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  1. The Mystery of the Ravens.Joseph Agassi - 1966 - Philosophy of Science 33 (4):395-402.
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  2. Von Wright's Paradoxes.W. H. Baumer - 1963 - Philosophy of Science 30 (2):165-172.
    This paper considers the relationship between G. H. von Wright's solution to the paradoxes of confirmation and his "Principal Theorem of Confirmation". The former utilizes the order of our knowledge of the qualities of confirming instances of an hypothesis; the latter states the way in which an instance contributes to the probability of an hypothesis. It is shown that these two, as stated by von Wright, are logically incompatible. Then the most thorough possible emendation of the paradoxes solution is considered, (...)
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  3. Confirmation Without Paradoxes.William M. Baumer - 1964 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 15:177.
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  4. Review: C. G. Hempel, On the Nature of Mathematical Truth. [REVIEW]Charles A. Baylis - 1946 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 11 (3):100-100.
  5. On Hempel's Rejection of Complete Verifiability.Robert W. Beard & Robert W. Loftin - 1974 - Philosophical Studies 25 (3):227 - 229.
  6. Review: Carl G. Hempel, A Purely Topological Form of Non-Aristotelian Logic. [REVIEW]Paul Bernays - 1938 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 3 (2):91-92.
  7. Review: Carl G. Hempel, A Note on the Paradoxes of Confirmation. [REVIEW]Max Black - 1946 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 11 (4):124-124.
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  8. Review: Carl G. Hempel, Paul Oppenheim, A Definition of "Degree of Confirmation.". [REVIEW]Max Black - 1946 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 11 (1):18-19.
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  9. Review: Olaf Helmer, Paul Oppenheim, A Syntatical Definition of Probability and of Degree of Confirmation. [REVIEW]Max Black - 1946 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 11 (1):17-18.
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  10. Hempel Carl G. And Oppenheim Paul. A Definition of “Degree of Confirmation.” Philosophy of Science, Vol. 12 , Pp. 98–115. [REVIEW]Max Black - 1946 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 11 (1):18-19.
  11. Review: C. H. Whiteley, Hempel's Paradoxes of Confirmation. [REVIEW]Max Black - 1945 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 10 (3):104-104.
  12. Review: Carl G. Hempel, A Purely Syntactical Definition of Confirmation. [REVIEW]Max Black - 1944 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 9 (2):47-47.
  13. On the Equivalence of Goodman’s and Hempel’s Paradoxes.Kenneth Boyce - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45:32-42.
    Historically, Nelson Goodman’s paradox involving the predicates ‘grue’ and ‘bleen’ has been taken to furnish a serious blow to Carl Hempel’s theory of confirmation in particular and to purely formal theories of confirmation in general. In this paper, I argue that Goodman’s paradox is no more serious of a threat to Hempel’s theory of confirmation than is Hempel’s own paradox of the ravens. I proceed by developing a suggestion from R. D. Rosenkrantz into an argument for the conclusion that these (...)
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  14. The Problem of Measure Sensitivity Redux.Peter Brössel - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (3):378-397.
    Fitelson (1999) demonstrates that the validity of various arguments within Bayesian confirmation theory depends on which confirmation measure is adopted. The present paper adds to the results set out in Fitelson (1999), expanding on them in two principal respects. First, it considers more confirmation measures. Second, it shows that there are important arguments within Bayesian confirmation theory and that there is no confirmation measure that renders them all valid. Finally, the paper reviews the ramifications that this "strengthened problem of measure (...)
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  15. A Comparative Treatment of the Paradox of Confirmation.Ram-Prasad Chakravarthi - 2002 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 30 (4):339-358.
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  16. “The Ravens Paradox” is a Misnomer.Roger Clarke - 2010 - Synthese 175 (3):427-440.
    I argue that the standard Bayesian solution to the ravens paradox— generally accepted as the most successful solution to the paradox—is insufficiently general. I give an instance of the paradox which is not solved by the standard Bayesian solution. I defend a new, more general solution, which is compatible with the Bayesian account of confirmation. As a solution to the paradox, I argue that the ravens hypothesis ought not to be held equivalent to its contrapositive; more interestingly, I argue that (...)
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  17. Hempel's Ambiguity.J. Alberto Coffa - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):141 - 163.
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  18. Humanistic Interpretation Between Hempel and Popper.Francesco Coniglione - 1996 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 47:283-302.
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  19. A Paradox in Hempel's Criterion of Maximal Specificity.Roger M. Cooke - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (2):327-328.
  20. The Place of Probability in Science.Ellery Eells & James H. Fetzer (eds.) - 2010 - Springer.
    To clarify and illuminate the place of probability in science Ellery Eells and James H. Fetzer have brought together some of the most distinguished philosophers ...
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  21. Sommers' Theory and the Paradox of Confirmation.George Englebretsen - 1971 - Philosophy of Science 38 (3):438-441.
  22. Hempel's Ravens, the Natural Classification of Hypotheses and the Growth of Knowledge.Menachem Fisch - 1984 - Erkenntnis 21 (1):45 - 62.
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  23. The Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):207-241.
    The (recent, Bayesian) cognitive science literature on the Wason Task (WT) has been modeled largely after the (not-so-recent, Bayesian) philosophy of science literature on the Paradox of Confirmation (POC). In this paper, we apply some insights from more recent Bayesian approaches to the (POC) to analogous models of (WT). This involves, first, retracing the history of the (POC), and, then, re-examining the (WT) with these historico-philosophical insights in mind.
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  24. Teaching & Learning Guide For: The Paradox of Confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1103-1105.
  25. The Paradox of Confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.
    Hempel first introduced the paradox of confirmation in (Hempel 1937). Since then, a very extensive literature on the paradox has evolved (Vranas 2004). Much of this literature can be seen as responding to Hempel’s subsequent discussions and analyses of the paradox in (Hempel 1945). Recently, it was noted that Hempel’s intuitive (and plausible) resolution of the paradox was inconsistent with his official theory of confirmation (Fitelson & Hawthorne 2006). In this article, we will try to explain how this inconsistency affects (...)
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  26. Putting the Irrelevance Back Into the Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction.Branden Fitelson - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (4):611-622.
    Naive deductive accounts of confirmation have the undesirable consequence that if E confirms H, then E also confirms the conjunction H & X, for any X—even if X is utterly irrelevant to H (and E). Bayesian accounts of confirmation also have this property (in the case of deductive evidence). Several Bayesians have attempted to soften the impact of this fact by arguing that—according to Bayesian accounts of confirmation— E will confirm the conjunction H & X less strongly than E confirms (...)
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  27. Studies in Bayesian Confirmation Theory.Branden Fitelson - 2001 - Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison
    According to Bayesian confirmation theory, evidence E (incrementally) confirms (or supports) a hypothesis H (roughly) just in case E and H are positively probabilistically correlated (under an appropriate probability function Pr). There are many logically equivalent ways of saying that E and H are correlated under Pr. Surprisingly, this leads to a plethora of non-equivalent quantitative measures of the degree to which E confirms H (under Pr). In fact, many non-equivalent Bayesian measures of the degree to which E confirms (or (...)
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  28. The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity.Branden Fitelson - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):378.
    Contemporary Bayesian confirmation theorists measure degree of (incremental) confirmation using a variety of non-equivalent relevance measures. As a result, a great many of the arguments surrounding quantitative Bayesian confirmation theory are implicitly sensitive to choice of measure of confirmation. Such arguments are enthymematic, since they tacitly presuppose that certain relevance measures should be used (for various purposes) rather than other relevance measures that have been proposed and defended in the philosophical literature. I present a survey of this pervasive class of (...)
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  29. Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation.Branden Fitelson & James Hawthorne - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):207-241.
    The (recent, Bayesian) cognitive science literature on The Wason Task (WT) has been modeled largely after the (not-so-recent, Bayesian) philosophy of science literature on The Paradox of Confirmation (POC). In this paper, we apply some insights from more recent Bayesian approaches to the (POC) to analogous models of (WT). This involves, first, retracing the history of the (POC), and, then, reexamining the (WT) with these historico-philosophical insights in mind.
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  30. How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens.Branden Fitelson & James Hawthorne - 2010 - In Ellery Eells & James Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science. Springer. pp. 247--275.
    The Paradox of the Ravens (a.k.a,, The Paradox of Confirmation) is indeed an old chestnut. A great many things have been written and said about this paradox and its implications for the logic of evidential support. The first part of this paper will provide a brief survey of the early history of the paradox. This will include the original formulation of the paradox and the early responses of Hempel, Goodman, and Quine. The second part of the paper will describe attempts (...)
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  31. Subjective Probability, Natural Predicates and Hempel's Ravens.Haim Gaifman - 1979 - Erkenntnis 14 (2):105 - 147.
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  32. On 'Ravens and Relevance' and a Likelihood Solution of the Paradox of Confirmation.L. Gibson - 1969 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20 (1):75-80.
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  33. An Orthodox Statistical Resolution of the Paradox of Confirmation.Ronald N. Giere - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (3):354-362.
    Several authors, e.g. Patrick Suppes and I. J. Good, have recently argued that the paradox of confirmation can be resolved within the developing subjective Bayesian account of inductive reasoning. The aim of this paper is to show that the paradox can also be resolved by the rival orthodox account of hypothesis testing currently employed by most statisticians and scientists. The key to the orthodox statistical resolution is the rejection of a generalized version of Hempel's instantiation condition, namely, the condition that (...)
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  34. The Paradox of Confirmation.I. J. Good - 1961 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 12 (45):63-64.
  35. The Paradox of Confirmation (II).I. J. Good - 1961 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 12 (45):63-64.
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  36. The Paradox of Confirmation.I. J. Good - 1960 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 11 (42):145-149.
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  37. The Paradox of Confirmation.L. J. Good - 1960 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 11 (42):145-b-145.
  38. Quantifier Probability Logic and the Confirmation Paradox.Theodore Hailperin - 2007 - History and Philosophy of Logic 28 (1):83-100.
    Exhumation and study of the 1945 paradox of confirmation brings out the defect of its formulation. In the context of quantifier conditional-probability logic it is shown that a repair can be accomplished if the truth-functional conditional used in the statement of the paradox is replaced with a connective that is appropriate to the probabilistic context. Description of the quantifier probability logic involved in the resolution of the paradox is presented in stages. Careful distinction is maintained between a formal logic language (...)
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  39. An Even Better Solution to the Paradox of the Ravens.James Hawthorne & Branden Fitelson - manuscript
    Think of confirmation in the context of the Ravens Paradox this way. The likelihood ratio measure of incremental confirmation gives us, for an observed Black Raven and for an observed non-Black non-Raven, respectively, the following “full” likelihood ratios.
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  40. Discussion: Re‐Solving Irrelevant Conjunction with Probabilistic Independence.James Hawthorne & Branden Fitelson - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (4):505-514.
    Naive deductivist accounts of confirmation have the undesirable consequence that if E confirms H, then E also confirms the conjunction H·X, for any X—even if X is completely irrelevant to E and H. Bayesian accounts of confirmation may appear to have the same problem. In a recent article in this journal Fitelson (2002) argued that existing Bayesian attempts to resolve of this problem are inadequate in several important respects. Fitelson then proposes a new‐and‐improved Bayesian account that overcomes the problem of (...)
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  41. Review: Hans Reichenbach, The Verifiability Theory of Meaning; Carl G. Hempel, The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration; Gustav Bergmann, Comments on Professor Hempel's "The Concept of Cognitive Significance.". [REVIEW]William H. Hay - 1952 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 17 (2):134-136.
  42. Review: Georg Henrik von Wright, On Confirmation. [REVIEW]Carl G. Hempel - 1950 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 14 (4):248-248.
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  43. The Ravens, Hempel and Goodman.C. A. Hooker - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):82-89.
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  44. On Confirmation.Janina Hosiasson-Lindenbaum - 1940 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):133-148.
  45. The Logic of Theory Assessment.Franz Huber - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (5):511-538.
    This paper starts by indicating the analysis of Hempel's conditions of adequacy for any relation of confirmation (Hempel, 1945) as presented in Huber (submitted). There I argue contra Carnap (1962, Section 87) that Hempel felt the need for two concepts of confirmation: one aiming at plausible theories and another aiming at informative theories. However, he also realized that these two concepts are conflicting, and he gave up the concept of confirmation aiming at informative theories. The main part of the paper (...)
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  46. Hempel Meets Wason.I. L. Humberstone - 1994 - Erkenntnis 41 (3):391-402.
    The adverse reaction to Hempel's 'ravens paradox' embodied in giving it that description is compared with the usual reaction of experimental subjects to the Wason selection task.
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  47. Sharpe R. A.. Validity and the Paradox of Confirmation. The Philosophical Quarterly , Vol. 14 , Pp. 170–173. [REVIEW]David Kaplan - 1967 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 32 (2):251.
  48. Review: R. A. Sharpe, Validity and the Paradox of Confirmation. [REVIEW]David Kaplan - 1967 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 32 (2):251-251.
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  49. Review: R. H. Vincent, The Paradoxes of Confirmation. [REVIEW]David Kaplan - 1967 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 32 (2):250-251.
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  50. Review: Carl G. Hempel, Inductive Inconsistencies. [REVIEW]Asa Kasher - 1973 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 38 (3):531-532.
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