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  1. The Psychophysical Nature of Humans.Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz - 1995 - Axiomathes 6 (1):31-37.
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  2. The Mental and the Physical as a Problem for Philosophy.R. F. Alfred Hoernle - 1917 - Philosophical Review 26 (3):297-314.
  3. Reply to Frank Jackson.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3:196-8.
    Commonsense psychological explanations are an integral part of a comprehensive commonsense background that includes almost everything that we deal with everyday— from traffic jams to paychecks to cozy dinners for two. It is the comprehensive commonsense background that I think is not wholesale refutable by science. A good deal of the comprehensive commonsense background itself depends on there being beliefs, desires, intentions and other propositional attitudes. If there never have been propositional attitudes, then there never have been statues or schools (...)
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  4. Reply to Jackson, II.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):196-198.
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  5. Grounding the Mental.R. L. Barnette - 1978 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39 (September):92-105.
  6. The Physical and the Psychical.Bawden H. Heath - 1904 - Philosophical Review 13 (5):541-546.
  7. The Functional View of the Relation Between the Psychical and the Physical.Bawden H. Heath - 1902 - Philosophical Review 11 (5):474-484.
  8. A Farewell to Isms.John Bolender - 2003 - In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. pp. 109.
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  9. Physiological Discoveries: Criteria or Symptoms.Stewart Candlish - 1971 - Analysis 31 (April):162-165.
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  10. The Distinction Between the Mental and the Physical.Morris R. Cohen - 1917 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 14 (10):261-267.
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  11. The Empirical Correlation of Mental and Bodily Phenomena.Grace A. de Laguna - 1918 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 15 (20):533-541.
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  12. Linguistic Approach to Psychophysics.J. N. Findlay - 1949 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 50:43-64.
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  13. Psychophysical Causal Relations.John A. Foster - 1968 - American Philosophical Quarterly 5 (January):64-70.
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  14. Whether Mentality is "Higher-Level".Robert Francescotti - 2002 - Philosophical Inquiry 24 (3-4):65-76.
  15. A New Visualization of the Mind-Brain Relationship.Stephen Harrison - 1989 - In The Case for Dualism. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.
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  16. The Case for Dualism.Stephen Harrison - 1989 - Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.
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  17. Descartes on Sensory Representation, Objective Reality, and Material Falsity.Gary Hatfield - 2013 - In Karen Detlefsen (ed.), Descartes' Meditations: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press. pp. 127–150.
    Descartes’ accounts of sensory perception have long troubled his interpreters, for their lack of clear and explicit statements on some fundamental issues. His readers have wondered whether he allows spatial sensory ideas (spatial qualia); whether sensory ideas such as color or pain are representations and, if so, what they represent; and what cognitive value Descartes attributed to sense perception. Recent discussions take differing stands on the questions just mentioned, and also disagree over Descartes’ account of the externalization of sensory qualities, (...)
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  18. On Correlating Brain States with Psychological States.Carl G. Hedman - 1970 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (August):247-51.
  19. The Psychophysical Continuum.H. L. Hollingworth - 1916 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 13 (7):182-190.
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  20. Better the Union Theory.Ted Honderich - 1991 - Analysis 51 (June):166-173.
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  21. Mental States, Natural Kinds and Psychophysical Laws.James Hopkins - 1978 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 221:221-236.
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  22. Reply to Jackson, I.Jennifer Hornsby - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):193-195.
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  23. Body & Mind: Past, Present And Future.K. D. Irani - 1980 - New York: Academic Press.
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  24. Conceptual Changes in Problem of Mind-Body Relation.K. D. Irani - 1980 - In Body & Mind: Past, Present And Future. New York: Academic Press.
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  25. Supervenience, Emergence, Realization, Reduction.Jaegwon Kim - 2003 - In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
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  26. Horgan's Naturalistic Metaphysics of Mind.Jaegwon Kim - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):27-52.
    Terry Horgan has made impressive and highly important contributions to numerous fields of philosophy ? metaphysics, philosophy of mind and psychology, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and value theory, to mention the most prominent ones. What gives Horgan's work a powerful and clarifying unity is his deep and unflagging commitment to philosophical naturalism. In fact, Horgan himself has often invoked naturalism to motivate his positions and arguments on a number of philosophical issues. In this talk, I will discuss some (...)
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  27. Reflexions Suggested by Psychophysical Materialism.S. S. Laurie - 1894 - Mind 3 (9):56-76.
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  28. Events, Sortals, and the Mind-Body Problem.Eric Marcus - 2006 - Synthese 150 (1):99-129.
    In recent decades, a view of identity I call Sortalism has gained popularity. According to this view, if a is identical to b, then there is some sortal S such that a is the same S as b. Sortalism has typically been discussed with respect to the identity of objects. I argue that the motivations for Sortalism about object-identity apply equally well to event-identity. But Sortalism about event-identity poses a serious threat to the view that mental events are token identical (...)
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  29. On Putnam's Critique of Metaphysical Realism: Mind-Body Identity and Supervenience.Ausonio Marras - 2001 - Synthese 126 (3):407-426.
    As part of his ongoing critique of metaphysical realism, Hilary Putnam has recently argued that current materialist theories of mind that locate mental phenomena in the brain can make no sense of the proposed identifications of mental states with physical (or physical cum computational) states, or of the supervenience of mental properties with physical properties. The aim of this paper is to undermine Putnam's objections and reassert the intelligibility – and perhaps the plausibility – of some form of mind-body identity (...)
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  30. Leibniz’s Theory of Universal Expression Explicated.Ari Maunu - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (2):247-267.
    According Leibniz's thesis of universal expression, each substance expresses the whole world, i.e. all other substances, or, as Leibniz frequently states, from any given complete individual notion (which includes, in internal terms, everything truly attributable to a substance) one can "deduce" or "infer" all truths about the whole world. On the other hand, in Leibniz's view each (created) substance is internally individuated, self-sufficient and independent of other (created) substances. What may be called Leibniz's expression problem is, how to reconcile these (...)
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  31. Mental States, Natural Kinds and Psychophysical Laws.Colin McGinn - 1978 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 52:195-220.
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  32. Real Things and the Mind-Body Problem.M. McGinn - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):303-17.
    Naturalism about the mind is often taken to be equivalent to some form of physicalism: the existence of mental properties must be shown not to compromise the autonomy of the physical realm. It is argued that this leads to a choice between reductionism, eliminativism, epiphenomenalism or interactionism. The central aim of the paper is to outline an Aristotelian alternative to the physicalist conception of natural bodies. It is argued that the distinction between form and matter, and an ontology which treats (...)
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  33. The Mental--Physical Dichotomy.T. R. Miles - 1963 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 64:71-84.
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  34. Anti-Reductionism and the Mind-Body Problem.Claudia M. Murphy - 1984 - Philosophy Research Archives 10:441-454.
    I argue that there are good reasons to deny both type-type and token-token mind-brain identity theories. Yet on the other hand there are compelling reasons for thinking that there is a causal basis for the mind. I argue that a path out of this impasse involves not only showing that criteria of individuation do not determine identity, but also that there are sound methodological reasons for thinking that the cause of intelligent behavior is a real natural kind. Finally, a commitment (...)
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  35. Perspectives On Mind.Herbert R. Otto (ed.) - 1988 - Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    INTRODUCTION Phenomenology and analytic philosophy have skirmished often, but seldom in ways conducive to dialectical progress. ...
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  36. The Two Factor Theory of the Mind-Brain Relation.Ullin T. Place - 2000 - Brain and Mind 1 (1):29-43.
    The analysis of mental concepts suggests that the distinctionbetween the mental and the nonmental is not ontologically fundamental,and that, whereas mental processes are one and the same things as thebrain processes with which they are correlated, dispositional mentalstates depend causally on and are, thus, ''''distinct existences'''' fromthe states of the brain microstructure with which ''they'' are correlated.It is argued that this difference in the relation between an entity andits composition/underlying structure applies across the board. allstuffs and processes are the same (...)
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  37. Reply to Lycan and Pappas's Quine's Materialism.Willard V. Quine - 1978 - Philosophia 7 (July):637-638.
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  38. Of Minds and Molecules.Francis V. Raab - 1965 - Philosophy of Science 32 (January):57-72.
    "Of Minds and Molecules" attempts to show the difficulties in mental-state brain-state monism. By exploring the differences in meaning between mental-state sentences and brain-state sentences, and by analysing the implications of the theory of the molecular composition of matter, a kind of dualism is arrived at that no scientist should feel uncomfortable with. It is a dualism without mental substance but it does not deprive mental states of their uniqueness. Arguments are given for the propriety of asserting causal connections and (...)
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  39. A Note on Mr Sheldon's Mind.J. H. Randall Jr - 1946 - Journal of Philosophy 43 (April):209-213.
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  40. Is Lewis's Mixed Theory Mixed Up?Michael J. Raven - 2013 - Theoria 79 (1):57-75.
    My aim is to rekindle interest in David Lewis's (1983) infamous but neglected Mixed Theory of mental states. The Mixed Theory is a mix of physicalism and functionalism designed to capture the intuitions that both Martians and abnormal human Madmen can be in pain. The Mixed Theory is widely derided. But I offer a new development of the Mixed Theory immune to its most prominent objections. In doing so, I uncover a new motivation for the Mixed Theory: its unique ability (...)
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  41. A Methodological Investigation Into the Relation Between Mind and Body.Max Rieser - 1946 - Journal of Philosophy 43 (September):551-557.
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  42. The Relations of Mental and Physical Processes.A. D. Ritchie - 1931 - Mind 40 (158):171-187.
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  43. Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory.W. Teed Rockwell - 2005 - Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
    In this highly original work, Teed Rockwell rejects both dualism and the mind-brain identity theory. He proposes instead that mental phenomena emerge not merely from brain activity but from an interacting nexus of brain, body, and world. The mind can be seen not as an organ within the body, but as a "behavioral field" that fluctuates within this brain-body-world nexus. If we reject the dominant form of the mind-brain identity theory -- which Rockwell calls "Cartesian materialism" -- and accept this (...)
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  44. The Brain/Body Problem.Marya Schechtman - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (2):149 – 164.
    It is a commonplace of contemporary thought that the mind is located in the brain. Although there have been some challenges to this view, it has remained mainstream outside of a few specialized discussions, and plays a prominent role in a wide variety of philosophical arguments. It is further assumed that the source of this view is empirical. I argue it is not. Empirical discoveries show conclusively that the brain is the central organ of mental life, but do not show (...)
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  45. Biological Naturalism.John R. Searle - manuscript
    “Biological Naturalism” is a name I have given to an approach to what is traditionally called the mind-body problem. The way I arrived at it is typical of the way I work: try to forget about the philosophical history of a problem and remind yourself of what you know for a fact. Any philosophical theory has to be consistent with the facts. Of course, something we think is a fact may turn out not to be, but we have to start (...)
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  46. Mind and Matter: A Problem Which Refuses Dissolution.A. Skillen - 1984 - Mind 93 (October):514-26.
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  47. Pin-Pricks to the Body and Pains to the Mind: A Natural History and Philosophy.Erling Skorpen - 1973 - Philosophy Forum 14 (September):53-79.
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  48. A Testable Mind-Brain Theory.Ralph L. Smith - 1999 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (4):421-436.
    Proceeding from the observation by Ryle that I cannot prepare myself for the next thought that I am going to think, I argue that conscious acts cannot control my bodily motions or thoughts. This position is not compatible with indeterminism. I also argue that consciousness represents the irreducible and multi-modal output of the behavioral control system sensors necessary for the control of human behavior demonstrated by Marken . My analysis supports one experimental result obtained by Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl (...)
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  49. On Complementarity and Causal Isomorphism.Douglas M. Snyder - 1988 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 9 (1):1-4.
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  50. Honderich, Davidson, and the Question of Mental Holism.Timothy L. S. Sprigge - 1981 - Inquiry 24 (October):323-342.
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