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  1. Constancy Mechanisms and the Normativity of Perception.Zed Adams & Chauncey Maher - 2017 - In Zed Adams & Jacob Browning (eds.), Giving a Damn: Essays in Dialogue with John Haugeland. Cambridge, MA: MIT Pres.
    In this essay, we draw on John Haugeland’s work in order to argue that Burge is wrong to think that exercises of perceptual constancy mechanisms suffice for perceptual representation. Although Haugeland did not live to read or respond to Burge’s Origins of Objectivity, we think that his work contains resources that can be developed into a critique of the very foundation of Burge’s approach. Specifically, we identify two related problems for Burge. First, if (what Burge calls) mere sensory responses are (...)
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  2. Perceptual Transparency and Perceptual Constancy.Jan Almäng - 2014 - Husserl Studies 30 (1):1-19.
    A central topic in discussions about qualia concerns their purported transparency. According to transparency theorists, an experience is transparent in the sense that the subject having the experience is aware of nothing but the intended object of the experience. In this paper this notion is criticized for failing to account for the dynamical aspects of perception. A key assumption in the paper is that perceptual content has a certain temporal depth, in the sense that each act of perception can present (...)
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  3. Simultaneous Color Constancy.Lawrence Arend & Adam Reeves - 1986 - J. Opt. Soc. Am. A 3 (10):1743-1751.
    Observers matched patches (simulated Munsell papers) in two simultaneously presented computer-controlled displays, a standard array presented under 6500-K illumination and a test array under 4000 or 10,000 K. Adaptation to the test illuminants was limited. The adjusted patch was surrounded by a single color (annulus display) or by many colors (Mondrian display). Observers either matched hue and saturation or made surface-color (paper) matches in which the subject was asked to make the test patch look as if it were cut from (...)
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  4. Seeing Shape: Shape Appearances and Shape Constancy.D. J. Bennett - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):487-518.
    A coin rotating back in depth in some sense presents a changing, elliptical shape. How are we to understand such (in this case) ‘appearances of ellipticality’? How is the experiential sense of such shifting shape appearances related to the experiential sense of enduring shape definitive of perceived shape constancy? Is the experiential recovery of surface shape based on the prior (perhaps more fundamental) recovery of point or element 3D spatial locations?—or is the perception of shape a largely independent perceptual achievement? (...)
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  5. Contesting Constancy in The Merchant of Venice.Jane Blanchard - 2009 - Renascence 61 (4):209-220.
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  6. Importance of Object Recognition in Size Constancy.Robert C. Bolles & Daniel E. Bailey - 1956 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 51 (3):222.
  7. Constancy, Categories and Bayes: A New Approach to Representational Theories of Color Constancy.Peter Bradley - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):601 – 627.
    Philosophers have long sought to explain perceptual constancy—the fact that objects appear to remain the same color, size and shape despite changes in the illumination condition, perspective and the relative distance—in terms of a mechanism that actively categorizes variable stimuli under the same pre-formed conceptual categories. Contemporary representationalists, on the other hand, explain perceptual constancy in terms of a modular mechanism that automatically discounts variation in the visual field to represent the stable properties of objects. In this paper I argue (...)
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  8. Relationship of Saccadic Suppression to Space Constancy.Bruce Bridgeman, A. H. C. Van der Heijden & Boris M. Velichkovsky - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (3):553-554.
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  9. Color Constancy: A Case for Multiple Levels and Paradigms.Michael H. Brill - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (4):658-658.
    Shepard claims that color constancy needs linear basis-function spectra, and infers the illuminant before removing its dependency. However, of the models of color constancy that have exact (and reasonable) spectral regimes, some do not need linear basis-function expansions of reflectance and illuminant spectra, some do not solve for the illuminant, and some estimate only partial object-reflectance information for single or multiple objects. [Shepard].
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  10. Spatial Content and Motoric Significance.Robert Briscoe - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):199-216.
    According to “actionism” (Noë 2010), perception constitutively depends on implicit knowledge of the way sensory stimulations vary as a consequence of the perceiver’s self-movement. My aim in this contribution is to develop an alternative conception of the role of action in perception present in the work of Gareth Evans using resources provided by Ruth Millikan’s biosemantic theory of mental representation.
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  11. Mental Imagery and the Varieties of Amodal Perception.Robert Briscoe - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):153-173.
    The problem of amodal perception is the problem of how we represent features of perceived objects that are occluded or otherwise hidden from us. Bence Nanay (2010) has recently proposed that we amodally perceive an object's occluded features by imaginatively projecting them into the relevant regions of visual egocentric space. In this paper, I argue that amodal perception is not a single, unitary capacity. Drawing appropriate distinctions reveals amodal perception to be characterized not only by mental imagery, as Nanay suggests, (...)
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  12. Multisensory Processing and Perceptual Consciousness: Part I.Robert Eamon Briscoe - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (2):121-133.
    Multisensory processing encompasses all of the various ways in which the presence of information in one sensory modality can adaptively influence the processing of information in a different modality. In Part I of this survey article, I begin by presenting a cartography of some of the more extensively investigated forms of multisensory processing, with a special focus on two distinct types of multisensory integration. I briefly discuss the conditions under which these different forms of multisensory processing occur as well as (...)
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  13. Conscious Vision in Action.Robert Briscoe & John Schwenkler - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (7):1435-1467.
    It is natural to assume that the fine-grained and highly accurate spatial information present in visual experience is often used to guide our bodily actions. Yet this assumption has been challenged by proponents of the Two Visual Systems Hypothesis , according to which visuomotor programming is the responsibility of a “zombie” processing stream whose sources of bottom-up spatial information are entirely non-conscious . In many formulations of TVSH, the role of conscious vision in action is limited to “recognizing objects, selecting (...)
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  14. Dynamic Size Constancy.Leonard Brosgole, Daniel G. McNichol, John Doyle & Ann Neylon - 1976 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 7 (1):12-14.
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  15. A Study in Deflated Acquaintance Knowledge: Sense-Datum Theory and Perceptual Constancy.Derek H. Brown - 2016 - In Sorin Costreie (ed.), Early Analytic Philosophy: New Perspectives on the Tradition. Springer. pp. 99-125.
    We perceive the objective world through a subjective perceptual veil. Various perceived properties, particularly “secondary qualities” like colours and tastes, are mind-dependent. Although mind-dependent, our knowledge of many facts about the perceptual veil is immediate and secure. These are well-known facets of sense-datum theory. My aim is to carve out a conception of sense-datum theory that does not require the immediate and secure knowledge of a wealth of facts about experienced sense-data (§1). Such a theory is of value on its (...)
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  16. Colour Layering and Colour Relationalism.Derek H. Brown - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (2):177-191.
    Colour Relationalism asserts that colours are non-intrinsic or inherently relational properties of objects, properties that depend not only on a target object but in addition on some relation that object bears to other objects. The most powerful argument for Relationalism infers the inherently relational character of colour from cases in which one’s experience of a colour contextually depends on one’s experience of other colours. Experienced colour layering—say looking at grass through a tinted window and experiencing opaque green through transparent grey—demands (...)
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  17. Colour Layering and Colour Constancy.Derek H. Brown - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.
    Loosely put, colour constancy for example occurs when you experience a partly shadowed wall to be uniformly coloured, or experience your favourite shirt to be the same colour both with and without sunglasses on. Controversy ensues when one seeks to interpret ‘experience’ in these contexts, for evidence of a constant colour may be indicative a constant colour in the objective world, a judgement that a constant colour would be present were things thus and so, et cetera. My primary aim is (...)
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  18. Thing Constancy as Measured by Correlation Coefficients.E. Brunswik - 1940 - Psychological Review 47 (1):69-78.
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  19. Constancy and Change.John Bunker - 1933 - Thought: Fordham University Quarterly 8 (2):244-244.
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  20. Inverse Gnomonic Projection of Plane Regions.F. Thomas Burke - 2011 - Wolfram Demonstrations Project.
    This demonstration shows inverse gnomonic projections of flat surface areas lying in a horizontal plane tangent to the projection sphere. It shows how optical surface area varies regularly as the distance of the respective surface area from the eye varies, decreasing as the latter increases. According to ecological psychology, this kind of regularity or "invariant" is what sensory systems are designed to detect. Attunement to such invariants in the interactions of eyes and terrains make possible the perception of distance and (...)
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  21. Size-Constancy Judgments and Perceptual Compromise.V. R. Carlson - 1962 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 63 (1):68.
  22. Naïve Realism: A Simple Approach.Justin Christy - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-19.
    Naïve realism is often characterized, by its proponents and detractors alike, as the view that for a subject to undergo a perceptual experience is for her to stand in a simple two-place acquaintance relation toward an object. However, two of the leading defenders of naïve realism, John Campbell and Bill Brewer, have thought it necessary to complicate this picture, claiming that a third relatum is needed to account for various possible differences between distinct visual experiences of the same object. This, (...)
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  23. Mood Constancy in Mixed Inferences.D. S. Clarke - 1970 - Analysis 30 (3):100 - 103.
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  24. Perceptual Constancy.Jonathan Cohen - 2015 - In Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception. pp. 621-639.
    Students of perception have long known that perceptual constancy is an important aspect of our perceptual interaction with the world. Here is a simple example of the phenomenon concerning color perception: there is some ordinary sense in which an unpainted ceramic coffee cup made from a uniform material looks a uniform color when it is viewed under uneven illumination, even though the light reflected by the shaded regions to our eyes is quite different from the light reflected by the unshaded (...)
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  25. Colour Constancy as Counterfactual.Jonathan Cohen - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):61 – 92.
    There is nothing in this World constant but Inconstancy. [Swift 1711: 258] In this paper I argue that two standard characterizations of colour constancy are inadequate to the phenomenon. This inadequacy matters, since, I contend, philosophical appeals to colour constancy as a way of motivating illumination-independent conceptions of colour turn crucially on the shortcomings of these characterizations. After critically reviewing the standard characterizations, I provide a novel counterfactualist understanding of colour constancy, argue that it avoids difficulties of its traditional rivals, (...)
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  26. A Note on the Influence of Praise and Reproof Upon Size Constancy.R. M. Cruikshank & E. Feigenbaum - 1941 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 29 (6):524.
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  27. Sensations and the Constancy Hypothesis.Durant Drake - 1929 - The Monist 39 (3):473-476.
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  28. Functional Equivalence of Masking and Cue Reduction in Perception of Shape at a Slant.William Epstein & Gary Hatfield - 1978 - Perception and Psychophysics 23 (2):137-144.
    In a backward masking paradigm Epstein, Hatfield, and Muise (1977) found that presentation of a frontoparallel pattern mask caused the perceived shape of elliptical figures which were rotated in depth to conform to a projective shape function. The current study extended the masking function by examining the effect of a mask which was partially or wholly cotemporal with the target. The study also assessed the functional equivalence of the masking treatment and the conventional treatment for minimizing depth information. Reports of (...)
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  29. The Locus of Masking Shape-at-a-Slant.William Epstein & Gary Hatfield - 1978 - Perception and Psychophysics 24 (6):501-504.
    Twelve subjects provided shape and orientation judgments for a set of projectively equivalent, variously rotated rectangles under three viewing conditions—monoptic, dichoptic, and binocular—with and without the presence of a pattern mask. In the absence of the mask, partial constancy was exhibited under the first two conditions and near perfect constancy under the binocular condition. Orientation was discriminated. Presence of the mask produced projective shape matching and diminished orientation discrimination. It is argued that the site of masking was postchiasmal, and the (...)
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  30. Perceived Shape at a Slant as a Function of Processing Time and Processing Load.William Epstein, Gary Hatfield & Gerard Muise - 1977 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 3:473–483.
    Shape and slant judgments of rotated or frontoparallel ellipses were elicited from three groups of 10 subjects. A masking stimulus was introduced to control processing time. Backward masking trials were presented with interstimulus intervals of 0, 25, and 50 msec, Reduction of processing time altered shape judgments in the direction of projective shape and slant judgments in the direction of frontoparallelness. This finding is consistent with the shape-slant invariance hypothesis. In order to study the effects of processing load, one group (...)
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  31. An Inquiry Into the Concepts of 'Reliability', 'Intersubjectivity' and 'Constancy'.Johan Galtung - 1959 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 2 (1-4):107 – 125.
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  32. Are Color Experiences Representational?Todd Ganson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):1-20.
    The dominant view among philosophers of perception is that color experiences, like color judgments, are essentially representational: as part of their very nature color experiences possess representational contents which are either accurate or inaccurate. My starting point in assessing this view is Sydney Shoemaker’s familiar account of color perception. After providing a sympathetic reconstruction of his account, I show how plausible assumptions at the heart of Shoemaker’s theory make trouble for his claim that color experiences represent the colors of things. (...)
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  33. Burge's Defense of Perceptual Content.Todd Ganson, Ben Bronner & Alex Kerr - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):556-573.
    A central question, if not the central question, of philosophy of perception is whether sensory states have a nature similar to thoughts about the world, whether they are essentially representational. According to the content view, at least some of our sensory states are, at their core, representations with contents that are either accurate or inaccurate. Tyler Burge’s Origins of Objectivity is the most sustained and sophisticated defense of the content view to date. His defense of the view is problematic in (...)
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  34. Color Constancy, Complexity, and Counterfactual.Joshua Gert - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):669-690.
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  35. The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems.James Jerome Gibson - 1966 - Boston, USA: Houghton Mifflin.
    Describes the various senses as sensory systems that are attuned to the environment. Develops the notion of rich sensory information that specifies the distal environment. Includes a discussion of affordances.
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  36. On the Perception of Structure.E. J. Green - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Many of the objects that we perceive have an important characteristic: When they move, they change shape. For instance, when you watch a person walk across a room, her body constantly deforms. I suggest that we exercise a type of perceptual constancy in response to changes of this sort, which I call structure constancy. In this paper I offer an account of structure constancy. I introduce the notion of compositional structure, and propose that structure constancy involves perceptually representing an object (...)
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  37. Spatial Perception: The Perspectival Aspect of Perception.E. J. Green & Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - Philosophy Compass:1-17.
    When we perceive an object, we perceive the object from a per- spective. As a consequence of the perspectival nature of perception, when we perceive, say, a circular coin from different angles, there is a respect in which the coin looks circular throughout, but also a respect in which the coin's appearance changes. More generally, perception of shape and size properties has both a constant aspect—an aspect that remains stable across changes in perspective—and a perspectival aspect—an aspect that changes depending (...)
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  38. The Constancy of Kantian Time: Reflections on Chronobiology.Pete A. Y. Gunter - 1985 - Philosophical Topics 13 (2):37-42.
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  39. Familiarity and Shape Constancy.Harold W. Hake & Albert E. Myers - 1969 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 80 (2p1):205.
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  40. Modes of Constancy and Truth, or the Contrary, in Christian Moral Teaching.Garth Hallett - 1982 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 56:95-101.
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  41. Perceiving as Having Subjectively Conditioned Appearances.Gary Hatfield - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):149-178.
    This paper develops an appearance view of perception. When we see an object, we see it by having it appear some way to us. We see the object, not the appearance; but we see the object via the appearance. The appearance is subjectively conditioned: aspects of it depend on attributes of the subject. We mentally have the appearance and can reflect on it as an appearance. But in the primary instance, of veridical perception, it is the object that we focus (...)
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  42. Psychological Experiments and Phenomenal Experience in Size and Shape Constancy.Gary Hatfield - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (5):940-953.
    Some experiments in perceptual psychology measure perceivers’ phenomenal experiences of objects versus their cognitive assessments of object properties. Analyzing such experiments, this article responds to Pizlo’s claim that much work on shape constancy before 1985 confused problems of shape ambiguity with problems of shape constancy. Pizlo fails to grasp the logic of experimental designs directed toward phenomenal aspects of shape constancy. In the domain of size perception, Granrud’s studies of size constancy in children and adults distinguish phenomenal from cognitive factors.
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  43. Phenomenal and Cognitive Factors in Spatial Perception.Gary Hatfield - 2012 - In Gary Hatfield & Sarah Allred (eds.), Visual Experience: Sensation, Cognition, and Constancy. Oxford University Press. pp. 35.
    This chapter provides an overview of the phenomenology of size perception and the use of instructions to tease apart phenomenal and cognitive aspects. It develops his own recent proposals concerning the geometry of visual space. The chapter proposes that visual space is contracted along the lines of sight. This contraction would explain the apparent convergence of railway tracks, but without invoking a “proximal mode” experience. Parallel railway tracks receding into the distance project converging lines onto the retinas. A true proximal (...)
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  44. Philosophy of Perception and the Phenomenology of Visual Space.Gary Hatfield - 2011 - Philosophic Exchange 42 (1):31-66.
    In the philosophy of perception, direct realism has come into vogue. Philosophical authors assert and assume that what their readers want, and what anyone should want, is some form of direct realism. There are disagreements over precisely what form this direct realism should take. The majority of positions in favor now offer a direct realism in which objects and their material or physical properties constitute the contents of perception, either because we have an immediate or intuitive acquaintance with those objects (...)
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  45. Perception and Cognition: Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology.Gary Hatfield - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    Representation and content in some (actual) theories of perception -- Representation in perception and cognition : task analysis, psychological functions, and rule instantiation -- Perception as unconscious inference -- Representation and constraints : the inverse problem and the structure of visual space -- On perceptual constancy -- Getting objects for free (or not) : the philosophy and psychology of object perception -- Color perception and neural encoding : does metameric matching entail a loss of information? -- Objectivity and subjectivity revisited (...)
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  46. Representation and Constraints: The Inverse Problem and the Structure of Visual Space.Gary Hatfield - 2003 - Acta Psychologica 114:355-378.
    Visual space can be distinguished from physical space. The first is found in visual experience, while the second is defined independently of perception. Theorists have wondered about the relation between the two. Some investigators have concluded that visual space is non-Euclidean, and that it does not have a single metric structure. Here it is argued that visual space exhibits contraction in all three dimensions with increasing distance from the observer, that experienced features of this contraction are not the same as (...)
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  47. Visual Experience: Sensation, Cognition, and Constancy.Gary Hatfield & Sarah Allred (eds.) - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    Seeing happens effortlessly and yet is endlessly complex. Among the most fascinating aspects of visual perception is its stability and constancy. As we shift our gaze or move about the world, the light projected onto the retinas is constantly changing. Yet the surrounding objects appear stable in their properties. Psychologists have long been interested in the constancies. They have asked questions such as: How good is constancy? Is constancy a fact about how things look, or is it a product of (...)
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  48. Epilogue: Advances and Open Questions.Gary Hatfield & William Epstein - 2012 - In Gary Hatfield & Sarah Allred (eds.), Visual Experience: Sensation, Cognition, and Constancy. Oxford University Press. pp. 232-241.
    The term “perceptual constancy” was used by the Gestalt theorists in the early part of the twentieth century (e.g., Koffka 1935, 34, 90) to refer to the tendency of perception to remain invariant over changes of viewing distance, viewing angle, and conditions of illumination. This tendency toward constancy is remarkable: every change in the viewing distance, position, and illumination is necessarily accompanied by a change in the local proximal (retinal) stimulation, and yet perception remains relatively stable. The tendency toward perceptual (...)
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  49. The Sensory Core and the Medieval Foundations of Early Modern Perceptual Theory.Gary Hatfield & William Epstein - 1979 - Isis: A Journal of the History of Science 70 (3):363-384.
    This article seeks the origin, in the theories of Ibn al-Haytham (Alhazen), Descartes, and Berkeley, of two-stage theories of spatial perception, which hold that visual perception involves both an immediate representation of the proximal stimulus in a two-dimensional ‘‘sensory core’’ and also a subsequent perception of the three dimensional world. The works of Ibn al-Haytham, Descartes, and Berkeley already frame the major theoretical options that guided visual theory into the twentieth century. The field of visual perception was the first area (...)
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  50. Visual Size Constancy as a Function of Convergence.T. G. Hermans - 1937 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 21 (2):145.
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