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Summary

How should we explain why perceptual experience provides us with evidence? Dogmatism and evidential internalism treat conscious mental states as explanatorily basic and posits a particular rule for justification, namely, that if it perceptually seems that p, then one has prima facie justification for p (Pollock 1974, Feldman and Conee 1985, Pryor 2000, Huemer 2007, among others). The knowledge-first view treats knowledge as explanatorily basic and analyzes justification in terms of a deficiency of knowledge (McDowell 1982, Williamson 2000, Millar 2008, Nagel 2013, Byrne 2014 among others). Reliabilism treats the reliability of the perceptual or cognitive system as explanatorily basic and analyzes evidence and justification as a product of this reliable system—be it in virtue of a reliable indicator or a reliable process (Goldman 1979, 1986, Lyons 2009 among others). By contrast, capacity views treat capacities as explanatorily basic and analyze evidence, justification, and knowledge as a product of the capacities employed. Among capacity views there is a distinction to be drawn between normative capacity views, on which mental capacities are understood as virtues or in other normative ways (Sosa 1991, 2006, 2007, Greco 2001, 2010, Bergmann 2006), and capacity views that forego normative terms (Burge 2003, Graham 2011, Schellenberg 2013, 2014). So on the first cluster of views, conscious mental states are explanatorily basic, on the second cluster knowledge, on the third reliability, and on the fourth capacities. These options are neither exclusive nor exhaustive. One might think that more than one of these four elements are explanatorily basic, or one might think that what is explanatorily basic is something else entirely.

What evidence does perceptual experience provide us with? To answer this question lets first distinguish between phenomenal evidence and factive evidence. We can understand phenomenal evidence as determined by how our environment sensorily seems to us when we are experiencing. We can understand factive perceptual evidence as necessarily determined by the environment to which we are perceptually related such that the evidence is guaranteed to be an accurate guide to the environment.Standard internalist views have it that we have the very same phenomenal evidence when we perceive and when we hallucinate. Standard knowledge-first views have it that when we perceive, we have factive evidence; when we hallucinate we have no evidence provided directly through experience: When we hallucinate we have only introspective evidence. Capacity views can go either way on the question of whether we have the very same or different evidence when we perceive or when we hallucinate. One option is to argue that when we perceive we have phenomenal and factive evidence; when we hallucinate, we have only phenomenal evidence. 

Key works

For dogmatism and evidential internalism, see Pollock 1974, Feldman and Conee 1985, Pryor 2000, Huemer 2007, among others. For knowledge-first views, see McDowell 1982, Williamson 2000, Millar 2008, Nagel 2013, Byrne 2014 among others. For reliabilism, see Goldman 1979, 1986, Lyons 2009 among others. For normative capacity views, see Sosa 1991, 2006, 2007, Greco 2001, 2010, Bergmann 2006. For non-normative capacity views, see Burge 2003, Graham 2011, Schellenberg 2013. 

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78 found
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1 — 50 / 78
  1. added 2019-01-04
    Metacognition in Multisensory Perception.Ophelia Deroy, Charles Spence & Uta Noppeney - 2016 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 20 (10):736-747.
    Are two senses more certain than one? Subjective confidence, as an instance of metacognition, has mostly been investigated on a sense-by-sense basis. Yet perception is most frequently multisensory. Here we consider the implications and relevance of understanding confidence at the multisensory level.
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  2. added 2018-12-15
    Crenças justificadas não-inferencialmente e o mito do dado.Eros Moreira De Carvalho - 2009 - Princípios 16 (25):231-263.
    The aim of this paper is to present an explanation of how the perceptualexperience fulfills its role of justification. The idea is that the perceptual experience justifiesnon-inferentially empirical beliefs in an internalist sense of justification. Against Sellars, I want to say that S relied on his experience to believe that the world is so and so. To discussthis question, I choose the arguments of Brewer and McDowell. Both argue that theexperience can justify beliefs, provided it has a conceptual content. But (...)
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  3. added 2018-11-21
    The Acquaintance Inference with 'Seem'-Reports.Rachel Etta Rudolph - forthcoming - Proceedings of the Chicago Linguistics Society.
    Some assertions give rise to the acquaintance inference: the inference that the speaker is acquainted with some individual. Discussion of the acquaintance inference has previously focused on assertions about aesthetic matters and personal tastes (e.g. 'The cake is tasty'), but it also arises with reports about how things seem (e.g. 'Tom seems like he's cooking'). 'Seem'-reports give rise to puzzling acquaintance behavior, with no analogue in the previously-discussed domains. In particular, these reports call for a distinction between the specific acquaintance (...)
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  4. added 2018-11-12
    Perceptual Knowledge, Discrimination, and Closure.Santiago Echeverri - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.
    Carter and Pritchard (2016) and Pritchard (2010, 2012, 2016) have tried to reconcile the intuition that perceptual knowledge requires only limited discriminatory abilities with the closure principle. To this end, they have introduced two theoretical innovations: a contrast between two ways of introducing error-possibilities and a distinction between discriminating and favoring evidence. I argue that their solution faces the “sufficiency problem”: it is unclear whether the evidence that is normally available to adult humans is sufficient to retain knowledge of the (...)
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  5. added 2018-11-11
    Neither/Nor.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Casey Doyle, Joe Milburn & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism. Routledge.
    Abstract: On one formulation, epistemological disjunctivism is the view that our perceptual beliefs constitute knowledge when they are based on reasons that provide them with factive support. Some would argue that it is impossible to understand how perceptual knowledge is possible unless we assume that we have such reasons to support our perceptual beliefs. Some would argue that it is impossible to understand how perceptual experience could furnish us with these reasons unless we assume that the traditional view of experience (...)
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  6. added 2018-10-05
    A Probabilistic Epistemology of Perceptual Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):1-25.
    There are three well-known models of how to account for perceptual belief within a probabilistic framework: (a) a Cartesian model; (b) a model advocated by Timothy Williamson; and (c) a model advocated by Richard Jeffrey. Each of these models faces a problem—in effect, the problem of accounting for the defeasibility of perceptual justification and perceptual knowledge. It is argued here that the best way of responding to this the best way of responding to this problem effectively vindicates the Cartesian model. (...)
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  7. added 2018-08-02
    Counterfactuals and the 'Grue-Speaker'.Alfred Schramm - manuscript
    Freitag (2015) and Schramm (2014) have proposed different, although converging, solutions of Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction. Answering their proposals, Dorst (2016 and 2018) has used the fictitious character of a ‘grue-speaker’ as his principal device for criticizing counterfactual-based treatments of the Riddle. In this paper, I argue that Dorst’s arguments fail: On the observation of no other than green emeralds, the ‘grue-speaker’ cannot use the symmetry between the ‘green’- and ‘grue’-languages for claiming ‘grue’- instead of ‘green’-evidence, and the counterfactuals (...)
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  8. added 2018-07-22
    Amodal Completion and Knowledge.Grace Helton & Bence Nanay - forthcoming - Analysis:any063.
    Amodal completion is the representation of occluded parts of perceived objects. We argue for the following three claims: First, at least some amodal completion-involved experiences can ground knowledge about the occluded portions of perceived objects. Second, at least some instances of amodal completion-grounded knowledge are not sensitive, i.e., it is not the case that in the nearest worlds in which the relevant claim is false, that claim is not believed true. Third, at least some instances of amodal completion grounded knowledge (...)
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  9. added 2018-05-29
    Are Perceptual Reasons the Objects of Perception?J. J. Cunningham - 2018 - In Johan Gersel, Rasmus Thybo Jensen, Morten S. Thaning & Søren Overgaard (eds.), In the Light of Experience: New Essays on Reasons and Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This paper begins with a Davidsonian puzzle in the epistemology of perception and introduces two solutions to that puzzle: the Truth-Maker View (TMV) and the Content Model. The paper goes on to elaborate (TMV), elements of which can be found in the work of Kalderon (2011) and Brewer (2011). The central tenant of (TMV) is the claim that one's reason for one's perceptual belief should, in all cases, be identified with some item one perceives which makes the proposition believed true. (...)
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  10. added 2018-04-15
    A Threefold Defense of Perceptual Dogmatism.H. R. Gentry - 2017 - Undergraduate Honors Theses.
    This paper attempts to defend perceptual dogmatism (PD), a theory of epistemic justification, from three objections: (1) the subject's perspective objection (SPO), (2) the problem of easy justification, and (3) the objection from cognitive penetration. The SPO charges PD with allowing for a subject to be justified in his belief that P even when P is accidentally true from the subject's perspective. The problem of easy justification claims that intuitively, PD is too permissive in granting justification for beliefs about the (...)
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  11. added 2018-02-17
    Perceptual Evidence and Information.Tommaso Piazza - 2010 - Knowledge, Technology & Policy 23 (1-2):75-95.
    Quite recently, Luciano Floridi has put forward the fascinating suggestion that knowledge should be analyzed as special kind of information, in particular as accounted information. As I will try tentatively to show, one important consequence of Floridi’s proposal is that the notion of justification, and of evidence, should play no role in a philosophical understanding of knowledge. In this paper, I shall suggest one potential difficulty with which Floridi’s proposal might be consequently afflicted, yet accept the fundamental suggestion that traditional (...)
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  12. added 2018-02-17
    Solidity and Impediment.Martin F. Fricke & Paul Snowdon - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):173-178.
  13. added 2018-02-17
    Intersubjective Science.Max Velmans - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):299-306.
    The study of consciousness in modern science is hampered by deeply ingrained, dualist presuppositions about the nature of consciousness. In particular, conscious experiences are thought to be private and subjective, contrasting with physical phenomena which are public and objective. In the present article, I argue that all observed phenomena are, in a sense, private to a given observer, although there are some events to which there is public access. Phenomena can be objective in the sense of intersubjective, investigators can be (...)
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  14. added 2017-09-29
    A Brief Note on How Phenomenal Objects Relate to Objects Themselves.Max Velmans - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (11-12):199-202.
    This brief note corrects some basic errors in Meijsing's JCS paper on 'The Whereabouts of Pictorial Space', concerning the status of phenomenal objects in the reflexive model of perception. In particular I clarify the precise sense in which a phenomenal object relates to the object itself in visual perception.
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  15. added 2017-09-25
    We Are at Something of a Loss to Explain Our Observations and Wonder Whether Any Reader Can Enlighten Us. Alan Beaton, Paul Norman, Guy Richardson.Alan Beaton - 1996 - In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception. Ridgeview. pp. 25--373.
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  16. added 2017-09-18
    Heterophenomenology Vs. Critical Phenomenology.Max Velmans - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):221-230.
    Following an on-line dialogue with Dennett (Velmans, 2001) this paper examines the similarities and differences between heterophenomenology (HP) and critical phenomenology (CP), two competing accounts of the way that conscious phenomenology should be, and normally is incorporated into psychology and related sciences. Dennett’s heterophenomenology includes subjective reports of conscious experiences, but according to Dennett, first person conscious phenomenena in the form of “qualia” such as hardness, redness, itchiness etc. have no real existence. Consequently, subjective reports about such qualia should be (...)
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  17. added 2017-09-11
    Esperienza religiosa e pratiche doxastiche.Daniele Bertini - 2017 - Hermeneutica 2017:211-236.
    My paper argues for the claim that religious experience may provide evidential reasons in support of religious beliefs. I name such a claim epistemic view of mystical experience (EM). In the first section, I sketch two approaches to EM. Swinburne, Alston and Plantinga (among others) develop a notable defense of EM. On the contrary, seminal works by Feuerbach and Bultmann offer the opposite account. I briefly show how to resist to the criticism of EM. In light of such line of (...)
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  18. added 2017-08-28
    Empiricism and Experience : Two Problems.Jordi Valor Abad - 2009 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2):323 – 328.
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  19. added 2017-02-23
    Experience and Justification: Revisiting McDowell’s Empiricism.Daniel Enrique Kalpokas - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):715-738.
    In this paper I try to defend McDowell’s empiricism from a certain objection made by Davidson, Stroud and Glüer. The objection states that experiences cannot be reasons because they are—as McDowell conceives them—inert. I argue that, even though there is something correct in the objection, that is not sufficient for rejecting the epistemological character that McDowell attributes to experiences. My strategy consists basically in showing that experiences involve a constitutive attitude of acceptance of their contents.
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  20. added 2016-12-05
    Perceiving Necessity.Catherine Legg & James Franklin - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3).
    In many diagrams one seems to perceive necessity – one sees not only that something is so, but that it must be so. That conflicts with a certain empiricism largely taken for granted in contemporary philosophy, which believes perception is not capable of such feats. The reason for this belief is often thought well-summarized in Hume's maxim: ‘there are no necessary connections between distinct existences’. It is also thought that even if there were such necessities, perception is too passive or (...)
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  21. added 2016-10-26
    On Whether We Can See Intentions.Shannon Spaulding - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).
    Direct Perception is the view that we can see others' mental states, i.e. that we perceive others' mental states with the same immediacy and directness that we perceive ordinary objects in the world. I evaluate Direct Perception by considering whether we can see intentions, a particularly promising candidate for Direct Perception. I argue that the view equivocates on the notion of intention. Disambiguating the Direct Perception claim reveals a troubling dilemma for the view: either it is banal or highly implausible.
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  22. added 2016-09-26
    Perceptual Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):969-990.
    A very natural view about perceptual knowledge is articulated, one on which perceptual knowledge is closely related to perceptual discrimination, and which fits well with a relevant alternatives account of knowledge. It is shown that this kind of proposal faces a problem, and various options for resolving this difficulty are explored. In light of this discussion, a two-tiered relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge is offered which avoids the closure problem. It is further shown how this proposal can: accommodate our (...)
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  23. added 2016-09-01
    Experiences, Seemings, and Perceptual Justification.Michael Pace - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):226-241.
    Several philosophers have distinguished between three distinct mental states that play a role in visual recognition: experiences, propositional seemings, and beliefs. I clarify and offer some reasons for drawing this three-fold distinction, and I consider its epistemological implications. Some philosophers have held that propositional seemings always confer prima facie justification, regardless of a particular seeming's relation to experience. I add to criticisms of this view in the literature by arguing that it fails to solve a version of the ‘problem of (...)
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  24. added 2016-08-18
    How to Undercut Radical Skepticism.Santiago Echeverri - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1299-1321.
    Radical skepticism relies on the hypothesis that one could be completely cut off from the external world. In this paper, I argue that this hypothesis can be rationally motivated by means of a conceivability argument. Subsequently, I submit that this conceivability argument does not furnish a good reason to believe that one could be completely cut off from the external world. To this end, I show that we cannot adequately conceive scenarios that verify the radical skeptical hypothesis. Attempts to do (...)
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  25. added 2016-06-22
    Epistemic Conditions on “Ought”: E=K as a Case Study.Cameron Boult - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (2):223-244.
    In The Norm of Belief, John Gibbons claims that there is a “natural reaction” to the general idea that one can be normatively required to Ø when that requirement is in some sense outside of one’s first person perspective or inaccessible to one. The reaction amounts to the claim that this is not possible. Whether this is a natural or intuitive idea or not, it is difficult to articulate exactly why we might think it is correct. To do so, we (...)
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  26. added 2016-04-04
    Review of Anil Gupta, Empiricism and Experience[REVIEW]Alan Millar - 2007 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (2).
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  27. added 2016-03-14
    Knowledge and the Internal Revisited.John McDowell - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):97-105.
    In “Knowledge and the Social Articulation of the Space of Reasons,” Robert Brandom reads my “Knowledge and the Internal” as sketching a position that, when properly elaborated, opens into his own social-perspectival conception of knowledge . But this depends on taking me to hold that there cannot be justification for a belief sufficient to exclude the possibility that the belief is false. And that is exactly what I argued against in “Knowledge and the Internal.” Seeing that P constitutes falsehood-excluding justification (...)
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  28. added 2016-03-11
    Chapter 22. Perceptual Knowledge.Richard Foley - 2012 - In When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. pp. 106-109.
  29. added 2016-03-11
    Review: Anil Gupta: Empiricism and Experience. [REVIEW]R. Gaskin - 2008 - Mind 117 (465):187-191.
  30. added 2016-03-11
    Is There a Problem About Appearances?Quentin Gibson - 1966 - Philosophical Quarterly 16 (October):319-328.
  31. added 2015-12-16
    Scepticism and Perceptual Justification.Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.) - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    One of the hardest problems in the history of Western philosophy has been to explain whether and how experience can provide knowledge about the objective world outside the experiencer's mind. A prominent brand of scepticism has precisely denied that experience can provide such knowledge. How, for instance can I know that my experiences are not produced in me by a powerful demon? This volume, originating from the research project on Basic Knowledge recently concluded at the Northern Institute of Philosophy, presents (...)
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  32. added 2015-10-30
    Evidence and its Limits.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Conor McHugh Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press.
    On a standard view about reasons, evidence, and justification, there is justification for you to believe all and only what your evidence supports and the reasons that determine whether there is justification to believe are all just pieces of evidence. This view is mistaken about two things. It is mistaken about the rational role of evidence. It is also mistaken about the rational role of reasons. To show this, I present two basis problems for the standard view and argue that (...)
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  33. added 2015-09-22
    The Epistemological Objection.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism. Springer Verlag.
    In this chapter, I rebut three incarnations of the epistemological objection put forth by McDowell (Mind and World, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1994a) and Brewer (Perception and Reason, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999). According to them, only the assumption that perceptual experiences have conceptual content can account for the fact that perception plays a crucial role in justifying belief about the external world. I begin by providing some context to the objections, viz. by presenting the myth of the given that (...)
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  34. added 2015-09-22
    Modest Nonconceptualism: Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - Springer.
    The author defends nonconceptualism, the claim that perceptual experience is nonconceptual and has nonconceptual content. Continuing the heated and complex debate surrounding this topic over the past two decades, she offers a sustained defense of a novel version of the view, Modest Nonconceptualism, and provides a systematic overview of some of the central controversies in the debate. -/- An explication of the notion of nonconceptual content and a distinction between nonconceptualist views of different strengths starts off the volume, then the (...)
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  35. added 2015-09-07
    Reasons and Perception.Declan Smithies - forthcoming - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter is organized around four central questions about the role of reasons in the epistemology of perception. The 'whether?' question: does perception provide us with reasons for belief about the external world? The 'how?' question: how does perception provide us with reasons for belief about the external world? The 'when?' question: when does perception provide us with reasons for belief about the external world? The 'what?' question: what are the reasons that perception provides us with for belief about the (...)
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  36. added 2015-08-27
    Introduction: Perceptual Evidence.James Genone - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):873-873.
  37. added 2015-08-13
    Perceptual Justification and Assertively Representing the World.Jochen Briesen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2239-2259.
    This paper argues that there is a problem for the justificatory significance of perceptions that has been overlooked thus far. Assuming that perceptual experiences are propositional attitudes and that only propositional attitudes which assertively represent the world can function as justifiers, the problem consists in specifying what it means for a propositional attitude to assertively represent the world without losing the justificatory significance of perceptions—a challenge that is harder to meet than might first be thought. That there is such a (...)
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  38. added 2015-07-02
    Seeming Evidence.Earl Conee - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oup Usa. pp. 52.
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  39. added 2015-07-02
    Evidence, Inference and Perceptions.Norman Arthur Marshall - 1970 - Dissertation, University of Oregon
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  40. added 2015-05-25
    Is Epistemological Disjunctivism the Holy Grail?Guido Melchior - 2014 - Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. 86-2012 90:335-346.
    Pritchard argues that epistemological disjunctivism seems plainly false at first sight, but if it were right, it would represent the “holy grail of epistemology” (1), a view that allows us “to have our cake and eat it too” (3). This prospect motivates Pritchard to develop and defend an account that prima facie might seem simply false. It is disputable whether ED really seems plainly false at first sight or whether this intuition is based on a particular philosophical tradition. However, in (...)
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  41. added 2015-05-16
    Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence Defended: Replies to McGrath, Pautz, and Neta.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):929-946.
    This paper defends and develops the capacity view against insightful critiques from Matt McGrath, Adam Pautz, and Ram Neta. In response to Matt McGrath, I show why capacities are essential and cannot simply be replaced with representational content. I argue moreover, that the asymmetry between the employment of perceptual capacities in the good and the bad case is sufficient to account for the epistemic force of perceptual states yielded by the employment of such capacities. In response to Adam Pautz, I (...)
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  42. added 2015-04-28
    Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):875-896.
    Perceptions guide our actions and provide us with evidence of the world around us. Illusions and hallucinations can mislead us: they may prompt as to act in ways that do not mesh with the world around us and they may lead us to form false beliefs about that world. The capacity view provides an account of evidence that does justice to these two facts. It shows in virtue of what illusions and hallucinations mislead us and prompt us to act. Moreover, (...)
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  43. added 2015-04-22
    Phenomenal Conservatism and the Subject’s Perspective Objection.Logan Paul Gage - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (1):43-58.
    For some years now, Michael Bergmann has urged a dilemma against internalist theories of epistemic justification. For reasons I explain below, some epistemologists have thought that Michael Huemer’s principle of Phenomenal Conservatism can split the horns of Bergmann’s dilemma. Bergmann has recently argued, however, that PC must inevitably, like all other internalist views, fall prey to his dilemma. In this paper, I explain the nature of Bergmann’s dilemma and his reasons for thinking that PC cannot escape it before arguing that (...)
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  44. added 2015-03-25
    E = K and Perceptual Knowledge.Tony Brueckner - 2009 - In Patrick Greenough & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
  45. added 2015-03-16
    The Given in Perceptual Experience.Erhan Demircioglu - 2015 - Synthese 192 (8).
    How are we to account for the epistemic contribution of our perceptual experiences to the reasonableness of our perceptual beliefs? It is well known that a conception heavily influenced by Cartesian thinking has it that experiences do not enable the experiencing subject to have direct epistemic contact with the external world; rather, they are regarded as openness to a kind of private inner realm that is interposed between the subject and the world. It turns out that if one wants to (...)
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  46. added 2015-02-20
    Knowledge and Awareness.Clayton Littlejohn - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):596-603.
    This paper takes a critical look at the idea that knowledge involves reflective access to reasons that provide rational support. After distinguishing between different kinds of awareness, I argue that the kind of awareness involved in awareness of reasons is awareness of something general rather than awareness of something that instances some generality. Such awareness involves the exercise of conceptual capacities and just is knowledge. Since such awareness is knowledge, this kind of awareness cannot play any interesting role in a (...)
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  47. added 2015-01-05
    How and Why Knowledge is First.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In A. Carter, E. Gordon & B. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First. Oxford University Press.
    A defense of the idea that knowledge is first in the sense that there is nothing prior to knowledge that puts reasons or evidence in your possession. Includes a critical discussion of the idea that perception or perceptual experience might provide reasons and a defense of a knowledge-first approach to justified belief.
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  48. added 2014-11-12
    Epistemic Disjunctivism and the Evidential Problem.José Zalabardo - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):615-627.
    I argue that Epistemic Disjunctivism doesn’t sustain a successful anti-sceptical strategy. I contend, in particular, that the treatment of scepticism that Duncan Pritchard puts forward on behalf of Epistemic Disjunctivism is unsatisfactory.
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  49. added 2014-09-03
    Pritchard's Reasons.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Research.
    My contribution to the author meets critics discussion of Pritchard's _Epistemological Disjunctivism_. In this paper, I examine some of the possible motivations for epistemological disjunctivism and look at some of the costs associated with the view. While Pritchard's view seems to be that our visual beliefs constitute knowledge because they're based on reasons, I argue that the claim that visual beliefs are based on reasons or evidence hasn't been sufficiently motivated. In the end I suggest that we'll get all the (...)
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  50. added 2014-08-15
    Experiential Evidence?Jack C. Lyons - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1053-1079.
    Much of the intuitive appeal of evidentialism results from conflating two importantly different conceptions of evidence. This is most clear in the case of perceptual justification, where experience is able to provide evidence in one sense of the term, although not in the sense that the evidentialist requires. I argue this, in part, by relying on a reading of the Sellarsian dilemma that differs from the version standardly encountered in contemporary epistemology, one that is aimed initially at the epistemology of (...)
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