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66 found
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1 — 50 / 66
  1. added 2020-05-28
    Mental States, Natural Kinds and Psychophysical Laws.Colin Mcginn & James Hopkins - 1978 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 52:195-236.
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  2. added 2019-05-24
    Leibniz’s Theory of Universal Expression Explicated.Ari Maunu - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (2):247-267.
    According Leibniz's thesis of universal expression, each substance expresses the whole world, i.e. all other substances, or, as Leibniz frequently states, from any given complete individual notion (which includes, in internal terms, everything truly attributable to a substance) one can "deduce" or "infer" all truths about the whole world. On the other hand, in Leibniz's view each (created) substance is internally individuated, self-sufficient and independent of other (created) substances. What may be called Leibniz's expression problem is, how to reconcile these (...)
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  3. added 2017-09-25
    Consciousness, Causality and Complementarity.Max Velmans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):404-416.
    This reply to five continuing commentaries on my 1991 target article on “Is human information processing conscious” focuses on six related issues: 1) whether focal attentive processing replaces consciousness as a causal agent in third-person viewable human information processing, 2)whether consciousness can be dissociated from human information processing, 3) continuing disputes about definitions of "consciousness" and about what constitutes a “conscious process” , 4) how observer-relativity in psychology relates (and does not relate) to relativity in physics, 5) whether the first-person (...)
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  4. added 2016-12-08
    The Brain/Body Problem.Marya Schechtman - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (2):149 – 164.
    It is a commonplace of contemporary thought that the mind is located in the brain. Although there have been some challenges to this view, it has remained mainstream outside of a few specialized discussions, and plays a prominent role in a wide variety of philosophical arguments. It is further assumed that the source of this view is empirical. I argue it is not. Empirical discoveries show conclusively that the brain is the central organ of mental life, but do not show (...)
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  5. added 2016-12-08
    The Physical and the Psychical.H. Heath Bawden - 1904 - Philosophical Review 13 (5):541-546.
  6. added 2016-12-08
    The Functional View of the Relation Between the Psychical and the Physical.H. Heath Bawden - 1902 - Philosophical Review 11 (5):474-484.
  7. added 2016-03-01
    Descartes on Sensory Representation, Objective Reality, and Material Falsity.Gary Hatfield - 2013 - In Karen Detlefsen (ed.), Descartes' Meditations: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press. pp. 127–150.
    Descartes’ accounts of sensory perception have long troubled his interpreters, for their lack of clear and explicit statements on some fundamental issues. His readers have wondered whether he allows spatial sensory ideas (spatial qualia); whether sensory ideas such as color or pain are representations and, if so, what they represent; and what cognitive value Descartes attributed to sense perception. Recent discussions take differing stands on the questions just mentioned, and also disagree over Descartes’ account of the externalization of sensory qualities, (...)
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  8. added 2014-04-02
    Whether Mentality is "Higher-Level".Robert Francescotti - 2002 - Philosophical Inquiry 24 (3-4):65-76.
  9. added 2014-03-27
    Real Things and the Mind-Body Problem.M. McGinn - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):303-17.
    Naturalism about the mind is often taken to be equivalent to some form of physicalism: the existence of mental properties must be shown not to compromise the autonomy of the physical realm. It is argued that this leads to a choice between reductionism, eliminativism, epiphenomenalism or interactionism. The central aim of the paper is to outline an Aristotelian alternative to the physicalist conception of natural bodies. It is argued that the distinction between form and matter, and an ontology which treats (...)
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  10. added 2014-03-27
    Monism, Dualism, Pluralism.Tim van Gelder - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (1):76-97.
    1. Consider the basic outlines of the mind-body debate as it is found in contemporary Anglo-American analytic philosophy. The central question is “whether mental phenomena are physical phenomena, and if not, how they relate to physical phenomena.”1 Over the centuries, a wide range of possible solutions to this problem have emerged. These are the various “isms” familiar to any student of the debate: Cartesian dualism, idealism, epiphenomenalism, central state materialism, non- reductive physicalism, anomalous monism, and so forth. Each purports to (...)
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  11. added 2014-03-26
    The Psychophysical Nature of Humans.Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz - 1995 - Axiomathes 6 (1):31-37.
  12. added 2014-03-24
    The Two Factor Theory of the Mind-Brain Relation.Ullin T. Place - 2000 - Brain and Mind 1 (1):29-43.
    The analysis of mental concepts suggests that the distinctionbetween the mental and the nonmental is not ontologically fundamental,and that, whereas mental processes are one and the same things as thebrain processes with which they are correlated, dispositional mentalstates depend causally on and are, thus, ''''distinct existences'''' fromthe states of the brain microstructure with which ''they'' are correlated.It is argued that this difference in the relation between an entity andits composition/underlying structure applies across the board. allstuffs and processes are the same (...)
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  13. added 2014-03-22
    On Putnam's Critique of Metaphysical Realism: Mind-Body Identity and Supervenience.Ausonio Marras - 2001 - Synthese 126 (3):407-426.
    As part of his ongoing critique of metaphysical realism, Hilary Putnam has recently argued that current materialist theories of mind that locate mental phenomena in the brain can make no sense of the proposed identifications of mental states with physical (or physical cum computational) states, or of the supervenience of mental properties with physical properties. The aim of this paper is to undermine Putnam's objections and reassert the intelligibility – and perhaps the plausibility – of some form of mind-body identity (...)
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  14. added 2014-03-21
    Horgan’s Naturalistic Metaphysics of Mind.Jaegwon Kim - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):27-52.
    Terry Horgan has made impressive and highly important contributions to numerous fields of philosophy ? metaphysics, philosophy of mind and psychology, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and value theory, to mention the most prominent ones. What gives Horgan's work a powerful and clarifying unity is his deep and unflagging commitment to philosophical naturalism. In fact, Horgan himself has often invoked naturalism to motivate his positions and arguments on a number of philosophical issues. In this talk, I will discuss some (...)
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  15. added 2014-03-12
    Events, Sortals, and the Mind–Body Problem.Eric Marcus - 2006 - Synthese 150 (1):99-129.
    In recent decades, a view of identity I call Sortalism has gained popularity. According to this view, if a is identical to b, then there is some sortal S such that a is the same S as b. Sortalism has typically been discussed with respect to the identity of objects. I argue that the motivations for Sortalism about object-identity apply equally well to event-identity. But Sortalism about event-identity poses a serious threat to the view that mental events are token identical (...)
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  16. added 2014-03-09
    Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory.W. Teed Rockwell - 2005 - Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
    In this highly original work, Teed Rockwell rejects both dualism and the mind-brain identity theory. He proposes instead that mental phenomena emerge not merely from brain activity but from an interacting nexus of brain, body, and world. The mind can be seen not as an organ within the body, but as a "behavioral field" that fluctuates within this brain-body-world nexus. If we reject the dominant form of the mind-brain identity theory -- which Rockwell calls "Cartesian materialism" -- and accept this (...)
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  17. added 2014-02-10
    Grounding the Mental.R. L. Barnette - 1978 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39 (September):92-105.
  18. added 2014-02-10
    Minds, Artificial Languages, and Philosophy.Warner A. Wick - 1953 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 14 (December):228-238.
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  19. added 2014-01-14
    Tania Lombrozo, 'The Mind is Just the Brain'.Simon van Rysewyk - unknown
  20. added 2013-11-27
    Is Lewis's Mixed Theory Mixed Up?Michael J. Raven - 2013 - Theoria 79 (1):57-75.
    My aim is to rekindle interest in David Lewis's (1983) infamous but neglected Mixed Theory of mental states. The Mixed Theory is a mix of physicalism and functionalism designed to capture the intuitions that both Martians and abnormal human Madmen can be in pain. The Mixed Theory is widely derided. But I offer a new development of the Mixed Theory immune to its most prominent objections. In doing so, I uncover a new motivation for the Mixed Theory: its unique ability (...)
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  21. added 2011-01-26
    Are Quantum Physics and Spirituality Related?Ian J. Thompson - 2002 - New Philosophy 107:333-355.
    Discussing questions concerning quantum physics and spirituality together is particularly valuable in order to see the connection between them from a New Church standpoint. An urgent reason for discussing this link is that some people want to identify these things. The feeling is widespread that somehow they are connected, but some “new age” people want to say that quantum physics tells us about spirituality. We know from Swedenborg that the connection is not quite so simple, so we need to understand (...)
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  22. added 2010-06-22
    Physicalism and Mental Causation.Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.) - 2003 - Imprint Academic.
  23. added 2010-06-22
    Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action.William R. Stoeger - 1999 - Notre Dame: University Notre Dame Press.
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  24. added 2010-06-22
    The Case for Dualism.Stephen Harrison - 1989 - Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.
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  25. added 2010-06-22
    Perspectives On Mind.Herbert R. Otto (ed.) - 1988 - Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    INTRODUCTION Phenomenology and analytic philosophy have skirmished often, but seldom in ways conducive to dialectical progress. ...
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  26. added 2010-06-22
    Body & Mind: Past, Present And Future.K. D. Irani - 1980 - New York: Academic Press.
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  27. added 2008-12-31
    Biological Naturalism.John R. Searle - manuscript
    “Biological Naturalism” is a name I have given to an approach to what is traditionally called the mind-body problem. The way I arrived at it is typical of the way I work: try to forget about the philosophical history of a problem and remind yourself of what you know for a fact. Any philosophical theory has to be consistent with the facts. Of course, something we think is a fact may turn out not to be, but we have to start (...)
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  28. added 2008-12-31
    A Farewell to Isms.John Bolender - 2003 - In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. pp. 109.
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  29. added 2008-12-31
    Supervenience, Emergence, Realization, Reduction.Jaegwon Kim - 2003 - In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
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  30. added 2008-12-31
    The Mind-Body Problem and Quine's Repudiation Theory.Nathan Stemmer - 2001 - Behavior and Philosophy 29:187-202.
    Most scholars who presently deal with the Mind-Body problem consider themselves monist materialists. Nevertheless, many of them also assume that there exist (in some sense of existence) mental entities. But since these two positions do not harmonize quite well, the literature is full of discussions about how to reconcile the positions. In this paper, I will defend a materialist theory that avoids all these problems by completely rejecting the existence of mental entities. This is Quine's repudiation theory. According to the (...)
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  31. added 2008-12-31
    Reply to Jackson, I.Jennifer Hornsby - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):193-195.
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  32. added 2008-12-31
    Reply to Jackson, II.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):196-198.
    Commonsense psychological explanations are an integral part of a comprehensive commonsense background that includes almost everything that we deal with everyday— from traffic jams to paychecks to cozy dinners for two. It is the comprehensive commonsense background that I think is not wholesale refutable by science. A good deal of the comprehensive commonsense background itself depends on there being beliefs, desires, intentions and other propositional attitudes. If there never have been propositional attitudes, then there never have been statues or schools (...)
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  33. added 2008-12-31
    A Testable Mind-Brain Theory.Ralph L. Smith - 1999 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (4):421-436.
    Proceeding from the observation by Ryle that I cannot prepare myself for the next thought that I am going to think, I argue that conscious acts cannot control my bodily motions or thoughts. This position is not compatible with indeterminism. I also argue that consciousness represents the irreducible and multi-modal output of the behavioral control system sensors necessary for the control of human behavior demonstrated by Marken . My analysis supports one experimental result obtained by Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl (...)
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  34. added 2008-12-31
    The Mind-Brain Problem, the Laws of Nature, and Constitutive Relationships.William R. Stoeger - 1999 - In Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. Notre Dame: University Notre Dame Press.
  35. added 2008-12-31
    Having Ideas.Richard A. Watson - 1994 - American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (3):185-198.
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  36. added 2008-12-31
    Better the Union Theory.Ted Honderich - 1991 - Analysis 51 (3):166-173.
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  37. added 2008-12-31
    A New Visualization of the Mind-Brain Relationship.Stephen Harrison - 1989 - In The Case for Dualism. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.
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  38. added 2008-12-31
    On Complementarity and Causal Isomorphism.Douglas M. Snyder - 1988 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 9 (1):1-4.
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  39. added 2008-12-31
    Psychophysical Correspondence: Sense and Nonsense.Forrest Williams - 1988 - In Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives On Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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  40. added 2008-12-31
    What is This Thing Called 'Pain'? The Philosophy of Science Behind the Contemporary Debate.Mark Wilson - 1985 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66 (3-4):227-67.
  41. added 2008-12-31
    Anti-Reductionism and the Mind-Body Problem.Claudia M. Murphy - 1984 - Philosophy Research Archives 10:441-454.
    I argue that there are good reasons to deny both type-type and token-token mind-brain identity theories. Yet on the other hand there are compelling reasons for thinking that there is a causal basis for the mind. I argue that a path out of this impasse involves not only showing that criteria of individuation do not determine identity, but also that there are sound methodological reasons for thinking that the cause of intelligent behavior is a real natural kind. Finally, a commitment (...)
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  42. added 2008-12-31
    Mind and Matter: A Problem Which Refuses Dissolution.A. Skillen - 1984 - Mind 93 (October):514-26.
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  43. added 2008-12-31
    Honderich, Davidson, and the Question of Mental Holism.Timothy L. S. Sprigge - 1981 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 24 (October):323-342.
  44. added 2008-12-31
    Psychophysical Relations.Edgar Wilson - 1981 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 24 (October):305-322.
  45. added 2008-12-31
    Conceptual Changes in Problem of Mind-Body Relation.K. D. Irani - 1980 - In Body & Mind: Past, Present And Future. New York: Academic Press.
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  46. added 2008-12-31
    Mental States, Natural Kinds and Psychophysical Laws.Colin McGinn - 1978 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 52:195-220.
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  47. added 2008-12-31
    Reply to Lycan and Pappas's Quine's Materialism.Willard V. Quine - 1978 - Philosophia 7 (3-4):637-638.
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  48. added 2008-12-31
    Three Counter-Strategies to Reductionism in Science.Francis J. Zucker - 1977 - In John B. Cobb & David Ray Griffin (eds.), Mind in Nature. University Press of America. pp. 43.
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  49. added 2008-12-31
    Pin-Pricks to the Body and Pains to the Mind: A Natural History and Philosophy.Erling Skorpen - 1973 - Philosophy Forum 14 (September):53-79.
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  50. added 2008-12-31
    Physiological Discoveries: Criteria or Symptoms.Stewart Candlish - 1971 - Analysis 31 (April):162-165.
1 — 50 / 66