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  1. Can I Know What I Am ThInking?Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
    In this paper, I argue that, if a common form of materialism is true, I cannot know my own thoughts, or even that I am thinking. I conclude that, since I can and do know these things, materialism about mind as I characterize it must be false.
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  2. What Gary Couldn’T Imagine in Advance.Tufan Kiymaz - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Research.
    I propose an anti-physicalist argument, namely, the imagination argument, and defend it against possible objections. My argument is inspired by Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument, or rather its misinterpretation by Daniel Dennett and Paul Churchland. They interpret the knowledge argument to be about the ability to imagine an unexperienced phenomenal state, which Jackson explicitly denies. The imagination argument, in its rudimentary form, can be briefly put as the following. Let Q be a visual phenomenal quality that is imaginable based on one’s (...)
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  3. Modal Arguments Against Materialism.Michael Pelczar - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):426-444.
  4. Phenomenal Consciousness.Manas Kumar Sahu - 2020 - Journal of Advances in Education and Philosophy 4 (4):160-166.
    The objective of this paper is to defend the non-reductive thesis of phenomenal consciousness. This paper will give an overview of the arguments for the non-reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness and justify why the reductionist approach is implausible in the context of explaining phenomenal subjective experience. The debate between reductionist and non-reductionist on the project of Demystifying and Mystifying phenomenal consciousness is driven by two fundamental assumptions-1) Reductive-Naturalistic Objectivism, 2) Phenomenal Realism. There are several arguments for the irreducibility of phenomenal (...)
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  5. Chalmers V Chalmers.Daniel Stoljar - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):469-487.
    This paper brings out an inconsistency between David Chalmers's dualism, which is the main element of his philosophy of mind, and his structuralism, which is the main element of his epistemology. The point is ad hominem , but the inconsistency if it can be established is of considerable independent interest. For the best response to the inconsistency, I argue, is to adopt what Chalmers calls ‘type‐C Materialism’, a version of materialism that has been much discussed in recent times because of (...)
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  6. Emergentism as an Option in the Philosophy of Religion: Between Materialist Atheism and Pantheism.James Franklin - 2019 - Suri: Journal of the Philosophical Association of the Philippines 7 (2):1-22.
    Among worldviews, in addition to the options of materialist atheism, pantheism and personal theism, there exists a fourth, “local emergentism”. It holds that there are no gods, nor does the universe overall have divine aspects or any purpose. But locally, in our region of space and time, the properties of matter have given rise to entities which are completely different from matter in kind and to a degree god-like: consciousnesses with rational powers and intrinsic worth. The emergentist option is compared (...)
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  7. On the Meta-Problem.J. Levine - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):148-159.
    According to Chalmers (2018), the meta-problem of consciousness is 'the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness'. In this paper I argue that the key to understanding both consciousness itself and addressing the meta-problem is to understand what acquaintance is and what its objects are. Unfortunately, I think there are still some serious mysteries lurking here, which I present briefly in this commentary. In particular, on the view of acquaintance I favour, it is unclear (...)
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  8. Mind--Brain Relationship and the Perspective of Meaning.R. Mukhopadhyay - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):184-208.
    We view the mind-body problem in terms of the two interconnected problems of phenomenal consciousness and mental causation, namely, how subjective conscious experience can arise from physical neurological processes and how conscious mental states can causally act upon the physical world. In order to address these problems, I develop here a non-physicalist framework that combines two apparently antithetical views: the materialist view of the mind as a product of the brain and the metaphysical view of consciousness rooted in an underlying (...)
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  9. A Posteriori Physicalism and the Discrimination of Properties.Philip Woodward - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):121-143.
    According to a posteriori physicalism, phenomenal properties are physical properties, despite the unbridgeable cognitive gap that holds between phenomenal concepts and physical concepts. Current debates about a posteriori physicalism turn on what I call “the perspicuity principle”: it is impossible for a suitably astute cognizer to possess concepts of a certain sort—viz., narrow concepts—without being able to tell whether the referents of those concepts are the same or different. The perspicuity principle tends to strike a posteriori physicalists as implausibly rationalistic; (...)
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  10. The Eudaimonian Question: On the Tragedy of Humanism (Ethics, Education and the Common Good).Raymond Aaron Younis - 2018 - Selected Papers From the Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia.
  11. The Problem of the Base and the Nature of Information.C. Montemayor - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (9-10):91-102.
    I present three problems regarding the Problem of the Base. They concern the nature of information, the kind of Platonism that physicalists allegedly confront, and the constraints imposed by causal principles. These problems focus on the notion of information and its relation to the Problem of the Base. I also highlight the importance of Schneider's paper, particularly its relevance for future debates.
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  12. Should Physicalists Fear Abstracta?B. G. Montero - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (9-10):40-49.
    Susan Schneider argues that physicalism must be false if abstracta are part of the physicalist's dependence base. In opposition to her view, here I set out some reasons to think that abstracta in general, including abstracta that are woven into the dependence base, are something physicalists can countenance with consistency.
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  13. Does the Mathematical Nature of Physics Undermine Physicalism?Susan Schneider - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (9-10):7-39.
  14. Vagueness and Zombies: Why ‘Phenomenally Conscious’ has No Borderline Cases.Jonathan A. Simon - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):2105-2123.
    I argue that there can be no such thing as a borderline case of the predicate ‘phenomenally conscious’: for any given creature at any given time, it cannot be vague whether that creature is phenomenally conscious at that time. I first defend the Positive Characterization Thesis, which says that for any borderline case of any predicate there is a positive characterization of that case that can show any sufficiently competent speaker what makes it a borderline case. I then appeal to (...)
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  15. On Physics' Faustian Bargain with Mathematics.G. Vision - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (9-10):59-71.
    Standard physicalism is repudiated by Susan Schneider on the grounds that the science of physics at physicalism's foundation is individuated by mathematics, revealing that science is abstract rather than concrete. She seeks to remedy the situation for physics, though not for physicalism, with a panprotopsychist variant of panpyschism. Her approach is clever and well-developed, but I believe it suffers from at least two flaws. First, with few exceptions individuation is the wrong tool for the discovery of a thing's nature; second, (...)
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  16. The Structure and Dynamics Argument Against Materialism.Torin Alter - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4):794-815.
  17. Composition and the Cases.Andrew M. Bailey - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (5):453-470.
    Some strange cases have gripped philosophers of mind. They have been deployed against materialism about human persons, functionalism about mentality, the possibility of artificial intelligence, and more. In this paper, I cry “foul”. It’s not hard to think that there’s something wrong with the cases. But what? My proposal: their proponents ignore questions about composition. And ignoring composition is a mistake. Indeed, materialists about human persons, functionalists about mentality, and believers in the possibility of artificial intelligence can plausibly deploy moderate (...)
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  18. On There Being Infinitely Many Thinkable Thoughts: A Reply to Porpora and a Defence of Tegmark.Benjamin L. Curtis - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):35-42.
    Porpora offers an a priori argument for the conclusion that there are infinitely many thoughts that it is physically possible for us to think. That there should be such an a priori argument is astonishing enough. That the argument should be simple enough to teach to a first-year undergraduate class in about 20 min, as Porpora’s is, is more astonishing still. Porpora’s main target is Max Tegmark’s recent argument for the claim that if current physics is right, then there are (...)
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  19. Self-Referentiality and Two Arguments Refuting Physicalism.Amihud Gilead - 2015 - International Philosophical Quarterly 55 (4):471-477.
  20. The Physicalist's Tight Squeeze: A Posteriori Physicalism Vs. A Priori Physicalism.Robert J. Howell - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):905-913.
    Both a priori physicalism and a posteriori physicalism combine a metaphysical and an epistemological thesis. They agree about the metaphysical thesis: our world is wholly physical. Most agree that this requires everything that there is must be necessitated by the sort of truths described by physics. If we call the conjunction of the basic truths of physics P, all physicalists agree that P entails for any truth Q. Where they disagree is whether or not this entailment can be known a (...)
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  21. If Materialism is True, the United States is Probably Conscious.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1697-1721.
    If you’re a materialist, you probably think that rabbits are conscious. And you ought to think that. After all, rabbits are a lot like us, biologically and neurophysiologically. If you’re a materialist, you probably also think that conscious experience would be present in a wide range of naturally-evolved alien beings behaviorally very similar to us even if they are physiologically very different. And you ought to think that. After all, to deny it seems insupportable Earthly chauvinism. But a materialist who (...)
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  22. Russellian Monism or Nagelian Monism?Daniel Stoljar - 2015 - In Torin Alter & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism. New York, NY, USA:
  23. Eliminating the Physical.Peter Ells - 2014 - Oxford Philosophical Society Review 36:23-27.
    If we reject physicalism, for the reasons given in my 2011 book ‘Panpsychism,’ we can arrive at a variant of idealism that accepts the concrete existence of all entities discoverable by science, but argues that these are nothing over and above centres of experience that can perceive one another and act on their percepts. In this metaphysical system, all physical properties and laws reduce without remainder to mental dittos – length is used in this paper as an example. Adopting this (...)
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  24. The Near-Death Experience Argument Against Physicalism: A Critique.B. Mitchell-Yellin & J. M. Fischer - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (7-8):158-183.
    Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, including the mind. One argument against physicalism appeals to neardeath experiences, conscious experiences during episodes, such as cardiac arrest, when one's normal brain functions are severely impaired. The core contention is that NDEs cannot be physically explained, and so we have reason to appeal to the non-physical in explaining them. In this paper, we consider in detail a recent article by Pim van Lommel in which he appeals to NDEs in arguing against (...)
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  25. Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem: The State of the Argument.Todd Moody - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (3-4):177-190.
  26. Explorations Around the Edges of Consciousness': Report on an International Workshop on East-West Approaches to the Nature of Mind, Consciousness, and Self.M. Velmans - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (11-12):140-148.
    n April, 2014 I organized an International Workshop on East-West Approaches to the Nature of Mind, Consciousness and Self, in the beautiful grounds of Dartington Hall, in Devon, England to explore the edges of current understanding of ordinary and extra-ordinary conscious experience. Although Consciousness Studies is now a flourishing area of investigation, ordinary and extra-ordinary human experiences do not fit comfortably into the prevailing materialist-reductionist paradigm, suggesting the need to explore non-reductionist approaches in an open, but nevertheless rigorous way. Consciousness (...)
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  27. Parrish, Stephen., The Knower and the Known: Physicalism, Dualism, and the Nature of Intelligibility. [REVIEW]Adam Wood - 2014 - Review of Metaphysics 67 (3):659-660.
  28. In Defence of Antecedent Physicalism.Daniel Cohnitz - 2012 - In A. Newen & R. van Riel (eds.), Introduction to the Philosophy of John Perry. CSLI.
  29. Revelation and Physicalism.Nic Damnjanovic - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):69-91.
    Revelation is the thesis that having an experience that instantiates some phenomenal property puts us in a position to know the nature or essence of that property. It is widely held that although Revelation is prima facie plausible, it is inconsistent with physicalism, and, in particular, with the claim that phenomenal properties are physical properties. I outline the standard argument for the incompatibility of Revelation and physicalism and compare it with the Knowledge Argument. By doing so, I hope to show (...)
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  30. Jan G. Michel: Der qualitative Charakter bewusster Erlebnisse. Physikalismus und phanomenale Eigenschaften in der Philosophie des Geistes. [REVIEW]Eva Schmidt - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):279-283.
  31. Introduction to Monist Alternatives to Physicalism.Max Velmans, Yujin Nagasawa, In M. Velmans & Y. Nagasawa - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (9-10):7-18.
    This Introduction to a Journal of Consciousness Studies Special Issue on Monist Alternatives to Physicalism summarises some of the basic problems of Physicalism and common fallacies in arguments for its defence that are found in the philosophical and scientific literature. It then introduces six monist alternatives: 1) a form of emergent panpsychism developed by William Seager; 2) a novel introduction to the process philosophy of A.N. Whitehead by Anderson Weekes; 3) a review of current developments in Russellian Monism by Torin (...)
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  32. You Are Simple.David Barnett - 2010 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism. Oxford University Press. pp. 161--174.
    I argue that, unlike your brain, you are not composed of other things: you are simple. My argument centers on what I take to be an uncontroversial datum: for any pair of conscious beings, it is impossible for the pair itself to be conscious. Consider, for instance, the pair comprising you and me. You might pinch your arm and feel a pain. I might simultaneously pinch my arm and feel a qualitatively identical pain. But the pair we form would not (...)
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  33. Introduction.Robert C. Koons & George Bealer - 2010 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    In this introduction, before summarizing the contents of the volume, the authors characterize materialism as it is understood within the philosophy of mind, and they identify three respects in which materialism is on the wane.
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  34. Wu Huan Xing Yi: Ren Lei Ji Jiang You Wu Zhi Shi Dai Zhuan Yi Dao Xin Ling Shi Dai de da Qu Shi.Qianqi Li - 2010 - Bai Xiang Wen Hua Shi Ye You Xian Gong Si.
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  35. Do Theories of Consciousness Rest on a Mistake?Adam Pautz - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):333-367.
    Using empirical research on pain, sound and taste, I argue against the combination of intentionalism about consciousness and a broadly ‘tracking’ psychosemantics of the kind defended by Fodor, Dretske, Hill, Neander, Stalnaker, Tye and others. Then I develop problems with Kriegel and Prinz's attempt to combine a Dretskean psychosemantics with the view that sensible properties are Shoemakerian response-dependent properties. Finally, I develop in detail my own 'primitivist' view of sensory intentionality.
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  36. Epistemological Objections to Materialism.Robert C. Koons - 2009 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 281--306.
    This chapter argues that materialism is vulnerable to two kinds of epistemological objections: transcendental arguments, that show that materialism is incompatible with the very possibility of knowledge; and defeater arguments, that show that belief in materialism provides an effective defeaters to claims to knowledge. It constructs objections of these two kinds in three areas of epistemology: our knowledge of the laws of nature (and of scientific essences), our knowledge of the ontology of material objects, mathematical and logical knowledge. The chapter (...)
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  37. Substance Dualism : A Non-Cartesian Approach.E. J. Lowe - 2009 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
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  38. Saving Appearances: A Dilemma for Physicalists.Charles Siewert - 2009 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
  39. The Argument From Revelation.Daniel Stoljar - 2009 - In Robert Nola & David Braddon Mitchell (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. MIT Press.
    1. Introduction The story of Canberra, the capital of Australia, is roughly as follows. In 1901, when what is called.
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  40. The Simplicity Intuition and Its Hidden Influence on Philosophy of Mind.David Barnett - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):308 - 335.
    Huxley’s Explanatory Gap: There can be no explanation of how states of consciousness arise from interaction among a collection of physical things.
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  41. Physicalism Quaerens Intellectum.Benedikt Paul Göcke - 2008 - Philosophical Forum 39 (4):463-468.
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  42. Reply to Goff on Physicalism.Robert Kirk - 2008 - Ratio 21 (1):106–112.
  43. Is Consciousness Really a Brain Process?Eric LaRock - 2008 - International Philosophical Quarterly 48 (2):201-229.
    I argue on the basis of recent findings in neuroscience that consciousness is not a brain process, and then explore some alternative, non-reductive options concerning the metaphysical relationship between consciousness and the brain, such as weak and strong accounts of the emergence of consciousness and the constitution view of consciousness. I propose an Aristotelian account of the strong emergence of consciousness. This account motivates a wider ontology than reductive physicalism and makes reference to formal causation as a way explaining the (...)
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  44. Consciousness and the Physical World.Max Velmans - 2008 - In Michel Weber & Will Desmond (eds.), Handbook of Whiteheadian Process Thought Volume 1. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 371-382.
    Physicalists commonly argue that conscious experiences are nothing more than states of the brain, and that conscious qualia are observer-independent, physical properties of the external world. Although this assumes the ‘mantle of science,’ it routinely ignores the findings of science, for example in sensory physiology, perception, psychophysics, neuropsychology and comparative psychology. Consequently, although physicalism aims to ‘naturalise’ consciousness, it gives an unnatural account of it. It is possible, however, to develop a natural, nonreductive, reflexive model of how consciousness relates to (...)
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  45. God, Physicalism, and the Totality of Facts.Andrea Christofidou - 2007 - Philosophy 82 (4):515-542.
    The paper offers a general critique of physicalism and of one variety of nonphysicalism, arguing that such theses are untenable. By distinguishing between the absolute conception of reality and the causal completeness of physics it shows that the 'explanatory gap' is not merely epistemic but metaphysical. It defends the essential subjectivity and unity of consciousness and its inseparability from a self-conscious autonomous rational and moral being. Casting a favourable light on dualism freed from misconceptions, it suggests that the only plausible (...)
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  46. Anti-Materialist Arguments and Influential Replies.Joe Levine - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 371--380.
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  47. Mind and its Place in the World: Non-Reductionist Approaches to the Ontology of Consciousness.Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom C. Elitzur (eds.) - 2006 - Ontos.
    By presenting a wide spectrum of non-reductive theories, the volume endeavors to overcome the dichotomy between dualism and monism that keeps plaguing the debate in favor of new and more differentiated positions.
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  48. Max Black's Objection to Mind-Body Identity.Ned Block - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2:3-78.
    considered an objection that he says he thought was first put to him by Max Black. He says.
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  49. Consciousness and Qualia Cannot Be Reduced.Brie Gertler - 2006 - In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell. pp. 202-216.
  50. Consciousness and Qualia Can Be Reduced.William G. Lycan - 2006 - In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell. pp. 189-201.
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