Related categories

57 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 57
  1. The Simplicity Intuition and Its Hidden Influence on Philosophy of Mind.David Barnett - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):308 - 335.
    Huxley’s Explanatory Gap: There can be no explanation of how states of consciousness arise from interaction among a collection of physical things.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  2. Mind and its Place in the World: Non-Reductionist Approaches to the Ontology of Consciousness.Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom C. Elitzur (eds.) - 2006 - Ontos.
    By presenting a wide spectrum of non-reductive theories, the volume endeavors to overcome the dichotomy between dualism and monism that keeps plaguing the debate in favor of new and more differentiated positions.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. The Rejection of the Identity Thesis.George Bealer - 1994 - In The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell.
    In this paper, the arguments against the mind-body identity thesis from the author’s [1994] paper, “Mental Properties,” are presented but in significantly more detail. It is shown that, because of scientific essentialism, two currently popular arguments against the identity thesis -- the multiple-realizability argument and the Nagel-Jackson knowledge argument -- are unsatisfactory as they stand and that their problems are incurable. It is then shown that a refutation of the identity thesis in its full generality can be achieved by weaving (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4. Max Black's Objection to Mind-Body Identity.Ned Block - 2006 - Oxford Review of Metaphysics 3:3-78.
    considered an objection that he says he thought was first put to him by Max Black. He says.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  5. The Property Dualism Argument Against Physicalism.Andrew Botterell - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28:223-242.
    Many contemporary philosophers of mind are concerned to defend a thesis called a posteriori physicalism. This thesis has two parts, one metaphysical, and the other epistemological. The metaphysical part of the thesis—the physicalist part—is the claim that the psychological nature of the actual world is wholly physical. The epistemological part of the thesis—the a posteriori part—is the claim that no a priori connection holds between psychological nature and physical nature. Despite its attractiveness, however, a familiar argument alleges that a posteriori (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Senses, Sensations and Brain Processes: A Criticism of the Property Dualism Argument.Leonard J. Clapp - 1997 - Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (1):139-148.
  7. In Defence of Antecedent Physicalism.Daniel Cohnitz - 2012 - In A. Newen & R. van Riel (eds.), Introduction to the Philosophy of John Perry. CSLI.
  8. Revelation and Physicalism.Nic Damnjanovic - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):69-91.
    Revelation is the thesis that having an experience that instantiates some phenomenal property puts us in a position to know the nature or essence of that property. It is widely held that although Revelation is prima facie plausible, it is inconsistent with physicalism, and, in particular, with the claim that phenomenal properties are physical properties. I outline the standard argument for the incompatibility of Revelation and physicalism and compare it with the Knowledge Argument. By doing so, I hope to show (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  9. Nagel's Argument That Mental Properties Are Nonphysical.Richard Double - 1983 - Philosophy Research Archives 9:217-22.
    One of Thomas Nagel’s premises in his argument for panpsychism is criticized. The principal criticisms are: Nagel has failed to provide a clear sense in which mental properties are nonphysical. Even within the framework of Nagel’s argumeent, there is no strong reason to think that the psychological lies outside the explanatory web of physical properties. This is because certain reducing properties common to both the psychological and nonpsychological may well be physical.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Can I Know What I Am ThInking?Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
    In this paper, I argue that, if a common form of materialism is true, I cannot know my own thoughts, or even that I am thinking. I conclude that, since I can and do know these things, materialism about mind as I characterize it must be false.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Consciousness and Qualia Cannot Be Reduced.Brie Gertler - 2006 - In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell. pp. 202-216.
  12. Physicalism Quaerens Intellectum.Benedikt Paul Göcke - 2008 - Philosophical Forum 39 (4):463-468.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  13. Neural Materialism, Pain's Badness, and a Posteriori Identities.Irwin Goldstein - 2004 - In Maite Ezcurdia, Robert Stainton & Christopher Viger (eds.), Canadian Journal of Philosophy. University of Calgary Press. pp. 261-273.
    Orthodox neural materialists think mental states are neural events or orthodox material properties of neutral events. Orthodox material properties are defining properties of the “physical”. A “defining property” of the physical is a type of property that provides a necessary condition for something’s being correctly termed “physical”. In this paper I give an argument against orthodox neural materialism. If successful, the argument would show at least some properties of some mental states are not orthodox material properties of neural events. Opposing (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Identifying Mental States: A Celebrated Hypothesis Refuted.Irwin Goldstein - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62.
    Functionalists think an event's causes and effects, its 'causal role', determines whether it is a mental state and, if so, which kind. Functionalists see this causal role principle as supporting their orthodox materialism, their commitment to the neuroscientist's ontology. I examine and refute the functionalist's causal principle and the orthodox materialism that attends that principle.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  15. The Reasons of a Materialist.Laurence Goldstein - 1980 - Philosophy 55 (April):249-252.
  16. How Not to Be a Reductivist.William Hasker - 2003 - Progress in Complexity, Information, and Design 2.
  17. On Neutralizing Introspection: The Data of Sensuous Awareness.J. S. Kelly - 1989 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):29-53.
  18. Introduction.Robert C. Koons & George Bealer - 2010 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    In this introduction, before summarizing the contents of the volume, the authors characterize materialism as it is understood within the philosophy of mind, and they identify three respects in which materialism is on the wane.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. A New Challenge for the Physicalist: Phenomenal Indistinguishabilty.Ran Lahav - 1994 - Philosophia 24 (1-2):77-103.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Anti-Materialist Arguments and Influential Replies.Joe Levine - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 371--380.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. The Physical Nature of Consciousness.P. Van Loocke (ed.) - 2001 - John Benjamins.
    Stuart Hameroff opens with an extended and updated exposition of the Penrose/Hameroff Orch-OR model, and subsequently addresses recent criticisms of quantum approaches to the brain. Evan Walker presents his view on consciousness from the perspective of a new approach to the integration of quantum theory and relativity. Friedrich Beck elaborates on the Beck/Eccles quantum approach to consciousness. Karl Pribram puts the holographic view on consciousness in perspective of his life long work. Peter Marcer and Edgar Mitchell explain the relevance of (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Consciousness and Qualia Can Be Reduced.William G. Lycan - 2006 - In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell. pp. 189-201.
  23. Materialism and the First Person.Geoffrey C. Madell - 2003 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 123-139.
    Here are some sentences from Fred Dretske's book Naturalising the Mind: For a materialist there are no facts that are accessible to only one person … If the subjective life of another being, what it is like to be that creature, seems inaccessible, this must be because we fail to understand what we are talking about when we talk about its subjective states. If S feels some way, and its feeling some way is a material state, how can it be (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  24. Mind and Materialism.Geoffrey C. Madell - 1988 - Edinburgh University Press.
  25. Understanding Sensations.Nicholas Maxwell - 1968 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 46 (August):127-146.
    My aim in this paper is to defend a version of the brain process theory, or identity thesis, which differs in one important respect from the theory put forward by J.J.C. Smart. I shall argue that although the sensations which a person experiences are, as a matter of contingent fact, brain processes, nonetheless there are facts about sensations which cannot be described or understood in terms of any physical theory. These 'mental' facts cannot be described by physics for the simple (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  26. What is It Not Like to Be a Brain?Colin McGinn - 2001 - In P. Loockvane (ed.), The Physical Nature of Consciousness. John Benjamins. pp. 157.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  27. A Refutation of Qualia Physicalism.Michael McKinsey - 2005 - In Michael O'Rourke & Corey G. Washington (eds.), Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry. MIT Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Review of Joe Levine's "Purple Haze". [REVIEW]Andrew Melnyk - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):359-362.
  29. The Simplicity Argument Versus a Materialist Theory of Consciousness.Ben L. Mijuskovic - 1976 - Philosophy Today 20 (4):292-305.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. The Near-Death Experience Argument Against Physicalism: A Critique.B. Mitchell-Yellin & J. M. Fischer - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (7-8):158-183.
    Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, including the mind. One argument against physicalism appeals to neardeath experiences, conscious experiences during episodes, such as cardiac arrest, when one's normal brain functions are severely impaired. The core contention is that NDEs cannot be physically explained, and so we have reason to appeal to the non-physical in explaining them. In this paper, we consider in detail a recent article by Pim van Lommel in which he appeals to NDEs in arguing against (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem: The State of the Argument.Todd Moody - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (3-4):177-190.
  32. Phenomenal Essentialism: A Problem for Identity Theorists.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 2004 - In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Reality: From Descartes to the Present. Mentis.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry.Michael O'Rourke & Corey G. Washington (eds.) - 2005 - MIT Press.
    15 Situating Semantics: A Response John Perry Introduction I am very grateful to Michael O'Rourke and Corey Washington for envisaging and putting together ...
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Is Physicalism Simpler Than Dualism?Adam Pautz - manuscript
    The problems with Physicalism that have most exercised its defenders are.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. The Relational Structure of Sensory Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem.Adam Pautz - manuscript
    I am going to develop an argument against Physicalism concerning qualitative mental properties. Unlike most arguments against Physicalism, it is not based on the usual a priori considerations, such as what Mary learns when she comes out of her black and white room or the apparent conceivability of Zombies. Rather, it is based on two broadly a posteriori premises about the structure of experience and its physical basis.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Do Theories of Consciousness Rest on a Mistake?Adam Pautz - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):333-367.
    Using empirical research on pain, sound and taste, I argue against the combination of intentionalism about consciousness and a broadly ‘tracking’ psychosemantics of the kind defended by Fodor, Dretske, Hill, Neander, Stalnaker, Tye and others. Then I develop problems with Kriegel and Prinz's attempt to combine a Dretskean psychosemantics with the view that sensible properties are Shoemakerian response-dependent properties. Finally, I develop in detail my own 'primitivist' view of sensory intentionality.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  37. Mary and Max and Jack and Ned.John Perry - 2006 - In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 2. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 79.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Pr.John Perry - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):172-181.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Replies. [REVIEW]John Perry - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):207-229.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  40. Objections to Physicalism.Howard M. Robinson (ed.) - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
    Physicalism has, over the past twenty years, become almost an orthodoxy, especially in the philosophy of mind. Many philosophers, however, feel uneasy about this development, and this volume is intended as a collective response to it. Together these papers, written by philosophers from Britain, the United States, and Australasia, show that physicalism faces enormous problems in every area in which it is discussed. The contributors not only investigate the well-known difficulties that physicalism has in accommodating sensory consciousness, but also bring (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  41. Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism.Howard M. Robinson - 1982 - Cambridge University Press.
    The assumption of materialism Howard Robinson believes is false.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  42. The Argument Against Physicalism.Gregg H. Rosenberg - 2004 - In A Place for Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  43. Jan G. Michel: Der qualitative Charakter bewusster Erlebnisse. Physikalismus und phanomenale Eigenschaften in der Philosophie des Geistes. [REVIEW]Eva Schmidt - 2013 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):279-283.
  44. Perception and Reality: From Descartes to the Present.Ralph Schumacher (ed.) - 2004 - Mentis.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  45. Is Consciousness Physical?Roy Wood Sellars - 1922 - Journal of Philosophy 19 (25):690-694.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Foundations for a Metaphysics of Pure Process, III: Is Consciousness Physical?Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1981 - The Monist 64 (January):66-90.
  47. Vagueness and Zombies: Why ‘Phenomenally Conscious’ has No Borderline Cases.Jonathan A. Simon - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    I argue that there can be no such thing as a borderline case of the predicate ‘phenomenally conscious’: for any given creature at any given time, it cannot be vague whether that creature is phenomenally conscious at that time. I first defend the Positive Characterization Thesis, which says that for any borderline case of any predicate there is a positive characterization of that case that can show any sufficiently competent speaker what makes it a borderline case. I then appeal to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Non-Reductive Physicalism?A. D. Smith - 1993 - In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  49. Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science.Robert J. Stainton (ed.) - 2006 - Malden MA: Blackwell.
  50. The Argument From Revelation.Daniel Stoljar - 2009 - In Robert Nola & David Braddon Mitchell (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. MIT Press.
    1. Introduction The story of Canberra, the capital of Australia, is roughly as follows. In 1901, when what is called.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
1 — 50 / 57