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  1. Review of From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds by Daniel C. Dennett. [REVIEW]Hane Htut Maung - 2020 - Synthesis Philosophica 35:267-270.
  2. A Novel Reading of Thomas Nagel’s “Challenge” to Physicalism.Serdal Tümkaya - forthcoming - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu.
    In passing remarks, some commentators have noted that for Nagel, physicalism is true. It has even been argued that Nagel seeks to find the best path to follow to achieve future physicalism. I advance these observations by adding that for Nagel, we should discuss the consciousness problem not in terms of physical and mental issues but in terms of our desire to include consciousness in an objective/scientific account, and we can achieve this only by revising our self-conception, i.e., folk psychology, (...)
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  3. Proximal Experience as an Essential Part of Physics.J. C. W. Edwards - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (3-4):76-99.
    Conscious experience has been said to be outside of, or alien to, physics, and unexplained in a physical world. However, it is argued here that experience is entirely expected in a physical world that can only be defined by its power to determine patterns of experience. Something physical is something with the type of causal power that can contribute to determining the content of an experience if a subject is present at the right place and time. Physical powers also interact (...)
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  4. Donald Davidson su metafora e monismo anomalo.Alessandro Cavazzana - 2016 - In Gabriella Airenti, Marco Cruciani & Maurizio Tirassa (eds.), Mind the Gap: Brain, Cognition and Society. Torino TO, Italia: pp. 117-123.
    The aim of this paper is to match anomalous monism with some of Donald Davidson's theories about metaphorical meaning. In particular, I will use anomalous monism to justify Davidson's scepticism toward the paraphrase and to suggest an insight of the metaphor from the speaker's side, in contrast with the whole Davidson's theory of meaning, formulated – as is well known – from the interpreter's side.
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  5. Attending to the Illusion of Consciousness.J. Dewhurst & K. Dolega - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):54-61.
    Chalmers (2018) raises three challenges for Michael Graziano's attention schema theory. Our aim in this paper is to bolster Graziano's attention schema theory with some tools and insights from the predictive processing framework, in order to respond to the challenges raised by Chalmers and more generally strengthen the theory. We will first introduce the attention schema theory and the three challenges raised by Chalmers, before outlining our application of predictive processing to the theory and how it can resolve these challenges, (...)
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  6. The Explanatory Gap Problem – How Neuroscience Might Contribute to its Solution.Daniel Kostic - 2012 - Dissertation, Humboldt University Berlin
    This thesis evaluates several powerful arguments that not only deny that brain states and conscious states are one and the same thing, but also claim that such an identity is unintelligible. I argue that these accounts do not undermine physicalism because they don’t provide any direct or independent justification for their tacit assumptions about a link between modes of presentation and explanation. In my view intelligibility of psychophysical identity should not be based exclusively on the analysis of meaning. The main (...)
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  7. No Problem: Evidence that the Concept of Phenomenal Consciousness is Not Widespread.J. Sytsma & E. Ozdemir - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):241-256.
    The meta-problem is 'the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness' (Chalmers, 2018, p. 6). This presupposes that we think there is a problem in the first place. We challenge the breadth of this 'we', arguing that there is already sufficient empirical evidence to cast doubt on the claim. We then add to this body of evidence, presenting the results of a new cross-cultural study extending the work of Sytsma and Machery (2010).
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  8. Response to Chalmers' 'The Meta-Problem of Consciousness'.D. Papineau - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):173-181.
    I am glad that David Chalmers has now come round to the view that explaining the 'problem intuitions' about consciousness is the key to a satisfactory philosophical account of the topic. I find it surprising, however, given his previous writings, that Chalmers does not simply attribute these intuitions to the conceptual gap between physical and phenomenal facts. Still, it is good that he doesn't, given that this was always a highly implausible account of the problem intuitions. Unfortunately, later in his (...)
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  9. A Teleological Strategy for Solving the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.Bradford Saad - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):205-216.
    Following Chalmers, I take the most promising response to the meta-problem to be a realizationist one on which (roughly) consciousness plays a role in realizing the processes that explain why we think that there is a hard problem of consciousness. I favour an interactionist dualist version of realizationism on which experiences are non-physical states that non-redundantly cause problem judgments. This view is subject to the challenges of specifying laws that would enable experiences to cause problem judgments and of explaining why (...)
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  10. Generating Explanatory Gaps.B. Fiala & S. Nichols - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):71-82.
    We develop a partial solution to the meta-problem of consciousness that builds on our previous psychological account of an apparent explanatory gap. Drawing from empirical work on explanatory cognition and conceptual development, we sketch a profile of cognitive systems for which primitive concepts facilitate explanatory gaps. This account predicts that there will be multiple explanatory gaps. We suggest that this is borne out by the existence of primitivist theories in multiple philosophical domains.
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  11. Editorial Introduction: Debates on the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.F. Kammerer - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):8-18.
  12. Mind--Brain Relationship and the Perspective of Meaning.R. Mukhopadhyay - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):184-208.
    We view the mind-body problem in terms of the two interconnected problems of phenomenal consciousness and mental causation, namely, how subjective conscious experience can arise from physical neurological processes and how conscious mental states can causally act upon the physical world. In order to address these problems, I develop here a non-physicalist framework that combines two apparently antithetical views: the materialist view of the mind as a product of the brain and the metaphysical view of consciousness rooted in an underlying (...)
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  13. The Brain and its Mindful Double.G. Vitiello - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (1-2):151-176.
    In the past decade Walter Freeman has contributed to the development of the dissipative quantum model of the brain and its testing against laboratory observations. In this paper the model is briefly reviewed with particular reference to the brain-mind relation and its quantum gauge field structure which determines the macroscopic functional behaviour of the brain. Memory appears to be memory of meanings constructed by learning which results from intentional actions. The consciousness act finds its realization in the unavoidable adjustments in (...)
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  14. Walter Freeman-- I Did It My Way.H. Atmanspacher - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (1-2):39-44.
    Walter Freeman was a pioneer of novel and viable enquiries to understand our brains and minds, without much concern about whether or not his points of view matched established mainstream positions. Alongside his successful career as a neurobiologist, he was curious and forceful enough to pick up and work with ideas, concepts, and tools from areas as diverse as medieval philosophy, phenomenology, nonlinear dynamics, and even quantum field theory. These fields of knowledge, scattered as they appear on the surface, all (...)
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  15. Freeman Neurodynamics: The Past 25 Years.S. Bressler, L. Kay & G. Vitiello - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (1-2):13-32.
    Walter Freeman established a unique approach for interpreting brain processes, perception, cognition, and intentionality. Freeman's neurodynamics approach evokes the concepts of mass action and synchrony in neural populations, and even today is far ahead of the field of dynamical systems in hierarchical brain models. He summarized the essence of his views on the physiology of perception in a landmark paper on the pages of Scientific American in 1991. He spelled out the main components of his neurodynamics theory in that essay, (...)
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  16. The Physiological Foresight in Freeman's Work: Predictions and Verifications.L. M. Kay - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (1-2):50-63.
    Freeman's studies on the physiology of the mammalian olfactory system were based on his characterization of activity of neural masses, based on a sigmoid relationship at the mesoscopic scale between population spiking activity as a result of continuous inputs. His early development of computational models to describe oscillatory responses of neural masses allowed him to predict physiological and anatomical properties, some of which required decades of research to be confirmed. His models of neural masses therefore allow us to link between (...)
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  17. The View From Within the Brain: Does Neurofeedback Close the Gap?J. Bielas - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (9-10):133-155.
    Neurophenomenology is intended to be a remedy for the hard problem of consciousness. There are, however, serious doubts as to whether it addresses the hard problem per se or is merely meant as a way for a more practical marriage between the domain of experience and neuroscience. If the latter is true, closing the gap would, at best, result in developing better models of phenomenality and better models of neuronal activity. The technology of neurofeedback, which helps subjects to selfregulate their (...)
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  18. A Split-Brain Perspective on Illusionism.N. L. Marinsek & M. S. Gazzaniga - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12):149-159.
  19. The Illusion of Illusionism.M. Nida-Rümelin - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12):160-171.
    A central thesis of Frankish's argument for illusionism is the claim that illusionism is possibly true. This is what the realist about phenomenal consciousness must deny. Frankish's argument for that premise is based on a widely shared understanding of phenomenal consciousness as being a matter of certain events instantiating special properties. I argue that the illusionist's reasoning is difficult to avoid if one accepts this common account. A positive argument for the thesis that the mere possibility of illusionism can be (...)
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  20. Delusions of Consciousness.Susan Blackmore - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12):52-64.
    Frankish's illusionism aims to replace the hard problem with the illusion problem; to explain why phenomenal consciousness seems to exist and why the illusion is so powerful. My aim, though broadly illusionist, is to explain why many other false assumptions, or delusions, are so powerful. One reason is a simple mistake in introspection. Asking, 'Am I conscious now?' or 'What is consciousness?' makes us briefly conscious in a new way. The delusion is to conclude that consciousness is always like this (...)
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  21. Illusionism as the Obvious Default Theory of Consciousness.Daniel Dennett - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12):65-72.
    Using a parallel with stage magic, it is argued that far from being seen as an extreme alternative, illusionism as articulated by Frankish should be considered the front runner, a conservative theory to be developed in detail, and abandoned only if it demonstrably fails to account for phenomena, not prematurely dismissed as 'counterintuitive'. We should explore the mundane possibilities thoroughly before investing in any magical hypotheses.
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  22. Editorial Introduction.K. Frankish - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12):9-10.
  23. The Interdependence of Embodied Cognition and Consciousness.J. Kiverstein - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (5-6):105-137.
    Classical cognitive scientists have operated with a strict separation of cognition from consciousness. At the same time they have attempted to explain consciousness using the same concepts of computation and representation as they employ to explain unconscious cognition. This has led some philosophers to argue that an unbridgeable gap separates subpersonal cognition from first-personal conscious experience. I shall argue that the appearance of such a gap is due to an assumption that classical cognitive science inherits from behaviourism that cognitive processes (...)
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  24. Selves, Bodies, and Self-Reference: Reflections on Jonathan Lowe's Non-Cartesian Dualism.J. L. Bermudez - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (11-12):20-42.
    This paper critically evaluates Jonathan Lowe's arguments for his non-Cartesian substance dualism. Sections 1 and 2 set out the principal claims of NCSD. The unity argument proposed in Lowe is discussed in Section 3. Throughout his career Lowe offered spirited attacks on reductionism about the self. Section 4 evaluates the anti-reductionist argument that Lowe offers in Subjects of Experience, an argument based on the individuation of mental events. Lowe offers an inventive proposal that the semantic distinction between direct and indirect (...)
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  25. Extending Neutral Monism to the Hard Problem.M. Silberstein - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (3-4):181-194.
    We agree with critics that enactive, sensorimotor, and ecological accounts of conscious experience do not in and of themselves fully deflate the hard problem of consciousness. As we noted in our earlier work, even if an extended account of cognition and intentionality allows us to be rid of qualia by deflating the dualism between intentionality and phenomenal experience, the heart of the hard problem, namely subjectivity, still remains. We argue that in order to resolve or deflate the hard problem the (...)
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  26. Hard to See the Problem?Antti Revonsuo - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (3-4):52-67.
    I argue that the hard problem of consciousness should be viewed from the perspective of the philosophy of science. In this context, the hard problem can be reformulated as a serious anomaly for the currently dominating research programme in the cognitive neurosciences. I cite empirical evidence from dream research to argue that for this research programme, consciousness is a phenomenon located inside the brain, but for whose constitution no plausible underlying constitutive mechanisms can at the moment be pointed out. Evidence (...)
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  27. The Role of the Brain During Conscious Experience: In Search of a New Metaphor.U. W. Weger & F. Edelhauser - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (11-12):111-129.
    Many scholars interpret the close correlation between neuronal and mental phenomena as causal in nature --with physiological events producing psychological states and processes. This interpretation is suggestive but by no means the most parsimonious or logically sound account and there is an increasing number of challenges to this view. The current article discusses these, briefly reviews alternative accounts and elaborates on one such alternative account in particular. Proposed already a century ago, we take it up here because we consider it (...)
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  28. Psychology and Near-Death Experiences: Challenges to and Opportunities for Ongoing Debates About Consciousness.Natasha Tassell-Matamua - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (11-12):150-172.
    The nature of consciousness continues to intrigue psychologists. Although much understanding has been progressed within the past few decades, psychological notions of consciousness continue to be based on a materialist reductionist model, which implies conscious processes are a function of neurological processes occurring in the brain. Yet, increased attention and empirical investigation of neardeath experiences poses challenges to this materialist reductionist position, and suggests consciousness may not be reliant on functioning neurological processes. This article will review the current state of (...)
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  29. Qual a motivação para se defender uma teoria causal da memória?César Schirmer Dos Santos - 2018 - In Juliano Santos do Carmo & Rogério F. Saucedo Corrêa (eds.), Linguagem e cognição. Pelotas: NEPFil. pp. 63-89.
    Este texto tem como objetivo apresentar a principal motivação filosófica para se defender uma teoria causal da memória, que é explicar como pode um evento que se deu no passado estar relacionado a uma experiência mnêmica que se dá no presente. Para tanto, iniciaremos apresentando a noção de memória de maneira informal e geral, para depois apresentar elementos mais detalhados. Finalizamos apresentando uma teoria causal da memória que se beneficia da noção de veritação (truthmaking).
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  30. Skill in Epistemology I: Skill and Knowledge.Carlotta Pavese - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (11):642-649.
    Knowledge and skill are intimately connected. In this essay, I discuss the question of their relationship and of which (if any) is prior to which in the order of explanation. I review some of the answers that have been given thus far in the literature, with a particular focus on the many foundational issues in epistemology that intersect with the philosophy of skill.
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  31. Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism.David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.) - 2008 - Bradford.
    Many philosophical naturalists eschew analysis in favor of discovering metaphysical truths from the a posteriori, contending that analysis does not lead to philosophical insight. A countercurrent to this approach seeks to reconcile a certain account of conceptual analysis with philosophical naturalism; prominent and influential proponents of this methodology include the late David Lewis, Frank Jackson, Michael Smith, Philip Pettit, and David Armstrong. Naturalistic analysis is a tool for locating in the scientifically given world objects and properties we quantify over in (...)
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  32. Scrutability and Epistemic Updating: Comments on Chalmers's Constructing the World.Laura Schroeter - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):638-651.
    In Constructing the World, Chalmers seeks to articulate and defend an important epistemic accessibility thesis, the Scrutability of Truth, which is crucial to Chalmers’ rationalist approach to meaning and modality. Chapters 3 and 4 of the book are devoted to persuading us that the move from weaker to stronger forms of Scrutability is intuitively plausible. In these comments, I want to question this move. The plausibility of strong forms of Scrutability hinges on controversial views about epistemic norms for answering ‘what (...)
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  33. The Entangled State of God and Humanity.Peter B. Todd - 2014 - Asheville Jung Center Webinar Series, 22.
    As the title, The Entangled State of God and Humanity suggests, this webinar dispenses with the pre-Copernican, patriarchal, anthropomorphic image of God while presenting a case for a third millennium theology illuminated by insights from archetypal depth psychology, quantum physics, neuroscience and evolutionary biology. It attempts to smash the conceptual barriers between science and religion. The published work of C.G. Jung, Wolfgang Pauli, David Bohm and Teilhard de Chardin outline a process whereby matter evolves in increasing complexity from sub-atomic particles (...)
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  34. Lowe's Argument Against the Psychoneural Token Identity Thesis.Katarzyna Paprzycka - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (3):372-396.
    E. J. Lowe argues that the mental event token cannot be identical to the complex neural event token for they have different counterfactual properties. If the mental event had not occurred, the behavior would not have ensued, while if the neural event had not occurred, the behavior would have ensued albeit slightly differently. Lowe's argument for the neural counterfactual relies on standard possible world semantics, whose evaluation of such counterfactuals is problematic. His argument for the mental counterfactual relies on a (...)
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  35. Supervenience, Emergence, and Realization in the Philosophy of Mind.J. Aegwon Kim - 1997 - In P. Machamer & M. Carrier (eds.), Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press and Universtaetsverlag Konstanz. pp. 271.
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  36. Thesis Eleven: A View From Sydney.Maria Markus & György Markus - 2010 - Thesis Eleven 100 (1):18-20.
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  37. O argumentacji Lowe'a na rzecz koncepcji przyczynowości intencjonalnej i fizycznej.Katarzyna Paprzycka - 2013 - Filozofia Nauki 21 (1).
    Lowe argues for a dualistic account of mental causation. He claims that the agent’s decision as well as a neural event both causally determine the resulting behavior in parallel and complementary ways. The decision determines that the arm arising occurs at all but it does not determine the detailed physical parameters of the movement. The neural cause determines the detailed parameters but does not deter-mine that the movement occurs. Lowe’s main argument for this view is the argument from counterfactual implications, (...)
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  38. David J. Chalmers: Constructing the World. [REVIEW]Matthias Neuber - 2014 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 68 (4):648-652.
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  39. Irreducibly Conscious. Selected Papers on Consciousness.Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom C. Elitzur (eds.) - 2009 - Winter.
  40. Externalism and Token-Identity.A. C. Genova - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (2):223-249.
    This study has two goals. The first is to identify three desiderata required for a successful defense of a version of nonreductive physicalism: semantic externalism, token-identity between mental andphysical events, and nonrelational type-individuation of physical states. In this context, the paper also presents a refutation of recent challenges to content-externalism by those who attempt to resuscitate internalism by focusing on narrow content associated with the fundamental phenomenology, rather than the intentionality, of mental states. The second goal is to defend the (...)
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  41. Réduction «Rôle-Occupant», Réduction «Micro-Macro» Et Explication Réductrice a Priori.Max Kistler - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (2):225-248.
    Selon une thése importante, il est en principe possible de déduire de manière a priori la plupart des vérités macroscopiques d’une (hypothétique) description complète du monde en termes microphysiques P, et donc de construire des explications réductrices a priori. Contre cette thèse, je montre que l’explication réductrice requiert des informations sur les phénomènes à réduire qui ne peuvent pas être extraites a priori des seules informations microphysiques. De telles réductions ont deux parties : une «reductionRO» («role-occupant») établit qu’une macropropriété M (...)
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  42. Causal Laws in Psychology, Part III.C. D. Mace - 1949 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:61-68.
  43. Externalism and Token-Token Identity.Mark Rowlands - 1995 - Philosophia 24 (3-4):359-75.
Psychophysical Supervenience
  1. The Josephson Junction.Ilexa Yardley - 2021 - Https://Medium.Com/the-Circular-Theory.
  2. Mentality and Object: Computational and Cognitive Diachronic Emergence.Ekin Erkan - 2020 - Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 20 (2):296-356.
    Espousing non-reductive physicalism, how do we pick out the specific relevant physical notion(s) from physical facts, specifically in relation to phenomenal experience? Beginning with a historical review of Gilbert Ryle’s behaviorism and moving through Hilary Putnam’s machine-state functionalism and Wilfrid Sellars’ inferential framework, up to more contemporaneous computationalist- and cognitivist-functionalism (Gualtiero Piccinini), we survey accounts of mentality that countenance the emergence of mental states vide input- and output-scheme. Ultimately arriving at the conclusion that functionalism cannot account for problems such as (...)
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  3. Mental Causation as Joint Causation.Chiwook Won - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    This paper explores and defends the idea that mental properties and their physical bases jointly cause their physical effects. The paper evaluates the view as an emergentist response to the exclusion problem, comparing it with a competing nonreductive physicalist solution, the compatibilist solution, and argues that the joint causation view is more defensible than commonly supposed. Specifically, the paper distinguishes two theses of closure, Strong Closure and Weak Closure, two causal exclusion problems, the overdetermination problem and the supervenience problem, and (...)
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  4. Emergentism and Sadra’s Psychology; a Common Physicalistic Challenge.Mahdi Homazadeh - 2019 - Asian Philosophy 29 (3):221-230.
    This paper first explores in detail a regenerated theory in philosophy of mind, known among contemporary philosophers as ‘emergentism’. By distinguishing strong and weak versions of the theory, I explain two important explanatory challenges presented by physicalists against this theory. In the following, I provide a brief overview of Sadr al-Muta’allihin’s theory of the incipience and degrees of the soul, examining similarities and differences between this theory and strong emergentism. Then, underlining the main aspects of similarity between the two theories, (...)
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  5. The Cognitive and Behavioral Sciences: Real Patterns, Real Unity, Real Causes, but No Supervenience.Don Ross & David Spurrett - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):637-647.
    Our response amplifies our case for scientific realism and the unity of science and clarifies our commitments to scientific unity, nonreductionism, behaviorism, and our rejection of talk of “emergence.” We acknowledge support from commentators for our view of physics and, responding to pressure and suggestions from commentators, deny the generality supervenience and explain what this involves. We close by reflecting on the relationship between philosophy and science.
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  6. Christian Materialism and Demonic Temptation.Matthew J. Hart - 2018 - Philosophia Christi 20 (2):481–496.
    Demons have the power to cause temptations in us, and Christian materialism implies the supervenience of temptations on brain states. This in turn implies that demons bring about temptations by causally interfering with our brains. But if they have such an ability to affect the physical world, it is mysterious why they do not wreak more havoc than they do both to our brains and in the world more generally. Substance dualism provides an elegant solution: demonic temptation is not a (...)
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  7. What's Wrong With Brute Supervenience? A Defense of Horgan on Physicalism and Superdupervenience.Kevin Morris - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (2):256-280.
    This paper offers a qualified defense of Terry Horgan’s view of brute, inexplicable supervenience theses as physically unacceptable—as having no place in physicalist metaphysics—and his corresponding emphasis on the importance of “superdupervenience”, metaphysical supervenience that can be explained in a “materialistically acceptable” way. I argue, in response to Tom Polger, that it may be possible to ground the physical unacceptability of brute supervenience in its relation physically unacceptable properties supervening on physical properties; moreover, I argue that Horgan’s emphasis on the (...)
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1 — 50 / 396