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1 — 50 / 97
  1. added 2019-11-11
    Surface Colour is Not a Perceptual Content.Damon Crockett - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):303-318.
    In this paper, I consider a view that explains colour experience by the independent representation of surface and illumination. This view implies that surface colour is a phenomenal perceptual content. I argue from facts of colour phenomenology to the conclusion that surface colour is not a phenomenal perceptual content. I then argue from results of surface-matching experiments to the conclusion that surface colour is neither a perceptual content of any kind nor any sort of computational output of the perceptual system. (...)
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  2. added 2019-09-26
    Olfactory Objects.Felipe Carvalho - 2014 - Disputatio 6 (38):45-66.
    The philosophy of perception has been mostly focused on vision, to the detriment of other modalities like audition or olfaction. In this paper I focus on olfaction and olfactory experience, and raise the following questions: is olfaction a perceptual-representational modality? If so, what does it represent? My goal in the paper is, firstly, to provide an affirmative answer to the first question, and secondly, to argue that olfaction represents odors in the form of olfactory objects, to which olfactory qualities are (...)
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  3. added 2019-05-20
    The Role of Spatial Appearances in Achieving Spatial-Geometric Perceptual Constancy.David J. Bennett - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):1-41.
    Long tradition in philosophy and in empirical psychology has it that the perceptual recovery of enduring objective size and shape proceeds through initial spatial appearance experiences—like the sensed changing visual field size of a receding car, or the shifting shape appearance of a coin as it rotates in depth. The present paper carefully frames and then critically examines such proposals. It turns out that these are contingent, empirical matters, requiring close examination of relevant research in perception science in order to (...)
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  4. added 2019-05-20
    Colour Constancy, Illumination, and Matching.Will Davies - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (4):540-562.
    Colour constancy is a foundational and yet puzzling phenomenon. Standard appearance invariantism is threatened by the psychophysical matching argument, which is taken to favour variantism. This argument, however, is inconclusive. The data at best support a pluralist view: colour constancy is sometimes variantist, sometimes invariantist. I add another potential explanation of these data, complex invariantism, which adopts an atypical six-dimensional model of colour appearance. Finally I prospect for a unifying conception of constancy among two neglected notions: discriminatory colour constancy and (...)
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  5. added 2019-05-20
    Colour Constancy and Fregean Representationalism.Boyd Millar - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):219-231.
    All representationalists maintain that there is a necessary connection between an experience’s phenomenal character and intentional content; but there is a disagreement amongst representationalists regarding the nature of those intentional contents that are necessarily connected to phenomenal character. Russellian representationalists maintain that the relevant contents are composed of objects and/or properties, while Fregean representationalists maintain that the relevant contents are composed of modes of presentation of objects and properties. According to Fregean representationalists such as David Chalmers and Brad Thompson, the (...)
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  6. added 2019-05-20
    Objective and Subjective Sides of Perception.Alan Gilchrist - 2012 - In Gary Hatfield & Sarah Allred (eds.), Visual Experience: Sensation, Cognition, and Constancy. Oxford University Press. pp. 105.
    Every perceptual experience has an objective and a subjective side. We see object size, independent of distance, but we also see that distant objects project smaller images. Early modern conceptions focused on local stimulation and thus on the subjective aspect. Helmholtz and Hering emphasized the objective aspect. Helmholtz split visual experience into two stages, with sensation representing the subjective side and perception, through cognitive processes, the objective side. Gestalt theory denied this dualism, rejecting both sensory and cognitive stages. Despite contrary (...)
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  7. added 2019-05-20
    On Perceptual Constancy.Gary Hatfield - 2009 - In Perception and Cognition: Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology. Clarendon Press. pp. 178-211.
    This chapter reconsiders the notion of perceptual constancy from the ground up. It distinguishes the phenomenology of perceptual constancy and stability from a functional characterization of perception as aiming at full constancy. Drawing on this distinction, we can attend to the phenomenology of constancy itself, and ask to what extent human perceivers attain constancy, as usually defined. Within this phenomenology, I distinguish phenomenal presentations of spatial features and color properties from categorizations, conceptualizations, and judgments that underlie verbal or other responses (...)
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  8. added 2019-05-20
    How Representationalism Can Account for the Phenomenal Significance of Illumination.René Jagnow - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):551-572.
    In this paper, I defend a representationalist account of the phenomenal character of color experiences. Representationalism, the thesis that phenomenal character supervenes on a certain kind of representational content, so-called phenomenal content, has been developed primarily in two different ways, as Russellian and Fregean representationalism. While the proponents of Russellian and Fregean representationalism differ with respect to what they take the contents of color experiences to be, they typically agree that colors are exhaustively characterized by the three dimensions of the (...)
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  9. added 2019-05-20
    On the Way Things Appear.Sydney Shoemaker - 2006 - In John Hawthorne (ed.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 461--480.
  10. added 2019-05-20
    The Dual Coding of Colour.Rainer Mausfeld - 2003 - In Rainer Mausfeld & Dieter Heyer (eds.), Colour Perception: Mind and the Physical World. Oxford University Press. pp. 381--430.
    The chapter argues from an ethology-inspired internalist perspective that ‘colour’ is not a homogeneous and autonomous attribute, but rather plays different roles in different conceptual forms underlying perception. It discusses empirical and theoretical evidence that indicates that core assumptions underlying orthodox conceptions are grossly inadequate. The assumptions pertain to the idea that colour is a kind of autonomous and unitary attribute. It is regarded as unitary or homogeneous by assuming that its core properties do not depend on the type of (...)
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  11. added 2019-05-20
    Conjoint Representations and the Mental Capacity for Multiple Simultaneous Perspectives.Rainer Mausfeld - 2003 - In Heiko Hecht, Robert Schwartz & Margaret Atherton (eds.), Looking Into Pictures. MIT Press. pp. 17--60.
  12. added 2019-05-20
    Color Perception: From Grassmann Codes to a Dual Code for Object and Illumination Colors.Rainer Mausfeld - 1998 - In W. Backhaus, R. Kliegl & J. Werner (eds.), Color Vision. Perspectives from Different Disciplines. De Gruyter.
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  13. added 2019-05-20
    The World of Colour.David Katz, R. B. Macleod & C. W. Fox - 1936 - Philosophy 11 (43):370-371.
    First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
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  14. added 2019-04-18
    Spatial Perception: The Perspectival Aspect of Perception.E. J. Green & Susanna Schellenberg - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (2):e12472.
    When we perceive an object, we perceive the object from a perspective. As a consequence of the perspectival nature of perception, when we perceive, say, a circular coin from different angles, there is a respect in which the coin looks circular throughout, but also a respect in which the coin's appearance changes. More generally, perception of shape and size properties has both a constant aspect—an aspect that remains stable across changes in perspective—and a perspectival aspect—an aspect that changes depending on (...)
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  15. added 2019-03-07
    A construção da experiência perceptiva: o que isso quer dizer?Gary Hatfield - 2017 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 21 (2):167-188.
    Abstract. Classical constructivists such as Rock and Hoffman contend that the processes of perception are intelligent and construct perceptual experience by going beyond the stimulus information or by creating a percept that deviates from the physical properties of the object. On these terms, Gibson’s theory of perception is anti-constructivist. After reviewing classical constructivism, this article maintains, first, that the phenomenology of visual space shows a deviation from physical spatial properties, by being contracted in depth, even under full cue conditions, a (...)
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  16. added 2019-03-07
    Visual Experience: Sensation, Cognition, and Constancy.Gary Hatfield & Sarah Allred (eds.) - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    Seeing happens effortlessly and yet is endlessly complex. Among the most fascinating aspects of visual perception is its stability and constancy. As we shift our gaze or move about the world, the light projected onto the retinas is constantly changing. Yet the surrounding objects appear stable in their properties. Psychologists have long been interested in the constancies. They have asked questions such as: How good is constancy? Is constancy a fact about how things look, or is it a product of (...)
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  17. added 2018-11-13
    Mindless Accuracy: On the Ubiquity of Content in Nature.Alex Morgan - 2018 - Synthese 195 (12):5403-5429.
    It is widely held in contemporary philosophy of mind that states with underived representational content are ipso facto psychological states. This view—the Content View—underlies a number of interesting philosophical projects, such as the attempt to pick out a psychological level of explanation, to demarcate genuinely psychological from non-psychological states, and to limn the class of states with phenomenal character. The most detailed and influential theories of underived representation in philosophy are the tracking theories developed by Fodor, Dretske, Millikan and others. (...)
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  18. added 2018-09-07
    Colour Layering and Colour Relationalism.Derek H. Brown - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (2):177-191.
    Colour Relationalism asserts that colours are non-intrinsic or inherently relational properties of objects, properties that depend not only on a target object but in addition on some relation that object bears to other objects. The most powerful argument for Relationalism infers the inherently relational character of colour from cases in which one’s experience of a colour contextually depends on one’s experience of other colours. Experienced colour layering—say looking at grass through a tinted window and experiencing opaque green through transparent grey—demands (...)
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  19. added 2018-09-07
    Colour Layering and Colour Constancy.Derek H. Brown - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.
    Loosely put, colour constancy for example occurs when you experience a partly shadowed wall to be uniformly coloured, or experience your favourite shirt to be the same colour both with and without sunglasses on. Controversy ensues when one seeks to interpret ‘experience’ in these contexts, for evidence of a constant colour may be indicative a constant colour in the objective world, a judgement that a constant colour would be present were things thus and so, et cetera. My primary aim is (...)
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  20. added 2018-07-24
    Perceptual Relativity.Christopher S. Hill - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):179-200.
    Visual experience is shaped by a number of factors that are independent of the external objects that we perceive—factors like lighting, angle of view, and the sensitivities of photoreceptors in the retina. This paper seeks to catalog, analyze, and explain the fluctuations in visual phenomenology that are due to such factors.
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  21. added 2018-05-21
    Naïve Realism: A Simple Approach.Justin Christy - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2167-2185.
    Naïve realism is often characterized, by its proponents and detractors alike, as the view that for a subject to undergo a perceptual experience is for her to stand in a simple two-place acquaintance relation toward an object. However, two of the leading defenders of naïve realism, John Campbell and Bill Brewer, have thought it necessary to complicate this picture, claiming that a third relatum is needed to account for various possible differences between distinct visual experiences of the same object. This, (...)
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  22. added 2018-04-07
    The Perspectival Character of Perception.Kevin J. Lande - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (4):187-214.
    You can perceive things, in many respects, as they really are. For example, you can correctly see a coin as circular from most angles. Nonetheless, your perception of the world is perspectival. The coin looks different when slanted than when head-on, and there is some respect in which the slanted coin looks similar to a head-on ellipse. Many hold that perception is perspectival because you perceive certain properties that correspond to the “looks” of things. I argue that this view is (...)
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  23. added 2018-03-30
    Are Perspectival Shapes Seen or Imagined? An Experimental Approach.John Schwenkler & Assaf Weksler - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (5):855-877.
    This paper proposes a novel experimental approach that would help to determine whether perspectival shapes, such as the elliptical profile of a tilted plate or coin, are part of perceptual experience. If they are part of perceptual experience, then it should be possible to identify these shapes simply by attending appropriately to them. Otherwise, in order to identify perspectival shapes they must first be constructed in the visual imagination. We propose that these accounts of perspectival identification can be tested by (...)
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  24. added 2018-03-10
    Constancy Mechanisms and the Normativity of Perception.Zed Adams & Chauncey Maher - 2017 - In Zed Adams & Jacob Browning (eds.), Giving a Damn: Essays in Dialogue with John Haugeland. Cambridge, MA: MIT Pres.
    In this essay, we draw on John Haugeland’s work in order to argue that Burge is wrong to think that exercises of perceptual constancy mechanisms suffice for perceptual representation. Although Haugeland did not live to read or respond to Burge’s Origins of Objectivity, we think that his work contains resources that can be developed into a critique of the very foundation of Burge’s approach. Specifically, we identify two related problems for Burge. First, if (what Burge calls) mere sensory responses are (...)
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  25. added 2017-12-22
    The Locus of Masking Shape-at-a-Slant.William Epstein & Gary Hatfield - 1978 - Perception and Psychophysics 24 (6):501-504.
    Twelve subjects provided shape and orientation judgments for a set of projectively equivalent, variously rotated rectangles under three viewing conditions—monoptic, dichoptic, and binocular—with and without the presence of a pattern mask. In the absence of the mask, partial constancy was exhibited under the first two conditions and near perfect constancy under the binocular condition. Orientation was discriminated. Presence of the mask produced projective shape matching and diminished orientation discrimination. It is argued that the site of masking was postchiasmal, and the (...)
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  26. added 2017-12-22
    Functional Equivalence of Masking and Cue Reduction in Perception of Shape at a Slant.William Epstein & Gary Hatfield - 1978 - Perception and Psychophysics 23 (2):137-144.
    In a backward masking paradigm Epstein, Hatfield, and Muise (1977) found that presentation of a frontoparallel pattern mask caused the perceived shape of elliptical figures which were rotated in depth to conform to a projective shape function. The current study extended the masking function by examining the effect of a mask which was partially or wholly cotemporal with the target. The study also assessed the functional equivalence of the masking treatment and the conventional treatment for minimizing depth information. Reports of (...)
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  27. added 2017-12-02
    Merleau-Ponty on Style as the Key to Perceptual Presence and Constancy.Samantha Matherne - 2017 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (4):693-727.
    In recent discussions of two important issues in the philosophy of perception, viz. the problems of perceptual presence and perceptual constancy, Merleau-Ponty’s ideas have been garnering attention thanks to the work of Sean Kelly and Alva Noë. Although both Kelly’s normative approach and Noë’s enactive approach highlight important aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s view, I argue that neither does full justice to it because they overlook the central role that style plays in his solution to these problems. I show that a closer (...)
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  28. added 2017-10-20
    On the Perception of Structure.E. J. Green - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):564-592.
  29. added 2017-09-17
    Principles of Gestalt Psychology.Kurt Koffka - 1935 - New York: Harcourt, Brace.
    A classical work on Gestalt psychology from a member of the "Berlin School." Discusses perception in relation to the environment, along with action, learning, memory, and socieity.
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  30. added 2017-09-12
    The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems.James Jerome Gibson - 1966 - Boston, USA: Houghton Mifflin.
    Describes the various senses as sensory systems that are attuned to the environment. Develops the notion of rich sensory information that specifies the distal environment. Includes a discussion of affordances.
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  31. added 2017-09-03
    Perceiving as Having Subjectively Conditioned Appearances.Gary Hatfield - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):149-178.
    This paper develops an appearance view of perception. When we see an object, we see it by having it appear some way to us. We see the object, not the appearance; but we see the object via the appearance. The appearance is subjectively conditioned: aspects of it depend on attributes of the subject. We mentally have the appearance and can reflect on it as an appearance. But in the primary instance, of veridical perception, it is the object that we focus (...)
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  32. added 2017-09-01
    Low-Level Properties in Perceptual Experience.Philip J. Walsh - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (5):682-703.
    Whether perceptual experience represents high-level properties like causation and natural-kind in virtue of its phenomenology is an open question in philosophy of mind. While the question of high-level properties has sparked disagreement, there is widespread agreement that the sensory phenomenology of perceptual experience presents us with low-level properties like shape and color. This paper argues that the relationship between the sensory character of experience and the low-level properties represented therein is more complex than most assume. Careful consideration of mundane examples, (...)
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  33. added 2017-06-15
    Hume's Table, Peacocke's Trees, the Tilted Penny and the Reversed Seeing-in Account.Robert Schroer - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (2):209-230.
    In seeing a tilted penny, we are experientially aware of both its circularity and another shape, which I dub ‘β-ellipticality’. Some claim that our experiential awareness of the intrinsic shapes/sizes of everyday objects depends upon our experiential awareness of β-shapes/β-sizes. In contrast, I maintain that β-property experiences are the result of what Richard Wollheim calls ‘seeing-in’, but run in reverse: instead of seeing a three-dimensional object in a flat surface, we see a flat surface in a three-dimensional object. Using this (...)
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  34. added 2017-02-27
    Action and Variation in Perception.Kristjan Laasik - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1364-1375.
    In her paper, ‘Action and Self-location in Perception’, Susanna Schellenberg argues that perceptual experience of an object's intrinsic spatial properties, such as its size and shape, requires a capacity to act. More specifically, Schellenberg argues that, to have a perceptual experience of an object's intrinsic spatial properties, a subject needs to have a certain practical conception of space, or a spatial know-how. That, in turn, requires self-locating representations, which locate the subject, relative to the perceptual object, as a perceiver and (...)
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  35. added 2017-02-14
    Constancy Research.Mark Wagner - 2012 - In Gary Hatfield & Sarah Allred (eds.), Visual Experience: Sensation, Cognition, and Constancy. Oxford University Press. pp. 63.
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  36. added 2017-02-13
    The Role of Adaptation in Color Constancy.Qasim Zaidi - 2005 - In Colin W. G. Clifford & Gillian Rhodes (eds.), Fitting the Mind to the World: Adaptation and After-Effects in High-Level Vision. Oxford University Press. pp. 2--103.
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  37. added 2017-02-13
    Effect of Stimulus Distance and Age on Shape Constancy.Kathleen A. Meneghini & H. W. Leibowitz - 1967 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 74 (2, Pt.1):241-248.
  38. added 2017-02-11
    Development of Two- and Three-Dimensional Size Constancy Under Restricted Cue Conditions.John J. Winters & David Baldwin - 1971 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 88 (1):113.
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  39. added 2017-02-11
    Form Constancy and the Perceptual Task: A Developmental Study.Dale W. Kaess - 1970 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 83 (3p1):465.
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  40. added 2017-02-11
    Familiarity and Shape Constancy.Harold W. Hake & Albert E. Myers - 1969 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 80 (2p1):205.
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  41. added 2017-02-11
    Distance Constancy.Olin W. Smith - 1958 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 55 (4):388.
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  42. added 2017-02-11
    Importance of Object Recognition in Size Constancy.Robert C. Bolles & Daniel E. Bailey - 1956 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 51 (3):222.
  43. added 2017-02-11
    Personal and Environmental Determinants of Perception in a Size Constancy Experiment.Jerome L. Singer - 1952 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 43 (6):420.
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  44. added 2017-02-11
    Shape Constancy: Dependence Upon Angle of Rotation; Individual Differences.William H. Lichte - 1952 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 43 (1):49.
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  45. added 2017-02-11
    Brightness-Constancy in Unrecognized Shadows.R. B. MacLeod - 1940 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 27 (1):1.
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  46. added 2017-02-11
    Visual Size Constancy as a Function of Convergence.T. G. Hermans - 1937 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 21 (2):145.
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  47. added 2017-02-11
    The Constancy of Gray with Constant and with Changing Illumination.C. O. Weber - 1933 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 16 (6):815.
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  48. added 2017-02-08
    Sensations and the Constancy Hypothesis.Durant Drake - 1929 - The Monist 39 (3):473-476.
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  49. added 2017-02-07
    Color Constancy, Complexity, and Counterfactual.Joshua Gert - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):669-690.
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  50. added 2017-02-03
    Perceptual Constancy: Why Things Look as They Do.Vincent Walsh & Janusz Kulikowski (eds.) - 1988 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book brings together experts from several diverse fields to present state of the art accounts of how the visual world enters two small holes in our heads ...
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