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  1. added 2020-02-23
    An Unsolved Puzzle About Knowledge.Thomas Tymoczko - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (137):437-458.
  2. added 2019-10-25
    Is ‘Knowing That P’ Identical with ‘Knowing That “P” Is True’?Changsheng Lai - 2019 - Philosophia:1-18.
    It is epistemological orthodoxy that the object of propositional knowledge is the truth of propositions. This traditional view is based on what I call the ‘KT-schema’, viz, ‘S knows that p, iff, S knows that “p” is true’. The purpose of this paper is to reject the KT-schema. By showing the paradoxical upshot of the KT-schema and providing counterexamples to the KT-schema, this paper argues that ‘knowing that p’ is more than ‘knowing that “p” is true’. Consequently, we shall rethink (...)
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  3. added 2018-02-16
    Paradoxien.Mark Sainsbury & Vincent C. Müller - 1993 - Reclam.
    Translation of Mark Sainsbury: Paradoxes (Cambridge University Press 1988).
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  4. added 2017-12-31
    Toward Predicate Approaches to Modality.Johannes Stern - 2016 - Switzerland: Springer.
    In this volume, the author investigates and argues for, a particular answer to the question: What is the right way to logically analyze modalities from natural language within formal languages? The answer is: by formalizing modal expressions in terms of predicates. But, as in the case of truth, the most intuitive modal principles lead to paradox once the modal notions are conceived as predicates. -/- The book discusses the philosophical interpretation of these modal paradoxes and argues that any satisfactory approach (...)
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  5. added 2015-10-13
    Necessities and Necessary Truths. Proof-Theoretically.Johannes Stern - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.
  6. added 2015-10-11
    Review of Mark Sainsbury, Paradoxes. [REVIEW]Vincent C. Müller - 1994 - European Review of Philosophy 1:182-184.
  7. added 2015-04-02
    The Paradox of the Knower.C. Anthony Anderson - 1983 - Journal of Philosophy 80 (6):338-355.
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  8. added 2014-04-02
    On the Possibility of a General Purge of Self-Reference.Lucas Rosenblatt - 2012 - Análisis Filosófico 32 (1):53-59.
    My aim in this paper is to gather some evident in favor of the view that a general purge of self-reference is possible. I do this by considering a modal-epistemic version of the Liar Paradox introduced by Roy Cook. Using yabloesque techniques, I show that it is possible to transform this circular paradoxical construction (and other constructions as well) into an infinitary construction lacking any sort of circularity. Moreover, contrary to Cook’s approach, I think that this can be done without (...)
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  9. added 2014-03-26
    The Paradox of the Knower Without Epistemic Closure.Charles B. Cross - 2001 - Mind 110 (438):319-333.
    In this essay I present a new version of the Paradox of the Knower and show that this new paradox vitiates a certain argument against epistemic closure. I then prove a theorem that relates the new paradox to epistemological scepticism. I conclude by assessing the use of the Knower in arguments against syntactical treatments of knowledge.
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  10. added 2012-11-17
    The Paradox of the Knower Without Epistemic Closure -- Corrected.C. B. Cross - 2012 - Mind 121 (482):457-466.
    This essay corrects an error in the presentation of the Paradox of the Knowledge-Plus Knower, which is the variant of Kaplan and Montague’s Knower Paradox presented in C. Cross 2001: ‘The Paradox of the Knower without Epistemic Closure,’ MIND, 110, pp. 319–33. The correction adds a universally quantified transitivity principle for derivability as an additional assumption leading to paradox. This correction does not affect the status of the Knowledge-Plus paradox as a rebuttal to an argument against epistemic closure, since the (...)
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  11. added 2012-11-17
    More on the Paradox of the Knower Without Epistemic Closure.Charles B. Cross - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):109-114.
    In “The Paradox of the Knower without Epistemic Closure”, MIND 110:319-33, 2001, I develop a version of the Knower Paradox which does not assume epistemic closure, and I use it to argue that the original Knower Paradox does not support an argument against epistemic closure. In “The Paradox of the Knower without Epistemic Closure?”, MIND 113:95-107, 2004, Gabriel Uzquiano, using his own result, argues that my rebuttal to the anti-closure argument is not successful. I respond here by arguing that in (...)
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