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  1. Kuanysh Abeshev (2014). On the Existence of Universal Numberings for Finite Families of D.C.E. Sets. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 60 (3):161-167.
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  2. Diana Ackerman (1981). Two Paradoxes of Analysis. Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):733-735.
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  3. Felicia Ackerman (1992). Analysis and its Paradoxes. In Edna Ullmann-Margalit (ed.), The Scientific Enterprise. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 169--178.
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  4. Seiki Akama & Sadaaki Miyamoto (2008). Curry and Fitch on Paradox. Logique Et Analyse 203:271-283.
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  5. Victor Allis & Teunis Koetsier (1991). On Some Paradoxes of the Infinite. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (2):187-194.
    In the paper below the authors describe three super-tasks. They show that although the abstract notion of a super-task may be, as Benacerraf suggested, a conceptual mismatch, the completion of the three super-tasks involved can be defined rather naturally, without leading to inconsistency, by means of a particular kinematical interpretation combined with a principle of continuity.
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  6. Alice Ambrose (1947). Bar-Hillel Yehoshua. Analysis of ‘Correct” Language. Mind, N.S., Vol. 55 , Pp. 328–340. Journal of Symbolic Logic 12 (1):23-24.
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  7. Alan Ross Anderson (1970). Meltzer B.. The Third Possibility. Mind, N.S. Vol. 73 , Pp. 430–433.Meltzer B. And Good I. J.. Two Forms of the Prediction Paradox. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 16 No. 61 , Pp. 50–51.Halberstadt William H.. In Defence of Euclid: A Reply to B. Meltzer. Mind, N.S. Vol. 76 , P. 282. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (3):458-459.
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  8. Alan Ross Anderson (1970). Review: B. Meltzer, The Third Possibility; B. Meltzer, I. J. Good, Two Forms of the Prediction Paradox; William H. Halberstadt, In Defence of Euclid: A Reply to B. Meltzer. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (3):458-459.
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  9. Miroslava Anđelković (1997). Predictor Paradox. Theoria 40 (4):121-126.
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  10. A. J. Ayer (1973). On a Supposed Antinomy. Mind 82 (325):125-126.
  11. L. K. B. (1958). Le Formalisme Logico-Mathématique Et le Problème du Non-Sens. Review of Metaphysics 12 (1):143-143.
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  12. Guillermo Badía (2013). Mundos posibles y paradojas. Areté. Revista de Filosofía 25 (2):219-229.
    Robert Adams' definition of a possible world is paradoxical according to Selmer Bringsjord, Patrick Grim and, more recently, Cristopher Menzel. The proofs given by Bringsjord and Grim relied crucially on the Powerset Axiom; Christoper Menzel showed that, while this continued tobe the case, there was still hope for Adams' definition, but Menzel he undustedan old russellian paradox in order to prove that we could obtain the same paradoxical consequences without appealing to any other set theory than the Axiomof Separation. Nevertheless, (...)
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  13. A. J. Baker (1955). Incompatible Hypotheticals and the Barber Shop Paradox. Mind 64 (255):384-387.
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  14. Prasanta S. Bandyoapdhyay, Davin Nelson, Mark Greenwood, Gordon Brittan & Jesse Berwald (2011). The Logic of Simpson’s Paradox. Synthese 181 (2):185-208.
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  15. Maya Bar-Hillel & Avishai Margalit (1985). Gideon's Paradox — a Paradox of Rationality. Synthese 63 (2):139 - 155.
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  16. Can Başkent (forthcoming). A Yabloesque Paradox in Epistemic Game Theory. Synthese:1-24.
    The Brandenburger–Keisler paradox is a self-referential paradox in epistemic game theory which can be viewed as a two-person version of Russell’s Paradox. Yablo’s Paradox, according to its author, is a non-self referential paradox, which created a significant impact. This paper gives a Yabloesque, non-self-referential paradox for infinitary players within the context of epistemic game theory. The new paradox advances both the Brandenburger–Keisler and Yablo results. Additionally, the paper constructs a paraconsistent model satisfying the paradoxical statement.
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  17. William H. Baumer (1965). Invalidly Invalidating a Paradox. Philosophical Quarterly 15 (61):350-352.
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  18. C. A. Baylis (1942). Quine W. V.. Russell's Paradox and Others. Technology Review, Vol. 44 , Pp. 16–17. Journal of Symbolic Logic 7 (1):44.
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  19. Charles A. Baylis (1952). Gregory Joshua C.. Heterological and Homological. Mind, N.S. Vol. 61 , Pp. 85–88. Journal of Symbolic Logic 17 (3):220.
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  20. Charles A. Baylis (1936). Ushenko A. P.. The Theory of Logic. Harper & Brothers, New York 1936, Xii+197 Pp. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 1 (3):113-114.
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  21. J. C. Beall (2009). Knowability and Possible Epistemic Oddities. In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press. pp. 105--125.
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  22. J. C. Beall (2007). Prolegomenon to Future Revenge. In Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.
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  23. JC Beall (2003). Review of Woods, John, Paradox and Paraconsistency: Conflict Resolution in the Abstract Sciences. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (6).
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  24. Jean Paul Bendegevanm (1987). Zeno's Paradoxes and the Tile Argument. Philosophy of Science 54 (2):295-.
    A solution of the zeno paradoxes in terms of a discrete space is usually rejected on the basis of an argument formulated by hermann weyl, The so-Called tile argument. This note shows that, Given a set of reasonable assumptions for a discrete geometry, The weyl argument does not apply. The crucial step is to stress the importance of the nonzero width of a line. The pythagorean theorem is shown to hold for arbitrary right triangles.
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  25. Jonathan Bennett (1965). Shaw R.. The Paradox of the Unexpected Examination. Mind, N.S. Vol. 67 , Pp. 382–384.Lyon Ardon. The Prediction Paradox. Mind, N.S. Vol. 68 , Pp. 510–517.Nerlich G. C.. Unexpected Examinations and Unprovable Statements. Mind, N.S. Vol. 70 , Pp. 503–513.Medlin Brian. The Unexpected Examination. American Philosophical Quarterly , Vol. 1 No. 1 , Pp. 66–72. See Corrigenda, Brian Medlin. The Unexpected Examination. American Philosophical Quarterly , Vol. 1 No. 1 , P. 333.)Fitch Frederic B.. A Goedelized Formulation of the Prediction Paradox. American Philosophical Quarterly , Vol. 1 No. 1 , Pp. 161–164. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 30 (1):101-102.
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  26. Jonathan Bennett & Hector-Neri Castaneda (1970). `Ought' and Assumption in Moral Philosophy. Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (1):134.
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  27. Merrie Bergmann (2010). Conjunction-Based Sorites: A Misguided Objection to Degree-Theoretic Solutions to Sorites Paradoxes. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (1):1-4.
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  28. Jose Luis Bermudez (2009). Truth, Indefinite Extensibility, and Fitch's Paradox. In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.
    A number of authors have noted that the key steps in Fitch’s argument are not intuitionistically valid, and some have proposed this as a reason for an anti-realist to accept intuitionistic logic (e.g. Williamson 1982, 1988). This line of reasoning rests upon two assumptions. The first is that the premises of Fitch’s argument make sense from an anti-realist point of view – and in particular, that an anti-realist can and should maintain the principle that all truths are knowable. The second (...)
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  29. Jose Bernadete (1964). Infinity: An Essay in Metaphysics. Clarendon Press.
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  30. Cristina Bicchieri (1989). Self-Refuting Theories of Strategic Interaction: A Paradox of Common Knowledge. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 30 (1-2):69 - 85.
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  31. Katalin BimbÓ (2006). 1. Curry-Type Paradoxes. Logique Et Analyse 49.
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  32. Max Black (1950). White Morton G.. On the Church-Frege Solution of the Paradox of Analysis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 9 No. 2 , Pp. 305–308. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 14 (4):249.
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  33. Max Black & Morton G. White (1950). On the Church-Frege Solution of the Paradox of Analysis. Journal of Symbolic Logic 14 (4):249.
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  34. J. Blau & U. Blau (1995). Epistemic Paradoxes. 1. Dialectica 49 (2-4):169-193.
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  35. Margaret Boden (1962). IX—The Paradox of Explanation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62 (1):159-178.
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  36. Alfons Borgers (1969). Halmos Paul R.. Naive Set Theory. D. Van Nostrand Company, Princeton 1960, Vii + 104 Pp. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 34 (2):308.
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  37. Jorge Bosch (1972). ``The Examination Paradox and Formal Prediction&Quot. Logique Et Analyse 15:505-525.
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  38. D. Bostock (2011). Note on Heterologicality. Analysis 71 (2):252-259.
    1. For simplicity, let the domain of our first-level quantifiers, ‘∀ x’ and so on, be words, and in particular just those words which are adjectives. And let the adjective ‘heterological’ be abbreviated just to As is well known, one cannot legitimately stipulate that Why not? Well, the obvious answer is that if is supposed to be an adjective, then this alleged stipulation would imply the contradiction But contradictions cannot be true, and it is no use stipulating that they shall (...)
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  39. Jacques Bouet (1983). Existe-t-il un modèle d'univers dépourvu de paradoxes ? Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 88 (3):385 - 392.
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  40. Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2005). De doctrinale paradox. Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 97 (1).
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  41. Steven J. Brams (1981). A Resolution of the Paradox of Omniscience. Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy 3:17-30.
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  42. Mimma Bresciani Califano (ed.) (2008). Paradossi E Disarmonie Nelle Scienze E Nelle Arti. L. S. Olschki.
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  43. Berit Brogaard (2009). On Keeping Blue Swans and Unknowable Facts at Bay : A Case Study on Fitch's Paradox. In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.
    (T5) ϕ → ◊Kϕ |-- ϕ → Kϕ where ◊ is possibility, and ‘Kϕ’ is to be read as ϕ is known by someone at some time. Let us call the premise the knowability principle and the conclusion near-omniscience.2 Here is a way of formulating Fitch’s proof of (T5). Suppose the knowability principle is true. Then the following instance of it is true: (p & ~Kp) → ◊K(p & ~Kp). But the consequent is false, it is not possible to know (...)
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  44. Joachim Bromand (2004). Review: Paradox and Paraconsistency: Conflict Resolution in the Abstract Sciences. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (450):416-420.
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  45. Liam Brophy (1947). Peguy the Paradox. New Blackfriars 28 (333):548-552.
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  46. B. L. Bunch (1980). Rescher on the Goodman Paradox. Philosophy of Science 47 (1):119-123.
  47. Johnw Burgess (2009). Can Truth Out? In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.
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  48. Michael B. Burke (2000). The Impossibility of Superfeats. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2):207-220.
    Is it logically possible to perform a "superfeat"? This is, is it logically possible to complete, in a finite time, an infinite sequence of distinct acts? In opposition to the received view, I argue that all superfeats have kinematic features that make them logically impossible.
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  49. Michael B. Burke (2000). The Staccato Run: A Contemporary Issue in the Zenonian Tradition. Modern Schoolman 78 (1):1-8.
    The “staccato run,” in which a runner stops infinitely often while running from one point to another, is a prototype of the “superfeat” (or "supertask”), that is, a feat involving the completion in a finite time of an infinite sequence of distinct, physically individuated acts. There is no widely accepted demonstration that superfeats are impossible logically, but I argue here, contra Grunbaüm, that they are impossible dynamically. Specifically, I show that the staccato run is excluded by Newton’s three laws of (...)
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  50. Michael B. Burke (1999). Benardete's Paradox. Sorites 11:82-85.
    Graham Priest has focused attention on an intriguing but neglected paradox posed by José Benardete in 1964. Benardete viewed the paradox as a threat to the intelligibility of the spatial and temporal continua and offered several different versions of it. Priest has selected one of those versions and formalized it. Although Priest has succeeded nicely in sharpening the paradox, the version he chose to formalize has distracting and potentially problematic features that are absent from some of Benardete's other versions. I (...)
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