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  1. Ron Aboodi, Adi Borer & and David Enoch (2008). Deontology, Individualism, and Uncertainty, a Reply to Jackson and Smith. Journal of Philosophy 105 (5):259-272.
    How should deontological theories that prohibit actions of type K — such as intentionally killing an innocent person — deal with cases of uncertainty as to whether a particular action is of type K? Frank Jackson and Michael Smith, who raise this problem in their paper "Absolutist Moral Theories and Uncertainty" (2006), focus on a case where a skier is about to cause the death of ten innocent people — we don’t know for sure whether on purpose or not — (...)
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  2. James F. Childress (1989). Dying Patients: Who's in Control? Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 17 (3):227-231.
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  3. Antti Kauppinen (2014). Hate and Punishment. Journal of Interpersonal Violence:1-19.
    According to legal expressivism, neither crime nor punishment consists merely in intentionally imposing some kind of harm on another. Crime and punishment also have an expressive aspect. They are what they are in part because they enact attitudes toward others—in the case of crime, some kind of disrespect, at least, and in the case of punishment, society’s condemnation or reprobation. Punishment is justified, at least in part, because (and when) it uniquely expresses fitting condemnation or other retributive attitude. What makes (...)
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  4. Norbert Paulo (2015). The Bite of Rights in Paternalism. In Thomas Schramme (ed.), New Perspectives on Paternalism and Health Care. Springer Verlag.
    This paper scrutinizes the tension between individuals’ rights and paternalism. I will argue that no normative account that includes rights of individuals can justify hard paternalism since the infringement of a right can only be justified with the right or interest of another person, which is never the case in hard paternalism. Justifications of hard paternalistic actions generally include a deviation from the very idea of having rights. The paper first introduces Tom Beauchamp as the most famous contemporary hard paternalist (...)
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