos. Using these resources he attempts to build up a stock of new beliefs and to thus piece together the puzzle of his wife’s death. At one (...)
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  44. added 2017-08-20
    The Bounds of Cognition • by Frederick Adams and Kenneth Aizawa.Derek Browne - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):385-386.
    Tools and technologies expand our capacities, including our cognitive capacities. Microscopes extend our perceptual capacities. Notebooks extend the natural limits of memory. These facts are important, for all that they are obvious. The extended cognition hypothesis wants more. Some external devices and processes are literal parts of cognitive processes themselves. When there is fast and reliable access to external data or processes , then the cognitive processes that occur uncontroversially inside the brain literally and controversially extend out into the world (...)
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  45. added 2017-08-20
    Book Notes: Adams, Frederick and Kenneth Aizawa,The Bounds of Cognition, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008, Pp. Xiii + 197, AU$120.00 / NZ$130.00 (Cloth). [REVIEW]William Fish - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):355-356.
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  46. added 2017-08-20
    Where is My Mind? [REVIEW]Jerry Fodor - 2009 - London Review of Books 31 (3).
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  47. added 2017-08-20
    Persons and the Extended-Mind Thesis.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2009 - Zygon 44 (3):642-658.
    The extended-mind thesis (EM) is the claim that mentality need not be situated just in the brain, or even within the boundaries of the skin. Some versions take "extended selves" be to relatively transitory couplings of biological organisms and external resources. First, I show how EM can be seen as an extension of traditional views of mind. Then, after voicing a couple of qualms about EM, I reject EM in favor of a more modest hypothesis that recognizes enduring subjects of (...)
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  48. added 2017-08-20
    The Bounds of Cognition.Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 2008 - Wiley-Blackwell.
  49. added 2017-08-20
    Curing Cognitive Hiccups: A Defense of The Extended Mind.Andy Clark - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (4):163-192.
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  50. added 2017-08-20
    Overextending the Mind.Brie Gertler - 2007 - In Brie Gertler & Lawrence Shapiro (eds.), Arguing About the Mind. Routledge. pp. 192--206.
    Clark and Chalmers argue that the mind is extended – that is, its boundary lies beyond the skin. In this essay, I will criticize this conclusion. However, I will also defend some of the more controversial elements of Clark and Chalmers's argument. I reject their conclusion because I think that their argument shows that a seemingly innocuous assumption, about internal states and processes, is flawed. My goal is not to conclusively refute Clark and Chalmers's conclusion. My aim is only to (...)
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