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73 found
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  1. Creating Carnists.Rachel Fredericks & Jeremy Fischer - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
    We argue that individual and institutional caregivers have a defeasible moral duty to provide dependent children with plant-based diets and related education. Notably, our three arguments for this claim do not presuppose any general duty of veganism. Instead, they are grounded in widely shared intuitions about children’s interests and caregivers’ responsibilities, as well as recent empirical research relevant to children’s moral development, autonomy development, and physical health. Together, these arguments constitute a strong cumulative case against inculcating in children the dietary (...)
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  2. Against private surrogacy: a child-centred view.Anca Gheaus - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
    Surrogacy involves a private agreement whereby a woman who gestates a child attempts to surrender her (putative) moral right to become the parent of that child such that another person (or persons), of the woman’s choice, can acquire it. Since people lack the normative power to privately transfer custody, attempts to do so are illegitimate, and the law should reflect this fact.
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  3. Children's Human Rights.Anca Gheaus - forthcoming - In Jesse Tomalty & Kerri Woods (eds.), Routledge Handbook for the Philosophy of Human Rights. Routledge. Translated by Kerri Woods.
    There is wide agreement that children have human rights, and that their human rights differ from those of adults. What explains this difference which is, at least at first glance, puzzling, given that human rights are meant to be universal? The puzzle can be dispelled by identifying what unites children’s and adults’ rights as human rights. Here I seek to answer the question of children’s human rights – that is, rights they have merely in virtue of being human and of (...)
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  4. Abortion, Infanticide, and Choosing Parenthood.Prabhpal Singh - forthcoming - Dialogue:1-26.
    Some responses to analogies between abortion and infanticide appeal to Judith Jarvis Thomson's argument for the permissibility of abortion. I argue that these responses fail because a parallel argument can be constructed for the permissibility of infanticide. However, an argument on the grounds of a right to choose to become a parent can maintain that abortion is permissible but infanticide is not by recognizing the normative significance and nature of parenthood. -/- Certaines réponses aux analogies entre l'avortement et l'infanticide font (...)
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  5. Procreative Justice Reconceived: Shifting the Moral Gaze.Emmalon Davis - 2024 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association (First View):1-23.
    This paper reconsiders Tommie Shelby's (2016) analysis of procreation in poor black communities. I identify three conceptual frames within which Shelby situates his analysis—feminization, choice-as-control, and moralization. I argue that these frames should be rejected on conceptual, empirical, and moral grounds. As I show, this framing engenders a flawed understanding of poor black women's procreative lives. I propose an alternative framework for reconceiving the relationship between poverty and procreative justice, one oriented around reproductive flourishing instead of reproductive responsibility. More generally, (...)
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  6. Feeding Infants: Choice-Specific Considerations, Parental Obligation, and Pragmatic Satisficing.Clare Marie Moriarty & Ben Davies - 2024 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 27 (2):167-183.
    Health institutions recommend that young infants be exclusively breastfed on demand, and it is widely held that parents who can breastfeed have an obligation to do so. This has been challenged in recent philosophical work, especially by Fiona Woollard. Woollard’s work critically engages with two distinct views of parental obligation that might ground such an obligation—based on maximal benefit and avoidance of significant harm—to reject an obligation to breastfeed. While agreeing with Woollard’s substantive conclusion, this paper (drawing on philosophical discussion (...)
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  7. What You're Rejecting When You're Expecting.Blake Hereth - 2023 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry (3):1-12.
    I defend two collapsing or reductionist arguments against Weak Pro-Natalism (WPN), the view that procreation is generally merely permissible. In particular, I argue that WPN collapses into Strong Pro-Natalism (SPN), the view that procreation is generally obligatory. Because SPN conflicts with the dominant view that procreation is never obligatory, demonstrating that WPN collapses into or entails SPN establishes epistemic parity (at least as concerns reproductive liberty) between WPN and Anti-Natalism (AN), the view that procreation is always impermissible. First, I distinguish (...)
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  8. Why Parent Together?Marcus William Hunt - 2023 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 19 (2):1-25.
    The paper offers an account of co-parenthood according to which co-parents are parent and child to one another. The paper begins by reviewing extant theories of the value of being a parent, to see whether the value of co-parenthood is reducible to this. Finding that it is not, I briefly elaborate a theory of parenthood on which parents are those who create persons. Using Aristotle’s four causes as a helpful prism, I outline how parents are the cause of their child, (...)
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  9. A Project View of the Right to Parent.Benjamin Lange - 2023 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 1:1-23.
    The institution of the family and its importance have recently received considerable attention from political theorists. Leading views maintain that the institution’s justification is grounded, at least in part, in the non-instrumental value of the parent-child relationship itself. Such views face the challenge of identifying a specific good in the parent-child relationship that can account for how adults acquire parental rights over a particular child—as opposed to general parental rights, which need not warrant a claim to parent one’s biological progeny. (...)
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  10. Caught in a School Choice Quandary: What should an equity-minded parent do?Michael Merry - 2023 - Theory and Research in Education 21 (2):155-175.
    In this article, I examine a case involving an equity-minded parent caught in a quandary about which school to select for her child, knowing that her decision may have consequences for others. To do so, I heuristically construct a fictional portrait and explore the deliberative process a parent might have through a dialogue taking place among ‘friends’, where each friend personifies a different set of ethical considerations. I then briefly consider two competing philosophical assessments but argue that neither position helpfully (...)
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  11. Moral Guilt without Blameworthiness.Jaeha Woo - 2023 - Southwest Philosophy Review 39 (1):201-208.
    I examine a particular case in which moral guilt seems to be incurred even though the agent cannot be said to be blameworthy in any way. I argue that the agent-regret induced by one’s causal involvement in bringing about the bad state of affairs is not always sufficient to account for the extent of guilt, and I suggest that the sense of failure in terms of fulfilling tasks that arise from role-responsibilities that have been taken on must be considered as (...)
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  12. Childhood after COVID: Children’s Interests in a Flourishing Childhood and a More Communal Childrearing.Anca Gheaus - 2022 - Philosophical Inquiry in Education 29 (1):65–71.
    This article brings into relief two desiderata in childrearing, the importance of which the pandemic has made clearer than ever. The first is to ensure that, in schools as well as outside them, children have ample opportunities to enjoy goods that are particular to childhood: unstructured time, to be spent playing with other children, discovering the world in company or alone, or indeed pursuing any of the creative activities that make children happy and help them learn. I refer to these (...)
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  13. That only the elite should have children is a worrying argument. [REVIEW]P. M. Msimang - 2022 - South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 15 (1):6-7.
  14. Health and Other Reveries: Homo Curare, Homo Faber, and the Realization of Care.Joel Michael Reynolds - 2022 - In Talia Welch & Susan Bredlau (eds.), Normality, Abnormality, and Pathology in Merleau-Ponty. SUNY Press. pp. 203-224.
    Merleau-Ponty claims that the idea of objective knowledge is supported by "our reveries." My aim in this paper is to explore this argument with respect to the idea of health. As a case study, I focus on bioethical issues surrounding return of results of incidental variants with respect to the use of genetic and genomic screening technologies (GSTs) in newborn and pediatric contexts. Drawing on a range of Merleau-Ponty’s texts, I argue that this case suggests the modern idea of health (...)
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  15. Wrongful Influence in Educational Contexts.John Tillson - 2022 - In Kathryn Ann Hytten (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Education. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
    When and why are coercion, indoctrination, manipulation, deception, and bullshit morally wrongful modes of influence in the context of educating children? Answering this question requires identifying what valid claims different parties have against one another regarding how children are influenced. Most prominently among these, it requires discerning what claims children have regarding whether and how they and their peers are influenced, and against whom they have these claims. The claims they have are grounded in the weighty interests they each equally (...)
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  16. Child-rearing With Minimal Domination: A Republican Account.Anca Gheaus - 2021 - Political Studies 69 (3).
    Parenting involves an extraordinary degree of power over children. Republicans are concerned about domination, which, on one view, is the holding of power that fails to track the interests of those over whom it is exercised. On this account, parenting as we know it is dominating due to the low standards necessary for acquiring and retaining parental rights and the extent of parental power. Domination cannot be fully eliminated from child-rearing without unacceptable loss of value. Most likely, republicanism requires that (...)
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  17. Naturalizing parenthood: Lessons from (some forms of) non‐traditional family‐making.Daniel Groll - 2021 - Journal of Social Philosophy 53 (3):356-370.
    Cases of non-traditional family-making offer a rich seam for thinking about normative parenthood. Gamete donors are genetically related to the resulting offspring but are not thought to be normative parents. Gestational surrogates are also typically not thought to be normative parents, despite having gestated a child. Adoptive parents are typically thought to be normative parents even though they are neither genetically nor gestationally related to their child. Philosophers have paid attention to these kinds of cases. But they have not paid (...)
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  18. Well-being, Gamete Donation, and Genetic Knowledge: The Significant Interest View.Daniel Groll - 2021 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 46 (6):758-781.
    The Significant Interest view entails that even if there were no medical reasons to have access to genetic knowledge, there would still be reason for prospective parents to use an identity-release donor as opposed to an anonymous donor. This view does not depend on either the idea that genetic knowledge is profoundly prudentially important or that donor-conceived people have a right to genetic knowledge. Rather, it turns on general claims about parents’ obligations to help promote their children’s well-being and the (...)
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  19. Defending the Distinction Between Pregnancy and Parenthood.Prabhpal Singh - 2021 - Journal of Medical Ethics 47 (3):189-191.
    In this paper, I respond to criticisms toward my account of the difference in moral status between fetuses and newborns. I show my critics have not adequately argued for their view that pregnant women participate in a parent-child relationship. While an important counterexample is raised against my account, this counterexample had already been dealt with in my original paper. Because the criticisms against my account lack argumentative support, they do not pose a problem for my account. I conclude the raised (...)
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  20. Parental responsibilities and moral status.Bruce Philip Blackshaw & Daniel Rodger - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics 47 (3):187-188.
    Prabhpal Singh has recently defended a relational account of the difference in moral status between fetuses and newborns as a way of explaining why abortion is permissible and infanticide is not. He claims that only a newborn can stand in a parent–child relation, not a fetus, and this relation has a moral dimension that bestows moral value. We challenge Singh’s reasoning, arguing that the case he presents is unconvincing. We suggest that the parent–child relation is better understood as an extension (...)
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  21. It’s Complicated: What Our Attitudes toward Pregnancy, Abortion, and Miscarriage Tell Us about the Moral Status of Early Fetuses.K. Lindsey Chambers - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (8):950-965.
    Many accounts of the morality of abortion assume that early fetuses must all have or lack moral status in virtue of developmental features that they share. Our actual attitudes toward early fetuses don’t reflect this all-or-nothing assumption: early fetuses can elicit feelings of joy, love, indifference, or distress. If we start with the assumption that our attitudes toward fetuses reflect a real difference in their moral status, then we need an account of fetal moral status that can explain that difference. (...)
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  22. Fetuses, Newborns, and Parental Responsibility.Prabhpal Singh - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics 46 (3):188-193.
    I defend a relational account of difference in the moral status between fetuses and newborns. The difference in moral status between a fetus and a newborn is that the newborn baby is the proper object of ‘parental responsibility’ whereas the fetus is not. ‘Parental responsibilities’ are a moral dimension of a ‘parent-child relation’, a relation which newborn babies stand in, but fetuses do not. I defend this relational account by analyzing the concepts of ‘parent’ and ‘child’, and conclude that the (...)
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  23. Mandating Vaccination.Anthony Skelton & Lisa Forsberg - 2020 - In Meredith Celene Schwartz (ed.), The Ethics of Pandemics. Peterborough, CA: Broadview Press. pp. 131-134.
    A short piece exploring some arguments for mandating vaccination for Covid-19.
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  24. Well-being, Disability, and Choosing Children.Matthew J. Barker & Robert A. Wilson - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):305-328.
    The view that it is better for life to be created free of disability is pervasive in both common sense and philosophy. We cast doubt on this view by focusing on an influential line of thinking that manifests it. That thinking begins with a widely-discussed principle, Procreative Beneficence, and draws conclusions about parental choice and disability. After reconstructing two versions of this argument, we critique the first by exploring the relationship between different understandings of well-being and disability, and the second (...)
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  25. What Is Unfair about Unequal Brute Luck? An Intergenerational Puzzle.Simon Beard - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (4):1043-1051.
    According to Luck egalitarians, fairness requires us to bring it about that nobody is worse off than others where this results from brute bad luck, but not where they choose or deserve to be so. In this paper, I consider one type of brute bad luck that appears paradigmatic of what a Luck Egalitarian ought to be most concerned about, namely that suffered by people who are born to badly off parents and are less well off as a result. However, (...)
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  26. Wronging Future Children.K. Lindsey Chambers - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.
    The dominant framework for addressing procreative ethics has revolved around the notion of harm, largely due to Derek Parfit’s famous non-identity problem. Focusing exclusively on the question of harm treats what procreators owe their offspring as akin to what they would owe strangers (if they owe them anything at all). Procreators, however, usually expect (and are expected) to parent the persons they create, so we cannot understand what procreators owe their offspring without also appealing to their role as prospective parents. (...)
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  27. The challenge for medical ethicists: Weighing pros and cons of advanced reproductive technologies to screen human embryos during IVF.Inmaculada de Melo-Martin - 2019 - In E. Scott Sills & Gianpiero D. Palermo (eds.), Human Embryos and Preimplantation Genetic Technologies. Elsevier. pp. 1-10.
    Embryo screening technologies offer important benefits to individuals who use them and society. These techniques can expand the reproductive options of many prospective parents and can contribute to reducing the burdens of disease and disability. Nonetheless, embryo screening techniques present individuals and societies with important ethical challenges. Here, I explore some of them. In particular, I discuss the costs for prospective parents of increased reproductive choices, as well as concerns about sanctioning problematic social norms, increasing social injustice, limiting the ways (...)
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  28. More Co-parents, Fewer Children: Multiparenting and Sustainable Population.Anca Gheaus - 2019 - Essays in Philosophy 20 (1):3-23.
    Some philosophers argue that we should limit procreation – for instance, to one child per person or one child per couple – in order to reduce our aggregate carbon footprint. I provide additional support to the claim that population size is a matter of justice, by explaining that we have a duty of justice towards the current generation of children to pass on to them a sustainable population. But instead of, or, more likely, alongside with, having fewer children in in (...)
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  29. Causal parenthood and the ethics of gamete donation.Jason Hanna - 2019 - Bioethics 33 (2):267-273.
    According to the causal theory of parenthood, people incur parental obligations by causing children to exist. Proponents of the causal theory often argue that gamete donors have special obligations to their genetic offspring. In response, many defenders of current gamete donation practices would reject the causal theory. In particular, they may invoke the ‘too many parents problem’: many people who causally contribute to the existence of children – for instance, fertility doctors – do not thereby incur parental obligations. This article (...)
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  30. The Real Value of Child-Parent Vulnerability.Mianna Lotz - 2019 - Ethics and Social Welfare 13 (3):244-260.
    A troubling paradox of sorts may be thought to lie at the heart of the child–parent relationship. This supposed paradox consists in an apparent incompatibility of the goods afforded by that relatio...
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  31. Paradoxes of Children’s Vulnerability.Colin Macleod - 2019 - Ethics and Social Welfare 13 (3):261-271.
  32. Philosophical Foundations of Children's and Family Law.Elizabeth Brake & Lucinda Ferguson (eds.) - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    What defines family law? Is it an area of law with clean boundaries and unified distinguishing characteristics, or an untidy grouping of disparate rules and doctrines? What values or principles should guide it – and how could it be improved? Indeed, even the scope of family law is contested. Whilst some law schools and textbooks separate family law from children’s law, this is invariably effected without asking what might be gained or lost from treating them together or separately. Should family (...)
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  33. Children's Vulnerability and Legitimate Authority Over Children.Anca Gheaus - 2018 - Journal of Applied Philosophy:60-75.
    Children's vulnerability gives rise to duties of justice towards children and determines when authority over them is legitimately exercised. I argue for two claims. First, children's general vulnerability to objectionable dependency on their caregivers entails that they have a right not to be subject to monopolies of care, and therefore determines the structure of legitimate authority over them. Second, children's vulnerability to the loss of some special goods of childhood determines the content of legitimate authority over them. My interest is (...)
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  34. Raising a Child with Respect.Norvin Richards - 2018 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 35 (S1):90-104.
    Parents whose children will become adults are expected to help them do so, as opposed to only keeping them alive while they manage it on their own. The parental help must respect the child's standing as a separate individual: our children aren't ours to shape to our design, even if our aim is to help them flourish. But then how are we to raise our children with respect for their individuality? According to Matthew Clayton, doing so requires refraining from attempting (...)
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  35. Do Parental Licensing Schemes Violate the Rights of Biological Parents?Christian Barry & R. J. Leland - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):755-761.
  36. The Problem of Choosing (For) Our Children.K. Lindsey Chambers - 2017 - In Jaime Ahlberg & Michael Cholbi (eds.), Procreation, Parenthood, and Educational Rights: Ethical and Philosophical Issues. Routledge.
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  37. The Harm Principle and Parental Licensing.Andrew Jason Cohen - 2017 - Social Theory and Practice 43 (4):825-849.
    Hugh LaFollette proposed parental licensing in 1980 (and 2010)--not as a requirement for pregnancy, but for raising a child. If you have a baby, are not licensed, and do not get licensed, the baby would be put up for adoption. Despite the intervention required in an extremely personal area of life, I argue that those who endorse the harm principle ought to endorse parental licensing of this sort. Put differently, I show how the harm principle strengthens the case for parental (...)
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  38. Review of Françoise Baylis and Carolyn McLeod, eds.: Family-making: contemporary ethical challenges: Oxford University Press, New York, 2014. [REVIEW]Inmaculada de Melo-Martín - 2017 - Monash Bioethics Review 34 (3-4):239-242.
  39. The chain of love and duty.Anca Gheaus - 2017 - Forum for European Philosophy Blog.
    Anca Gheaus considers the reasons we owe our children a sustainable world.
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  40. Love and Justice: a Paradox?Anca Gheaus - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):739-759.
    Three claims about love and justice cannot be simultaneously true and therefore entail a paradox: (1) Love is a matter of justice. (2) There cannot be a duty to love. (3) All matters of justice are matters of duty. The first claim is more controversial. To defend it, I show why the extent to which we enjoy the good of love is relevant to distributive justice. To defend (2) I explain the empirical, conceptual and axiological arguments in its favour. Although (...)
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  41. Parental genetic shaping and parental environmental shaping.Anca Gheaus - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):20-31.
    Analytic philosophers tend to agree that intentional parental genetic shaping and intentional parental environmental shaping for the same feature are, normatively, on a par. I challenge this view by advancing a novel argument, grounded in the value of fair relationships between parents and children: Parental genetic shaping is morally objectionable because it unjustifiably exacerbates the asymmetry between parent and child with respect to the voluntariness of their entrance into the parent–child relationship. Parental genetic shaping is, for this reason, different from (...)
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  42. Sufficientarian Parenting Must be Child-Centered.Anca Gheaus - 2017 - Law, Ethics and Philosophy 5:189-197.
    Liam Shields’ sufficientarian commitments mean that he should subscribe to a child-centered account of the right to parent. This point most likely generalizes: sufficientarians who acknowledge children’s full moral status must embrace a child-centered account of the right to parent.
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  43. Teach the Children Well: On Virtue and its Benefits.Michelle Mason - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (6):734-760.
    What connection (if any) is there between living well, in the sense of living a life of ethical virtue, and faring well, in the sense of living a life that is good for the agent whose life it is? Philosophical arguments that attempt to defend a connection between exercising the virtues and living a good life typically display two commitments: first, a commitment to addressing their answer to the person whose life is in question and, second, a commitment to showing (...)
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  44. No Longer as Free as the Wind: Human Reproduction and Parenting Enter the Scope of Morality; Review Essay.Lantz Fleming Miller - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (3):657-664.
    Camus considered the most crucial philosophical problem to be that of suicide—whether to discontinue your existence by endingit. Alternatively, a most crucial philosophical problem may be procreation—whether to continue human existence by making new humans. The topic has spurred an increasing amount of debate over the past decade, with marked diversion with Anscomb’s comment that it makes no moral sense to inquire whether one should reproduce. One might as well ask why digest food or why should the wind blow. This (...)
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  45. The Moral Foundations of Parenthood.Joseph Millum - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    In this book, Joseph Millum explains how parental rights and responsibilities are acquired, what they consist in, and how parents should go about making decisions on behalf of their children. In doing so, he provides a set of frameworks to help solve pressing ethical dilemmas relating to parents and children.
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  46. Human Rights and The Right to be Loved.Japa Pallikkathayil - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):743-748.
  47. Better Parenting through Biomedical Modification: A Case for Pluralism, Deference, and Charity.David Wasserman - 2017 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 27 (2):217-247.
    The moral limits on how, and how much, parents may attempt to shape their children depend on what the moral project of parenthood is all about. A great deal has been written in the past forty years on the moral functions of parents and families and the acquisition and character of parental duties and rights. There has also been a great deal of philosophical writing on the use of technologies to create, select, and modify children, with such seminal works as (...)
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  48. Parental Education and Expensive Consumption Habits.Danielle Zwarthoed - 2017 - Journal of Applied Philosophy (2):825-843.
    The aim of this article is to investigate the general and special obligations of parents with respect to the shaping of consumption habits, from a liberal egalitarian perspective. The article argues that, in virtue of them being well placed to shape the next generation's consumption habits, parents have a duty of justice to prevent their children from developing expensive consumption habits in order to enable them to leave their fair share to others. In virtue of the special relationship they have (...)
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  49. Parents of Adults with Diminished Self-Governance.Jennifer Desante, David Degrazia & Marion Danis - 2016 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 25 (1):93-107.
    Most theories of parenthood assume, at least implicitly, that a child will grow up to be an independent, autonomous adult. However, some children with cognitive limitations or psychiatric illness are unable to do so. For this reason, these accounts do not accommodate the circumstances and responsibilities of parents of such adult children. Our article attempts to correct this deficiency. In particular, we describe some of the common characteristics and experiences of this population of parents and children, examine the unique aspects (...)
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  50. Parental partiality and the intergenerational transmission of advantage.Thomas Douglas - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2735-2756.
    Parents typically favour their own children over others’. For example, most parents invest more time and money in their own children than in other children. This parental partiality is usually regarded as morally permissible, or even obligatory, but it can have undesirable distributive effects. For example, it may create unfair or otherwise undesirable advantages for the favoured child. A number of authors have found it necessary to justify parental partiality in the face of these distributive concerns, and they have typically (...)
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