About this topic
Summary The literature on perceptual knowledge—or, more broadly, the epistemology of perception—addresses a wide array of issues that often overlap.  Among the most prominent questions in the literature are the following: How should we account for perceptual knowledge and related notions such as perceptual evidence, justification, rationality, and entitlement?  Is any perceptual knowledge/justification immediate, or is all perceptual knowledge/justification mediated by other knowledge/justification?  Must perceptual experiences be understood as having conceptual content—or as having representational content at all—to justify perceptual beliefs?  How should the metaphysics of perception inform the epistemology of perception (or vice versa)?  How can we address skeptical threats to the status of our perceptual beliefs?  Do we have the same evidence for our perceptual beliefs in good and bad cases of perceptual experience?  More broadly, what is the relationship between the epistemic standing of our perceptual beliefs in good and bad cases?
Key works Some central works about the nature of perceptual knowledge are Dretske(1969, 2000), Goldman (1976), McDowell (1994), Williamson (2000), Johnston (2006), and Sosa (2007).  Some central works about the nature of perceptual justification, entitlement and rationality are Pryor (2000), Huemer (2001), Burge (2003) and Wright (2004).  Important discussions of the relationship between perceptual content and the epistemology of perception include Sellars (1956), Martin (1992), Brewer (1999), Heck (2000), and Silins (2011).  Important discussions of the relationship between the metaphysics and epistemology of perception include Fumerton (1985), Martin (2006), McDowell (2008), and Sosa (2011).  Pryor (2000), Huemer (2001), and Wright (2002) rank among the most important recent discussions of perception and skepticism.  Pritchard (2012) and Schellenberg (2013) have developed accounts of the relationship between the epistemology of the good and the bad cases.
Introductions Opie and O’Brien (2004), BonJour (2007), and Siegel and Silins (2015) provide overviews of the literature on the epistemology of perception. 
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1 — 50 / 212
  1. added 2018-12-26
    Em Defesa da Justificação Perceptiva: Desmistificando o Mito do Dado.Eros Carvalho - 2007 - Dissertation, Federal University of Minas Gerais
    Since Wilfrid Sellars' attack on sense-date theories, it became hard to understand the role of perceptual experience in the justification of beliefs about the world. Many philosophers have started to sustain that experience only causes beliefs, never justifies them. In this thesis, I defend that experience justifies empirical beliefs non-inferentially. I work out three senses of 'justification': basement, reason and warrant. The idea is that experience can be a reason to believe. The subject can base upon his experience in order (...)
  2. added 2018-12-15
    Crenças justificadas não-inferencialmente e o mito do dado.Eros Moreira De Carvalho - 2009 - Princípios 16 (25):231-263.
    The aim of this paper is to present an explanation of how the perceptualexperience fulfills its role of justification. The idea is that the perceptual experience justifiesnon-inferentially empirical beliefs in an internalist sense of justification. Against Sellars, I want to say that S relied on his experience to believe that the world is so and so. To discussthis question, I choose the arguments of Brewer and McDowell. Both argue that theexperience can justify beliefs, provided it has a conceptual content. But (...)
  3. added 2018-12-05
    La nostalgia restauradora, el ocaso de la hermenéutica del punto de vista ajeno.Jorge Montesó Ventura - 2018 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 75:177-190.
    Nostalgia is the emotional effect that causes searching between memories the disappeared home, longed for. In itself, while researching in memories, it implies a certain degree of self-absorption and individuation, because the memories are in extremely particular, a return to the self. When this nostalgia is filled with a restorative eagerness, when it has social and political pretensions, this return translates into a marked distancing between one’s point of view and that of any other, until it becomes a threat to (...)
  4. added 2018-10-28
    The Nyāya Argument for Disjunctivism.Henry Ian Schiller - forthcoming - History of Philosophy Quarterly.
    The Nyāya school of classical Indian epistemology defended (by today’s standards) a radical version of epistemic externalism. They also gave arguments from their epistemological positions to an early version of disjunctivism about perceptual experience. In this paper I assess the value of such an argument, concluding that a modified version of the Nyāya argument may be defensible.
  5. added 2018-10-06
    Object Reidentification and the Epistemic Role of Attention.Nilanjan Das - 2018 - Ratio 31 (4):402-414.
    Reidentification scepticism is the view that we cannot knowledgeably reidentify previously perceived objects. Amongst classical Indian philosophers, the Buddhists argued for reidentification scepticism. In this essay, I will discuss two responses to this Buddhist argument. The first response, defended by Vācaspati Miśra (9th century CE), is that our outer senses allow us to knowledgeably reidentify objects. I will claim that this proposal is problematic. The second response, due to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (9th century CE), is that the manas or the inner (...)
  6. added 2018-09-18
    El sentimiento en la Noología de Zubiri.Antonio Malo - 1999 - Acta Philosophica 8 (1).
    Zubirian reflection on feeling is aimed at elucidating the essence of aesthetic feeling through three successive steps: first, to establish what is a feeling; Second, to indicate what is the relationship between feeling and reality; third and last one, to approach in what the aesthetic feeling consists. In our study we will limit ourselves to the first two stages, since it seems to us that, despite his penetrating intuitions, Zubiri has not revealed the essence of feeling for lack of a (...)
  7. added 2018-09-17
    Reid’s View of Memorial Conception.Marina Folescu - 2018 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 16 (3):211-226.
    Thomas Reid believed that the human mind is well equipped, from infancy, to acquire knowledge of the external world, with all its objects, persons and events. There are three main faculties that are involved in the acquisition of knowledge: (original) perception, memory, and imagination. It is thought that we cannot understand how exactly perception works, unless we have a good grasp on Reid’s notion of perceptual conception (i.e., of the conception employed in perception). The present paper argues that the same (...)
  8. added 2018-08-24
    Internalism and Perceptual Knowledge.Bill Brewer - 1996 - European Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):259-275.
  9. added 2018-04-04
    Alston on the Epistemic Advantages of the Theory of Appearing.Matthew McGrath - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41:53-70.
    William Alston claimed that epistemic considerations are relevant to theorizing about the metaphysics of perceptual experience. There must be something about the intrinsic nature of a perceptual experience that explains why it is that it justifies one in believing what it does, rather than other propositions. A metaphysical theory of experience that provides the resources for such an explanation is to be preferred over ones that do not. Alston argued that the theory of appearing gains a leg up on its (...)
  10. added 2018-03-05
    Remarks on Perception and Other Minds.Edmund Dain - 2017 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 6 (2):31-45.
    It is a simple truth about the English language that we can see or hear or feel what others are thinking or feeling. But it is tempting to think that there is a deeper sense in which we cannot really see or hear or feel these things at all. Rather, what is involved must be a matter of inference or interpretation, for instance. In these remarks, I argue against a variety of ways in which that thought, the thought that we (...)
  11. added 2018-03-03
    A Epistemologia da Perceção (Verbete).Eros Carvalho - manuscript
    Tomamos como certo que os nossos sentidos nos colocam em contato com o ambiente ao nosso redor. Enquanto caminhamos em uma rua, vemos obstáculos que temos de contornar ou remover. Mesmo de costas, podemos ouvir a bicicleta que se aproxima e dar passagem. Em suma, por meio de experiências perceptivas (visuais, auditivas, olfativas etc.), ficamos conscientes de objetos ou eventos que estejam ocorrendo ao nosso redor. Além disso, com base no que percebemos, podemos formar e manter crenças acerca do ambiente (...)
  12. added 2018-02-17
    Escepticismo y Desacuerdo.Rodrigo Laera - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (1):81-97.
    Within the framework of the epistemological debate on disagreement, this paper aims to examine the sceptical thesis that holds that, if it is impossible to rationally choose among two excluding positions, the only sensible or rational thing to do is to suspend judgement. The idea that ordinary life does not constitute the source of scepticism is presented, which rules out real disagreement between epistemic pairs as its foundation. Sceptical scenes differ ontologically from everyday scenes, without such ontological difference entailing an (...)
  13. added 2018-02-17
    Perception: And Our Knowledge of the External World.Don Locke - 1967 - Ny: Routledge.
  14. added 2018-01-19
    Expressions, Looks and Others' Minds.William E. S. McNeill - forthcoming - In Matthew Parrott & Anita Avramides (eds.), Other Minds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    We can know some things about each others' mental lives. The view that some of this knowledge is genuinely perceptual is getting traction. But the idea that we can see any of each others' mental states themselves - the Simple Perceptual Hypothesis - remains unpopular. Very often the view that we can perceptually know, for example, that James is angry, is thought to depend either on our awareness of James' expression or on the way James appears - versions of what (...)
  15. added 2018-01-02
    1. Acquaintance Vs. Knowledge of Truths.John Campbell - manuscript
    Suppose your conscious life were surgically excised, but everything else left intact, what would you miss? In this situation you would not have the slightest idea what was going on. You would have no idea what there is in the world around you; what the grounds are of the potentialities and threats are that you are negotiating. Experience of your surroundings provides you with knowledge of what is there: with your initial base of knowledge of what the things are that (...)
  16. added 2018-01-02
    Review of Richard Gaskin, Experience and the World's Own Language: A Critique of John McDowell's Empiricism[REVIEW]Jason Bridges - 2007 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (2).
  17. added 2017-12-05
    Ambivalence, Emotional Perceptions, and the Concern with Objectivity.Hili Razinsky - 2017 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 4 (2):211-228.
    Hili Razinsky, free downlad at link. ABSTRACT: Emotional perceptions are objectivist (objectivity-directed or cognitive) and conscious, both attributes suggesting they cannot be ambivalent. Yet perceptions, including emotional perceptions of value, allow for strictly objectivist ambivalence in which a person unitarily perceives the object in mutually undermining ways. Emotional perceptions became an explicandum of emotion for philosophers who are sensitive to the unique conscious character of emotion, impressed by the objectivist character of perceptions, and believe that the perceptual account solves a (...)
  18. added 2017-11-15
    Transparency and Knowledge of One's Own Perceptions.Martin Francisco Fricke - 2017 - Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 25:65-67.
    So-called "transparency theories" of self-knowledge, inspired by a remark of Gareth Evans, claim that we can obtain knowledge of our own beliefs by directing out attention towards the world, rather than introspecting the contents of our own minds. Most recent transparency theories concentrate on the case of self-knowledge concerning belief and desires. But can a transparency account be generalised to knowledge of one's own perceptions? In a recent paper, Alex Byrne (2012) argues that we can know what we see by (...)
  19. added 2017-10-14
    Review of Radicalizing Enactivism by Hutto and Myin (2012).Michael Starks - 2017 - Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Michael Starks 3rd Ed. (2017).
    Probably the leading exponent of W’s ideas on the language games of inner and outer (the ‘Two Selves’ operation of our personality or intentionality or EP etc. ) the prolific Daniel Hutto’s (DH) approach is called ‘Radical Enactivism’ and is well explained in numerous recent books and papers. It is a development of or version of the Embodied Mind ideas now current and, cleansed of its jargon, it is a straightforward extension of W’s 2nd and 3rd period writings (though Hutto (...)
  20. added 2017-09-25
    How Experienced Phenomena Relate to Things Themselves: Kant, Husserl, Hoche, and Reflexive Monism.Max Velmans - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):411-423.
    What we normally think of as the “physical world” is also the world as experienced, that is, a world of appearances. Given this, what is the reality behind the appearances, and what might its relation be to consciousness and to constructive processes in the mind? According to Kant, the thing itself that brings about and supports these appearances is unknowable and we can never gain any understanding of how it brings such appearances about. Reflexive monism argues the opposite: the thing (...)
  21. added 2017-09-25
    We Are at Something of a Loss to Explain Our Observations and Wonder Whether Any Reader Can Enlighten Us. Alan Beaton, Paul Norman, Guy Richardson.Alan Beaton - 1996 - In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception. Ridgeview. pp. 25--373.
  22. added 2017-09-25
    Symposium: Does Our Knowledge or Perception of the Ego Admit of Being Analysed?A. Boutwood, H. W. Blunt & G. F. Stout - 1890 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1 (4):28 - 39.
  23. added 2017-09-20
    Disjunktivismus. Die Auflösung des Dualismus von Anschauung und Welt.Hannes Ole Matthiessen - 2014 - In David Lauer & Christian Barth (eds.), Die Philosophie John McDowells. Münster: Mentis. pp. 51-66.
  24. added 2017-09-15
    A Reflexive Science of Consciousness.Max Velmans - 1993 - In Gregory Bock & Joan Marsh (eds.), Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness: Ciba Foundation Symposium 174. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. pp. 81-99.
    Classical ways of viewing the relation of consciousness to the brain and physical world make it difficult to see how consciousness can be a subject of scientific study. In contrast to physical events, it seems to be private, subjective, and viewable only from a subject's first-person perspective. But much of psychology does investigate human experience, which suggests that classical ways of viewing these relations must be wrong. An alternative, Reflexive model is outlined along with it's consequences for methodology. Within this (...)
  25. added 2017-08-28
    John McDowell, Mind and World.Monika Betzler - 1998 - Erkenntnis 48 (1):117-122.
  26. added 2017-08-04
    Many Molyneux Questions.Mohan Matthen & Jonathan Cohen - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    (This paper will appear in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy. The Accepted Version will be posted when it is published.) -/- Molyneux's Question (MQ) concerns whether a newly sighted man would recognize/distinguish a sphere and a cube by vision, assuming he could previously do this by touch. We argue that (MQ) splits into questions about (a) shared representations of space in different perceptual systems, and about (b) shared ways of constructing higher dimensional spatiotemporal features from information about lower dimensional ones, (...)
  27. added 2017-05-25
    Practical Knowledge and Perception.Evgenia Mylonaki - 2016 - In Mark Alznauer & Jose Torralba (eds.), Theories of Action and Morality: Perspectives from Philosophy and Social Theory. Hildesheim, Germany: Georg Olms Verlag. pp. 241-265.
    In this paper I examine the relation between intentional action and morality from the perspective of practical epistemology. In other words I study the relation between Elizabeth Anscombe's knowledge of one’s own intentional actions (knowledge in action) and Iris Murdoch's knowledge of what is good to do or what one ought to do in particular circumstances (knowledge in the circumstances). If practical knowledge in the former sense (knowledge in action) and practical knowledge in the latter sense (knowledge in the circumstances) (...)
  28. added 2017-04-05
    THINKING,‭ ‬SENSATION,‭ ‬UNDERSTANDING,‭ ‬REASON,‭ ‬ARGUMENTATION,‭ ‬EMOTIONS,‭ ‬EXPERIENCE,‭ ‬WISDOM.de Balbin Ulrich - 2017 - Oxford: Academic Publishers.
    Ulrich de Balbian Meta-Philosophy Research Center -/- Do not talk about or use the misleading,‭ ‬umbrella-word like mind and consciousness,‭ ‬or mental processes and phenomena.‭ ‬Even Hume realized this and emphasized the need for accurate definitions of those words and processes we wish to investigate.‭ ‬Talk about and investigate specific processes or‭ ‬‘notions and activities‭’‬ like thinking,‭ ‬reasoning,‭ ‬sensing and experience/ing,‭ ‬arguments and argumentation,‭ ‬etc‭ ‬.I intend to explore the notions of thought‭ (‬thinking‭)‬,‭ ‬sensation,‭ ‬feeling,‭ ‬understanding and insight,‭ ‬reason/ing and (...)
  29. added 2017-02-12
    Perceptual Knowledge.Donald Mcqueen - 1983 - Philosophical Books 24 (1):58-60.
  30. added 2017-02-11
    Knowledge of Alternatives and Perception of Tachistoscopic Stimuli.Kent Gummerman - 1970 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 83 (3p1):385.
  31. added 2017-02-08
    Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge.John Henry McDowell - 2011 - Marquette University Press.
  32. added 2017-02-08
    Knowledge and the Flow of Information Fred I. Dretske Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981. Pp. Xiv, 273. $18.50.Douglas Odegard - 1982 - Dialogue 21 (4):778-779.
  33. added 2017-01-28
    DICKER, G. "Perceptual Knowledge". [REVIEW]J. W. Roxbee-cox - 1983 - Mind 92:279.
  34. added 2017-01-25
    Perception and Cognition Are Largely Independent, but Still Affect Each Other in Systematic Ways: Arguments From Evolution and the Consciousness-Attention Dissociation.Carlos Montemayor & Harry Haroutioun Haladjian - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8:1-15.
    The main thesis of this paper is that two prevailing theories about cognitive penetration are too extreme, namely, the view that cognitive penetration is pervasive and the view that there is a sharp and fundamental distinction between cognition and perception, which precludes any type of cognitive penetration. These opposite views have clear merits and empirical support. To eliminate this puzzling situation, we present an alternative theoretical approach that incorporates the merits of these views into a broader and more nuanced explanatory (...)
  35. added 2017-01-18
    Dretske on Knowledge Closure.Steven Luper - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):379 – 394.
    In early essays and in more recent work, Fred Dretske argues against the closure of perception, perceptual knowledge, and knowledge itself. In this essay I review his case and suggest that, in a useful sense, perception is closed, and that, while perceptual knowledge is not closed under entailment, perceptually based knowledge is closed, and so is knowledge itself. On my approach, which emphasizes the safe indication account of knowledge, we can both perceive, and know, that sceptical scenarios (such as being (...)
  36. added 2017-01-06
    Austin on Perception, Knowledge and Meaning.Lawlor Krista - forthcoming - In Savas Tsohatzidis (ed.), Interpreting Austin. Cambridge University Press.
  37. added 2016-12-24
    Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied Rationality.Rolla Giovanni - 2016 - Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 39 (3):5-28.
    Based on Pritchard’s distinction (2012, 2016) between favoring and discriminating epistemic grounds, and on how those grounds bear on the elimination of skeptical possibilities, I present the dream argument as a moderate skeptical possibility that can be reasonably motivated. In order to block the dream argument skeptical conclusion, I present a version of phenomenological disjunctivism based on Noë’s actionist account of perceptual consciousness (2012). This suggests that perceptual knowledge is rationally grounded because it is a form of embodied achievement – (...)
  38. added 2016-11-20
    An Explanatory Challenge for Epistemological Disjunctivism.Cameron Boult - 2018 - Episteme 15 (2):141-153.
    Epistemological Disjunctivism is a view about paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge. Duncan Pritchard claims that it is particularly well suited to accounting for internalist and externalist intuitions. A number of authors have disputed this claim, arguing that there are problems for Pritchard’s way with internalist intuitions. I share the worry. However, I don’t think it has been expressed as effectively as it can be. My aim in this paper is to present a new way of formulating the worry, in terms (...)
  39. added 2016-11-19
    Etiology, Understanding, and Testimonial Belief.Andrew Peet - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1547-1567.
    The etiology of a perceptual belief can seemingly affect its epistemic status. There are cases in which perceptual beliefs seem to be unjustified because the perceptual experiences on which they are based are caused, in part, by wishful thinking, or irrational prior beliefs. It has been argued that this is problematic for many internalist views in the epistemology of perception, especially those which postulate immediate perceptual justification. Such views are unable to account for the impact of an experience’s etiology on (...)
  40. added 2016-10-11
    Perceptual Knowledge — Philosophical studies n° 22.G. Dicker - 1985 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 90 (1):128-129.
  41. added 2016-09-26
    Perceptual Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):969-990.
    A very natural view about perceptual knowledge is articulated, one on which perceptual knowledge is closely related to perceptual discrimination, and which fits well with a relevant alternatives account of knowledge. It is shown that this kind of proposal faces a problem, and various options for resolving this difficulty are explored. In light of this discussion, a two-tiered relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge is offered which avoids the closure problem. It is further shown how this proposal can: accommodate our (...)
  42. added 2016-09-01
    Perceptual Justification: Factive Reasons and Fallible Virtues.C. Kelp & H. Ghijsen - 2016 - In C. Mi, M. Slote & E. Sosa (eds.), Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy. Routledge.
    Two different versions of epistemological disjunctivism have recently been upheld in the literature: a traditional, Justified True Belief Epistemological Disjunctivism (JTBED) and a Knowledge First Epistemological Disjunctivism (KFED). JTBED holds that factive reasons of the form “S sees that p” provide the rational support in virtue of which one has perceptual knowledge, while KFED holds that factive reasons of the form “S sees that p” just are ways of knowing that p which additionally provide justification for believing that p. We (...)
  43. added 2016-08-05
    Helmholtz's Physiological Psychology.Lydia Patton - 2018 - In Sandra Lapointe (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Nineteenth Century: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 5. Routledge.
    Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-1894) established results both controversial and enduring: analysis of mixed colors and of combination tones, arguments against nativism, and the analysis of sensation and perception using the techniques of natural science. The paper focuses on Helmholtz’s account of sensation, perception, and representation via “physiological psychology”. Helmholtz emphasized that external stimuli of sensations are causes, and sensations are their effects, and he had a practical and naturalist orientation toward the analysis of phenomenal experience. However, he argued as well (...)
  44. added 2016-07-27
    Leibniz's Passionate Knowledge.Markku Roinila - 2016 - Blityri (1/2 2015):75-85.
    In §18 of Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason, Leibniz says: ”Thus our happiness will never consist, and must never consist, in complete joy, in which nothing is left to desire, and which would dull our mind, but must consist in a perpetual progress to new pleasures and new perfections.” -/- This passage is typical in Leibniz’s Nachlass. Universal perfection creates in us joy or pleasure of the mind and its source is our creator, God. When this joy (...)
  45. added 2016-06-04
    THE TRANSCENDENTAL METAPHYSIC OF G.F. STOUT: HIS DEFENCE AND ELABORATION OF TROPE THEORY.Fraser Macbride - 2014 - In A. Reboul (ed.), Mind, Value and Metaphysics: Papers Dedicated to Kevin Mulligan. Springer. pp. 141-58.
    G. F. Stout is famous as an early twentieth century proselyte for abstract particulars, or tropes as they are now often called. He advanced his version of trope theory to avoid the excesses of nominalism on the one hand and realism on the other. But his arguments for tropes have been widely misconceived as metaphysical, e.g. by Armstrong. In this paper, I argue that Stout’s fundamental arguments for tropes were ideological and epistemological rather than metaphysical. He moulded his scheme to (...)
  46. added 2016-04-04
    In Memoriam: James W. Cornman.Keith Lehrer - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 41 (1):3-4.
  47. added 2016-04-04
    In Memoriam: James W. Cornman.Keith Lehrer - 1978 - Philosophical Studies 34 (4):333 - 334.
  48. added 2016-03-14
    Jonathan Dancy, Ed., Perceptual Knowledge. [REVIEW]D. Maclachlan - 1990 - Philosophy in Review 10 (3):101-104.
  49. added 2016-03-14
    Perceptual Knowledge: An Analytical and Historical Study. By Georges Dicker.Robert J. Henle - 1983 - Modern Schoolman 60 (2):126-127.
  50. added 2016-03-11
    Physics and Commonsense.Ravi Gomatam - manuscript
    Broadly stated, naïve realism is the attitude that the form of our outer experiences directly and literally correspond to the structure of the real world underlying these experiences. Naïve realism permeates our everyday thinking about, and ordinary language description of, the macroscopic world. It has undeniable pragmatic justification. However, as Descartes recognized centuries ago, philosophically speaking, naïve realism requires a justification. Physicists, nevertheless, simply assume naïve realism in interpreting the laboratory observations realistically. Thus, physicists do not find the philosophical issues (...)
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