About this topic
Summary Paul Feyerabend (1924-1994) was an influential philosopher of science who challenged orthodoxy in the philosophy of science throughout his career.  Following studies in Vienna, he worked for a time in the late 1950's in Britain before moving to the University of California at Berkeley.  Though he remained attached to Berkeley throughout the remainder of his career, he held a range of visiting positions, and in later years also held a position at the ETH in Zurich.  In early work, Feyerabend subjected the logical empiricist account of meaning to criticism, arguing for meaning variance and the incommensurability of theories.  He was perhaps most famous for his book Against Method in which he argues that all rules of scientific method may be legitimately violated in specific circumstances.
Key works Feyerabend's most famous book is Against Method.  Later books include  Science in a Free SocietyFarewell to ReasonConquest of Abundance and  The Tyranny of Science.  Many of his most important papers have been collected in the three volumes of his philosophical papers Feyerabend 1981, Feyerabend 1981, Feyerabend 1999.  Several books devoted to Feyerabend have been published, including Farrell 2003, Oberheim 2007, Preston 1997, as well as a recent edited collection of essays Preston et al 2000.  Feyerabend's autobiography, Killing Time, is also to be recommended.
Introductions Paul Hoyningen-Huene's obituary of Feyerabend contains general remarks on Feyerabend's philosophical work, as well as his life and career (see Hoyningen-Huene 1994).  For a more detailed overview of Feyerabend's career and the development of his ideas, see John Preston's entry on Feyerabend in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (see Preston 2008).
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  1. Science Rules: A Historical Introduction to Scientific Methods.Peter Achinstein (ed.) - 2004 - Johns Hopkins University Press.
    Is there a universal set of rules for discovering and testing scientific hypotheses? Since the birth of modern science, philosophers, scientists, and other thinkers have wrestled with this fundamental question of scientific practice. Efforts to devise rigorous methods for obtaining scientific knowledge include the twenty-one rules Descartes proposed in his Rules for the Direction of the Mind and the four rules of reasoning that begin the third book of Newton's Principia , and continue today in debates over the very possibility (...)
  2. Is It a Good Thing?Peter Achinstein - 2000 - In Paul Feyerabend, John Preston, Gonzalo Munévar & David Lamb (eds.), The Worst Enemy of Science?: Essays in Memory of Paul Feyerabend. Oxford University Press. pp. 37.
  3. Proliferation: Is It a Good Thing?Peter Achinstein - 2000 - In John Preston, Gonzalo Munévar & David Lamb (eds.), 'The Worst Enemy of Science'?: Essays in Memory of Paul Feyerabend. Oup Usa.
  4. Book Review: Stadler, F., and Fischer, K. R., Editors. (2006). Paul Feyerabend: Ein Philosoph Aus Wien. Vienna: Springer. [REVIEW]J. Agassi - 2008 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (2):303-305.
  5. Book Review: Paul Feyerabend: Ein Philosoph Aus Wien, Edited by F. Stadler and KR Fischer. [REVIEW]Joseph Agassi - forthcoming - Philosophy of the Social Sciences.
  6. III. Yates on Feyerabend's Democratic Relativism.C. Fred Alford - 1985 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 28 (1-4):113 – 118.
    Stephen Yates's objections to Feyerabend's political theory (Inquiry 27 [1984], 137?42) are presented in a way that makes them unnecessarily vulnerable to a rhetorical strategy often employed by Feyerabend. Like many other critics, Yates seems to assume that it is the implausibility of Feyerabend's claims that opens them to refutation, whereas it is really this that makes them such slippery targets of criticism. Rather than claim that Feyerabend's ideal would be virtually impossible to realize, I argue that Feyerabend does not (...)
  7. Le réalisme scientifique de Feyerabend.Bernard Baertschi - 1986 - Dialogue 25 (2):267-.
  8. Radical Knowledge: A Philosophical Inquiry Into the Nature and Limits of Science. By Gonzalo Munevar, with a Forword by Paul K. Feyerabend.Dominic J. Balestra - 1984 - Modern Schoolman 61 (2):134-137.
  9. Paul Feyerabend.Aristides Baltas - 1995 - Neusis 2:150-154.
  10. Protocol Sentences and Scientific Anarchism.Francesco Barone - 1972 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 16:327-345.
    Contrary to a common opinion, some theses of scientific anarchism are historically connected not only to Popper's and "second" Wittgenstein's thoughts, but also to some ideas affirmed by the advocates of "physicalism" (like Neurath) during the neopositivistie debate on protocol sentences. The common basis of "physicalism" and "anarchism" is a repulse of the "atomistic" theory of meaning. That is making more adequate the epistemological description of knowledge. But both Neurath and Feyerabend err in thinking that this repulse entails a conception (...)
  11. Nietzsche, Feyerabend, and the Voices of Relativism.Gordon C. F. Bearn - 1986 - Metaphilosophy 17 (2-3):135-152.
  12. Looking at Feyerabend Through Ontic Coloured Glasses.B. Richard Beatch - 1997 - Philosophical Inquiry 19 (1-2):35-51.
  13. Epistemological Relativism: Nature and Problems.B. Richard Beatch - 1994 - Dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo
    Relativistic accounts of scientific knowledge have become more popular over the past thirty years than, perhaps, at any time previous to this. Ever since Kuhn offered his account of science in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, the philosophy of science has had to contend with various accounts of scientific truth ranging from Kuhnian type positions to the most radical positions such as that of Feyerabend. Relativism has not simply been limited to the philosophy of science, however. More and more, thinkers (...)
  14. Observationality: Quine and the Epistemological Nihilists.P. William Bechtel & Eric Stiffler - 1978 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978:93 - 108.
    Quine has proposed an alternative criterion for identifying observation sentences which has not yet received serious evaluation. We investigate this new criterion, showing how it differs from more traditional criteria and measuring it against the major objections to traditional criteria. Our judgment is that it meets Suppe's and Achinstein's objections and one version of the theory-ladenness objection offered by Hanson, Feyerabend, and Kuhn. We suggest how it might also provide an answer to the more serious version of the theory-ladenness objection. (...)
  15. Memorial Minutes.Nuel D. Belnap & Paul Feyerabend - 1974 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1974:60.
  16. Philosophy and Methodology of Military Intelligence: Correspondence with Paul Feyerabend.Isaac Ben-Israel - 2001 - Philosophia 28 (1-4):71-101.
    The paper includes a series of letters exchanged between the author and the late Professor Feyerabend, concerning the best "method" for military intelligence, as a test case for the role of conceptual frameworks in philosophy of science. The letters deal with issues like: Is it possible to make an intelligence estimate without a conceptual framework? Does such a framework have any 'positive' role? If so, how should a conceptual framework in intelligence be built? What risks lurk within it? Is it (...)
  17. Paul K. Feyerabend -- Search for Abundance.S. Benvenuto - 1995 - Télos 1995 (102):107-114.
  18. De la paradoja en el" todo vale" de Paul Feyerabend a la falacia de la falsa libertad.Horacio Bernardo - 2003 - A Parte Rei 25:7.
  19. The Mind-Brain Identity Theory: A Collection of Papers.Clive Vernon Borst - 1970 - New York: St Martin's P..
    Mind body, not a pseudo-problem, by H. Feigl.--Is consciousness a brain process? by U. T. Place.--Sensations and brain processes, by J. J. C. Smart.--The nature of mind, by D. M. Armstrong.--Materialism as a scientific hypothesis, by U. T. Place.--Sensations and brain processes: a reply to J. J. C. Smart, by J. T. Stevenson.--Further remarks on sensations and brain processes, by J. J. C. Smart.--Smart on sensations, by K. Baier.--Brain processes and incorrigibility, by J. J. C. Smart.--Could mental states be brain (...)
  20. Gunnar Andersson, Criticism and the History of Science. Kuhn's, Lakatos's and Feyerabend's Criticisms of Critical Rationalism, (Philosophy of History and Culture, Vol. 13.). [REVIEW]Hardy Bouillon - 1998 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 29 (1):133-135.
  21. Quelle épistémologie historique ? Kuhn, Feyerabend, Hacking et l'école bachelardienne.Anastasios Brenner - forthcoming - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale.
    Pendant un demi-siècle, la méthode appropriée en philosophie des sciences dans la tradition continentale était l'étude historique ; dans la tradition anglosaxonne, l'analyse logique. Ce clivage au sein du discours philosophique s'est grandement estompé de nos jours. D'une part, Kuhn a défendu la pertinence philosophique de l'histoire des sciences. D'autre part, Vuillemin et Gilles-Gaston Granger ont promu l'étude de la philosophie analytique et l'emploi de ses techniques logiques. Le rapprochement des deux traditions a pris encore une nouvelle tournure dans les (...)
  22. Incommensurability.Harold I. Brown - 1983 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):3 – 29.
    The thesis that certain competing scientific theories are incommensurable was introduced by Kuhn and Feyerabend in 1962 and has been a subject of widespread critique. Critics have generally taken incommensurable theories to be theories which cannot be compared in a rational manner, but both Kuhn and Feyerabend have explicitly rejected this interpretation, and Feyerabend has discussed ways in which such comparisons can be made in a number of his writings. This paper attempts to clarify the incommensurability thesis through the examination (...)
  23. Science in a Free Society by Paul Feyerabend; New Left Books; London, 1978; Pp. 221.J. R. Brown - 1981 - Dialogue 20 (1):169-171.
  24. The Abundant World: Paul Feyerabend's Metaphysics of Science.Matthew J. Brown - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 57:142-154.
    The goal of this paper is to provide an interpretation of Feyerabend's metaphysics of science as found in late works like Conquest of Abundance and Tyranny of Science. Feyerabend's late metaphysics consists of an attempt to criticize and provide a systematic alternative to traditional scientific realism, a package of views he sometimes referred to as “scientific materialism.” Scientific materialism is objectionable not only on metaphysical grounds, nor because it provides a poor ground for understanding science, but because it implies problematic (...)
  25. Introduction: Reappraising Paul Feyerabend.Matthew J. Brown & Ian James Kidd - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 57:1-8.
    This volume is devoted to a reappraisal of the philosophy of Paul Feyerabend. It has four aims. The first is to reassess his already well-known work from the 1960s and 1970s in light of contemporary developments in the history and philosophy of science. The second is to explore themes in his neglected later work, including recently published and previously unavailable writings. The third is to assess the contributions that Feyerabend can make to contemporary debate, on topics such as perspectivism, realism, (...)
  26. Feyerabend and Popper on Theory Proliferation and Anomaly Import: On the Compatibility of Theoretical Pluralism and Critical Rationalism.Karim Bschir - 2015 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 5 (1):24-55.
    A fundamental tenet of Paul Feyerabend’s pluralistic view of science has it that theory proliferation, that is, the availability of theoretical alternatives, is of crucial importance for the detection of anomalies in established theories. Paul Hoyningen-Huene calls this the Anomaly Importation Thesis, according to which anomalies are imported, as it were, into well-established theories from competing alternatives. This article pursues two major objectives: (a) to work out the systematic details of Feyerabend’s ideas on theory proliferation and anomaly import as they (...)
  27. Scientific Realism, Commensurability, and Conceptual Change: A Critique of Paul Feyerabend's Philosophy of Science.Richard M. Burian - 1971 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
  28. Feyerabend and the Pragmatic Theory of Observation.Robert E. Butts - 1966 - Philosophy of Science 33 (4):383-394.
    Central to Paul K. Feyerabend's philosophy of science are two theses: (1) there is no standard observation language available to science; instead, observability is to be viewed as a pragmatic matter; and (2) when considering questions of empirical significance and experimental test, the methodological unit of science is a set of inconsistent theories. I argue that the pragmatic theory of observation by itself decides neither for nor against any particular specification of meaning for an observation language; and that Feyerabend's position (...)
  29. Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory by Barry Barnes; The Interaction Between Science and Philosophy Edited by Y. Elkana; Against Method, Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge by Paul Feyerabend.G. N. Cantor - 1976 - History of Science 14:265.
  30. Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend, For and Against Method, Ed. By Matteo Motterlini.H. Chang - 2000 - Annals of Science 57:456-457.
  31. To Transform the Phenomena: Feyerabend, Proliferation, and Recurrent Neural Networks.Paul M. Churchland - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (4):420.
    Paul Feyerabend recommended the methodological policy of proliferating competing theories as a means to uncovering new empirical data, and thus as a means to increase the empirical constraints that all theories must confront. Feyerabend's policy is here defended as a clear consequence of connectionist models of explanatory understanding and learning. An earlier connectionist "vindication" is criticized, and a more realistic and penetrating account is offered in terms of the computationally plastic cognitive profile displayed by neural networks with a recurrent architecture.
  32. Feyerabend's Conquest of Abundance.Stephen R. L. Clark - 2002 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 45 (2):249 – 267.
  33. P. K. Feyerabend, "Philosophical Papers; Vol I Realism, Rationalism and Scientific Method; Vol II Problems of Empiricism".Stephen R. L. Clark - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (135):172.
  34. Philosophical PapersVol. I Realism, Rationalism & Scientific MethodVol. II Problems of Empiricism.Stephen R. L. Clark & P. K. Feyerabend - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (135):172.
  35. Feyerabend, Rorty, Mouffe and Keane: On Realising Democracy.Thomas Clarke - 1999 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 2 (3):81-118.
    This article examines a peculiarity dating from Classical times, namely, that democracy may be achieved, in practice, independently of and prior to its articulation as theory. This peculiarity has implications for the way in which the history of democratic theory is understood, and also for the place of the democratic theorist in society. Paul Feyerabend, Richard Rorty, Chantal Mouffe and John Keane are theorists of democracy, but they all depart, first, from the commitment to the universal truth?claims that underpin other (...)
  36. Feyerabend on Explanation and Reduction.José Alberto Coffa - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (16):500-508.
  37. Le premesse" etiche" dell'epistemologia di Paul K Feyerabend.David Comincini - 2004 - Epistemologia 27 (2):245-264.
  38. Paul K. Feyerabend, Zeitverschwendung, aus dem Englischen übersetzt von Joachim Jung.Paul Cortois - 1998 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 60 (2):401-403.
  39. Afscheid Van een geniaal bordenwasser. Paul Feyerabend en de vrolijke wetenschapsfilosofie.Paul Cortois - 1995 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (1):91 - 110.
    In this commemorative article the significance of Paul Feyerabend's work for philosophy of science in general is reviewed. Its unifying perspective is identified as the fight against any possible constraint on imagination (i.e. on the capacity of generating alternatives). This alternative-maximizing search was already central in Feyerabend's 'pre-anarchistic' studies. In fact, I claim that the really significant theses and arguments, as far as the intrinsic debate within the philosophy of science is concerned, were present in these earlier studies (criticism of (...)
  40. Feyerabend, the Ancient Quarrel and the Problem of Aesthetic Criteria.George Couvalis - 1994 - Philosophical Inquiry 16 (1-2):1-19.
  41. Feyerabend's Critique of Foundationalism.George Couvalis - 1989 - Avebury.
  42. Radical Fallibilism Vs Conceptual Analysis: The Significance of Feyerabend's Philosophy of Science. [REVIEW]George Couvalis, Gonzalo Munévar, Eric Oberheim & Paul Hoyningen-Huehne - 1999 - Metascience 8 (2):206-233.
  43. Feyerabend, Ionesco, and the Philosophy of the Drama.S. C. Couvalis - 1988 - Critical Philosophy 4:51.
  44. Feyerabend, Ionesco, and the Philosophy of the Drama.S. G. Couvalis - 1988 - Critical Philosophy 4:51-66.
  45. Feyerabend's Epistemology and Brecht's Theory of the Drama.S. G. Couvalis - 1987 - Philosophy and Literature 11 (1):117-123.
  46. Feyerabend and Laymon on Brownian Motion.Spyridon George Couvalis - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (3):415-421.
    In this paper, I will defend Paul Feyerabend's claim--that there are some scientific theories that cannot be refuted unless one of their rivals is first confirmed--by criticizing Ronald Laymon's well-known attack on Feyerabend's claim. In particular, I will argue both that the Second Law of Thermodynamics was not refuted before the Kinetic Theory's predictions were confirmed, and that it could not have been refuted without the confirmation of the remarkable predictions of some rival theory.
  47. Should Philosophers Become Playwrights?Spyridon George Couvalis - 1986 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 29 (1-4):451-457.
    Feyerabend has recently argued that the best way to deal with philosophical problems is through drama rather than through intellectual debate. This paper criticises his view and corrects it.
  48. Feyerabend's Discourse Against Method: A Marxist Critique.J. Curthoys & W. Suchting - 1977 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 20 (1-4):243 – 371.
  49. Kuhn Vs. Popper Vs. Lakatos Vs. Feyerabend.John Darwin - 2010 - Philosophy of Management 9 (1):39-57.
    In this paper we examine the alleged war between Kuhn and Popper, extending the discussion to incorporate two of their lesser known, but important, protagonists, Lakatos and Feyerabend. The argument presented here is that the four can fruitfully be considered together, and that it is possible to go beyond the surface tensions and clashes between them to fashion an approach which takes advantage of the insights of all. The implications of this approach for management are then considered, using the concept (...)
  50. Paul Feyerabend , The Tyranny of Science . Reviewed By.Robert Deltete - 2011 - Philosophy in Review 31 (4):271-273.
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