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  1. added 2020-06-19
    Chalmers V Chalmers.Daniel Stoljar - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):469-487.
    This paper brings out an inconsistency between David Chalmers's dualism, which is the main element of his philosophy of mind, and his structuralism, which is the main element of his epistemology. The point is ad hominem , but the inconsistency if it can be established is of considerable independent interest. For the best response to the inconsistency, I argue, is to adopt what Chalmers calls ‘type‐C Materialism’, a version of materialism that has been much discussed in recent times because of (...)
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  2. added 2020-04-19
    Phenomenal Consciousness.Manas Kumar Sahu - 2020 - Journal of Advances in Education and Philosophy 4 (4):160-166.
    The objective of this paper is to defend the non-reductive thesis of phenomenal consciousness. This paper will give an overview of the arguments for the non-reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness and justify why the reductionist approach is implausible in the context of explaining phenomenal subjective experience. The debate between reductionist and non-reductionist on the project of Demystifying and Mystifying phenomenal consciousness is driven by two fundamental assumptions-1) Reductive-Naturalistic Objectivism, 2) Phenomenal Realism. There are several arguments for the irreducibility of phenomenal (...)
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  3. added 2020-04-16
    Modal Arguments Against Materialism.Michael Pelczar - forthcoming - Noûs.
  4. added 2020-02-23
    Composition and the Cases.Andrew M. Bailey - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (5):453-470.
    Some strange cases have gripped philosophers of mind. They have been deployed against materialism about human persons, functionalism about mentality, the possibility of artificial intelligence, and more. In this paper, I cry “foul”. It’s not hard to think that there’s something wrong with the cases. But what? My proposal: their proponents ignore questions about composition. And ignoring composition is a mistake. Indeed, materialists about human persons, functionalists about mentality, and believers in the possibility of artificial intelligence can plausibly deploy moderate (...)
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  5. added 2019-10-14
    Emergentism as an Option in the Philosophy of Religion: Between Materialist Atheism and Pantheism.James Franklin - 2019 - Suri: Journal of the Philosophical Association of the Philippines 7 (2):1-22.
    Among worldviews, in addition to the options of materialist atheism, pantheism and personal theism, there exists a fourth, “local emergentism”. It holds that there are no gods, nor does the universe overall have divine aspects or any purpose. But locally, in our region of space and time, the properties of matter have given rise to entities which are completely different from matter in kind and to a degree god-like: consciousnesses with rational powers and intrinsic worth. The emergentist option is compared (...)
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  6. added 2019-03-22
    Conceivability Arguments.Katalin Balog - 1998 - Dissertation, Rutgers University
    The dissertation addresses the mind-body problem, and in particular, the problem of how to fit phenomenal consciousness into the rest of reality. Phenomenal consciousness - the what it’s like feature of experience - can appear to the scientifically inclined philosopher to be deeply mysterious. It is difficult to understand how the swirl of atoms in the void, the oscillation of field values, the firing of synapses, or anything physical can add up to the smells, tastes, feelings, moods, and so forth (...)
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  7. added 2019-02-03
    'Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness' by William S. Robinson. [REVIEW]Christian Onof - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (4).
  8. added 2018-10-28
    What Gary Couldn’T Imagine in Advance.Tufan Kiymaz - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Research.
    I propose an anti-physicalist argument, namely, the imagination argument, and defend it against possible objections. My argument is inspired by Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument, or rather its misinterpretation by Daniel Dennett and Paul Churchland. They interpret the knowledge argument to be about the ability to imagine an unexperienced phenomenal state, which Jackson explicitly denies. The imagination argument, in its rudimentary form, can be briefly put as the following. Let Q be a visual phenomenal quality that is imaginable based on one’s (...)
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  9. added 2018-07-06
    Is Consciousness Really a Brain Process?Eric LaRock - 2008 - International Philosophical Quarterly 48 (2):201-229.
    I argue on the basis of recent findings in neuroscience that consciousness is not a brain process, and then explore some alternative, non-reductive options concerning the metaphysical relationship between consciousness and the brain, such as weak and strong accounts of the emergence of consciousness and the constitution view of consciousness. I propose an Aristotelian account of the strong emergence of consciousness. This account motivates a wider ontology than reductive physicalism and makes reference to formal causation as a way explaining the (...)
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  10. added 2018-02-16
    Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 2.Dean Zimmerman (ed.) - 2006 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is the forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. Much of the most interesting work in philosophy today is metaphysical in character: this new series is a much-needed focus for it. OSM offers a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighbouring fields, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. (...)
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  11. added 2017-10-05
    Consciousness and the Physical World.Max Velmans - 2008 - In Michel Weber & Will Desmond (eds.), Handbook of Whiteheadian Process Thought Volume 1. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 371-382.
    Physicalists commonly argue that conscious experiences are nothing more than states of the brain, and that conscious qualia are observer-independent, physical properties of the external world. Although this assumes the ‘mantle of science,’ it routinely ignores the findings of science, for example in sensory physiology, perception, psychophysics, neuropsychology and comparative psychology. Consequently, although physicalism aims to ‘naturalise’ consciousness, it gives an unnatural account of it. It is possible, however, to develop a natural, nonreductive, reflexive model of how consciousness relates to (...)
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  12. added 2017-09-26
    A Natural Account of Phenomenal Consciousness.Max Velmans - 2001 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 34 (1):39-59.
    Physicalists commonly argue that conscious experiences are nothing more than states of the brain, and that conscious qualia are observer-independent, physical properties of the external world. Although this assumes the 'mantle of science,' it routinely ignores the findings of science, for example in sensory physiology, perception, psychophysics, neuropsychology and comparative psychology. Consequently, although physicalism aims to naturalise consciousness, it gives an unnatural account of it. It is possible, however, to develop a natural, nonreductive, reflexive model of how consciousness relates to (...)
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  13. added 2017-09-26
    The Limits of Neuropsychological Models of Consciousness.Max Velmans - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):702-703.
    This commentary elaborates on Gray's conclusion that his neurophysiological model of consciousness might explain how consciousness arises from the brain, but does not address how consciousness evolved, affects behaviour or confers survival value. The commentary argues that such limitations apply to all neurophysiological or other third-person perspective models. To approach such questions the first-person nature of consciousness needs to be taken seriously in combination with third-person models of the brain.
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  14. added 2017-09-25
    The Eudaimonian Question: On the Tragedy of Humanism (Ethics, Education and the Common Good).Raymond Aaron Younis - 2018 - Selected Papers From the Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia.
  15. added 2017-09-13
    How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?Max Velmans - 2003 - Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic.
    In daily life we take it for granted that our minds have conscious control of our actions, at least for most of the time. But many scientists and philosophers deny that this is really the case, because there is no generally accepted theory of how the mind interacts with the body. Max Velmans presents a non-reductive solution to the problem, in which ‘conscious mental control’ includes ‘voluntary’ operations of the preconscious mind. On this account, biological determinism is compatible with experienced (...)
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  16. added 2017-08-03
    A Posteriori Physicalism and the Discrimination of Properties.Philip Woodward - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):121-143.
    According to a posteriori physicalism, phenomenal properties are physical properties, despite the unbridgeable cognitive gap that holds between phenomenal concepts and physical concepts. Current debates about a posteriori physicalism turn on what I call “the perspicuity principle”: it is impossible for a suitably astute cognizer to possess concepts of a certain sort—viz., narrow concepts—without being able to tell whether the referents of those concepts are the same or different. The perspicuity principle tends to strike a posteriori physicalists as implausibly rationalistic; (...)
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  17. added 2017-03-13
    Vagueness and Zombies: Why ‘Phenomenally Conscious’ has No Borderline Cases.Jonathan Simon - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):2105-2123.
    I argue that there can be no such thing as a borderline case of the predicate ‘phenomenally conscious’: for any given creature at any given time, it cannot be vague whether that creature is phenomenally conscious at that time. I first defend the Positive Characterization Thesis, which says that for any borderline case of any predicate there is a positive characterization of that case that can show any sufficiently competent speaker what makes it a borderline case. I then appeal to (...)
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  18. added 2016-12-08
    The Simplicity Argument Versus a Materialist Theory of Consciousness.Ben L. Mijuskovic - 1976 - Philosophy Today 20 (4):292-305.
  19. added 2015-12-08
    Introduction.Robert C. Koons & George Bealer - 2010 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    In this introduction, before summarizing the contents of the volume, the authors characterize materialism as it is understood within the philosophy of mind, and they identify three respects in which materialism is on the wane.
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  20. added 2015-09-22
    Jan G. Michel: Der qualitative Charakter bewusster Erlebnisse. Physikalismus und phanomenale Eigenschaften in der Philosophie des Geistes. [REVIEW]Eva Schmidt - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):279-283.
  21. added 2015-08-29
    Review of Joe Levine's "Purple Haze". [REVIEW]Andrew Melnyk - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):359-362.
  22. added 2014-09-10
    Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem: The State of the Argument.Todd Moody - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (3-4):177-190.
  23. added 2014-09-02
    The Near-Death Experience Argument Against Physicalism: A Critique.B. Mitchell-Yellin & J. M. Fischer - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (7-8):158-183.
    Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, including the mind. One argument against physicalism appeals to neardeath experiences, conscious experiences during episodes, such as cardiac arrest, when one's normal brain functions are severely impaired. The core contention is that NDEs cannot be physically explained, and so we have reason to appeal to the non-physical in explaining them. In this paper, we consider in detail a recent article by Pim van Lommel in which he appeals to NDEs in arguing against (...)
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  24. added 2014-04-03
    A New Challenge for the Physicalist: Phenomenal Indistinguishabilty.Ran Lahav - 1994 - Philosophia 24 (1-2):77-103.
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  25. added 2014-03-28
    Conceptual Gaps and Odd Possibilities.Scott Sturgeon - 1999 - Mind 108 (430):377-380.
  26. added 2014-03-28
    Identifying Mental States: A Celebrated Hypothesis Refuted.Irwin Goldstein - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62.
    Functionalists think an event's causes and effects, its 'causal role', determines whether it is a mental state and, if so, which kind. Functionalists see this causal role principle as supporting their orthodox materialism, their commitment to the neuroscientist's ontology. I examine and refute the functionalist's causal principle and the orthodox materialism that attends that principle.
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  27. added 2014-03-21
    Neural Materialism, Pain's Badness, and a Posteriori Identities.Irwin Goldstein - 2004 - In Maite Ezcurdia, Robert Stainton & Christopher Viger (eds.), Canadian Journal of Philosophy. University of Calgary Press. pp. 261-273.
    Orthodox neural materialists think mental states are neural events or orthodox material properties of neutral events. Orthodox material properties are defining properties of the “physical”. A “defining property” of the physical is a type of property that provides a necessary condition for something’s being correctly termed “physical”. In this paper I give an argument against orthodox neural materialism. If successful, the argument would show at least some properties of some mental states are not orthodox material properties of neural events. Opposing (...)
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  28. added 2014-03-21
    Physicalism and the Necessary A Posteriori.Daniel Stoljar - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):33-55.
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  29. added 2014-03-19
    Materialism and the First Person.Geoffrey Madell - 2003 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 123-139.
    Here are some sentences from Fred Dretske's book Naturalising the Mind: For a materialist there are no facts that are accessible to only one person … If the subjective life of another being, what it is like to be that creature, seems inaccessible, this must be because we fail to understand what we are talking about when we talk about its subjective states. If S feels some way, and its feeling some way is a material state, how can it be (...)
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  30. added 2014-03-17
    Mind and its Place in the World: Non-Reductionist Approaches to the Ontology of Consciousness.Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom C. Elitzur (eds.) - 2006 - Ontos.
    By presenting a wide spectrum of non-reductive theories, the volume endeavors to overcome the dichotomy between dualism and monism that keeps plaguing the debate in favor of new and more differentiated positions.
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  31. added 2014-03-17
    Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science.Robert J. Stainton (ed.) - 2006 - Malden MA: Blackwell.
  32. added 2014-03-16
    Max Black's Objection to Mind-Body Identity.Ned Block - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2:3-78.
    considered an objection that he says he thought was first put to him by Max Black. He says.
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  33. added 2014-03-12
    Mary and Max and Jack and Ned.John Perry - 2006 - In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 2. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 79.
  34. added 2014-03-09
    Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry.Michael O'Rourke & Corey Washington (eds.) - 2005 - MIT Press.
    15 Situating Semantics: A Response John Perry Introduction I am very grateful to Michael O'Rourke and Corey Washington for envisaging and putting together ...
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  35. added 2014-03-07
    Do Theories of Consciousness Rest on a Mistake?Adam Pautz - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):333-367.
    Using empirical research on pain, sound and taste, I argue against the combination of intentionalism about consciousness and a broadly ‘tracking’ psychosemantics of the kind defended by Fodor, Dretske, Hill, Neander, Stalnaker, Tye and others. Then I develop problems with Kriegel and Prinz's attempt to combine a Dretskean psychosemantics with the view that sensible properties are Shoemakerian response-dependent properties. Finally, I develop in detail my own 'primitivist' view of sensory intentionality.
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  36. added 2014-02-10
    Replies. [REVIEW]John Perry - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):207-229.
    It would have been pleasant if David Chalmers, to whose arguments a good deal of KPC is devoted, had simply said that the book won him over completely, vowed never to ignore identity or commit the subject matter fallacy again, and expressed unbridled enthusiasm for all forms of reflexive content. ’Twas not to be.
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  37. added 2014-02-10
    Pr.John Perry - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):172-181.
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  38. added 2012-10-30
    In Defence of Antecedent Physicalism.Daniel Cohnitz - 2012 - In A. Newen & R. van Riel (eds.), Introduction to the Philosophy of John Perry. CSLI.
  39. added 2012-10-10
    Revelation and Physicalism.Nic Damnjanovic - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):69-91.
    Revelation is the thesis that having an experience that instantiates some phenomenal property puts us in a position to know the nature or essence of that property. It is widely held that although Revelation is prima facie plausible, it is inconsistent with physicalism, and, in particular, with the claim that phenomenal properties are physical properties. I outline the standard argument for the incompatibility of Revelation and physicalism and compare it with the Knowledge Argument. By doing so, I hope to show (...)
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  40. added 2011-04-05
    Can I Know What I Am ThInking?Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
    In this paper, I argue that, if a common form of materialism is true, I cannot know my own thoughts, or even that I am thinking. I conclude that, since I can and do know these things, materialism about mind as I characterize it must be false.
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  41. added 2011-02-14
    The Simplicity Intuition and Its Hidden Influence on Philosophy of Mind.David Barnett - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):308 - 335.
    Huxley’s Explanatory Gap: There can be no explanation of how states of consciousness arise from interaction among a collection of physical things.
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  42. added 2010-06-22
    Perception and Reality: From Descartes to the Present.Ralph Schumacher (ed.) - 2004 - Mentis.
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  43. added 2010-06-22
    The Physical Nature of Consciousness.P. Van Loocke (ed.) - 2001 - John Benjamins.
    Stuart Hameroff opens with an extended and updated exposition of the Penrose/Hameroff Orch-OR model, and subsequently addresses recent criticisms of quantum approaches to the brain. Evan Walker presents his view on consciousness from the perspective of a new approach to the integration of quantum theory and relativity. Friedrich Beck elaborates on the Beck/Eccles quantum approach to consciousness. Karl Pribram puts the holographic view on consciousness in perspective of his life long work. Peter Marcer and Edgar Mitchell explain the relevance of (...)
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  44. added 2009-10-29
    Physicalism Quaerens Intellectum.Benedikt Paul Göcke - 2008 - Philosophical Forum 39 (4):463-468.
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  45. added 2008-12-31
    Is Physicalism Simpler Than Dualism?Adam Pautz - manuscript
    The problems with Physicalism that have most exercised its defenders are.
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  46. added 2008-12-31
    The Relational Structure of Sensory Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem.Adam Pautz - manuscript
    I am going to develop an argument against Physicalism concerning qualitative mental properties. Unlike most arguments against Physicalism, it is not based on the usual a priori considerations, such as what Mary learns when she comes out of her black and white room or the apparent conceivability of Zombies. Rather, it is based on two broadly a posteriori premises about the structure of experience and its physical basis.
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  47. added 2008-12-31
    The Argument From Revelation.Daniel Stoljar - 2009 - In Robert Nola & David Braddon Mitchell (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. MIT Press.
    1. Introduction The story of Canberra, the capital of Australia, is roughly as follows. In 1901, when what is called.
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  48. added 2008-12-31
    Anti-Materialist Arguments and Influential Replies.Joe Levine - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 371--380.
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  49. added 2008-12-31
    Consciousness and Qualia Can Be Reduced.William G. Lycan - 2006 - In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell. pp. 189-201.
  50. added 2008-12-31
    Consciousness and Qualia Cannot Be Reduced.Brie Gertler - 2006 - In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell. pp. 202-216.
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