Paul Ricoeur

In the framework of Husserl's phenomenology, intentionality is regarded as the main feature of every act of consciousness. Our consciousness is directed towards objects immanent in it, however in a variety of epistemological functions and operations, such as sensory perception, judgment, cognition, volition, imagination, etc. Husserl uses the technical terms noesis and noema to designate the intentional acts of consciousness and their outcome in the constitution of objects in consciousness. At the same time, the persistence of a hyletic data is (...) emphasized, which as pure sense data escapes the phenomenological reduction and remains as such a residuum in the consciousness. In my lecture I try to work out the clear implication of epistemological referentiality in the phenomenological basic notion of intentionality. Among other things, I rely on the conceptual history of intentionality, i. e. on the earlier theories of intentionality in the Middle Ages and the philosophical revival of this notion in the late 19th century by Franz Brentano. Referentiality defines itself as the referential access of consciousness to objects of sensory perception, judgment, cognition, etc., in which the objects form the final referents. In the phenomenological framework, intentionality refers to the intentional access of consciousness to objects irrespective of their consciousness-immanence or -transcendence. The analogy between intentionality and referentiality is therefore based on the act-character as well as the directionality of consciousness which suggests the characteristic attempt of consciousness to gain intentional-referential access to objects. The directionality of consciousness in every intentional act ultimately marks and confirms the referentiality i. e the referential access of consciousness to the object. Intentionality as intentional-referential access to objects becomes a problem, when the access of consciousness to the object proves to be inadequate. I try to show how this problem of referentiality inevitably arises in Husserl's phenomenology of inner time-consciousness, especially in his conception of a time-object (Zeitobjekt). The consciousness-immanence of a time-object, such as a melody, points to a problem, that the intertwining of the temporality of consciousness and that of time-object necessarily results in various aporias of time, as Paul Ricœur observes and discusses in detail in his seminal work Temps et Récit. Moreover, the residual persistence of hyletic data, that survives all phenomenological reductions, would establish an actual interface between consciousness and reality, as Jaakko Hintikka emphasizes in his essay The phenomenological dimension. The aporicity of time refers to the autonomy of time and, thereby, to the autonomy of time-object in its intentional in-existence in consciousness. The hyletic data as interface between consciousness and reality points to the necessary referential extension of consciousness to objects that are otherwise excluded in the context of phenomenology. From these and similar premises, I would like to demonstrate how the problem of referentiality in Husserl's philosophy of time inevitably presupposes a reversion of referentiality within the prevailing noesis-noema structure that underlies the consciousness-immanence of objects. (shrink)

This article argues that, despite their distance across the colonial divide, a creolizing reading of Frantz Fanon and Paul Ricœur can yield valuable insights into decoloniality. Tracing their shared philosophical concerns with embodied phenomenology, social ontology and recognition, I argue that their respective accounts of sociogeny and hermeneutics can be productively read together as describing a shared end of mutual recognition untainted by racism or coloniality – a ‘new skin’ for humanity, as Fanon describes it. More specifically, Fanon contributes to (...) Ricœur an understanding of how divergences in social location can be overcome through liberatory action that posits a new logic of sociality; likewise, Ricœur provides Fanon with an account of how liberatory horizons are produced through this praxis, based on the imaginative connection between ideology and utopia. This article concludes by arguing that these congruent methodological and normative concerns can be read together to concretize – and potentially actualize – the utopic end of liberatory struggle in mutual recognition through fashioning this new skin. (shrink)

This article engages the considerations of imagination in Kierkegaard and Ricoeur to argue for a moral dimension of the imagination and its objects. Imaginary objects are taken to be mental representations in images and narratives of people or courses of action that are not real in the sense that they are not actual, or have not yet happened. Three claims are made in the article. First, by drawing on the category of possibility, a conceptual distinction is established between imagination and (...) fantasy, I claim that imagination has a moral dimension because it is engaged in considering real-life possibilities. Second, drawing on Kierkegaard and Ricoeur, it is argued that mental representations of selfhood in imagination have a moral dimension because they essentially allow people to understand the development of agency in human selfhood by means of representations of would-be selves and narrative figurations of the self. Third, mental representations of human selves have a moral dimension because they form important points of reference for moral orientations in the field of human praxis. (shrink)

How can personal identity be determined in such a way that developments, experiences and other dynamic and context-dependent aspects of that identity can be taken into account? For several decades now, the narrative, the story, has often been referred to in answering this question as a cognitive instrument that can adequately deal with those aspects. The monologue thus appears to present itself as a medium in which personal or autobiographical identity is formed. However, what happens when we place the identity (...) narrative in a dialogue: when two people with very diverse backgrounds have a dialogue that touches on their identity? Does this perhaps provide an entirely new challenge and enrichment of that narrative, which can have a major impact on both the individual and the relationship? I want to explore these questions in this article, motivated by both the philosophical perspective and my experiences as co-initiator of the "Keti Koti Table", in which such a dialogue plays a central role. To this end, I will first discuss the dynamic aspects of the narrative, in which the phenomenon of "refiguration" as presented by Ricoeur is key. This is then discussed in the context of the dialogue. In § 4 I discuss the specific dialogue method that we have developed for the Keti Koti Table. Subsequently, in § 5, some experiences of participants are discussed, whose identity refigurations are analyzed under the influence of the dialogue in § 6. It is concluded with a brief conclusion about the special significance of the dialogue for the narrative self-constitution in a diverse society. (shrink)

The aim of this thesis is to show that a familiar hermeneutical movement from suspicion to affirmation of rational meaning, as a reader reflects on a narrative, is, in part, grounded in the narrative's rhythmic structure which mediates a sonorous condition of being appropriated by the reader. This hermeneutical process involves the reader in appropriating the temporal perspective which creates a 'space' for reflection in which a provisional conceptual unity is made possible, but subject to continuing movement from suspicion to (...) affirmation. It is shown that this relationship between Self and Other is dialectical, and mediated by the textual modes of metaphor and narrative. Particular examples of poetry and prose are examined, and the story of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac in the 'Authorised Version' of the Bible is analyzed in detail in an attempt to show how the reader, imaginatively inhabiting the world of the text, is involved in a process in which there is an 'instant' of letting go Self reflection; and there is affirmation of reasonable hope that the narrative may be rationally understood. In an attempt to address the critical issue of validation of rational meaning to show that affirmation may be given reasonable hope, the analogy of juridical legality is examined, particularly with respect to Aristotle's notion of phronesis. The analysis draws upon the hermeneutical philosophy of Paul Ricoeur with particular regard to his theories of metaphor and narrative, and the role of the creative imagination. It also makes use of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the lived body in terms of a dialectical relationship between its material objectivity and its phenomenological aspects, especially, with respect to sonorous being and corporeal intentionality. From the discipline of literary criticism, Northrop Frye's notion of prose rhythm in his Anatomy of Criticism is employed to identity this key mediatory characteristic. (shrink)

Using insights from two of the major proponents of the hermeneutical approach, Paul Ricoeur and Hannah Arendt—who both recognized the ethicopolitical importance of narrative and acknowledged some of the dangers associated with it—I will flesh out the worry that “narrativity” in political theory has been overly attentive to storytelling and not heedful enough of story listening. More specifically, even if, as Ricoeur says, “narrative intelligence” is crucial for self-understanding, that does not mean, as he invites us to, that we should (...) always seek to develop a “narrative identity” or become, as he says, “the narrator of our own life story.” I offer that, perhaps inadvertently, such an injunction might turn out to be detrimental to the “art of listening.” This, however, must also be cultivated if we want to do justice to our narrative character and expect narrative to have the political role that both Ricoeur and Arendt envisaged. Thus, although there certainly is a “redemptive power” in narrative, when the latter is understood primarily as the act of narration or as the telling of stories, there is a danger to it as well. Such a danger, I think, intensifies at a time like ours, when, as some scholars have noted, “communicative abundance” or the “ceaseless production of redundancy” in traditional and social media has often led to the impoverishment of the public conversation. (shrink)

El hábito es una de las encrucijadas filosóficas en las que el dilema entre naturaleza y libertad se pone de manifiesto. El artículo expone la descripción que Paul Ricoeur ofrece sobre esta noción en Lo voluntario y lo involuntario (1950) y defiende que el hábito constituye una genuina y paradójica forma de libertad, pues ésta se realiza gracias y a través de la necesidad. Se tiene en consideración el difícil punto de partida de Ricoeur, quien, por una parte, rechaza lo (...) que él denomina la explicación cosmológica de Tomás de Aquino y, por otra, acoge la novedad del cogito cartesiano, siendo a la vez consciente de las limitaciones dualistas que el planteamiento conlleva. Inspirándose en Ravaisson, Ricoeur rechaza una interpretación maquinal del hábito y se acerca a la idea clásica de segunda naturaleza. En el artículo se muestran los problemas de Ricoeur en el empleo de este término y se señalan los límites de la propuesta del autor, para quien, al final, no hay sistema entre lo natural y lo libre. (shrink)

Cet article interroge les tensions entre phénoménologie et herméneutique telles qu’elles se cristallisent dans le propos de Ricœur sur la religion, en particulier dans un texte tardif qui a connu plusieurs versions et qui est peut-être le seul où le philosophe aborde aussi directement les questions méthodologiques que soulève une phénoménologie de la religion. Nous tentons de montrer que Ricœur considère en quelque sorte cette dernière avec des œillères, au profit d’une herméneutique de la religion qui, pour modeste et prudente (...) qu’elle soit, se voit forcée de renoncer à prendre en charge l’élucidation de la constitution originaire de l’expérience religieuse. (shrink)

In Ricoeur’s last works, we can find what he calls a poetics of love. Choosing the “dialectic” path of a comparison between love and justice, Ricoeur claims that justice lies in the rule of equivalence (give to each his own); the disorientation of love, instead, suspends the return, the equivalence, the exchange. Love does not say: “do ut des”, but rather (if we can transform the expression) it says “do ut dem”, to offer without expecting anything in return: this is (...) what Ricoeur calls a “first gift”. However, it is an expectation that is always open to the possibility of a “surprise”: the surprise of a “second first gift” able to fulfill the gratuity of the original act of donation. This essay questions this possibility of “mutual gift”. (shrink)

This volume examines the nature of interpretation, strategies within interpretation, and negotiations about the adequacy of an interpretation, with special attention paid to possible roles interpretation plays in the academic study of religions. Each chapter of this book refines a conceptual element that combines with others into a theory of interpretation useful for the classroom and in scholarship on hermeneutics.

Ce texte défend la thèse selon laquelle il y aurait plus d’un tournant herméneutique chez Ricœur. Il soutient que c’est en se rendant compte des apories liées à son premier tournant herméneutique, celui de 1960, que Ricœur s’est résolument tourné vers les questions et les défis de l’herméneutique, dans ce qui peut être compris comme un retournement de son premier tournant herméneutique. Ce tournant a par la suite pris d’autres formes chez Ricœur et sa philosophie en est devenue une des (...) détours herméneutiques. On se demandera si la voie des détours est toujours la voie royale de l’herméneutique et on se penchera sur la dernière expression de ce tournant herméneutique à la fin de La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli. (shrink)

Paul Ricoeur is a philosopher of wide ranging interests whose main concern is hermeneutics. His hermeneutics is self-reflexive, an existential appropriation that eventually gives way to self-understanding. Questions pertaining to self-identity, the problem of the other and intersubjectivity are presented by him in a tensive style, keeping the scope of interpretations wide open. While discussing the question of self-identity, he moves towards intersubjectivity which is centred on self-esteem. It provides a context for self-constancy which gives to a moral identity, an (...) attestation of Here I am. Here arises the basic issue, how the narrative identity which is hermeneutical give rise to an ethical relation. If so, Ricoeur must be ready to see that there is an asymmetric relation between the same and the other which can be termed ethical. Though he says that conscience contains an injunction to attest ourselves to say, Here I am, it is a statement of “said” and not one of “saying”. Only a statement of “saying” can interrupt ontology and enact the movement from the same to the other which is ethical. Hence, Ricoeur stands at the hemeneutical level which cannot abandon ontology. But the polysemic nature of alterity posed by him never closes the possibilities of an ethical interpretation. (shrink)

L’expression de « greffe de l’herméneutique sur la phénoménologie » utilisée par Ricœur a souvent été reprise pour caractériser la phénoménologie herméneutique ricœurienne ou aborder ces champs de la phénoménologie et de l’herméneutique à partir de l’exemple ricœurien. Or, on peut penser que cette expression a été mal comprise et, partant, a pu conduire à divers malentendus concernant l’approche ricœurienne dans son rapport à la phénoménologie et l’herméneutique. Si le terme de greffe induit et renvoie à une différenciation de deux (...) méthodes et domaines, au sens d’une méthode et d’un domaine qui s’ajouteraient et complèteraient une autre méthode et un autre domaine, c’est moins la différence entre phénoménologie et herméneutique qui est engagée que celle entre une origine phénoménologique de l’herméneutique ricœurienne et le projet d’une anthropologie philosophique. Il est caractéristique que cette visée ne soit pas prise en compte par des critiques se réclamant d’un ancrage et d’une expertise soit en phénoménologie soit en herméneutique, révélant alors certaines limitations dans une approche de la philosophie ricœurienne. (shrink)

Resumo: Paul Ricoeur propõe uma filosofia do símbolo, que se encontra no limiar da inserção da hermenêutica em sua filosofia. Decisiva para esta fase, foi a interpelação de outras disciplinas que se constituíram por meio da análise da linguagem simbólica, entre as quais se encontra a antropologia estrutural de Lévi-Strauss. Dessa forma, definimos os termos mais específicos do diálogo estabelecido entre Paul Ricoeur e Claude Lévi-Strauss sobre a análise da linguagem simbólica do mito. Esta pesquisa nos auxiliou a compreender melhor (...) a fase de abertura da hermenêutica ricoeuriana e suas aproximações e afastamentos com o estruturalismo lévi-straussiano, tão difundido em nosso campo acadêmico. Palavras-chave: Hermenêutica; Estruturalismo; Símbolo. Convergent divergence: the dialogue between Paul Ricoeur and Claude Lévi-Strauss Abstract: Paul Ricoeur proposes a philosophy of the symbol, which is on the threshold of the insertion of hermeneutics in his philosophy. Decisive for this phase, was to put forward the question to other disciplines that played an essential role in the analysis of symbolic language, among which is the structural anthropology of Lévi-Strauss. Thus, the terms - more specific to the dialogue established between Paul Ricoeur and Claude Lévi-Strauss on the analysis of the symbolic language of myth - were defined. Finally, this research provides a better understanding of the opening phase of the Ricoeur’s hermeneutics as well as its alignments and divergences with the structuralism of Lévi-Strauss so widespread in the academic field. Keywords: Hermeneutics; Structuralism; Symbol. Divergencia convergente: el diálogo entre Paul Ricoeur y Claude Lévi-Strauss Resumen: Paul Ricoeur propone una filosofía del símbolo, que se encuentra en el umbral de la inserción de la hermenéutica en su filosofía. Decisivo para esta fase fue la interpelación de otras disciplinas que se constituyeron a partir del análisis del lenguaje simbólico, entre las que se encuentra la antropología estructural de Lévi-Strauss. Definimos así los términos específicos del diálogo establecido entre Paul Ricoeur y Claude Lévi-Strauss sobre el análisis del lenguaje simbólico del mito. Esta investigación nos ayudó a comprender mejor la fase de apertura de la hermenéutica ricoeuriana y sus aproximaciones y alejamientos del estructuralismo lévi-straussiano, tan difundido en nuestro campo académico. Palabras clave: Hermenéutica; Estructuralismo; Símbolo. Data de registro: 04/10/2022 Data de aceite: 01/02/2023. (shrink)

Detendo-se no pecado em Pelágio como possibilidade enquanto exercício da liberdade e responsabilidade individual, o artigo assinala a defesa da neutralidade envolvendo a criação do ser humano e a sua capacidade para o bem e o mal, sublinhando a liberdade da vontade e a sua absoluta indeterminação, o que atrela o pecado à escolha. Portanto, atribuindo à vontade a condição de locus da instauração da experiência ético-lógico existencial envolvendo o exercício da liberdade, Pelágio se contrapõe a tese do pecado original (...) enquanto herança psico-biológica, intelecto-afetiva e volitivo-consciencial transmitida pelo arquétipo humano em Adão para a sua descendência. Dessa forma, assinalando a vontade como a causa do pecado em um movimento que converge para encerrar a sua imputação ao agente enquanto detentor da vontade em exercício, o texto mostra que Agostinho afirma, paradoxalmente, a tendência humana para a prática do mal como resultante da herança adâmica, que impõe a sua posteridade a condição de absoluta depravação e inescapável culpa, na medida em que o ser humano é constituído enquanto tal em estado de santa inocência em um processo que atribui ao pecado a condição de um produto da escolha humana através do exercício de sua liberdade e plena consciência. Finalizando, a pesquisa examina o pecado como símbolo racionalentre Pelágio e Agostinho segundo Paul Ricoeur, que afirma a necessidade de um processo que seja capaz de desconstruir o conceito em função da emergência da intenção ortodoxa enquanto sentido reto e eclesial. (shrink)

En el presente artículo analizaremos el rol de la autobiografía en Tiempo y narración, intentando comprender los motivos por los que este género literario no tiene tanta relevancia en la obra de Ricoeur. En lo referente a su relación con la identidad narrativa,sostendremos que, a pesar de lo que se podría suponer, la identidad narrativa es una derivación del análisis de la autobiografía y no a la inversa. Invertido este vínculo, nuestro segundo paso consistirá en deslindar el tipo de relación (...) que tienen las ficciones literarias y los relatos de vida en la identidad narrativa. (shrink)

En este artículo examinamos a grandes rasgos la alternativa a la idea de lucha en el proceso de reconocimiento mutuo. Analizamos los conceptos que en nuestras sociedades modernas han dado lugar a estados de paz concretos, y que habiendo emergido de la tradición cristiana, tienen una sedimentación semántica que nos invita a desentrañarla. La philia, el eros y el ágape son aquí nuestros conceptos clave. Descubrimos cómo el ágape se distancia del eros platónico y de la philia aristotélica en la (...) forma de la infinitud y de la incondicionalidad, cómo se dona a sí mismo sin esperar la reciprocidad y sin resistirse a llevar la iniciativa en el establecimiento de las relaciones pacíficas, pudiendo llegar a tener suma importancia en el orden democrático. (shrink)

Ricœur n’a cessé d’explorer les liens de la littérature et de la philosophie, du poétique entendu au sens large et de la philosophie pratique. Ces réflexions ont fécondé ses analyses de façon majeure, le concept d’identité narrative – l’adjectif s’entendant aussi dans sa dimension littéraire – en étant un des centres. Mais cette valorisation de la linéarité du récit a parfois donné l’impression d’avoir davantage mis en avant l’importance du roman, délaissant le rôle de la poésie et du théâtre. Cet (...) article se propose d’explorer les liens mutuels entre la sagesse poétique et la sagesse pratique en leur redonnant toute leur place. Il le fait en suivant la manière dont le philosophe a donné une place à la poésie, singulièrement celle de Rilke, et en mettant au jour les différentes stratégies argumentatives (l’exergue, la correspondance, le commentaire) par lesquelles la poésie, et surtout le psaume, éclaire et enrichit la compréhension de ce/celui qui s’engage dans l’action. (shrink)

El artículo analiza la relación entre ipseidad y promesa desde la perspectiva de la identidad narrativa que propone el filósofo francés Paul Ricoeur. Desde dicha perspectiva, la promesa aparece como paradigma de la ipseidad, pues, en ella la identidad aparece como polo de responsabilidad, creatividad e intersubjetividad. El artículo termina con el intento de esbozar la ontología detrás de la tesis de la identidad narrativa.

Trata-se de uma tradução direta do texto em francês do filósofo Paul Ricoeur para o português, que está no livro De la métaphysique à la rhétorique, essais à la mémoire de Chaïm Perelman avec un inédit sur la logique em 1986, e corresponde a uma conferência realizada por Paul Ricoeur em 1970 no Instituto de Estudos Avançados na Bélgica. O tema da presente conferência esclarece conceitos importantes utilizados por Paul Ricoeur, fortalecendo seu pressuposto antropológico que considera como a atividade fundamental (...) humana a interpretação. (shrink)

As the absolute other of Greek thought and speech, Chinese renders Greek strange; in seeking equivalency, Jullien’s discussion on time demonstrates a creative betrayal of the original and an equally creative appropriation by the target language in the process of translation.

When Paul Ricoeur died in 2005, the New York Times described him as "one of the most eminent philosophers of the twentieth century." In his lifetime, Ricoeur published influential works on language, memory, identity, and history, creating an innovative blend of hermeneutics and phenomenology. Despite his major interest in the imagination, however, he never wrote a complete text on the topic. The present volume, Lectures on Imagination, fills this gap, providing an indispensable resource for philosophically inclined readers from all backgrounds. (...) Over the course of these lectures, Ricoeur examines classical and contemporary philosophical theories of imagination, ranging from thinkers such as Aristotle, Pascal, Spinoza, Hume, and Kant to Husserl, Wittgenstein, Sartre, and Ryle. He argues that, with few exceptions, Western philosophy has focused on reproductive rather than productive imagination, thus diminishing the creative capacity of the human mind. For Ricoeur, productive imagination is a form of fiction-a new dimension of reality generated by the human mind. His theory has far-reaching implications. In all domains, we are not restricted by existing structures or institutions, because the productive imagination has the power to break through and transform our sense of our own horizons. (shrink)

The following article explores what notion of truth is possible in Ricœur’s narrative identity. It is motivated by the question of how our identity can be constituted in narratives of self when we are often easily self-deceiving and do not choose the building blocks of our narratives. It explores how our identities are constituted in narrative, with others, in order to see what dimensions of truth this allows. Narrative identity implicates a novel notion of truth that is intrinsically ethical, which (...) gives rise to a set of ethical issues. In particular, a truth of self that occurs in relation to others is open to violence and abuse—our very identity is, to varying degrees, in others’ hands. Butler’s ethics of fragility may offer a positive solution. (shrink)

The ‘interpretive turn’ in twentieth-century hermeneutics rests on the general ontological claim that human reality is the reality of self-interpreting animals. But under the circumstances of advanced modernity, there are aspects of human life, or spheres of human thought and action, that appear to contradict this general thesis, in that they do not present themselves as the doings of self-interpreting animals at all. Of these, the predominant one is the sphere of work or 'productive' action. In face of historical circumstances (...) in which work presents itself as bereft of the meanings that concern self-interpreting animals, hermeneutic philosophy faces a choice: Does it exempt work from the realm of self-interpretive activity, making it an exception to the general ontological thesis; or does it seek to retrieve the hermeneutic provenance of productive action? With a focus on the writings of Gadamer and Ricoeur, the chapter shows that philosophical hermeneutics has vacillated on this issue and it suggests that retrieval of the self-interpretive dimension of productive action is a central task for hermeneutics today. (shrink)

Introduction au numéro spécial "L'articulation de la phénoménologie et de l'herméneutique chez Paul Ricœur".

Introduction au numéro spécial "L'articulation de la phénoménologie et de l'herméneutique chez Paul Ricœur".

Recent developments in literary theory and philosophy, specifically regarding the role of critique, that inspire the turn to post-critique and realism, respectively, indicate a renewed sensitivity for concerns characteristic of hermeneutic phenomenology. This essay argues that crucial aspects of Ricœur’s articulation of phenomenology and hermeneutics may help to understand and support post-critique and realism and that, in turn, the latter two invite hermeneutics to return to its phenomenological condition. To this end, Ricœur’s understanding of the hermeneutical condition of phenomenology, both (...) in the form of Husserl’s idealist phenomenology and the phenomenology of religion, is revisited; Ricœur’s account of distantiation is critically assessed; and, finally, the interplay of trust and distrust at stake in hermeneutic phenomenology is contrasted with the modern insistence on hyperbolic doubt. (shrink)

J’examine pourquoi et dans quel sens l’imagination est présente dans un récit portant sur des faits ou des événements réels. Je présente le problème tel qu’il est énoncé par Paul Ricœur lorsqu’il introduit les trois genres du « Même », de « l’Autre » et de « l’Analogue » afin d’expliquer comment un récit peut rendre des faits et des événements « tels qu’ils se sont réellement passés ». J’en appelle, pour la solution, à la notion de « phantasma » (...) d’Edmund Husserl, qu’il considère comme le support de l’imagination pure, comme lorsque j’imagine un centaure. Le phantasma joue dans l’imagination pure le même rôle que les sensations dans la perception. Je soutiens qu’un récit comporte un phantasma – ce qu’il nous permet de visualiser et d’expérimenter à la lecture d’un récit – et que ce phantasma est analogue aux sensations de perceptions que les premiers observateurs avaient de ces faits et événements. Il n’y a donc pas, premièrement, de différence radicale entre la perception et l’imagination : toutes deux comportent un moment de « simple présentation » par le biais de sensations ou de phantasma, respectivement. Deuxièmement, la partie imaginative d’un récit nous permet de faire de nouveau l’expérience de faits et événements bruts sur le mode du « comme si ». (shrink)

Rage against the system : the unity of truth -- A philosophy of hope? The universality of truth -- Absolutely no absolutes? Ricœur's encounter with Thévenaz -- Finitude and the infinite : the God of the philosophers -- Finitude and evil : the crucial distinction -- Rightly relating evil and finitude -- The poetic symbol of creation -- The mysterious unity of creation -- The original goodness of creation -- Conclusion. New frontiers between philosophy and theology.

Dans les situations les plus radicales de fragilisation de l’identité personnelle, la question « Qui suis-je? » est laissée sans réponse. Selon Paul Ricoeur, ces situations ne représentent pas pour autant de véritables pertes d’identité. Persiste une forme épurée, mise à nu de l’ipséité, qui finit par résoudre son errance identitaire en s’engageant envers autrui. Cet article vise à analyser la nature de cette ipséité résiduelle et à s’interroger sur la conception proposée par Ricoeur. Nous chercherons d’abord à montrer que (...) ni l’ipséité comme telle ni la promesse, qui est l’un de ses modes, ne constituent des modèles d’identité personnelle. Conservant l’idée que quelque chose reste de nous dans les crises identitaires, le concept ricoeurien d’ipséité fera ensuite l’objet d’une réappropriation phénoménologique venant lui donner, par le détour du concept d’identité narrative proposé par László Tengelyi, une base et une consistance identitaire. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: In this article, we intend to address the role of memory and narrative in the constitution of personal identity, based on Alice Munro’s short story “The Bear Came Over the Mountain” and the theoretical concepts of Paul Ricoeur (especially in Oneself as Another). This movement will allow us to underscore the idea that, contrary to what part of the analytical literature on identity and narrative has held, it is not just what we might call self-narrative that plays a role (...) in maintaining personal identity. Instead, we recover the Ricoeurian idea of a network of narratives or tangled of stories, in which self- and hetero-narratives are entangled, thus providing support to the identities it captures. (shrink)

Despite the fact that it is only rarely mentioned by Ricœur, the concept of second (or post-critical) naivety seems to express an idea that is central to his hermeneutical attitude, which is why it deserves more attention. This idea can be broadly understood as the aspiration to arrive at a mediated and post-critical (self-)understanding through “detours” provided by different critical methods such as psychoanalysis or structuralism. My article consists of three parts: first, I examine the origins of the notion of (...) second naivety, drawing attention to the fact that both Ricœur and his precursors used the term in connection with religious symbols and faith. Then, by comparing it to analogous ideas in Ricœur’s works, I argue that the concept of second naivety can be extended to interpretation in general. Finally, I explore the possibility of a second naivety after those particular critical methods. (shrink)

This article points out some methodological difficulties in Time and Narrative. On the one hand, the imbalance in the re-elaboration of the mimetic model: the extensive treatment of the configurative and the refigurative components contrasts with the indeterminacy which remains in the prefigurative component. On the other hand, there is a discontinuity between narrative refiguration and the hermeneutics of historical consciousness. A certain ambiguity of the “ontological” allows for the integration of the hermeneutics of historical consciousness and the prefigurative dimension (...) of action. By limiting the scope of refiguration in this way, the poetic circle operates solely within the hermeneutic circle. The connectors of historical time and the theory of the act of reading are also related to the hermeneutics of action. Thus an alternative view of Time and Narrative emerges, where narrative ceases to be the main axis, and where praxis gives full meaning to the hermeneutic reflection, and thereby to the experience of time. (shrink)

The confrontation with the human and social sciences is one of the main characteristics of Paul Ricoeur’s philosophical thought. It represents an important resource for the Cogito that has experienced suspicion and must therefore face the need to understand itself through scientific explanation. However, Ricoeurian thinking also rejects any reductionism, considering that it is essential to maintain a dimension of meaning independent of explanation. If this dimension is denied, the sciences themselves lose their logical coherence. The aim of this article (...) is to show how Ricoeur was able to hold together these two apparently irreconcilable needs. The analysis is based in particular on Freud and Philosophy (De l’interprétation. Essai sur Freud) from 1965, a book that can be seen both as the birthplace of this “impossible conciliation” and as a model for the author’s later works in setting up interdisciplinary dialogues. To exemplify the presence of this same argumentative structure in other contexts, the article ends with a reference to Ricoeur’s analysis of the relationship between philosophy and the critique of ideologies, as presented in his Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, which he held ten years after the publication of the book on Freud. (shrink)

Detendo-se no pecado em Pelágio como possibilidade enquanto exercício da liberdade e responsabilidade individual, o artigo assinala a defesa da neutralidade envolvendo a criação do ser humano e a sua capacidade para o bem e o mal, sublinhando a liberdade da vontade e a sua absoluta indeterminação, o que atrela o pecado à escolha. Dessa forma, o texto mostra o pecado em Agostinho como fato e ato enquanto liberdade, responsabilidade e culpa pessoal, na medida em que o ser humano é (...) constituído enquanto tal em estado de santa inocência em um processo que atribui ao pecado a condição de um produto da escolha humana através do exercício de sua liberdade e plena consciência, convergindo para um acontecimento que, baseado na atitude de Adão, impõe a sua posteridade a condição de absoluta depravação e inescapável culpa. Assim, examinando o pecado como símbolo racional entre Pelágio e Agostinho segundo Paul Ricoeur, a pesquisa afirma a necessidade de um processo que seja capaz de desconstruir o conceito em função da emergência da intenção ortodoxa enquanto sentido reto e eclesial. (shrink)

Unusually, Fratelli tutti and Laudato si’ both cite the work of French thinker Paul Ricoeur. It is unusual because reference to individual scholars can be rare in Catholic social teaching, and because Ricoeur was a philosopher, and not a Catholic. Yet Ricoeur’s work, which spanned nearly seventy years and incorporated both philosophy and engagement with religious resources, focused on meaningful communication in text and action for the work of living together. For an encyclical committed to rethinking and rejuvenating attitudes to (...) each other in public life, across disagreement, Ricoeur’s work provides an ideal conversation partner. His approach involves attending carefully to the ethical entanglement of self and other, mediated by the institution. This attention supports the driving concern and reasoning of Fratelli tutti—to recenter the agency of neighbor, people, and institution for the fragile political work of deliberation, cooperation, and action. (shrink)