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106 found
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1 — 50 / 106
  1. added 2018-12-28
    The Question of Moral Ontology.Daniel Nolan - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):201-221.
    Our ordinary moral practices not only suppose that some people ought to perform some actions, and that some outcomes are morally better or worse than others, but also that there are rights, duties, goodness, and other apparently abstract moral entities. What should we make of these entities, and the talk of these entities? It is not straighforward to account for these entities in other terms. On the other hand, this paper will argue that talk of such entities is not easily (...)
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  2. added 2018-10-09
    The Physical World is a Fiction.Peter Lloyd - 1994 - Philosophy Now 11:5-9.
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  3. added 2018-09-22
    Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen '(Nicht-)Metaphysik' der Religion: (Anti-)Realismus, (Non-)Kognitivismus und die religiöse Imagination.Amber Griffioen - 2016 - In Rico Gutschmidt & Thomas Rentsch (eds.), Gott ohne Theismus. Münster, Germany: pp. 127-147.
    In this chapter, I first explore the possible meanings of the expression 'non-metaphysical religion' and its relation to the realism and cognitivism debates (as well as these debates' relation to each other). I then sketch out and defend the germs of an alternative semantics for religious language that I call 'religious imaginativism'. This semantics attempts to move us away from the realism-antirealism debates in Philosophy of Religion and in this sense might count as 'non-metaphysical'. At the same time, it allows (...)
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  4. added 2018-06-08
    A Critique of Metaphysical Thinking.T. Parent - manuscript
    This is a rough draft of the front matter and ch. 1, for a new book manuscript on metametaphysics.
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  5. added 2018-02-17
    Revolutionary Fictionalism: A Call to Arms.Mary Leng - 2005 - Philosophia Mathematica 13 (3):277-293.
    This paper responds to John Burgess's ‘Mathematics and _Bleak House_’. While Burgess's rejection of hermeneutic fictionalism is accepted, it is argued that his two main attacks on revolutionary fictionalism fail to meet their target. Firstly, ‘philosophical modesty’ should not prevent philosophers from questioning the truth of claims made within successful practices, provided that the utility of those practices as they stand can be explained. Secondly, Carnapian scepticism concerning the meaningfulness of _metaphysical_ existence claims has no force against a _naturalized_ version (...)
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  6. added 2017-07-25
    Committing Ourselves to Nothing: An Anti-Orthodox View of Existential Quantifier Expressions.Stephen M. Nelson - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Minnesota
    There is a significant difference between the words `is' and `exists' that has either been overlooked or under-appreciated by many philosophers. This difference comes in sentences that express existential quantification using `is', `exists', or their cognates, such as, "There are cookies in the jar," or, "There exists a strange species of fish that nobody has studied yet." Phrases such as `there are' and `there exists' are existential quantifier expressions, since they're used to express existential quantification. The orthodox view of these (...)
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  7. added 2017-05-01
    Metaphysics as Make-Believe.Alexis Burgess - 2010 - In John Woods (ed.), Fictions and Models. Philosophia.
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  8. added 2017-02-15
    Editorial: Truth Matters.Denis Dutton & Patrick Patrick Gerard Henry - 1996 - Philosophy and Literature 20 (2):299-304.
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  9. added 2017-02-07
    Editorial: Truth Matters.Henry Patrick Gerard & Dutton Denis - 1996 - Philosophy and Literature 20 (2):299-304.
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  10. added 2017-01-31
    Fictionalism Versus Deflationism: A New Look.Matteo Plebani - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):301-316.
    In the recent literature there has been some debate between advocates of deflationist and fictionalist positions in metaontology. The purpose of this paper is to advance the debate by reconsidering one objection presented by Amie Thomasson against fictionalist strategies in metaontology. The objection can be reconstructed in the following way. Fictionalists need to distinguish between the literal and the real content of sentences belonging to certain areas of discourse. In order to make that distinction, they need to assign different truth-conditions (...)
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  11. added 2017-01-28
    Fiction, Mathematics and Modality: A Unified Fictionalism.Seahwa Kim - 1999 - Dissertation, Princeton University
    I defend a unified fictionalism about modality and mathematics. First, I defend each view separately against internal objections. Then, I attempt a unified fictionalism by giving an analysis of truth in fiction which is neither modal nor platonistic. Finally, I explore the prospects for nominalistic unified fictionalism. ;In the first chapter, I defend modal fictionalism: the view that statements about possible worlds are best understood as claims about the content of a fiction, the 'many-worlds story'. I address the Brock-Rosen objection (...)
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  12. added 2017-01-22
    Fiction and Fictionalism.E. Caddick - 2011 - British Journal of Aesthetics 51 (3):340-343.
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  13. added 2017-01-20
    Colour Fictionalism.Dimitria Electra Gatzia - 2010 - Rivista di Estetica 43:109-123.
    In "How to Speak of the Colors", Mark Johnston’s claims that eliminativism would require us to jettison colour discourse. In this paper, I challenge Johnston’s claim. I argue that a particular version of eliminativism, i.e., prescriptive colour fictionalism, allows us to continue employing colour discourse as we have thus far in the absence of colours. In doing so, it employs statistical models in its base discourse to derive high-level statistical constructs that can be linked to the fiction via bridge principles.
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  14. added 2017-01-17
    Fictionalism in Ontology: The 2011 Paolo Bozzi Lecture.Achille C. Varzi - 2014 - Rivista di Estetica 56:253-270.
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  15. added 2017-01-17
    Some Problems with a Behavioristic Account of Early Group Pretense.Susannah K. Devitt - unknown
    _Free to read on publishers website_ In normal child development, both individual and group pretense first emerges at approximately two years of age. The metarepresentational account of pretense holds that children already have the concept PRETEND when they first engage in early group pretense. A behavioristic account suggests that early group pretense is analogous to early beliefs or desires and thus require no mental state concepts. I argue that a behavioral account does not explain the actual behavior observed in children (...)
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  16. added 2017-01-16
    Truth in Fictionalism.Alexis Burgess - forthcoming - In Michael Glanzberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford University Press.
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  17. added 2017-01-15
    Fictionalism and the Incompleteness Problem.Lukas Skiba - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1349-1362.
    Modal fictionalists face a problem that arises due to their possible-world story being incomplete in the sense that certain relevant claims are neither true nor false according to it. It has recently been suggested that this incompleteness problem generalises to other brands of fictionalism, such as fictionalism about composite or mathematical objects. In this paper, I argue that these fictionalist positions are particularly threatened by a generalised incompleteness problem since they cannot emulate the modal fictionalists’ most attractive response. I then (...)
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  18. added 2017-01-15
    Saving Mental Fictionalism From Cognitive Collapse.Meg Wallace - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (2):1-20.
    Mental fictionalism maintains that: folk psychology is a false theory, but we should nonetheless keep using it, because it is useful, convenient, or otherwise beneficial to do so. We should treat folk psychology as a useful fiction—false, but valuable. Yet some argue that mental fictionalism is incoherent: if a mental fictionalist rejects folk psychology then she cannot appeal to fictions in an effort to keep folk psychological discourse around, because fictions presuppose the legitimacy of folk psychology. Call this the Argument (...)
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  19. added 2017-01-15
    Pretense for the Complete Idiom.Andy Egan - 2008 - Noûs 42 (3):381-409.
  20. added 2017-01-14
    A Free Logic for Fictionalism.Mircea Dumitru - 2015 - In Iulian D. Toader, Gabriel Sandu & Ilie Pȃrvu (eds.), Romanian Studies in Philosophy of Science. Springer Verlag.
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  21. added 2017-01-04
    Can Fictionalists Have Faith?Finlay Malcolm - 2018 - Religious Studies 54 (2):215-232.
    According to non-doxastic theories of propositional faith, belief that p is not necessary for faith that p. Rather, propositional faith merely requires a ‘positive cognitive attitude’. This broad condition, however, can be satisfied by several pragmatic approaches to a domain, including fictionalism. This paper shows precisely how fictionalists can have faith given non-doxastic theory, and explains why this is problematic. It then explores one means of separating the two theories, in virtue of the fact that the truth of the propositions (...)
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  22. added 2016-12-27
    Review of Brock and Everett (Eds.) Fictional Objects. [REVIEW]Lee Walters - forthcoming - British Journal of Aesthetics.
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  23. added 2016-12-12
    Fiction and Metaphysics.Amie L. Thomasson - 1999 - Cambridge University Press.
    This challenging study places fiction squarely at the centre of the discussion of metaphysics. Philosophers have traditionally treated fiction as involving a set of narrow problems in logic or the philosophy of language. By contrast Amie Thomasson argues that fiction has far-reaching implications for central problems of metaphysics. The book develops an 'artifactual' theory of fiction, whereby fictional characters are abstract artifacts as ordinary as laws or symphonies or works of literature. By understanding fictional characters we come to understand how (...)
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  24. added 2016-12-08
    Fiction and Fictionalism.R. M. Sainsbury - 2009 - Routledge.
    Are fictional characters such as Sherlock Holmes real? What can fiction tell us about the nature of truth and reality? In this excellent introduction to the problem of fictionalism R. M. Sainsbury covers the following key topics: what is fiction? realism about fictional objects, including the arguments that fictional objects are real but non-existent; real but non-factual; real but non-concrete the relationship between fictional characters and non-actual worlds fictional entities as abstract artefacts fiction and intentionality and the problem of irrealism (...)
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  25. added 2016-12-08
    Reflexive Fictionalisms.Daniel Nolan & J. O'Leary-Hawthorne - 1996 - Analysis 56 (1):23-32.
  26. added 2016-12-05
    Review of David Chalmers, David Manley, Ryan Wasserman (Eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology[REVIEW]Elizabeth Barnes - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (10).
  27. added 2016-12-05
    Fictionalism in Metaphysics.Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.) - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Fictionalism is the view that a serious intellectual inquiry need not aim at truth. It came to prominence in philosophy in 1980, when Hartry Field argued that mathematics does not have to be true to be good, and Bas van Fraassen argued that the aim of science is not truth but empirical adequacy. Both suggested that the acceptance of a mathematical or scientific theory need not involve belief in its content. Thus the distinctive commitment of fictionalism is that acceptance in (...)
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  28. added 2016-11-15
    Fictional Contexts.Andrea Bonomi - 2008 - In P. Bouquet, L. Serafini & R. Thomason (eds.), Perspectives on Context. Stanford: CSLI Publications. pp. 213–48.
    is accounted for, among other things, in terms of particular relations between events (or states1) and places or times. Roughly speaking, an event α is said to occur in a place p (or interval t) if the spatial (temporal) extension of α is located in p (or t). Let the predicate ‘Occ’ denote such a relation. From this point of view, part of the content of the above sentences can be associated, respectively, with formulas such as.
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  29. added 2016-08-04
    The Will to Make‐Believe: Religious Fictionalism, Religious Beliefs, and the Value of Art.Andrea Sauchelli - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):620-635.
    I explore some of the reasons why, under specific circumstances, it may be rational to make-believe or imagine certain religious beliefs. Adopting a jargon familiar to certain contemporary philosophers, my main concern here is to assess what reasons can be given for adopting a fictionalist stance towards some religious beliefs. My understanding of fictionalism does not involve solely a propositional attitude but a broader stance, which may include certain acts of pretence. I also argue that a plausible reason to be (...)
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  30. added 2015-12-08
    The Myth of Seven.Stephen Yablo - 2005 - In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Clarendon Press. pp. 88--115.
  31. added 2015-10-02
    Names of Attitudes and Norms for Attitudes.Inga Nayding - 2015 - Disputatio 7 (40):1-24.
    Fictionalists claim that instead of believing certain controversial propositions they accept them nonseriously, as useful make-believe. In this way they present themselves as having an austere ontology despite the apparent ontological commitments of their discourse. Some philosophers object that this plays on a distinction without a difference: the fictionalist’s would-be nonserious acceptance is the most we can do for the relevant content acceptance-wise, hence such acceptance is no different from what we ordinarily call ‘belief’ and should be so called. They (...)
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  32. added 2015-09-08
    Truth, Pretense and the Liar Paradox.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2015 - In Kentaro Fujimoto, José Martínez Fernández, Henri Galinon & Theodora Achourioti (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Springer Verlag. pp. 339-354.
    In this paper we explain our pretense account of truth-talk and apply it in a diagnosis and treatment of the Liar Paradox. We begin by assuming that some form of deflationism is the correct approach to the topic of truth. We then briefly motivate the idea that all T-deflationists should endorse a fictionalist view of truth-talk, and, after distinguishing pretense-involving fictionalism (PIF) from error- theoretic fictionalism (ETF), explain the merits of the former over the latter. After presenting the basic framework (...)
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  33. added 2015-04-28
    It Ain’T Easy: Fictionalism, Deflationism, and Easy Arguments in Ontology.Gabriele Contessa - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):763-773.
    Fictionalism and deflationism are two moderate meta-ontological positions that try to occupy a middle ground between the extremes of heavy-duty realism and hard-line eliminativism. Deflationists believe that the existence of certain entities (e.g.: numbers) can be established by means of ‘easy’ arguments—arguments that, supposedly, rely solely on uncontroversial premises and trivial inferences. Fictionalists, however, find easy arguments unconvincing. Amie Thomasson has recently argued that, in their criticism of easy arguments, fictionalists beg the question against deflationism and that the fictionalist alternative (...)
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  34. added 2015-04-11
    Two Kinds of Fictionalism.Robert Hollinger - 1977 - The Monist 60 (4):556-567.
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  35. added 2015-03-27
    Modal Anti-Realism: Instrumentalism Vs. Fictionalism.Piotr Warzoszczak - 2011 - Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 6 (1):31-49.
    The aim of the paper is to compare two kinds of anti-realism about possible worlds: a version of instrumentalism and fictionalism. The former is inspired by M. Eklund’s paper Fiction, indifference and ontology, according to which ontologically uncommitted truth conditions for possible-world sentences are reducible to their instrumental utility and truth conditions of their literally true interpretations. The latter is inspired by S. Yablo’s work on fictionalism, according to which whenever we engage in possible-world talk, we engage in a game (...)
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  36. added 2015-03-24
    Fictionalism and the Informativeness of Identity.Kroon Frederick - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 106 (3):197 - 225.
    Identity claims often look nonsensical because they apparently declare distinct things to be identical. I argue that this appearance is not just an artefact of grammar. We should be fictionalists about such claims, seeing them against the background of speakers' pretense that their words secure reference to a plurality of objects that are then declared to be identical from within the pretense. I argue that it is the resulting interpretative tension – arising from the fact that two things can never (...)
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  37. added 2015-03-23
    Semantic Pretense.Mark Richard - 2000 - In T. Hofweber & A. Everett (eds.), Empty Names, Fiction, and the Puzzles of Non-Existence. CSLI Publications. pp. 205--32.
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  38. added 2015-03-22
    Fiction and Fictionalism, de RM Saisnbury. [REVIEW]María José Alcaraz León - 2011 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):179-185.
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  39. added 2015-03-21
    Pretense Theory and the Imported Background.Jeffrey Goodman - 2011 - Open Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):22.
    Kendall Walton’s pretense theory, like its rivals, says that what’s true in a fiction F depends in part on the importation of background propositions into F. The aim of this paper is to present, explain, and defend a brief yet straightforward argument–one which exploits the specific mechanism by which the pretense theory says propositions are imported into fictions–for the falsity of the pretense theory.
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  40. added 2015-03-20
    A Defence of Semantic Pretence Hermeneutic Fictionalism Against the Autism Objection.Seahwa Kim - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):1-13.
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  41. added 2015-03-20
    Fictionalism About Neural Representations.Mark Sprevak - 2013 - The Monist 96 (4):539-560.
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  42. added 2015-03-20
    Psychological Fictionalism, and the Threat of Fictionalist Suicide.Richard Joyce - 2013 - The Monist 96 (4):517-538.
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  43. added 2015-03-20
    Mental Fictionalism: The Very Idea.Tamás Demeter - 2013 - The Monist 96 (4):483-504.
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  44. added 2015-03-20
    Fictionalism Versus Deflationism.Amie L. Thomasson - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):1023-1051.
    Fictionalism has long presented an attractive alternative to both heavy-duty realist and simple eliminativist views about entities such as properties, propositions, numbers, and possible worlds. More recently, a different alternative to these traditional views has been gaining popularity: a form of deflationism that holds that trivial arguments may lead us from uncontroversial premisses to conclude that the relevant entities exist — but where commitment to the entities is a trivial consequence of other claims we accept, not a posit to explain (...)
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  45. added 2015-03-20
    Fiction and Fictionalism, by Mark Sainsbury. [REVIEW]Chiara Panizza - 2010 - Disputatio 4 (29):88-94.
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  46. added 2015-03-19
    Fictionalism.E. C. Bourne - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):147-162.
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  47. added 2015-03-18
    Fiction and Fictionalism * BY RICHARD M. SAINSBURY.A. Everett - 2011 - Analysis 71 (4):779-780.
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  48. added 2015-03-18
    Fictionalism in Metaphysics.Frederick Kroon - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (11):786-803.
    This is a survey of contemporary work on ‘fictionalism in metaphysics’, a term that is taken to signify both the place of fictionalism as a distinctive anti‐realist metaphysics in which usefulness rather than truth is the norm of acceptance, and the fact that philosophers have given fictionalist treatments of a range of specifically metaphysical notions.
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  49. added 2015-03-18
    Fictionalism and Moore's Paradox.Zoltán Gendler Szabó - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):293-307.
    A fictionalist attitude towards an area of discourse encourages us to assent to certain sentences of that discourse without believing that they are true. Prima facie, this amounts to a suggestion that we should also assent to sentences of the form 'S but I don't believe that S'. Traditional versions of fictionalism have an answer to this challenge, but I argue that the answer is unavailable for a currently popular type of fictionalism. This is bad news for fictionalism in general (...)
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  50. added 2015-03-18
    Fictionalism and Realism.Michael Neumann - 1978 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):533 - 541.
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