About this topic
Summary The literature on perceptual knowledge—or, more broadly, the epistemology of perception—addresses a wide array of issues that often overlap.  Among the most prominent questions in the literature are the following: How should we account for perceptual knowledge and related notions such as perceptual evidence, justification, rationality, and entitlement?  Is any perceptual knowledge/justification immediate, or is all perceptual knowledge/justification mediated by other knowledge/justification?  Must perceptual experiences be understood as having conceptual content—or as having representational content at all—to justify perceptual beliefs?  How should the metaphysics of perception inform the epistemology of perception (or vice versa)?  How can we address skeptical threats to the status of our perceptual beliefs?  Do we have the same evidence for our perceptual beliefs in good and bad cases of perceptual experience?  More broadly, what is the relationship between the epistemic standing of our perceptual beliefs in good and bad cases?
Key works Some central works about the nature of perceptual knowledge are Dretske(1969, 2000), Goldman (1976), McDowell (1994), Williamson (2000), Johnston (2006), and Sosa (2007).  Some central works about the nature of perceptual justification, entitlement and rationality are Pryor (2000), Huemer (2001), Burge (2003) and Wright (2004).  Important discussions of the relationship between perceptual content and the epistemology of perception include Sellars (1956), Martin (1992), Brewer (1999), Heck (2000), and Silins (2011).  Important discussions of the relationship between the metaphysics and epistemology of perception include Fumerton (1985), Martin (2006), McDowell (2008), and Sosa (2011).  Pryor (2000), Huemer (2001), and Wright (2002) rank among the most important recent discussions of perception and skepticism.  Pritchard (2012) and Schellenberg (2013) have developed accounts of the relationship between the epistemology of the good and the bad cases.
Introductions Opie and O’Brien (2004), BonJour (2007), and Siegel and Silins (2015) provide overviews of the literature on the epistemology of perception. 
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  1. added 2020-05-29
    О созидании, пещерном искусстве и восприятии: доксологический подход.Rosengren Mats & Dmitrii Vorobev - 2020 - Вопросы Философии 8:80-93.
    Представляя доксологию как постфеноменологический способ решения эпистемических и перцептивных проблем, автор обращается к истории открытия в конце XIX в. палеолитической наскальной живописи и к данным современных когнитивных наук. Восприятие и познание не являются отражением объективной реальности, это – особая творческая деятельность людей, обусловленная как биологическими, так и социокультурными факторами. Используя принципы Э. Кассирера, Л. Флека, П. Бурдье и Ж. Деррида, автор дает очерк сложного переплетения биологических и социальных факторов в процессе восприятия, анализируя первые попытки осмысления так называемого «пещерного искусства», и (...)
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  2. added 2020-04-30
    Not Rational, But Not Brutely Causal Either: A Response to Fodor on Concept Acquisition.Louise Antony - unknown - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 35 (1):45-57.
    Jerry Fodor has argued that concept acquisition cannot be a psychological or “rational-causal” process, but can only be a “brute-causal” process of acquisition. This position generates the “doorknob  DOORKNOB” problem: why are concepts typically acquired on the basis of experience with items in their extensions? I argue that Fodor’s taxonomy of causal processes needs supplementation, and characterize a third type: what I call “intelligible-causal processes.” Armed with this new category I present what I regard as a better response than (...)
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  3. added 2020-03-18
    The Nature of Object of Perception and Its Role in the Knowledge Concerning the External World.Mika Suojanen - 2015 - Turku: University of Turku.
    Questions concerning perception are as old as the field of philosophy itself. Using the first-person perspective as a starting point and philosophical documents, the study examines the relationship between knowledge and perception. The problem is that of how one knows what one immediately perceives. The everyday belief that an object of perception is known to be a material object on grounds of perception is demonstrated as unreliable. It is possible that directly perceived sensible particulars are mind-internal images, shapes, sounds, touches, (...)
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  4. added 2020-03-18
    Virtue and Action: Justification of Knowledge Concerning Morality.Mika Suojanen - 2014 - In Juhana Lemetti Nora Hämäläinen (ed.), Philosophical Studies from University of Helsinki. Helsinki: Helsinki University Press. pp. 69‒80.
    The paper is about the question whether we could know a person's moral character by observing his or her acts.
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  5. added 2020-03-17
    McDowell and the Contents of Intuition.Jacob Browning - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (1-2):83-104.
    In Mind and World, John McDowell provided an influential account of how perceptual experience makes knowledge of the world possible. He recommended a view he called “conceptualism”, according to which concepts are intimately involved in perception and there is no non‐conceptual content. In response to criticisms of this view (especially those from Charles Travis), McDowell has more recently proposed a revised account that distinguishes between two kinds of representation: the passive non‐propositional contents of perceptual experience – what he now calls (...)
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  6. added 2020-02-07
    Precis of Perception and Reason, and Response to Commentator (Michael Ayers).Bill Brewer - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):405.
    What is the role of conscious perceptual experience in the acquisition of empirical knowledge? My central claim is that a proper account of the way in which perceptual experiences contribute to our understanding of the most basic beliefs about particular things in the mind-independent world around us reveals how such experiences provide peculiarly fundamental reasons for such beliefs. There are, I claim, epistemic requirements upon the very possibility of empirical belief. The crucial epistemological role of experiences lies in their essential (...)
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  7. added 2019-12-22
    Perceptual Input Is Not Conceptual Content.Justin Halberda - 2019 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 23 (8):636-638.
    Can we represent number approximately? A seductive reductionist notion is that participants in number tasks rely on continuous extent cues (e.g.,area) and therefore that the representations underlying performance lack numerical content. I suggest that this notion embraces a misconception: that perceptual input determines conceptual content.
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  8. added 2019-12-16
    Does perceptual psychology rule out disjunctivism in the theory of perception?Charles Goldhaber - forthcoming - Synthese:1-23.
    Disjunctivist views in the theory of perception hold that genuine perceptions differ in some relevant kind from misperceptions, such as illusions and hallucinations. In recent papers, Tyler Burge has argued that such views conflict with the basic tenets of perceptual psychology. According to him, perceptual psychology is committed to the view that genuine perceptions and misperceptions produced by the same proximal stimuli must be or involve perceptual states of the same kind. This, he argues, conflicts with disjunctivism. In this paper, (...)
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  9. added 2019-10-17
    Naïve Realism and Phenomenal Similarity.Sam Clarke & Alfonso Anaya - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
    It has been claimed that naïve realism predicts phenomenological similarities where there are none and, thereby, mischaracterizes the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. If true, this undercuts a key motivation for the view. Here, we defend naïve realism against this charge, proposing that such arguments fail (three times over). In so doing, we highlight a more general problem with critiques of naïve realism that target the purported phenomenological predictions of the view. The problem is: naïve realism, broadly construed, doesn’t make (...)
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  10. added 2019-10-07
    Austin on Perception, Knowledge and Meaning.Krista Lawlor - 2017 - In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), Interpreting J. L. Austin: Critical Essays. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    Austin’s Sense and Sensibilia (1962) generates wildly different reactions among philosophers. Interpreting Austin on perception starts with a reading of this text, and this in turn requires reading into the lectures key ideas from Austin’s work on natural language and the theory of knowledge. The lectures paint a methodological agenda, and a sketch of some first-order philosophy, done the way Austin thinks it should be done. Crucially, Austin calls for philosophers to bring a deeper understanding of natural language meaning to (...)
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  11. added 2019-10-01
    Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on Perception and Self-Awareness.Christian Coseru - 2016 - In John Powers (ed.), The Buddhist World. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 526–537.
    Like many of their counterparts in the West, Buddhist philosophers realized a long time ago that our linguistic and conceptual practices are rooted in pre-predicative modes of apprehension that provide implicit access to whatever is immediately present to awareness. This paper examines Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s contributions to what has come to be known as “Buddhist epistemology” (sometimes referred in the specialist literature by the Sanskrit neologism pramāṇavāda, lit. “doctrine of epistemic warrants”), focusing on the phenomenological and epistemic role of perception (...)
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  12. added 2019-09-15
    Perception, Causally Efficacious Particulars, and the Range of Phenomenal Consciousness: Reply to Commentaries.Christian Coseru - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (9-10):55-82.
    This paper responds to critical commentaries on my book, Perceiving Reality (OUP, 2012), by Laura Guerrero, Matthew MacKenzie, and Anand Vaidya. Guerrero focuses on the metaphysics of causation, and its role in the broader question of whether the ‘two truths’ framework of Buddhist philosophy can be reconciled with the claim that science provides the best account of our experienced world. MacKenzie pursues two related questions: (i) Is reflexive awareness (svasaṃvedana) identical with the subjective pole of a dual-aspect cognition or are (...)
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  13. added 2019-07-04
    Was sind die Objekte der Wahrnehmung?: Ernst Cassirers Antwort auf die analytische Wahrnehmungstheorie.Tobias Endres - 2018 - In Stefan Niklas & Thiemo Breyer (eds.), Ernst Cassirer in Systematischen Beziehungen: Zur Kritisch-Kommunikativen Bedeutung Seiner Kulturphilosophie. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 25-46.
    What are the Objects of Perception? Ernst Cassirer’s Response to Analytic Theories of Perception. On the basis of its third volume, the Phenomenology of Knowledge (1929), Cassirer’s principal work, the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (1923-29), can be read as a phenomenology of perception. That is to say, Cassirer not only starts from the fact of multiple forms of cultural expression to reconstruct their transcendental conditions of objectification, but at once to trace their underlying forms of perceptive subjectivity. Hence, a holistic (...)
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  14. added 2019-06-20
    Motions in the Body, Sensations in the Mind: Malebranche's Mechanics of Sensory Perception and Taste.Katharine Julia Hamerton - forthcoming - Arts Et Savoirs.
    This article, which seeks to connect philosophy, polite culture, and the Enlightenment, shows how Malebranche’s Cartesian science presented a full-frontal attack on the worldly notion of a good taste aligned with reason. It did this by arguing that the aesthetic tastes that people experience were the result of mechanically-transmitted sensations that, like all physical sensations, were inaccurate, erroneous and relativistic. The mechanics of this process is explored in detail to show how Malebranche was challenging honnête thinking. The article suggests that (...)
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  15. added 2019-06-17
    New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism.Casey Doyle, Joe Milburn & Duncan Pritchard (eds.) - 2019 - New York: Routledge.
    This is the first volume dedicated solely to the topic of epistemological disjunctivism. The original essays in this volume, written by leading and up-and-coming scholars on the topic, are divided into three thematic sections. The first set of chapters addresses the historical background of epistemological disjunctivism. It features essays on ancient epistemology, Immanuel Kant, J.L. Austin, Edmund Husserl, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The second section tackles a number contemporary issues related to epistemological disjunctivism, including its relationship with perceptual disjunctivism, radical skepticism, (...)
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  16. added 2019-06-06
    Disjunctivism and Perceptual Knowledge in Merleau-Ponty and McDowell.J. C. Berendzen - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (3):261-286.
    On the face of it, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s views bear a strong resemblance to contemporary disjunctivist theories of perception, especially John McDowell’s epistemological disjunctivism. Like McDowell, Merleau-Ponty seems to be a direct realist about perception and holds that veridical and illusory perceptions are distinct. This paper furthers this comparison. Furthermore, it is argued that elements of Merleau-Ponty’s thought provide a stronger case for McDowell’s kind of epistemological view than McDowell himself provides. Merleau-Ponty’s early thought can be used to develop a unique (...)
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  17. added 2019-06-06
    Explaining Perceptual Knowledge: Reply to Quassim Cassam.Barry Stroud - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (4):590-596.
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  18. added 2019-06-06
    Elusive Knowledge of Things in Themselves.Rae Langton - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):129.
    Kant argued that we have no knowledge of things in themselves, no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of things, a thesis that is not idealism but epistemic humility. David Lewis agrees, but for Ramseyan reasons rather than Kantian. I compare the doctrines of Ramseyan and Kantian humility, and argue that Lewis's contextualist strategy for rescuing knowledge from the sceptic should also rescue knowledge of things in themselves. The rescue would not be complete: for knowledge of things in themselves would remain (...)
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  19. added 2019-06-05
    Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity, and Realism: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars.Willem A. deVries (ed.) - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    Leading philosophers from both sides of the Atlantic present essays on Wilfrid Sellars's Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, one of the crowning achievements of 20th-century analytic philosophy. They discuss empiricism, perception, epistemology, realism, and normativity, showing how vibrant Sellarsian philosophy remains in the 21st century.
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  20. added 2019-04-18
    Sellarsian Perspectives on Perception and Non-Conceptual Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2006 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 92 (1):173-196.
    I argue that a Sellarsian approach to experience allows one to take seriously the thought that there is something given to us in perception without denying that we can only be conscious of conceptually structured content. I argue against the traditional empiricist reading of Sellars, according to which sensations are understood as epistemically graspable prior to concrete propositional representations, by showing that it is unclear on such a view why sensations are not just the given as Sellars so famously criticizes (...)
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  21. added 2019-03-19
    The Recent Renaissance of Acquaintance.Thomas Raleigh - forthcoming - In Thomas Raleigh & Jonathan Knowles (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    This is the introductory essay to the collection of essays: 'Acquaintance: New Essays' (eds. Knowles & Raleigh, forthcoming, OUP). In this essay I provide some historical background to the concept of acquaintance. I examine various Russellian theses about acquaintance that contemporary acquaintance theorists may wish to reject. I consider a number of questions that acquaintance theorists face. I provide a survey of current debates in philosophy where acquaintance has recently been invoked. And I also provide brief summaries of the other (...)
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  22. added 2019-02-27
    Sympathy in Perception. [REVIEW]Catherine Legg & Jack Alan Reynolds - 2018 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2018 (0809).
  23. added 2019-02-27
    Idealism Operationalized: How Peirce’s Pragmatism Can Help Explicate and Motivate the Possibly Surprising Idea of Reality as Representational.Catherine Legg - 2017 - In Kathleen Hull & Richard Kenneth Atkins (eds.), Peirce on Perception and Reasoning: From Icons to Logic. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 40-53.
    Neopragmatism has been accused of having ‘an experience problem’. This paper begins by outlining Hume's understanding of perception according to which ideas are copies of impressions thought to constitute a direct confrontation with reality. This understanding is contrasted with Peirce's theory of perception according to which percepts give rise to perceptual judgments which do not copy but index the percept (just as a weather-cock indicates the direction of the wind). Percept and perceptual judgment thereby mutually inform and correct one another, (...)
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  24. added 2019-01-31
    Inexact Knowledge Without Improbable Knowing.Jeremy Goodman - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):30-53.
    In a series of recent papers, Timothy Williamson has argued for the surprising conclusion that there are cases in which you know a proposition in spite of its being overwhelmingly improbable given what you know that you know it. His argument relies on certain formal models of our imprecise knowledge of the values of perceptible and measurable magnitudes. This paper suggests an alternative class of models that do not predict this sort of improbable knowing. I show that such models are (...)
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  25. added 2018-12-26
    Em Defesa da Justificação Perceptiva: Desmistificando o Mito do Dado.Eros Carvalho - 2007 - Dissertation, Federal University of Minas Gerais
    Since Wilfrid Sellars' attack on sense-date theories, it became hard to understand the role of perceptual experience in the justification of beliefs about the world. Many philosophers have started to sustain that experience only causes beliefs, never justifies them. In this thesis, I defend that experience justifies empirical beliefs non-inferentially. I work out three senses of 'justification': basement, reason and warrant. The idea is that experience can be a reason to believe. The subject can base upon his experience in order (...)
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  26. added 2018-12-15
    Crenças justificadas não-inferencialmente e o mito do dado.Eros Moreira De Carvalho - 2009 - Princípios 16 (25):231-263.
    The aim of this paper is to present an explanation of how the perceptualexperience fulfills its role of justification. The idea is that the perceptual experience justifiesnon-inferentially empirical beliefs in an internalist sense of justification. Against Sellars, I want to say that S relied on his experience to believe that the world is so and so. To discussthis question, I choose the arguments of Brewer and McDowell. Both argue that theexperience can justify beliefs, provided it has a conceptual content. But (...)
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  27. added 2018-12-05
    La nostalgia restauradora, el ocaso de la hermenéutica del punto de vista ajeno.Jorge Montesó Ventura - 2018 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 75:177-190.
    Nostalgia is the emotional effect that causes searching between memories the disappeared home, longed for. In itself, while researching in memories, it implies a certain degree of self-absorption and individuation, because the memories are in extremely particular, a return to the self. When this nostalgia is filled with a restorative eagerness, when it has social and political pretensions, this return translates into a marked distancing between one’s point of view and that of any other, until it becomes a threat to (...)
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  28. added 2018-10-28
    The Nyāya Argument for Disjunctivism.Henry Ian Schiller - 2019 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 36 (1):1-18.
    The Nyāya school of classical Indian epistemology defended (by today’s standards) a radical version of epistemic externalism. They also gave arguments from their epistemological positions to an early version of disjunctivism about perceptual experience. In this paper I assess the value of such an argument, concluding that a modified version of the Nyāya argument may be defensible.
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  29. added 2018-10-06
    Object Reidentification and the Epistemic Role of Attention.Nilanjan Das - 2018 - Ratio 31 (4):402-414.
    Reidentification scepticism is the view that we cannot knowledgeably reidentify previously perceived objects. Amongst classical Indian philosophers, the Buddhists argued for reidentification scepticism. In this essay, I will discuss two responses to this Buddhist argument. The first response, defended by Vācaspati Miśra (9th century CE), is that our outer senses allow us to knowledgeably reidentify objects. I will claim that this proposal is problematic. The second response, due to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (9th century CE), is that the manas or the inner (...)
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  30. added 2018-09-18
    El sentimiento en la Noología de Zubiri.Antonio Malo - 1999 - Acta Philosophica 8 (1).
    Zubirian reflection on feeling is aimed at elucidating the essence of aesthetic feeling through three successive steps: first, to establish what is a feeling; Second, to indicate what is the relationship between feeling and reality; third and last one, to approach in what the aesthetic feeling consists. In our study we will limit ourselves to the first two stages, since it seems to us that, despite his penetrating intuitions, Zubiri has not revealed the essence of feeling for lack of a (...)
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  31. added 2018-09-17
    Reid’s View of Memorial Conception.Marina Folescu - 2018 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 16 (3):211-226.
    Thomas Reid believed that the human mind is well equipped, from infancy, to acquire knowledge of the external world, with all its objects, persons and events. There are three main faculties that are involved in the acquisition of knowledge: (original) perception, memory, and imagination. It is thought that we cannot understand how exactly perception works, unless we have a good grasp on Reid’s notion of perceptual conception (i.e., of the conception employed in perception). The present paper argues that the same (...)
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  32. added 2018-08-24
    Internalism and Perceptual Knowledge.Bill Brewer - 1996 - European Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):259-275.
  33. added 2018-04-04
    Alston on the Epistemic Advantages of the Theory of Appearing.Matthew McGrath - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41 (9999):53-70.
    William Alston claimed that epistemic considerations are relevant to theorizing about the metaphysics of perceptual experience. There must be something about the intrinsic nature of a perceptual experience that explains why it is that it justifies one in believing what it does, rather than other propositions. A metaphysical theory of experience that provides the resources for such an explanation is to be preferred over ones that do not. Alston argued that the theory of appearing gains a leg up on its (...)
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  34. added 2018-03-05
    Remarks on Perception and Other Minds.Edmund Dain - 2017 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 6 (2):31-45.
    It is a simple truth about the English language that we can see or hear or feel what others are thinking or feeling. But it is tempting to think that there is a deeper sense in which we cannot really see or hear or feel these things at all. Rather, what is involved must be a matter of inference or interpretation, for instance. In these remarks, I argue against a variety of ways in which that thought, the thought that we (...)
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  35. added 2018-03-03
    A Epistemologia da Percepção (Verbete).Eros Carvalho - manuscript
    Tomamos como certo que os nossos sentidos nos colocam em contato com o ambiente ao nosso redor. Enquanto caminhamos em uma rua, vemos obstáculos que temos de contornar ou remover. Mesmo de costas, podemos ouvir a bicicleta que se aproxima e dar passagem. Em suma, por meio de experiências perceptivas (visuais, auditivas, olfativas etc.), ficamos conscientes de objetos ou eventos que estejam ocorrendo ao nosso redor. Além disso, com base no que percebemos, podemos formar e manter crenças acerca do ambiente (...)
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  36. added 2018-02-17
    Escepticismo y Desacuerdo.Rodrigo Laera - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (1):81-97.
    Within the framework of the epistemological debate on disagreement, this paper aims to examine the sceptical thesis that holds that, if it is impossible to rationally choose among two excluding positions, the only sensible or rational thing to do is to suspend judgement. The idea that ordinary life does not constitute the source of scepticism is presented, which rules out real disagreement between epistemic pairs as its foundation. Sceptical scenes differ ontologically from everyday scenes, without such ontological difference entailing an (...)
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  37. added 2018-02-17
    Perception: And Our Knowledge of the External World.Don Locke - 1967 - Ny: Routledge.
    First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
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  38. added 2018-01-19
    Expressions, Looks and Others' Minds.William E. S. McNeill - forthcoming - In Matthew Parrott & Anita Avramides (eds.), Other Minds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    We can know some things about each others' mental lives. The view that some of this knowledge is genuinely perceptual is getting traction. But the idea that we can see any of each others' mental states themselves - the Simple Perceptual Hypothesis - remains unpopular. Very often the view that we can perceptually know, for example, that James is angry, is thought to depend either on our awareness of James' expression or on the way James appears - versions of what (...)
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  39. added 2018-01-02
    1. Acquaintance Vs. Knowledge of Truths.John Campbell - manuscript
    Suppose your conscious life were surgically excised, but everything else left intact, what would you miss? In this situation you would not have the slightest idea what was going on. You would have no idea what there is in the world around you; what the grounds are of the potentialities and threats are that you are negotiating. Experience of your surroundings provides you with knowledge of what is there: with your initial base of knowledge of what the things are that (...)
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  40. added 2018-01-02
    Review of Richard Gaskin, Experience and the World's Own Language: A Critique of John McDowell's Empiricism[REVIEW]Jason Bridges - 2007 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (2).
  41. added 2017-12-05
    Ambivalence, Emotional Perceptions, and the Concern with Objectivity.Hili Razinsky - 2017 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 4 (2):211-228.
    Hili Razinsky, free downlad at link. ABSTRACT: Emotional perceptions are objectivist (objectivity-directed or cognitive) and conscious, both attributes suggesting they cannot be ambivalent. Yet perceptions, including emotional perceptions of value, allow for strictly objectivist ambivalence in which a person unitarily perceives the object in mutually undermining ways. Emotional perceptions became an explicandum of emotion for philosophers who are sensitive to the unique conscious character of emotion, impressed by the objectivist character of perceptions, and believe that the perceptual account solves a (...)
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  42. added 2017-11-15
    Transparency and Knowledge of One's Own Perceptions.Martin Francisco Fricke - 2017 - Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 25:65-67.
    So-called "transparency theories" of self-knowledge, inspired by a remark of Gareth Evans, claim that we can obtain knowledge of our own beliefs by directing out attention towards the world, rather than introspecting the contents of our own minds. Most recent transparency theories concentrate on the case of self-knowledge concerning belief and desires. But can a transparency account be generalised to knowledge of one's own perceptions? In a recent paper, Alex Byrne (2012) argues that we can know what we see by (...)
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  43. added 2017-10-14
    Review of Radicalizing Enactivism by Hutto and Myin (2012).Michael Starks - 2017 - Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Michael Starks 3rd Ed. (2017).
    Probably the leading exponent of W’s ideas on the language games of inner and outer (the ‘Two Selves’ operation of our personality or intentionality or EP etc. ) the prolific Daniel Hutto’s (DH) approach is called ‘Radical Enactivism’ and is well explained in numerous recent books and papers. It is a development of or version of the Embodied Mind ideas now current and, cleansed of its jargon, it is a straightforward extension of W’s 2nd and 3rd period writings (though Hutto (...)
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  44. added 2017-09-25
    How Experienced Phenomena Relate to Things Themselves: Kant, Husserl, Hoche, and Reflexive Monism.Max Velmans - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):411-423.
    What we normally think of as the “physical world” is also the world as experienced, that is, a world of appearances. Given this, what is the reality behind the appearances, and what might its relation be to consciousness and to constructive processes in the mind? According to Kant, the thing itself that brings about and supports these appearances is unknowable and we can never gain any understanding of how it brings such appearances about. Reflexive monism argues the opposite: the thing (...)
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  45. added 2017-09-25
    We Are at Something of a Loss to Explain Our Observations and Wonder Whether Any Reader Can Enlighten Us. Alan Beaton, Paul Norman, Guy Richardson.Alan Beaton - 1996 - In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception. Ridgeview. pp. 25--373.
  46. added 2017-09-25
    Symposium: Does Our Knowledge or Perception of the Ego Admit of Being Analysed?A. Boutwood, H. W. Blunt & G. F. Stout - 1891 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (4):28 - 39.
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  47. added 2017-09-20
    Disjunktivismus. Die Auflösung des Dualismus von Anschauung und Welt.Hannes Ole Matthiessen - 2014 - In David Lauer & Christian Barth (eds.), Die Philosophie John McDowells. Münster: Mentis. pp. 51-66.
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  48. added 2017-09-15
    A Reflexive Science of Consciousness.Max Velmans - 1993 - In Gregory Bock & Joan Marsh (eds.), Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness: Ciba Foundation Symposium 174. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. pp. 81-99.
    Classical ways of viewing the relation of consciousness to the brain and physical world make it difficult to see how consciousness can be a subject of scientific study. In contrast to physical events, it seems to be private, subjective, and viewable only from a subject's first-person perspective. But much of psychology does investigate human experience, which suggests that classical ways of viewing these relations must be wrong. An alternative, Reflexive model is outlined along with it's consequences for methodology. Within this (...)
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  49. added 2017-08-28
    John McDowell, Mind and World.Monika Betzler - 1998 - Erkenntnis 48 (1):117-122.
  50. added 2017-08-04
    Many Molyneux Questions.Mohan Matthen & Jonathan Cohen - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):47-63.
    Molyneux's Question (MQ) concerns whether a newly sighted man would recognize/distinguish a sphere and a cube by vision, assuming he could previously do this by touch. We argue that (MQ) splits into questions about (a) shared representations of space in different perceptual systems, and about (b) shared ways of constructing higher dimensional spatiotemporal features from information about lower dimensional ones, most of the technical difficulty centring on (b). So understood, MQ resists any monolithic answer: everything depends on the constraints faced (...)
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