Paul Feyerabend

In 1957, Feyerabend delivered a paper titled ‘On the Quantum-Theory of Measurement’ at the Colston Research Symposium in Bristol to sketch a completion of von Neumann's measurement scheme without collapse, using only unitary quantum dynamics and well-motivated statistical assumptions about macroscopic quantum systems. Feyerabend's paper has been recognised as an early contribution to quantum measurement, anticipating certain aspects of decoherence. Our paper reassesses the physical and philosophical content of Feyerabend's contribution, detailing the technical steps as well as its overall philosophical (...) motivations and consequences. Summarising our results, Feyerabend interpreted collapse as a positivist assumption in quantum mechanics leading to a strict distinction between the uninterpreted formalism of unitary evolution in quantum mechanics and the classically interpreted observational language describing post-measurement outcomes. Thus Feyerabend took the no-collapse completion of the von Neumann measurement scheme to show the dispensability of the positivist assumption, leading the way to a realistic interpretation of quantum theory. We note, however, that there are substantial problems with his account of measurement that bring into question its viability as a legitimate foil to the orthodox view. We further argue that his dissatisfaction with the von Neumann measurement scheme is indicative of early views on theoretical pluralism. (shrink)

Pendant un demi-siècle, la méthode appropriée en philosophie des sciences dans la tradition continentale était l'étude historique ; dans la tradition anglosaxonne, l'analyse logique. Ce clivage au sein du discours philosophique s'est grandement estompé de nos jours. D'une part, Kuhn a défendu la pertinence philosophique de l'histoire des sciences. D'autre part, Vuillemin et Gilles-Gaston Granger ont promu l'étude de la philosophie analytique et l'emploi de ses techniques logiques. Le rapprochement des deux traditions a pris encore une nouvelle tournure dans les (...) derniers textes de Feyerabend et dans les travaux de Ian Hacking. Celui-ci associe délibérément les instruments historiques de l'école française avec les procédés logiques de l'école nordaméricaine. Quelle est la signification de ce rapprochement ? Quels problèmes fait-il surgir ? Quelles directions de recherche ouvre-t-il ? Telles sont les questions que nous aborderons par le biais d'une étude comparée de certains développements récents de la philosophie des sciences en France et en Amérique du Nord. For over half a century the continental tradition favored a historical method in philosophy of science, while the Anglo-American tradition promoted a logical method. In recent years this contrast has tended to lessen. On the one hand, there has been a growing interest since the 1970s in France for the analytic tradition, due to the pioneering studies of Vuillemin and Gilles-Gaston Granger. On the other hand, Kuhn has brought out the philosophical relevance of history of science. This tendency takes a new turn in Feyerabend's final texts as well as in the works of Ian Hacking. The latter deliberately combines the historical instruments of the French school with the logical techniques of the North-American school. How to understand this evolution ? What directions of research does it open up ? I address these questions by way of a comparative study of some recent developments in philosophy of science both in France and North America. (shrink)

SINGLE MAGNETIC NORTHPOLES AND SOUTPOLESAND THEIR IMPORTANCE FOR SCIENCETen lectures delivered at the University of Viennaduring the summer semester of 1947byDr. Felix EhrenhaftU. S. Visiting Profe...

Popper’s popular critics – Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Lakatos – replace his older, Wittgenstein-style critics, now defunct. His new critics played with the idea of criticism as beneficial, in vain search of variants of these that could better appeal to the public. Some of their criticism of Popper is valid but marginal for the dispute about rationality. He was Fallibilist; they hedged about it. He viewed learning from experience as learning from error; they were unclear about it. His view resembles Freud’s (...) reality principle; they hedged about this too, as they defended the stupid idea of constructive criticism. He stressed his criticism of the view of science as inductive; they endorsed it. They differed from him significantly regarding their intended readers: he had addressed those who readily admit criticism and his popular critics addressed those who find it hard to admit openly that criticism upsets them somewhat. Current popular criticism of Popper’s ideas shows yet again the logical relation between the critical attitude and liberalism: liberalism without critically mindedness is permissible, scarcely the other way around. Hence, we better read the objection that Popper’s popular critics have launched against him not as criticism proper, but as somewhat reasonable protest against his use of the highest standards in his relentless advocacy of liberalism and of criticism in his valuation of science and of democracy as joint. (shrink)

We analyse insufficient epistemic pluralism and associated problems in science-based policy advice during the COVID-19 pandemic drawing on specific arguments in Paul Feyerabend’s philosophy. Our goal is twofold: to deepen our understanding of the epistemic shortcomings in science-based policy during the pandemic, and to assess the merits and problems of Feyerabend’s arguments for epistemic pluralism as well as their relevance for policy-making. We discuss opportunities and challenges of integrating a plurality of viewpoints from within and outside science into policy advice (...) thus contributing to discussions about normative issues concerning evidence and expertise in policy-making. (shrink)

This paper introduces and reproduces a document from Feyerabend’s Nachlass including: (i) Feyerabend’s 1967 tentative translation into English of an original German typescript reporting the lecture notes of an academic course on magnetic monopoles delivered by physicist Felix Ehrenhaft (1879-1952) at the University of Vienna in the 1947 summer semester; and (ii) Feyerabend’s memoir focusing on Ehrenhaft in postwar Vienna.In addition to making available to a larger audience Ehrenhaft’s lectures on a highly controversial topic, the publication of Feyerabend’s typescript offers (...) the opportunity to reconsider, delve deeper into and cast a brighter light on a rather neglected aspect in the growing literature on Feyerabend’s thought: the significance of Ehrenhaft for the development of Feyerabend’s intellectual biography. (shrink)

SINGLE MAGNETIC NORTHPOLES AND SOUTPOLESAND THEIR IMPORTANCE FOR SCIENCETen lectures delivered at the University of Viennaduring the summer semester of 1947byDr. Felix EhrenhaftU. S. Visiting Profe...

In 1966, Paul Feyerabend published a short essay on the relation between dialectical materialist philosophy and Niels Bohr’s quantum theory, in which he develops several provocative ideas about the relations between science, ideology and society. I use Feyerabend’s essay to construct an account of his ‘Dadaist’ philosophical methodology. I argue that Dadaism is an ironic form of intellectual seriousness, such that the Dadaist is prepared to take any idea or practice seriously as a potentially valuable contribution to collective human thought (...) and action (despite any diverging personal convictions), especially if they find such engagement to be lacking in their local culture. I identify a weakness in Feyerabend’s formulation of Dadaism, so far as it is conceived as a matter of individual epistemic character and thus fails to account for the role of the social structure of intellectual activity. This weakness can be remedied by supplementing philosophical Dadaism with descriptions of the kinds of institutions and incentive structures that might cultivate its constitutive epistemic dispositions. (shrink)

Karl Popper and Paul Feyerabend were among the most influential philosophers of science of the twentieth century. Extensive studies have been dedicated to the development of their controversial relationship, which saw Feyerabend turning from a student and supporter of Popper to one of his harshest critics. Yet, it is not as well known that the rift between Popper and Feyerabend arose mainly in the context of their studies on the foundations of quantum mechanics, which has been the main subject of (...) their discussions for about two decades. This paper reconstructs in detail their diatribe over the foundations of quantum mechanics, emphasising also the major role that their personal relationship played in their distancing. (shrink)

In a reference letter for Feyerabend’s application to UC Berkeley, Carl Hempel writes that ‘Mr. Feyerabend combines a forceful and penetrating analytic mind with a remarkably thorough training and...

CAMILO, Bruno. O anarquismo e o estímulo à inovação científica. In: SOUZA, Poliana Mendes de. (org.). Inovação na educação superior brasileira: metodologia e casos. Recife: Even3 Publicações, 2021. p. 57-73. -/- Este trabalho, inserido na subárea da filosofia da ciência, possui como tema principal o “anarquismo metodológico” tal como é apresentado pelo filósofo da ciência Paul Feyerabend. O objetivo geral é apresentar o modo como o “anarquismo metodológico”, tal como exposto em Feyerabend (2007), pode contribuir para resolver o problema da (...) “educação científica” e estimular a inovação ou mudança, para em seguida refletir sobre a possibilidade de aplicar o “anarquismo metodológico” nas escolas do Brasil. Tal reflexão será pertinente se consideradas as dificuldades que afligem a “educação científica” no Brasil, sobretudo aquelas que dizem respeito a falta de desenvolvimento da inovação científica e tecnológica do país. (shrink)

I argue that we can profitably understanding Feyerabend’s work in at least the latter half of his career in terms of a series of experiments with ways of conceptualising and criticising scientism, under the aegis of a ‘critique of scientific reason’. The critique of science’s self-understanding was the more sophisticated and successful, while the critique of scientific modernity was more erratic and less effective, due mainly to the failure to take up the necessary resources.

I argue that a main theme Feyerabend's philosophical work was a critique of scientism. This devolves into two sub-critiques - a critique of conceptions of science's self-understanding and a critique of scientific cultures. The former is more compelling and more aligned with mainstream themes in Anglophone analytical philosophy of science, the latter is less developed but more resonant with themes in feminist, postcolonial and 'continental' forms of philosophy of science.

The aim of this paper is to give an account of the change in Feyerabend's philosophy that made him abandon methodological monism and embrace methodological pluralism. In this paper I offer an explanation in terms of a simple model of 'change of belief through evidence'. My main claim is that the evidence triggering this belief revision can be identified in Feyerabend's technical work in the interpretation of quantum mechanics, in particular his reevaluation of Bohr's contribution to it. This highlights an (...) under-appreciated part of Feyerabend's early work and makes it central to an understanding of the dynamics in his overall philosophy of science. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Feyerabendian proliferation is best understood as cosmologically divergent proliferation. The divergent aspect is inspired by a Darwinian background, and it affects other elements of Feyerabend’s philosophy, as much as the way his pluralism advances, like the cosmological dimension. This cosmological item influences not only how theories should proliferate - divergently - but also why they must be tenaciously retained and compared. On this account, we underline Feyerabend’s view that the principle of proliferation is never (...) alone; instead, it is always coupled with the principle of tenacity. This is the reason we take these two principles as two sides of the same coin. Moreover, when approaching tenacity, we discuss three aspects of tenacity (attractiveness, fruitfulness, and retainment) under two forms of how they are related to the cosmologically divergent proliferation. First, working on many cosmologies, allowed by proliferation, to develop them. Second, retaining all theories by what is called a practical suspension or setback. As a result, we argue that such an approach, divergent pluralism, is an adequate way for understanding Feyerabend’s pluralism and a clear way of avoiding misunderstandings of his view. (shrink)

Duhem-Quine’s thesis provides plausibility for Feyerabend’s methodological anarchism by showing that the empirical refutation of a theoretical system is as chimerical as its verification. Grünbaum argues against this that such a thesis is untenable. They both agree in the formulation of Duhem’s argument as it was exposed by Quine. However, the exegesis carried out by Quinn, Laudan and Ariew makes it clear that it is a mistake to identify the Duhem-Quine thesis with the Duhem thesis. I argue that, if this (...) is so, then a refutation that can be accepted as such only in retrospect is logically possible. (shrink)

In this paper I defend the claim that Paul Feyerabend held a robust metaphilosophical position for most of his philosophical career. This position I call Decision-Based Epistemology and reconstruct it in terms of three key components: a form of epistemic voluntarism concerning the justification of philosophical positions and a behaviorist account of philosophical beliefs, which allows him to cast normative arguments concerning philosophical beliefs in scientific methodology, such as realism, in terms of means-ends relations. I then introduce non-naturalist and naturalist (...) variants of his conception of normativity, which I trace back to his mentors Viktor Kraft and Karl Popper, respectively. This distinction, introduced on the metaphilosophical level, can can be put to use to explain key changes in Feyerabend’s philosophical proposals, such as the viability of his methodological argument for realism. I conclude that this Decision-Based Epistemology should be further explored by historically embedding Feyerabend’s metaphilosophy in a voluntarist tradition of scientific philosophy. (shrink)

Relativism in the philosophy of science is widely associated with the work of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. Kuhn and Feyerabend espoused views about conceptual change and variation of scientific method that have apparent relativistic implications. Both held that scientific theories or paradigms may be incommensurable due to semantic variation. Two ways that truth may be relative because of semantic incommensurability will be distinguished. Davidson’s criticism of the idea of an untranslatable language will be discussed, as well as a response (...) to incommensurability based on the causal theory of reference of Kripke and Putnam. A form of relativism with respect to epistemic rationality may also be derived from the claims of Kuhn and Feyerabend about methodological variation. Kuhn’s initial suggestions about paradigm-dependent standards and absence of extra-paradigmatic standards give rise to a view on which rationality is relative to paradigm. Kuhn’s later view that there is a stable set of shared scientific values is less prone to relativistic interpretation. Feyerabend’s claim that “anything goes” suggests an extreme form of relativism, but should be understood instead as the view that all rules of method may be violated in some circumstances. The latter brings Feyerabend’s view into line with Kuhn’s later view. (shrink)

The problem of the empirical basis is one of the most prominent difficulties within the Popperian tradition. Some claim that Popper’s anti-inductivism and antipsychologism lead to the concession that science has no empirical basis. Recent commentators have focused on this problem in Popper’s methodology. However, the problem also arises in a peculiar way in the thought of two underdiscussed members of the Popperian tradition: William Bartley and Paul Feyerabend. In this article, I aim to accomplish three primary goals. First, I (...) argue that defenses of Popper’s solution to the problem of the empirical basis fail to address the deeper issues that have been pointed out by Popper’s critics. Second, I show how, despite Bartley’s efforts, he also succumbs to a modified version of the problem of the empirical basis. However, Bartley’s later work in evolutionary epistemology provides a more sensible response to the problem. Finally, I show how the problem arises in two distinct senses within Feyerabend’s methodology. I show how Feyerabend accidentally dissolves one sense of the problem and then provide a proposal for remedying the second version of the problem. (shrink)

This paper aims to show that the development of Feyerabend’s philosophical ideas in the 1950s and 1960s largely took place in the context of debates on quantum mechanics. In particular, he developed his influential arguments for pluralism in science in discussions with the quantum physicist David Bohm, who had developed an alternative approach to quantum physics which (in Feyerabend’s perception) was met with a dogmatic dismissal by some of the leading quantum physicists. I argue that Feyerabend’s arguments for theoretical pluralism (...) and for challenging established theories were connected to his objections to the dogmatism and conservatism he observed in quantum physics. However, as Feyerabend gained insight into the physical details and historical complexities which led to the development of quantum mechanics, he gradually became more modest in his criticisms. His writings on quantum mechanics especially engaged with Niels Bohr; initially, he was critical of Bohr’s work in quantum mechanics, but in the late 1960s, he completely withdrew his criticism and even praised Bohr as a model scientist. He became convinced that however puzzling quantum mechanics seemed, it was methodologically unobjectionable – and this was crucial for his move towards ‘anarchism’ in philosophy of science. (shrink)

Michael Ende’s bestseller/The Neverending Story/is set in a magical world called “Fantastica”. In Fantastica, there are heroes and villains, just as in the world of universities and academies. There is even an entity, or better: a non-entity of shaky existence, das Nichts, the Nothingness – loved by some philosophers like Martin Heidegger. In Fantastica Nothingness is able to create trouble and destruction. The same is true in the land of academic history and philosophy of science – let us call it (...) “HOPOSia”. In HOPOSia, particularly in its Anglophone provinces, Nothingness of knowledge and information has succeeded in building up strong opinions about the topic “Mach and Relativity”, and has created confusion and disinformation. However, you may slightly relax; our story in HOPOSia is less cruel so far and more peaceful than what happens in Fantastica. Sometimes it has even entertaining aspects. There are similarities, though: If there had not been lies and manipulation of believes, our story would have ended years ago. It went on instead and will possibly do so forever. (shrink)

My aim in this chapter is to reconstruct Feyerabend’s anti-scientism by comparing it with the similar critiques of one of his main philosophical influences – Ludwig Wittgenstein. I argue that they share a common conception of scientism that gathers around a concern that it erodes a sense of wonder or mystery required for a full appreciation of human existence – a sense that Feyerabend, like Wittgenstein, characterised in terms of the ‘mystical’.

Feyerabend is well-known as a pluralist, and notorious for his defences of, and sympathetic references to, heterodox subjects, such as parapsychology. Focusing on the latter, I ask how we should understand the relationship between the pluralism and the defences, drawing on Marcello Truzzi's and Martin Gardner's remarks on Feyerabend along the way.

Paul Feyerabend once made a remark to the effect that his pragmatic theory of observation can be traced back to proposals put forward by leading Logical Empiricists during the height of the protocol sentence debate. In this paper I want to vindicate the systematic side of Feyerabend’s remark and show that a pragmatic theory of observation can in fact be found in Rudolf Carnap’s writings of 1932. I first proceed to dispel a misunderstanding concerning the term “pragmatic” raised by Thomas (...) Oberdan. Following Morris’ and Carnap’s documented usage, I show that the intended meaning of “pragmatic” refers to a specific semiotic relation between users of a language and their environment describable by empirical means. I reconstruct such a pragmatic theory in terms of a detector model that interprets observation sentences as bodily dispositions indicating physical events in the surroundings of the detector. I then proceed to show how Feyerabend’s later theory of observation picks up central features of Carnap’s account and also shares some of the motivations. I conclude by noting how an empirical theory of observation sentences offers a bootstrapping solution to the “basis problem”. (shrink)

Paul K. Feyerabend (1924–94) was an imaginative maverick philosopher of science, a critic of positivism, as well as, more recently, falsificationism, philosophy of science itself, and of “rationalist” attempts to lay down or discover rules of scientific method.

The goal of this paper is to provide an interpretation of Feyerabend's metaphysics of science as found in late works like Conquest of Abundance and Tyranny of Science. Feyerabend's late metaphysics consists of an attempt to criticize and provide a systematic alternative to traditional scientific realism, a package of views he sometimes referred to as “scientific materialism.” Scientific materialism is objectionable not only on metaphysical grounds, nor because it provides a poor ground for understanding science, but because it implies problematic (...) claims about the epistemic and cultural authority of science, claims incompatible with situating science properly in democratic societies. I show how Feyerabend's metaphysical view, which I call “the abundant world” or “abundant realism,” constitute a sophisticated and challenging form of ontological pluralism that makes interesting connections with contemporary philosophy of science and issues of the political and policy role of science in a democratic society. (shrink)

This volume is devoted to a reappraisal of the philosophy of Paul Feyerabend. It has four aims. The first is to reassess his already well-known work from the 1960s and 1970s in light of contemporary developments in the history and philosophy of science. The second is to explore themes in his neglected later work, including recently published and previously unavailable writings. The third is to assess the contributions that Feyerabend can make to contemporary debate, on topics such as perspectivism, realism, (...) and political philosophy of science. The fourth and final aim is to reconsider Feyerabend's place within the history of philosophy of science in the light of new scholarship. (shrink)

Los críticos que han interpretado el pensamiento de Feyerabend como un relativismo radical no hacen justicia a su intencionalidad, y se muestran incapaces de comprender la unidad de su obra, en particular, su abandono posterior de los ideales relativis-tas. Se busca distinguir las diversas posiciones de Feyerabend frente al relativismo y exponer su reducción al absurdo de las nociones de la ciencia propias del positivis-mo lógico y del racionalismo crítico. Así mismo, se plantea cómo Feyerabend, ante la ausencia de un (...) criterio para discernir la tarea científica, postula un relativismo, pero, al final de su vida, busca elaborar una metafísica de la abundancia que supere las coordenadas de aquel. (shrink)

This paper argues that essential features of Feyerabend's philosophy, namely his radicalization of critical rationalism and his turn to relativism, could be understood better in the light of his engagement with early Greek thought. In contrast to his earlier, Popperian views he came to see the Homeric worldview as a genuine alternative, which was not falsified by the Presocratics. Unlike socio–psychological and externalist accounts my reading of his published and unpublished material suggests that his alternative reconstruction of the ancient beginnings (...) of the Western scientific tradition motivate and justify his moderate Protagorean relativism. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between epistemic integrity, virtue, and authority by offering a virtue epistemological reading of the defences of non-scientific beliefs, practices, and traditions in the writings of Paul Feyerabend. I argue that there was a robust epistemic rationale for those defences and that it can inform contemporary reflection on the epistemic authority of the sciences. Two common explanations of the purpose of those defences are rejected as lacking textual support. A third “pluralist” reading is judged more persuasive, (...) but found to be incomplete, owing to a failure to accommodate Feyerabend’s focus upon the integrity of scientists and the authority of science. I therefore suggest that the defences are more fully understood as defences of the epistemic integrity of scientists that take the form of critical exposures of failures by scientists to act with integrity. An appeal is made to contemporary virtue epistemology that clarifies Feyerabend’s implicit association of epistemic... (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to offer a sympathetic reconstruction of the political thought of Paul Feyerabend. Using a critical discussion of the idea of the ‘free society’ it is suggested that his political thought is best understood in terms of three thematic concerns – liberation, hegemony, and the authority of science – and that the political significance of those claims become clear when they are considered in the context of his educational views. It emerges that Feyerabend is best (...) understood as calling for the grounding of cognitive and cultural authorities – like the sciences – in informed deliberation, rather than the uncritical embrace of prevailing convictions. It therefore emerges that a free society is best understood as one of epistemically responsible citizenship rather than epistemically anarchistic relativism of the ‘anything goes’ – a striking anticipation of current debates about philosophy of science in society. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article asks whether the philosophy of Paul K. Feyerabend can be reasonably classified as postmodernist, a label applied to him by friends and foes alike. After describing some superficial similarities between the style and content of both Feyerabend’s and postmodernist writings, I offer three more robust characterisations of postmodernism in terms of relativism, ‘incredulity to metanarratives’, and ‘depthlessness’. It emerges that none of these characterisations offers a strong justification for classifying Feyerabend as ‘postmodern’ in any significant sense. Indeed, what (...) does emerge is that Feyerabend’s work was fundamentally informed by a humanitarian vision of the value of science that is, in fact, strikingly modern. (shrink)

It is very well known that from the late-1960s onwards Feyerabend began to radically challenge some deeply-held ideas about the history and methodology of the sciences. It is equally well known that, from around the same period, he also began to radically challenge wider claims about the value and place of the sciences within modern societies, for instance by calling for the separation of science and the state and by questioning the idea that the sciences served to liberate and ameliorate (...) human societies. But what is less known is how, if at all, these two sets of challenges were connected, and why Feyerabend felt it important to raise them at all. In this chapter, my aim is to explore these issues by considering why Feyerabend used radical strategies to challenge the authority of science, and what purpose, if any, they were supposed to serve. Why, for instance, did Feyerabend defend alternative medicine, psychical abilities, astrology, magic and witchcraft and why did he argue that ‘Western science’ is complicit in environmental destruction, intellectual imperialism, social oppression, and spiritual destitution. Located in their historical and political context, such defences and arguments seem peculiar, not least because science was recognised not only as a central site of the intellectual and ideological competition between the West and the Soviet Union, but also because Western victory in that site was considered inevitable. What, then, did Feyerabend think he was trying to achieve by raising radical challenges to a central component of the cultural and intellectual prestige of the Western world grounded in appeals to practices and traditions which most would regard as eccentric at best and absurd at worst? My suggestion is that Feyerabend was making a subtler point than one might suppose. For the purpose of these radical challenges was to determine if the members of Western societies would in fact honour the epistemic standards – of tolerance, critical enquiry – which were identified as being characteristic of science and definitive of the social and political values of Western liberal democracy. I suggest that Feyerabend was trying to demonstrate that scientists were, too often, guilty of the same intolerant and dogmatic attitudes which were, according to prevailing propaganda, the property of illiberal totalitarian societies. Science does not reflect the superior epistemic and political values of Western societies but are, in fact, reflective of the same vices ascribed to the Soviet Union. If that is the case, then the sciences are not symbols of our epistemic and political values, but quite the reverse, hence Feyerabend’s talk of the ‘dogmatic’, ‘totalitarian’, ‘ratiofascist’ nature of modern science. But there is a positive upshot to Feyerabend’s challenge. For even if the sciences do not yet reflect the epistemic and political values of liberal democratic Western societies, they might yet be reformed so that they are. And there is a parallel between Feyerabend’s strategy and that of many of the other radicals of the time – student activists, environmentalists, and pacifists – namely to test the commitment to tolerance and deliberative debate of the establishment by asking it to seriously engage with ideas and convictions opposed to its own. For both science and society can become ‘tyrannical’ through the same means: by exempting themselves from critical scrutiny, by promoting self-serving ‘myths’ about themselves, and by derogating and excluding alternatives, including the ‘outsider’ perspectives they offer. The chapter concludes by suggesting that Feyerabend is distinctive in virtue of his willingness to offer radical criticisms of the authority of science such that it can fulfil its legitimate ideological role – namely, of symbolising and instantiating our core epistemic and political values – such that we can offer a sincere and meaningful answer to Feyerabend’s question ‘what’s so great about science?’. (shrink)

This volume is devoted to a reappraisal of the philosophy of Paul Feyerabend. It has four aims. The first is to reassess his already well-known work from the 1960s and 1970s in light of contemporary developments in the history and philosophy of science. The second is to explore themes in his neglected later work, including recently published and previously unavailable writings. The third is to assess the contributions that Feyerabend can make to contemporary debate, on topics such as perspectivism, realism, (...) and political philosophy of science. The fourth and final aim is to reconsider FeyerabendÕs place within the history of philosophy of science in the light of new scholarship. (shrink)

The present article-based dissertation is a contribution to a historical and systematic recon- struction of Paul Feyerabend’s philosophy. Building on previous work on the same subject, this thesis continues a research effort exploring Feyerabend’s early ties to scientific philoso- phy, in particular Logical Empiricism and the Vienna Circle, as well as its continued effects on Feyerabend’s later philosophy. The main claim is that Feyerabend’s formative years in Vienna (1946-1955) happened in the context of scientific philosophy and that his early philosophi- (...) cal proposals should be interpreted as a critical contribution within this tradition. Secondly, it proposes a framework to connect Feyerabend’s early and later philosophy and explain the theoretical change involved. -/- The first article gives the reader an overview of Feyerabend’s philosophy, introducing key themes of Feyerabend’s writings. -/- The second article deals with the context and interpretation of Feyerabend’s earliest extant essay (1948) and identifies an early stage of Feyerabend’s philosophical formation, possibly preceding his acquaintance with Logical Empiricism, in which positivism as a concept of ”philosophy of physicists” is his primary interest. This helps to build a very fine-grained time sequence of his early philosophical interests and helps to disentangle the notion of scientific philosophy. -/- The third article deals with an objection by Thomas Oberdan to the claim that Feyerabend’s pragmatic theory of observation is a development of earlier proposals by Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath and Karl Popper in the early 1930s. In particular, Oberdan denies that Carnap ever proposed such a theory about protocol sentences. The article argues that Oberdan’s objection fails by reconstructing how such a theory can be found in Carnap’s 1932 writings. Feyerabend’s pragmatic theory of observation is indeed one major point of contact between Logical Empiricism, Feyerabend’s early philosophy and his later ’post-positivist’ philosophy. This completes one main interpretative claim in previous work, namely, that Feyerabend’s pragmatic theory of observation should be seen as a contribution to the project of a ”behavioristics of scholars”. -/- The fourth and last article is dedicated to Feyerabend’s role as a protagonist in the so-called historical turn in the philosophy of science in the 1960s. His early strong opposition and his later adherence to the turn is discussed and an explanation of the change involved is given. To this end I introduce a reconstruction of Feyerabend’s metaphilosophy, a framework called Decision-based Epistemology, and claim that specific changes on the metaphilosophical level can account for prominent changes on the level of Feyerabend’s philosophical contributions. -/- An introduction at the beginning of the collection of articles gives a rationale of the outline, the overall research project and provides more informations on how these articles fit in the overall research project. (shrink)