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  1. Virtue is a Great Moral Good.Bradford Cokelet - manuscript
    According to Aristotelian virtue ethicists, virtue is a great moral good that contributes to, but cannot be reduced to, an agent's welfare. In addition, they hold that the value of virtue is different from, and in some sense greater than, the agent-neutral intrinsic goodness that consequentialists attribute to states of affair. According to Thomas Hurka (1998, 2003, 2011), these fundamental Aristotelian views are indefensible. In this paper, I rebuff Hurka's skepticism and identify an Aristotelian view that stands fast in the (...)
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  2. Manifestations of Virtue.Arden Ali - forthcoming - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, vol. 10.
    Few philosophers endorse a virtue theory of praiseworthiness. The widespread aversion to any virtue theory of moral worth rests chiefly on a skeptical argument that emphasizes the fact that praiseworthy acts can be performed by people who lack the relevant virtue. This chapter studies this skeptical argument closely. It concludes that the skeptical argument's core premise has been misleadingly characterized. Once the core premise has been clarified, the virtue theory appears to escape the grip of the skeptical argument.
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  3. Acting with Good Intentions: Virtue Ethics and the Principle That Ought Implies Can.Charles K. Fink - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Research 45:79-95.
    In Morals from Motives, Michael Slote proposed an agent-based approach to virtue ethics in which the morality of an action derives solely from the agent’s motives. Among the many objections that have been raised against Slote’s account, this article addresses two problems associated with the Kantian principle that ought implies can. These are the problems of “deficient” and “inferior” motivation. These problems arise because people cannot freely choose their motives. We cannot always choose to act from good motives; nor can (...)
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  4. Aristotle for the Modern Ethicist.Sophia Connell - 2019 - Ancient Philosophy Today 1 (2):192-214.
    Elizabeth Anscombe and Mary Midgley discussed Aristotle's ethics as an alternative to modern moral philosophy. This idea is best known from Anscombe's 1958 paper ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’. The main...
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  5. Situationism and the Problem of Moral Improvement.Matthew C. Taylor - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (3):312-327.
    A wealth of research in social psychology indicates that various ethically arbitrary situational factors exert a surprisingly powerful influence on moral conduct. Empirically-minded philosophers have argued over the last two decades that this evidence challenges Aristotelian virtue ethics. John Doris, Gilbert Harman, and Maria Merritt have argued that situationist moral psychology – as opposed to Aristotelian moral psychology – is better suited to the practical aim of helping agents act better. The Aristotelian account, with its emphasis on individual factors, invites (...)
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  6. Objections to Virtue Ethics.Jens Johansson & Frans Svensson - 2018 - In Nancy Snow (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Virtue. Oxford University Press.
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  7. Virtues for the Imperfect.Katharina Nieswandt & Ulf Hlobil - 2018 - Journal of Value Inquiry 53 (4):605-625.
    We suggest a new neo-Aristotelian account of right action: An action A is right for an agent S in a situation C just in case it is possible for A in C to result from a good practical inference. A practical inference is good if people must have a disposition to make such practical inferences where a society is to flourish. One advantage of this account is that it applies to non-ideal agents. It thus blocks the right-but-not-virtuous objection to virtue (...)
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  8. The Entanglement Problem and Idealization in Moral Philosophy.Olle Risberg - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):542-559.
    According to many popular views in normative ethics, meta-ethics and axiology, facts about what we ought to do or what is good for us depend on facts about the attitudes that some agent would have in some relevant idealized circumstances. This paper presents an unrecognized structural problem for such views which threatens to be devastating.
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  9. How Should One Live? An Introduction to Ethics and Moral Reasoning.Bradley Thames - 2018 - San Diego, CA, USA: Bridgepoint Education.
    This book provides an entry-level introduction to philosophical ethics, theories of moral reasoning, and selected issues in applied ethics. Chapter 1 describes the importance of philosophical approaches to ethical issues, the general dialectical form of moral reasoning, and the broad landscape of moral philosophy. Chapter 2 presents egoism and relativism as challenges to the presumed objectivity and unconditionality of morality. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 discuss utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics, respectively. Each chapter begins with a general overview of the (...)
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  10. Aristotelian Naturalism Vs. Mutants, Aliens and the Great Red Dragon.Scott Woodcock - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (4):313-328.
    In this paper I present a new objection to the Aristotelian Naturalism defended by Philippa Foot. I describe this objection as a membership objection because it reveals the fact that AN invites counterexamples when pressed to identify the individuals bound by its normative claims. I present three examples of agents for whom the norms generated by AN are not obviously authoritative: mutants, aliens, and the Great Red Dragon. Those who continue to advocate for Foot's view can give compelling replies to (...)
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  11. Categorizing Character: Moving Beyond the Aristotelian Framework.Christian Miller - 2017 - In David Carr (ed.), Varieties of Virtue Ethics. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 143-162.
    Philosophers have inherited a familiar taxonomy of character types from Aristotle. We are all acquainted with the labels of the virtuous, vicious, continent, and incontinent person. The goal of this paper is to argue that we should jettison this framework. The main reason is that psychological research in the past fifty years has suggested a much more complex picture of moral character than what can be usefully captured by these four categories. In its place, I will suggest a better taxonomy (...)
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  12. CAPS Psychology and the Empirical Adequacy of Aristotelian Virtue Ethics.Laura Papish - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (3):537-549.
    For the past decade and a half, Aristotelians have tried to counter the following criticism articulated by John Doris: if we look at personality and social psychology research, we must conclude that we generally neither have, nor have the capacity to develop, character traits of the kind envisioned by Aristotle and his followers. Some defenses of Aristotelian virtue ethics proceed by trying to insulate it from this challenge, while others have tried to dissipate the force of Doris's critique by showing (...)
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  13. Right-Makers and the Targets of Virtue.Nicholas Smith - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (2):311-326.
    The still dominant virtue-ethical account of right action claims that an action is right just in case a virtuous agent would perform it. Because this account arguably fails to capture what makes actions right, virtue ethicists are well-advised to consider alternatives. I argue that a target-centered account, if suitably developed, succeeds in capturing what makes actions right. First, I explain why a target-centered account shows initial promise in capturing what makes actions right and present an interpretation of the account as (...)
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  14. Transformative Suffering and The Cultivation of Virtue.Ian James Kidd - 2015 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 22 (4):291-294.
    The idea that certain experiences of suffering can be positively transformative has a central role in the practical and pastoral aspects of Christian theology. It is easy to identify different historical and doctrinal reasons why physical, mental, and spiritual suffering enjoy a central role in that tradition, but less easy to articulate and justify the provocative claim that suffering can be positively transformative. Indeed, some critics protest that the very idea is deeply offensive, on moral, theological, and psychological grounds, and (...)
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  15. Virtue and Second-Personal Reasons: A Reply to Cokelet.Mark LeBar - 2015 - Ethics 126 (1):162-174.
    In “Two-Level Eudaimonism and Second-Personal Reasons,” Bradford Cokelet argues that we should reject one strategy—one I advanced earlier in this journal—for reconciling a virtue-ethical theoretical framework with that part of our moral experience that has been described as second-personal reasons. Cokelet frames a number of related objections to that strategy, and his concerns are worth taking up. Addressing them provides an opportunity both to revisit and develop the model bruited in my earlier article and to gain additional insight into second-personal (...)
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  16. Homo Religiosus: Does Spirituality Have a Place in Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics?David Mcpherson - 2015 - Religious Studies 51 (3):335-346.
    In this article I seek to show the importance of spirituality for a neo-Aristotelian account of ‘the good life’. First, I lay out my account of spirituality. Second, I discuss why the issue of the place of spirituality in the good life has often either been ignored or explicitly excluded from consideration by neo-Aristotelians. I suggest that a lot turns on how one understands the ‘ethical naturalism’ to which neo-Aristotelians are committed. Finally, I argue that through a deeper exploration of (...)
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  17. Review of Kristján Kristjánsson's Virtues and Vices in Positive Psychology: A Philosophical Critique. [REVIEW]Christian Miller - 2015 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:online.
    Kristján Kristjánsson's new book is the first detailed treatment of positive psychology from a philosophical perspective (at least as far as I am aware). Kristjánsson has been an active contributor to a number of debates in recent years at the intersection of moral philosophy, psychology, and education, and brings his vast familiarity with the relevant literature to bear in engaging with this movement. The result is a book that raises a number of good questions and concerns about positive psychology, but (...)
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  18. Knowing Better: Virtue, Deliberation, and Normative Ethics.Daniel Star - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
    Knowing Better presents a novel solution to the problem of reconciling the seemingly conflicting perspectives of ordinary virtue and normative ethics. Normative ethics is a sophisticated, open-ended philosophical enterprise that attempts to articulate and defend highly general ethical principles. Such principles aspire to specify our reasons, and tell us what it is right to do. However, it is not plausible to suppose that virtuous people in general follow such philosophical principles. These principles are difficult to articulate and assess, and we (...)
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  19. Neuroscience, Virtues, Ethics, Compassion and the Question of Character.Raymond Aaron Younis - 2015 - Reimagining the University.
    There has been much debate recently about the meaning, place and function of “character” and “character traits” in Virtue Ethics. For example, a number of philosophers have argued recently that Virtue Ethics would be strengthened as a theory by the omission of talk of character traits; recent neuroscientific studies have suggested that there is scope for scepticism about the existence of such traits. I will argue that both approaches are flawed and unconvincing: in brief, the first approach tends to be (...)
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  20. Duty, Desire and the Good Person: Towards a Non‐Aristotelian Account of Virtue.Nomy Arpaly - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):59-74.
    This paper presents an account of the virtuous person, which I take to be the same as the good person. I argue that goodness in a person is based on her desires. Contra Aristotelians, I argue that one does not need wisdom to be good. There can be a perfectly good person with mental retardation or autism. Contra Kantians, I argue that the sense of duty - which does exist! - is compatible with a desire-based moral psychology.
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  21. Limitations of Virtue Ethics in the Social Professions.Derek Clifford - 2014 - Ethics and Social Welfare 8 (1):2-19.
  22. Virtue Ethics and the Demands of Social Morality.Bradford Cokelet - 2014 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies Normative Ethics: Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 236-260.
    Building on work by Steve Darwall, I argue that standard virtue ethical accounts of moral motivation are defective because they don't include accounts of social morality. I then propose a virtue ethical account of social morality, and respond to one of Darwall's core objections to the coherence of any such (non-Kantian) account.
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  23. Qualified Agent and Agent-Based Virtue Ethics and the Problems of Right Action.Jason Kawall - 2014 - In Stan van Hooft & Nafsika Athanassoulis (eds.), The Handbook of Virtue Ethics. Acumen Publishing.
    An on-going question for virtue ethics is whether it stands as a truly distinctive approach to ethics. In particular, there has been much discussion of whether virtue ethics can provide a viable understanding of right action, one that is a genuine rival to familiar consequentialist and deontological accounts. In this chapter I examine two prominent approaches to virtue ethics, (i) qualified agent and (ii) agent-based virtue ethics, and consider whether either can provide an adequate account of right action. I begin (...)
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  24. The Virtue of Justice Revisited.Mark LeBar - 2014 - In Stan van Hooft & Nafsika Athanassoulis (eds.), The Handbook of Virtue Ethics. Acumen Publishing.
    Some of the earliest Western ideas about the virtues of character gave justice a prominent position, but if moral philosophy has made any progress at all in the past two centuries, we might think it worthwhile to reconsider what that virtue involves. Kant seems (even to most non-Kantians) to have crystallized something important to our relations with others in formulating a proscription against treating others merely as means. And twentieth-century moral and political theory put the justice of social institutions in (...)
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  25. Can I Be a Good Animal?Bana Bashour - 2013 - In Bana Bashour Hans Muller (ed.), Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and its Implications. Routledge. pp. 182--193.
    In this chapter, I wish to present an account of virtue ethics that does not base virtue solely on dispositions to behave in some way, but in the set of psychological states attributed to a person. In doing so, this modified account deals with all the problems the traditional virtue ethicist faces. I will start this chapter by presenting the main objections to virtue ethics: first, that it does not tell one how to act (which a moral theory should be (...)
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  26. Does Human Nature Conflict with Itself?: Human Form and the Harmony of the Virtues.Micah Lott - 2013 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):657-683.
    Does possessing some human virtues make it impossible for a person to possess other human virtues? Isaiah Berlin and Bernard Williams both answered “yes” to this question, and they argued that to hold otherwise—to accept the harmony of the virtues—required a blinkered and unrealistic view of “what it is to be human.” In this essay, I have two goals: (1) to show how the harmony of the virtues is best interpreted, and what is at stake in affirming or denying it; (...)
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  27. To What Extent Must We Go Beyond Neo-Aristotelian Ethical Naturalism?David McPherson - 2012 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):627-654.
    In this essay I discuss the limits of recent attempts to develop a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic on the basis of a commitment to ‘ethical naturalism.’ By ‘ethical naturalism’ I mean the view that ethics can be founded on claims about what it is for human beings to flourish qua member of the human species, which is analogous to what it is for plants and other animals to flourish qua member of their particular species. Drawing on Charles Taylor’s account of ‘strong (...)
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  28. L’Éthique de la Vertu Et le Critère de L’Action Correcte.Martin Gibert & Mauro Rossi - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (2):367-390.
    ABSTRACT : According to the most popular version of virtue ethics (Hursthouse, 1991; Zagzebsk,i 1996), the right action in a given situation is the action that a fully virtuous agent would do given the circumstances. However, this criterion raises two objections: in some situations, it does not determine the right action correctly, and in other situations, it does not determine any right action at all. In this article, we argue that these objections stem from either simple imaginative resistance or a (...)
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  29. Hursthouse’s Virtue Ethics and Abortion: Abortion Ethics Without Metaphysics? [REVIEW]R. Jo Kornegay - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):51-71.
    This essay explicates and evaluates the roles that fetal metaphysics and moral status play in Rosalind Hursthouse’s abortion ethics. It is motivated by Hursthouse’s puzzling claim in her widely anthologized paper Virtue Ethics and Abortion that fetal moral status and (by implication) its underlying metaphysics are in a way, fundamentally irrelevant to her position. The essay clarifies the roles that fetal ontology and moral status do in fact play in her abortion ethics. To this end, it presents and then develops (...)
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  30. A Virtue Ethics Response to Henley on Hume, Aristotle and the Situationist Challenge.Erick W. Schmidt - 2011 - Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (2):27-32.
  31. Rightness and Goodness in Agent-Based Virtue Ethics.Liezl Van Zyl - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:103-114.
    In Morals from Motives (2001) Michael Slote puts forward an agent-based virtue ethics that purports to derive an account of deontic terms from aretaic evaluations of motives or character traits. In this view, an action is right if and only if it proceeds from a good or virtuous motive or at least does not come from a bad motive, and wrong if it comes from a bad motive. I argue that Slote does not provide an account of right action at (...)
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  32. Scepticism About the Virtue Ethics Approach to Nursing Ethics.Stephen Holland - 2010 - Nursing Philosophy 11 (3):151-158.
    Nursing ethics centres on how nurses ought to respond to the moral situations that arise in their professional contexts. Nursing ethicists invoke normative approaches from moral philosophy. Specifically, it is increasingly common for nursing ethicists to apply virtue ethics to moral problems encountered by nurses. The point of this article is to argue for scepticism about this approach. First, the research question is motivated by showing that requirements on nurses such as to be kind, do not suffice to establish virtue (...)
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  33. The Self-Centeredness Objection to Virtue Ethics: Zhu Xi’s Neo-Confucian Response.Yong Huang - 2010 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):651-692.
    As virtue ethics has developed into maturity, it has also met with a number of objections. This essay focuses on the self-centeredness objection: since virtue ethics recommends that we be concerned with our own virtues or virtuous characters, it is self-centered. In response, I first argue that, for Zhu Xi’s neo-Confucianism, the character that a virtuous person is concerned with consists largely in precisely those virtues that incline him or her to be concerned with the good of others. While such (...)
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  34. Is Agent-Based Virtue Ethics Self-Undermining?William Ransome - 2010 - Ethical Perspectives 17 (1):41-57.
    Agent-based virtue ethics strives to offer a viable account of both moral conduct and the source of moral value, independent of ‘deontic’ teleological and deontological characterizations. One of its chief proponents offers an agent-based virtue-ethical account that aspires to derive all moral value, including the moral status of actions, solely from the ‘aretaic’ concept of benevolence.I suggest that morality as benevolence fails to offer a viable account of either virtuous moral conduct or the source of moral value, because it is (...)
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  35. Virtue Ethics and the Selection of Children with Impairments: A Reply to Rosalind McDougall.Carla Saenz - 2010 - Bioethics 24 (9):499-506.
    In ‘Parental Virtues: A New Way of Thinking about the Morality of Reproductive Actions’ Rosalind McDougall proposes a virtue-based framework to assess the morality of child selection. Applying the virtue-based account to the selection of children with impairments does not lead, according to McDougall, to an unequivocal answer to the morality of selecting impaired children. In ‘Impairment, Flourishing, and the Moral Nature of Parenthood,’ she also applies the virtue-based account to the discussion of child selection, and claims that couples with (...)
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  36. The Limits of the Explanatory Power of Developmentalism.David Sobel - 2010 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (4):517-527.
    Richard Kraut's neo-Aristotelian account of well-being, Developmentalism, aspires to explain not only which things are good for us but why those things are good for us. The key move in attempting to make good on this second aspiration involves his claim that our ordinary intuitions about what is good for a person can be successfully explained and systematized by the idea that what benefi ts a living thing develops properly that living thing's potentialities, capacities, and faculties. I argue that Kraut's (...)
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  37. Asymmetrical Virtue Particularism.Rebecca Stangl - 2010 - Ethics 121 (1):37-57.
    In this essay, I defend an account of right action that I shall call “asymmetrical virtue particularism.” An action, on this account, is right just insofar as it is overall virtuous. But the virtuousness of an action in any particular respect, X, is deontically variant; it can fail to be right-making, either because it is deontically irrelevant or because it is wrong-making. Finally, the account is asymmetrical insofar as the viciousness of actions is not deontically variant; if any action is (...)
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  38. Virtue Ethics and the Search for an Account of Right Action.Frans Svensson - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (3):255-271.
    Conceived of as a contender to other theories in substantive ethics, virtue ethics is often associated with, in essence, the following account or criterion of right action: VR: An action A is right for S in circumstances C if and only if a fully virtuous agent would characteristically do A in C. There are serious objections to VR, which take the form of counter-examples. They present us with different scenarios in which less than fully virtuous persons would be acting rightly (...)
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  39. The Incoherence Objection in Moral Theory.Eric Wiland - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (3):279-284.
    J.J.C. Smart famously complained that rule utilitarianism is incoherent, and that rule utilitarians are guilty of rule worship . Much has been said about whether Smart’s complaint is justified, but I will assume for the sake of argument that Smart was on to something. Instead, I have three other goals. First, I want to show that Smart’s complaint is a specific instance of a more general objection to a moral theory—what I will call the Incoherence Objection. Second, I want to (...)
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  40. Species Extinction and the Vice of Thoughtlessness: The Importance of Spiritual Exercises for Learning Virtue. [REVIEW]Jeremy Bendik-Keymer - 2009 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 23 (1-2):61-83.
    In this paper, I present a sample spiritual exercise—a contemporary form of the written practice that ancient philosophers used to shape their characters. The exercise, which develops the ancient practice of the examination of conscience, is on the sixth mass extinction and seeks to understand why the extinction appears as a moral wrong. It concludes by finding a vice in the moral character of the author and the author’s society. From a methodological standpoint, the purpose of spiritual exercises is to (...)
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  41. Pt. 3. The Malleability of Human Nature. Reflections on Secular Foundationalism and Our Human Future / Stephen Erickson ; Nature as Second Nature : Plasticity and Habit / Peter Wake ; The Posthumanist Challenge to a Partly Naturalized Virtue Ethics. [REVIEW]Roberta M. Berry - 2009 - In Mark J. Cherry (ed.), The Normativity of the Natural: Human Goods, Human Virtues, and Human Flourishing. Springer.
  42. Getting It Right in Ethical Experience: John McDowell and Virtue Ethics. [REVIEW]Anne-Marie S. Christensen - 2009 - Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (4):493–506.
    Most forms of virtue ethics are characterized by two attractive features. The first is that proponents of virtue ethics acknowledge the need to describe how moral agents acquire or develop the traits and abilities necessary to become morally able agents. The second attractive feature of most forms of virtue ethics is that they are forms of moral realism. The two features come together in the attempt to describe virtue as a personal ability to distinguish morally good reasons for action. It (...)
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  43. In Defense of the Primacy of the Virtues.Jason Kawall - 2009 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3 (2):1-21.
    In this paper I respond to a set of basic objections often raised against those virtue theories in ethics which maintain that moral properties such rightness and goodness (and their corresponding concepts) are to be explained and understood in terms of the virtues or the virtuous. The objections all rest on a strongly-held intuition that the virtues (and the virtuous) simply must be derivative in some way from either right actions or good states of affairs. My goal is to articulate (...)
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  44. Virtue Ethics and Deontic Constraints.Mark LeBar - 2009 - Ethics 119 (4):642-671.
    One important objection to virtue ethical theories is that they apparently must account for the wrongness of a wrong action in terms of a lack of virtue (or presence of vice) in the agent, and not in terms of the effects of the action on its victim. We take such effects to ground deontic constraints on how we may act, and virtue theory appears unable to account for such constraints. I claim, however, that eudaimonist virtue theory can account for wrongness (...)
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  45. Agent-Based Virtue Ethics and the Problem of Action Guidance.Liezl van Zyl - 2009 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (1):50-69.
    Agent-based accounts of virtue ethics, such as the one provided by Michael Slote, base the rightness of action in the motive from which it proceeds. A frequent objection to agent-basing is that it does not allow us to draw the commonsense distinction between doing the right thing and doing it for the right reasons, that is, between act-evaluation and agent-appraisal. I defend agent-basing against this objection, but argue that a more fundamental problem for this account is its apparent failure to (...)
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  46. Virtue Ethics, Kantian Ethics, and the 'One Thought Too Many' Objection.Marcia Baron - 2008 - In Monika Betzler (ed.), Kant's Ethics of Virtues. De Gruyter. pp. 245-278.
  47. Problems for Virtue Theories in Epistemology.Robert Lockie - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (2):169 - 191.
    This paper identifies and criticizes certain fundamental commitments of virtue theories in epistemology. A basic question for virtues approaches is whether they represent a ‘third force’––a different source of normativity to internalism and externalism. Virtues approaches so-conceived are opposed. It is argued that virtues theories offer us nothing that can unify the internalist and externalist sub-components of their preferred success-state. Claims that character can unify a virtues-based axiology are overturned. Problems with the pluralism of virtues theories are identified––problems with pluralism (...)
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  48. That “Ought” Does Not Imply “Right”: Why It Matters for Virtue Ethics.Daniel C. Russell - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):299-315.
    Virtue ethicists sometimes say that a right action is what a virtuous person would do, characteristically, in the circumstances. But some have objected recently that right action cannot be defined as what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances because there are circumstances in which a right action is possible but in which no virtuous person would be found. This objection moves from the premise that a given person ought to do an action that no virtuous person would do, (...)
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  49. A Dilemma for Particularist Virtue Ethics.Rebecca Stangl - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):665-678.
    There is an obvious affinity between virtue ethics and particularism. Both stress the complexify of the moral life, the inadequacy of rule-following as a guide to moral deliberation, and the importance of judgement in discerning the morally relevant features of particular situations. Yet it remains an open question how deep the affinity goes. I argue that the radical form of particularism defended by Jonathan Dancy has surprisingly strong implications for virtue ethics. Adopting such a view would require the virtue theorist (...)
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  50. Virtue Ethics and Elitism.Frans Svensson - 2008 - Philosophical Papers 37 (1):131-155.
    Because of its reliance on a basically Aristotelian conception of virtue, contemporary virtue ethics is often criticised for being inherently elitist. I argue that this objection is mistaken. The core of my argument is that we need to take seriously that virtue, according to Aristotle, is something that we acquire gradually, via a developmental process. People are not just stuck with their characters once and for all, but can always aspire to become better (more virtuous). And that is plausibly the (...)
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