This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories

102 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 102
  1. The Will to Make‐Believe: Religious Fictionalism, Religious Beliefs, and the Value of Art.Andrea Sauchelli - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    I explore some of the reasons why, under specific circumstances, it may be rational to make-believe or imagine certain religious beliefs. Adopting a jargon familiar to certain contemporary philosophers, my main concern here is to assess what reasons can be given for adopting a fictionalist stance towards some religious beliefs. My understanding of fictionalism does not involve solely a propositional attitude but a broader stance, which may include certain acts of pretence. I also argue that a plausible reason to be (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. New Problems for Modal Fictionalism.Bradley Armour-Garb - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1201-1219.
    In this paper, after clarifying certain features of Gideon Rosen’s Modal Fictionalism, I raise two problems for that view and argue that these problems strongly suggest that advocates of a “Deflationist Strategy” ought not to endorse, or adopt Rosen-style Modal Fictionalism.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Pretense and Pathology: Philosophical Fictionalism and its Applications.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2015 - Cambridge University Press.
    In this book, Bradley Armour-Garb and James A. Woodbridge distinguish various species of fictionalism, locating and defending their own version of philosophical fictionalism. Addressing semantic and philosophical puzzles that arise from ordinary language, they consider such issues as the problem of non-being, plural identity claims, mental-attitude ascriptions, meaning attributions, and truth-talk. They consider 'deflationism about truth', explaining why deflationists should be fictionalists, and show how their philosophical fictionalist account of truth-talk underwrites a dissolution of the Liar Paradox and its kin. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Truth, Pretense and the Liar Paradox.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2015 - In Kentaro Fujimoto, José Martínez Fernández, Henri Galinon & Theodora Achourioti (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Springer Verlag. pp. 339-354.
    In this paper we explain our pretense account of truth-talk and apply it in a diagnosis and treatment of the Liar Paradox. We begin by assuming that some form of deflationism is the correct approach to the topic of truth. We then briefly motivate the idea that all T-deflationists should endorse a fictionalist view of truth-talk, and, after distinguishing pretense-involving fictionalism (PIF) from error- theoretic fictionalism (ETF), explain the merits of the former over the latter. After presenting the basic framework (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Why Deflationists Should Be Pretense Theorists (and Perhaps Already Are).Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2010 - In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 59-77.
    In this paper, we do two things. First, we clarify the notion of deflationism, with special attention to deflationary accounts of truth. Seocnd, we argue that one who endorses a deflationary account of truth (or of semantic notions, generally) should be, or perhaps already is, a pretense theorist regarding truth-talk. In §1 we discuss mathematical fictionalism, where we focus on Yablo’s pretense account of mathematical discourse. §2 briefly introduces the key elements of deflationism and explains deflationism about truth in particular. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  6. From Mathematical Fictionalism to Truth‐Theoretic Fictionalism.Bradley Armour‐Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):93-118.
    We argue that if Stephen Yablo (2005) is right that philosophers of mathematics ought to endorse a fictionalist view of number-talk, then there is a compelling reason for deflationists about truth to endorse a fictionalist view of truth-talk. More specifically, our claim will be that, for deflationists about truth, Yablo’s argument for mathematical fictionalism can be employed and mounted as an argument for truth-theoretic fictionalism.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. From Fictionalism to Realism.C. Barbero, M. Ferraris & A. Voltolini (eds.) - 2013 - Cambridge Scholars Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Review of David Chalmers, David Manley, Ryan Wasserman (Eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology[REVIEW]Elizabeth Barnes - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (10).
  9. Ontology and Metaontology. A Contemporary Guide.Francesco Berto & Matteo Plebani - 2015 - Bloomsbury Academic.
    'Ontology and Metaontology: A Contemporary Guide' is a clear and accessible survey of ontology, focussing on the most recent trends in the discipline. -/- Divided into parts, the first half characterizes metaontology: the discourse on the methodology of ontological inquiry, covering the main concepts, tools, and methods of the discipline, exploring the notions of being and existence, ontological commitment, paraphrase strategies, fictionalist strategies, and other metaontological questions. The second half considers a series of case studies, introducing and familiarizing the reader (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Quasi-Realism No Fictionalism.Simon Blackburn - 2005 - In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 322--338.
  11. Fictional Contexts.Andrea Bonomi - 2008 - In P. Bouquet, L. Serafini & R. Thomason (eds.), Perspectives on Context. Stanford: CSLI Publications. pp. 213–48.
    is accounted for, among other things, in terms of particular relations between events (or states1) and places or times. Roughly speaking, an event α is said to occur in a place p (or interval t) if the spatial (temporal) extension of α is located in p (or t). Let the predicate ‘Occ’ denote such a relation. From this point of view, part of the content of the above sentences can be associated, respectively, with formulas such as.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  12. Fictionalism.E. C. Bourne - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):147-162.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  13. Truth in Fictionalism.Alexis Burgess - forthcoming - In Michael Glanzberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Metaphysics as Make-Believe.Alexis Burgess - 2010 - In John Woods (ed.), Fictions and Models. Philosophia.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Fiction and Fictionalism.E. Caddick - 2011 - British Journal of Aesthetics 51 (3):340-343.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16. How to Be a Nominalist and a Fictional Realist.Ross P. Cameron - 2013 - In Christy Mag Uidhir (ed.), Art and Abstract Objects. Oxford University Press. pp. 179.
  17. It Ain’T Easy: Fictionalism, Deflationism, and Easy Arguments in Ontology.Gabriele Contessa - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):763-773.
    Fictionalism and deflationism are two moderate meta-ontological positions that try to occupy a middle ground between the extremes of heavy-duty realism and hard-line eliminativism. Deflationists believe that the existence of certain entities (e.g.: numbers) can be established by means of ‘easy’ arguments—arguments that, supposedly, rely solely on uncontroversial premises and trivial inferences. Fictionalists, however, find easy arguments unconvincing. Amie Thomasson has recently argued that, in their criticism of easy arguments, fictionalists beg the question against deflationism and that the fictionalist alternative (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  18. Fictionalism and the Attitudes.Chris John Daly - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):423 - 440.
    This paper distinguishes revolutionary fictionalism from other forms of fictionalism and also from other philosophical views. The paper takes fictionalism about mathematical objects and fictionalism about scientific unobservables as illustrations. The paper evaluates arguments that purport to show that this form of fictionalism is incoherent on the grounds that there is no tenable distinction between believing a sentence and taking the fictionalist's distinctive attitude to that sentence. The argument that fictionalism about mathematics is ‘comically immodest’ is also evaluated. In place (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  19. Mental Fictionalism: The Very Idea.Tamás Demeter - 2013 - The Monist 96 (4):483-504.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Some Problems with a Behavioristic Account of Early Group Pretense.Susannah K. Devitt - unknown
    In normal child development, both individual and group pretense first emerges at approximately two years of age. The metarepresentational account of pretense holds that children already have the concept PRETEND when they first engage in early group pretense. A behavioristic account suggests that early group pretense is analogous to early beliefs or desires and thus require no mental state concepts. I argue that a behavioral account does not explain the actual behavior observed in children and it cannot explain how children (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. The Fictionality of Plays.John Dilworth - 2002 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60 (3):263–273.
    The category of works of fiction is a very broad and heterogeneous one. I do have a general thesis in mind about such works, namely, that they themselves are fictional, in much the same way as are the fictional events or entities that they are about. But a defense of such a broad thesis would provide an intractably complex topic for an introductory essay, so I shall here confine myself to a presentation of a similar thesis for narrative theatrical works (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  22. There Are No Abstract Objects.Cian Dorr - 2008 - In Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Blackwell.
    I explicate and defend the claim that, fundamentally speaking, there are no numbers, sets, properties or relations. The clarification consists in some remarks on the relevant sense of ‘fundamentally speaking’ and the contrasting sense of ‘superficially speaking’. The defence consists in an attempt to rebut two arguments for the existence of such entities. The first is a version of the indispensability argument, which purports to show that certain mathematical entities are required for good scientific explanations. The second is a speculative (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  23. What We Disagree About When We Disagree About Ontology.Cian Dorr - 2005 - In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 234--86.
    In this paper I attempt two things. First, I argue that one can coherently imagine different communities using languages structurally similar to English, but in which the meanings of the quantifiers vary, so that the answers to ontological questions, such as ‘Under what circumstances do some things compose something?’, are different. Second, I argue that nevertheless, one can make sense of the idea that of the various possible assignments of meanings to the quantifiers, one is especially fundamental, so that there (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   48 citations  
  24. Composition as a Fiction.Cian Dorr & Gideon Rosen - 2002 - In Richard Gale (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Metaphysics. Blackwell. pp. 151--174.
    Region R Question: How many objects — entities, things — are contained in R? Ignore the empty space. Our question might better be put, 'How many material objects does R contain?' Let's stipulate that A, B and C are metaphysical atoms: absolutely simple entities with no parts whatsoever besides themselves. So you don't have to worry about counting a particle's top half and bottom half as different objects. Perhaps they are 'point-particles', with no length, width or breadth. Perhaps they are (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   32 citations  
  25. A Free Logic for Fictionalism.Mircea Dumitru - 2015 - In Iulian D. Toader, Gabriel Sandu & Ilie Pȃrvu (eds.), Romanian Studies in Philosophy of Science. Springer Verlag.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Editorial: Truth Matters.Denis Dutton & Patrick Patrick Gerard Henry - 1996 - Philosophy and Literature 20 (2):299-304.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Fictionalism: Modality.Antony Eagle - manuscript
    and argue that (2) is similarly not true, but a convention: we use talk of pos• sibility to capture claims about consistency, or whatever. (This is merely an example; I don't suppose that (2) appeals to anyone particularly as a neces• sary truth about possibility or consistency.) Again, the kind of thing that is in..
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Telling Tales.Antony Eagle - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt2):125 - 147.
    Utterances within the context of telling fictional tales that appear to be assertions are nevertheless not to be taken at face value. The present paper attempts to explain exactly what such 'pseudo-assertions' are, and how they behave. Many pseudo-assertions can take on multiple roles, both within fictions and in what I call 'participatory criticism' of a fiction, especially when they occur discourse-initially. This fact, taken together with problems for replacement accounts of pseudo-assertion based on the implicit prefixing of an 'in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  29. Are There Uncontroversial Error Theories?Terence Rajivan Edward - 2011 - Philosophical Pathways (162).
    This paper evaluates an argument for the conclusion that in order to produce a viable objection to a particular error theory, the objection must not be applicable to any error theory. The reason given for this conclusion is that error theories about some discourses are uncontroversial. But the examples given of uncontroversial error theories are not good ones, nor do there appear to be other examples available.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Pretense for the Complete Idiom1.Andy Egan - 2008 - Noûs 42 (3):381-409.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  31. Fiction, Indifference, and Ontology.Matti Eklund - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):557–579.
    In this paper I outline an alternative to hermeneutic fictionalism, an alternative I call indifferentism, with the same advantages as hermeneutic fictionalism with respect to ontological issues but avoiding some of the problems that face fictionalism. The difference between indifferentism and fictionalism is this. The fictionalist about ordinary utterances of a sentence S holds, with more orthodox views, that the speaker in some sense commits herself to the truth of S. It is only that for the fictionalist this is truth (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  32. Fictionalism in Metaphysics.Eli Kalderon Mark (ed.) - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Fictionalism is the view that a serious intellectual inquiry need not aim at truth. It came to prominence in philosophy in 1980, when Hartry Field argued that mathematics does not have to be true to be good, and Bas van Fraassen argued that the aim of science is not truth but empirical adequacy. Both suggested that the acceptance of a mathematical or scientific theory need not involve belief in its content. Thus the distinctive commitment of fictionalism is that acceptance in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Fiction and Fictionalism * BY RICHARD M. SAINSBURY.A. Everett - 2011 - Analysis 71 (4):779-780.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Pretense, Existence, and Fictional Objects.Anthony Everett - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):56–80.
    There has recently been considerable interest in accounts of fiction which treat fictional characters as abstract objects. In this paper I argue against this view. More precisely I argue that such accounts are unable to accommodate our intuitions that fictional negative existentials such as “Raskolnikov doesn’t exist” are true. I offer a general argument to this effect and then consider, but reject, some of the accounts of fictional negative existentials offered by abstract object theorists. I then note that some of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  35. Fictionalism and the Informativeness of Identity.Frederick Kroon - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 106 (3):197 - 225.
    Identity claims often look nonsensical because they apparently declare distinct things to be identical. I argue that this appearance is not just an artefact of grammar. We should be fictionalists about such claims, seeing them against the background of speakers' pretense that their words secure reference to a plurality of objects that are then declared to be identical from within the pretense. I argue that it is the resulting interpretative tension – arising from the fact that two things can never (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  36. The Blackwell Companion to Metaphysics.Richard Gale (ed.) - 2002 - Blackwell.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Colour Fictionalism.Dimitria Electra Gatzia - 2010 - Rivista di Estetica 43 (1):109-123.
    In "How to Speak of the Colors", Mark Johnston’s claims that eliminativism would require us to jettison colour discourse. In this paper, I challenge Johnston’s claim. I argue that a particular version of eliminativism, i.e., prescriptive colour fictionalism, allows us to continue employing colour discourse as we have thus far in the absence of colours. In doing so, it employs statistical models in its base discourse to derive high-level statistical constructs that can be linked to the fiction via bridge principles.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  38. Pretense Theory and the Imported Background.Jeffrey Goodman - 2011 - Open Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):22.
    Kendall Walton’s pretense theory, like its rivals, says that what’s true in a fiction F depends in part on the importation of background propositions into F. The aim of this paper is to present, explain, and defend a brief yet straightforward argument–one which exploits the specific mechanism by which the pretense theory says propositions are imported into fictions–for the falsity of the pretense theory.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Editorial: Truth Matters.Henry Patrick Gerard & Dutton Denis - 1996 - Philosophy and Literature 20 (2):299-304.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. Two Kinds of Fictionalism.Robert Hollinger - 1977 - The Monist 60 (4):556-567.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  41. Error Theory and Fictionalism.Nadeem Hussain - 2010 - In John Skorupski (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Ethics. Routledge.
    This paper surveys contemporary accounts of error theory and fictionalism. It introduces these categories to those new to metaethics by beginning with moral nihilism, the view that nothing really is right or wrong. One main motivation is that the scientific worldview seems to have no place for rightness or wrongness. Within contemporary metaethics there is a family of theories that makes similar claims. These are the theories that are usually classified as forms of error theory or fictionalism though there are (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. Truth Vs. Pretense in Discourse About Motion (or, Why the Sun Really Does Rise).Brendan Jackson - 2007 - Noûs 41 (2):298–317.
    These days it is widely agreed that there is no such thing as absolute motion and rest; the motion of an object can only be characterized with respect to some chosen frame of reference.1 This is a fact of which many of us are well-aware, and yet a cursory consideration of the ways we ascribe motion to objects gives the impression that it is a fact we persistently ignore. We insist to the police officer that we came to a full (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  43. The Sky Over Canberra: Folk Discourse and Serious Metaphysics.Andrew Kenneth Jorgensen - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (2):365-383.
    I take up the task of examining how someone who takes seriously the ambitious programme of conceptual analysis advocated by the Canberra School can minimise the eliminative consequences which I argue the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis recipe of conceptual analysis is likely to have for many folk discourses. The objective is to find a stable means to preserve the constative appearance of folk discourse and to find it generally successful in its attempts to describe an external world, albeit in non-scientific terms that do (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Psychological Fictionalism, and the Threat of Fictionalist Suicide.Richard Joyce - 2013 - The Monist 96 (4):517-538.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  45. Moral Fictionalism.Richard Joyce - 2005 - In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Philosophy Now. Oxford University Press. pp. 14-17.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  46. On 'Average'.Christopher Kennedy & Jason Stanley - 2009 - Mind 118 (471):583 - 646.
    This article investigates the semantics of sentences that express numerical averages, focusing initially on cases such as 'The average American has 2.3 children'. Such sentences have been used both by linguists and philosophers to argue for a disjuncture between semantics and ontology. For example, Noam Chomsky and Norbert Hornstein have used them to provide evidence against the hypothesis that natural language semantics includes a reference relation holding between words and objects in the world, whereas metaphysicians such as Joseph Melia and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  47. A Defence of Semantic Pretence Hermeneutic Fictionalism Against the Autism Objection.Seahwa Kim - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):1-13.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Modal Fictionalism and Analysis.Seahwa Kim - 2005 - In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 116.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  49. Fiction, Mathematics and Modality: A Unified Fictionalism.Seahwa Kim - 1999 - Dissertation, Princeton University
    I defend a unified fictionalism about modality and mathematics. First, I defend each view separately against internal objections. Then, I attempt a unified fictionalism by giving an analysis of truth in fiction which is neither modal nor platonistic. Finally, I explore the prospects for nominalistic unified fictionalism. ;In the first chapter, I defend modal fictionalism: the view that statements about possible worlds are best understood as claims about the content of a fiction, the 'many-worlds story'. I address the Brock-Rosen objection (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  50. Fictionalism in Metaphysics.Frederick Kroon - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (11):786-803.
    This is a survey of contemporary work on ‘fictionalism in metaphysics’, a term that is taken to signify both the place of fictionalism as a distinctive anti‐realist metaphysics in which usefulness rather than truth is the norm of acceptance, and the fact that philosophers have given fictionalist treatments of a range of specifically metaphysical notions.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
1 — 50 / 102