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Summary

How should we explain why perceptual experience provides us with evidence? Dogmatism and evidential internalism treat conscious mental states as explanatorily basic and posits a particular rule for justification, namely, that if it perceptually seems that p, then one has prima facie justification for p (Pollock 1974, Feldman and Conee 1985, Pryor 2000, Huemer 2007, among others). The knowledge-first view treats knowledge as explanatorily basic and analyzes justification in terms of a deficiency of knowledge (McDowell 1982, Williamson 2000, Millar 2008, Nagel 2013, Byrne 2014 among others). Reliabilism treats the reliability of the perceptual or cognitive system as explanatorily basic and analyzes evidence and justification as a product of this reliable system—be it in virtue of a reliable indicator or a reliable process (Goldman 1979, 1986, Lyons 2009 among others). By contrast, capacity views treat capacities as explanatorily basic and analyze evidence, justification, and knowledge as a product of the capacities employed. Among capacity views there is a distinction to be drawn between normative capacity views, on which mental capacities are understood as virtues or in other normative ways (Sosa 1991, 2006, 2007, Greco 2001, 2010, Bergmann 2006), and capacity views that forego normative terms (Burge 2003, Graham 2011, Schellenberg 2013, 2014). So on the first cluster of views, conscious mental states are explanatorily basic, on the second cluster knowledge, on the third reliability, and on the fourth capacities. These options are neither exclusive nor exhaustive. One might think that more than one of these four elements are explanatorily basic, or one might think that what is explanatorily basic is something else entirely.

What evidence does perceptual experience provide us with? To answer this question lets first distinguish between phenomenal evidence and factive evidence. We can understand phenomenal evidence as determined by how our environment sensorily seems to us when we are experiencing. We can understand factive perceptual evidence as necessarily determined by the environment to which we are perceptually related such that the evidence is guaranteed to be an accurate guide to the environment.Standard internalist views have it that we have the very same phenomenal evidence when we perceive and when we hallucinate. Standard knowledge-first views have it that when we perceive, we have factive evidence; when we hallucinate we have no evidence provided directly through experience: When we hallucinate we have only introspective evidence. Capacity views can go either way on the question of whether we have the very same or different evidence when we perceive or when we hallucinate. One option is to argue that when we perceive we have phenomenal and factive evidence; when we hallucinate, we have only phenomenal evidence. 

Key works

For dogmatism and evidential internalism, see Pollock 1974, Feldman and Conee 1985, Pryor 2000, Huemer 2007, among others. For knowledge-first views, see McDowell 1982, Williamson 2000, Millar 2008, Nagel 2013, Byrne 2014 among others. For reliabilism, see Goldman 1979, 1986, Lyons 2009 among others. For normative capacity views, see Sosa 1991, 2006, 2007, Greco 2001, 2010, Bergmann 2006. For non-normative capacity views, see Burge 2003, Graham 2011, Schellenberg 2013. 

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89 found
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1 — 50 / 89
  1. added 2020-05-18
    Conventionalism in Reid’s ‘Geometry of Visibles’.Edward Slowik - 2003 - Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 34:467-489.
    The role of conventions in the formulation of Thomas Reid’s theory of the geometry of vision, which he calls the “geometry of visibles”, is the subject of this investigation. In particular, we will examine the work of N. Daniels and R. Angell who have alleged that, respectively, Reid’s “geometry of visibles” and the geometry of the visual field are non-Euclidean. As will be demonstrated, however, the construction of any geometry of vision is subject to a choice of conventions regarding the (...)
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  2. added 2020-04-18
    A Defense of Liberalism in the Epistemology of Perception.Megan Feeney - 2019 - Dissertation, Rutgers University
  3. added 2020-03-17
    Spin Control Comment on John McDowell's "Mind and World".Alex Byrne - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:261-273.
  4. added 2020-03-13
    The Relationship Between Empirical Knowledge and Experiences.Mika Suojanen - 2014 - AL-Mukhatabat (10):102-112.
    Experience has been described as a mental state with properties that it represents and possesses. Nevertheless, the existence of experience as a mental entity has been questioned by eliminative materialism, which states that everything that goes on in the world is physical, and thus there are no mental states. Experience can be analysed as a dependent entity known introspectively by living subjects. However, when experience is necessary in order to be connected with the environment and informed of its facts, it (...)
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  5. added 2019-12-22
    Perceptual Input Is Not Conceptual Content.Justin Halberda - 2019 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 23 (8):636-638.
    Can we represent number approximately? A seductive reductionist notion is that participants in number tasks rely on continuous extent cues (e.g.,area) and therefore that the representations underlying performance lack numerical content. I suggest that this notion embraces a misconception: that perceptual input determines conceptual content.
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  6. added 2019-12-13
    Reason and Experience in Buddhist Epistemology.Christian Coseru - 2013 - In Steven Emmanuel (ed.), A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy. West Sussex, UKL: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.. pp. 241–255.
    Among the key factors that play a crucial role in the acquisition of knowledge, Buddhist philosophers list (i) the testimony of sense experience, (ii) introspective awareness (iii) inferences drawn from these directs modes of acquaintance, and (iv) some version of coherentism, so as guarantee that truth claims remains consistent across a diverse philosophical corpus. This paper argues that when Buddhists employ reason, they do so primarily in order to advance a range of empirical and introspective claims. As a result, reasoning, (...)
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  7. added 2019-12-09
    Perceiving Reality: Consciousness, Intentionality, and Cognition in Buddhist Philosophy.Christian Coseru - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    What turns the continuous flow of experience into perceptually distinct objects? Can our verbal descriptions unambiguously capture what it is like to see, hear, or feel? How might we reason about the testimony that perception alone discloses? Christian Coseru proposes a rigorous and highly original way to answer these questions by developing a framework for understanding perception as a mode of apprehension that is intentionally constituted, pragmatically oriented, and causally effective. By engaging with recent discussions in phenomenology and analytic philosophy (...)
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  8. added 2019-08-25
    Putnam’s Last Papers: Hilary Putnam: Naturalism, Realism, and Normativity, Edited by Mario De Caro. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016, 248 Pp, $51.50 HB. [REVIEW]Panu Raatikainen - 2019 - Metascience 28 (3):487-489.
  9. added 2019-08-08
    Experience as Evidence.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton M. Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.
    This chapter explores whether and when experience can be evidence. It argues that experiences can be evidence, and that this claim is compatible with just about any epistemological theory. It evaluates the most promising argument for the conclusion that certain experiences (e.g., seeming to see) are always evidence for believing what the experiences represent. While the argument is very promising, one premise needs further defense. The argument also depends on a certain connection between reasonable belief and the first person perspective.
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  10. added 2019-06-06
    Heterophenomenology Versus Critical Phenomenology.Max Velmans - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1):221-230.
    Following an on-line dialogue with Dennett (Velmans, 2001) this paper examines the similarities and differences between heterophenomenology (HP) and critical phenomenology (CP), two competing accounts of the way that conscious phenomenology should be, and normally is incorporated into psychology and related sciences. Dennett’s heterophenomenology includes subjective reports of conscious experiences, but according to Dennett, first person conscious phenomena in the form of “qualia” such as hardness, redness, itchiness etc. have no real existence. Consequently, subjective reports about such qualia should be (...)
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  11. added 2019-04-24
    Plenty of Room Left for the Dogmatist.Thomas Raleigh - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):66-76.
    Barnett provides an interesting new challenge for Dogmatist accounts of perceptual justification. The challenge is that such accounts, by accepting that a perceptual experience can provide a distinctive kind of boost to one’s credences, would lead to a form of diachronic irrationality in cases where one has already learnt in advance that one will have such an experience. I show that this challenge rests on a misleading feature of using the 0–1 interval to express probabilities and show that if we (...)
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  12. added 2019-04-01
    Scepticism and Perceptual Justification.Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.) - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    How can experience provide knowledge, or even justified belief, about the objective world outside our minds? This volume presents original essays by prominent contemporary epistemologists, who show how philosophical progress on foundational issues can improve our understanding of, and suggest a solution to, this famous sceptical question.
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  13. added 2019-03-01
    Idealism Operationalized: How Peirce’s Pragmatism Can Help Explicate and Motivate the Possibly Surprising Idea of Reality as Representational.Catherine Legg - 2017 - In Kathleen Hull & Richard Kenneth Atkins (eds.), Peirce on Perception and Reasoning: From Icons to Logic. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 40-53.
    Neopragmatism has been accused of having ‘an experience problem’. This paper begins by outlining Hume's understanding of perception according to which ideas are copies of impressions thought to constitute a direct confrontation with reality. This understanding is contrasted with Peirce's theory of perception according to which percepts give rise to perceptual judgments which do not copy but index the percept (just as a weather-cock indicates the direction of the wind). Percept and perceptual judgment thereby mutually inform and correct one another, (...)
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  14. added 2019-02-27
    Sympathy in Perception. [REVIEW]Catherine Legg & Jack Alan Reynolds - 2018 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2018 (0809).
  15. added 2019-01-18
    Looks and Perceptual Justification.Matthew McGrath - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):110-133.
    Imagine I hold up a Granny Smith apple for all to see. You would thereby gain justified beliefs that it was green, that it was apple, and that it is a Granny Smith apple. Under classical foundationalism, such simple visual beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning your experience. Under dogmatism, some or all of these beliefs are justified immediately by your experience and not by reasons you possess. This paper argues for what I call the looks (...)
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  16. added 2019-01-04
    Metacognition in Multisensory Perception.Ophelia Deroy, Charles Spence & Uta Noppeney - 2016 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 20 (10):736-747.
    Are two senses more certain than one? Subjective confidence, as an instance of metacognition, has mostly been investigated on a sense-by-sense basis. Yet perception is most frequently multisensory. Here we consider the implications and relevance of understanding confidence at the multisensory level.
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  17. added 2018-12-15
    Crenças justificadas não-inferencialmente e o mito do dado.Eros Moreira De Carvalho - 2009 - Princípios 16 (25):231-263.
    The aim of this paper is to present an explanation of how the perceptualexperience fulfills its role of justification. The idea is that the perceptual experience justifiesnon-inferentially empirical beliefs in an internalist sense of justification. Against Sellars, I want to say that S relied on his experience to believe that the world is so and so. To discussthis question, I choose the arguments of Brewer and McDowell. Both argue that theexperience can justify beliefs, provided it has a conceptual content. But (...)
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  18. added 2018-11-21
    The Acquaintance Inference with 'Seem'-Reports.Rachel Etta Rudolph - 2019 - Proceedings of the Chicago Linguistics Society 54:451-460.
    Some assertions give rise to the acquaintance inference: the inference that the speaker is acquainted with some individual. Discussion of the acquaintance inference has previously focused on assertions about aesthetic matters and personal tastes (e.g. 'The cake is tasty'), but it also arises with reports about how things seem (e.g. 'Tom seems like he's cooking'). 'Seem'-reports give rise to puzzling acquaintance behavior, with no analogue in the previously-discussed domains. In particular, these reports call for a distinction between the specific acquaintance (...)
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  19. added 2018-11-12
    Perceptual Knowledge, Discrimination, and Closure.Santiago Echeverri - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.
    Carter and Pritchard (2016) and Pritchard (2010, 2012, 2016) have tried to reconcile the intuition that perceptual knowledge requires only limited discriminatory abilities with the closure principle. To this end, they have introduced two theoretical innovations: a contrast between two ways of introducing error-possibilities and a distinction between discriminating and favoring evidence. I argue that their solution faces the “sufficiency problem”: it is unclear whether the evidence that is normally available to adult humans is sufficient to retain knowledge of the (...)
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  20. added 2018-11-11
    Neither/Nor.Clayton Littlejohn - 2019 - In Casey Doyle, Joe Milburn & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism. Routledge.
    Abstract: On one formulation, epistemological disjunctivism is the view that our perceptual beliefs constitute knowledge when they are based on reasons that provide them with factive support. Some would argue that it is impossible to understand how perceptual knowledge is possible unless we assume that we have such reasons to support our perceptual beliefs. Some would argue that it is impossible to understand how perceptual experience could furnish us with these reasons unless we assume that the traditional view of experience (...)
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  21. added 2018-10-05
    A Probabilistic Epistemology of Perceptual Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):1-25.
    There are three well-known models of how to account for perceptual belief within a probabilistic framework: (a) a Cartesian model; (b) a model advocated by Timothy Williamson; and (c) a model advocated by Richard Jeffrey. Each of these models faces a problem—in effect, the problem of accounting for the defeasibility of perceptual justification and perceptual knowledge. It is argued here that the best way of responding to this the best way of responding to this problem effectively vindicates the Cartesian model. (...)
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  22. added 2018-08-02
    Counterfactuals and the 'Grue-Speaker'.Alfred Schramm - manuscript
    Freitag (2015) and Schramm (2014) have proposed different, although converging, solutions of Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction. Answering their proposals, Dorst (2016 and 2018) has used the fictitious character of a ‘grue-speaker’ as his principal device for criticizing counterfactual-based treatments of the Riddle. In this paper, I argue that Dorst’s arguments fail: On the observation of no other than green emeralds, the ‘grue-speaker’ cannot use the symmetry between the ‘green’- and ‘grue’-languages for claiming ‘grue’- instead of ‘green’-evidence, and the counterfactuals (...)
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  23. added 2018-07-22
    Amodal Completion and Knowledge.Grace Helton & Bence Nanay - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):415-423.
    Amodal completion is the representation of occluded parts of perceived objects. We argue for the following three claims: First, at least some amodal completion-involved experiences can ground knowledge about the occluded portions of perceived objects. Second, at least some instances of amodal completion-grounded knowledge are not sensitive, that is, it is not the case that in the nearest worlds in which the relevant claim is false, that claim is not believed true. Third, at least some instances of amodal completion-grounded knowledge (...)
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  24. added 2018-05-29
    Are Perceptual Reasons the Objects of Perception?J. J. Cunningham - 2018 - In Johan Gersel, Rasmus Thybo Jensen, Morten S. Thaning & Søren Overgaard (eds.), In the Light of Experience: New Essays on Perception and Reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This paper begins with a Davidsonian puzzle in the epistemology of perception and introduces two solutions to that puzzle: the Truth-Maker View (TMV) and the Content Model. The paper goes on to elaborate (TMV), elements of which can be found in the work of Kalderon (2011) and Brewer (2011). The central tenant of (TMV) is the claim that one's reason for one's perceptual belief should, in all cases, be identified with some item one perceives which makes the proposition believed true. (...)
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  25. added 2018-02-17
    Perceptual Evidence and Information.Tommaso Piazza - 2010 - Knowledge, Technology & Policy 23 (1-2):75-95.
    Quite recently, Luciano Floridi has put forward the fascinating suggestion that knowledge should be analyzed as special kind of information, in particular as accounted information. As I will try tentatively to show, one important consequence of Floridi’s proposal is that the notion of justification, and of evidence, should play no role in a philosophical understanding of knowledge. In this paper, I shall suggest one potential difficulty with which Floridi’s proposal might be consequently afflicted, yet accept the fundamental suggestion that traditional (...)
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  26. added 2018-02-17
    Solidity and Impediment.Martin F. Fricke & Paul Snowdon - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):173-178.
  27. added 2018-02-17
    Intersubjective Science.Max Velmans - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):299-306.
    The study of consciousness in modern science is hampered by deeply ingrained, dualist presuppositions about the nature of consciousness. In particular, conscious experiences are thought to be private and subjective, contrasting with physical phenomena which are public and objective. In the present article, I argue that all observed phenomena are, in a sense, private to a given observer, although there are some events to which there is public access. Phenomena can be objective in the sense of intersubjective, investigators can be (...)
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  28. added 2017-09-29
    A Brief Note on How Phenomenal Objects Relate to Objects Themselves.Max Velmans - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (11-12):199-202.
    This brief note corrects some basic errors in Meijsing's JCS paper on 'The Whereabouts of Pictorial Space', concerning the status of phenomenal objects in the reflexive model of perception. In particular I clarify the precise sense in which a phenomenal object relates to the object itself in visual perception.
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  29. added 2017-09-25
    We Are at Something of a Loss to Explain Our Observations and Wonder Whether Any Reader Can Enlighten Us. Alan Beaton, Paul Norman, Guy Richardson.Alan Beaton - 1996 - In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception. Ridgeview. pp. 25--373.
  30. added 2017-09-11
    Esperienza religiosa e pratiche doxastiche.Daniele Bertini - 2017 - Hermeneutica 2017:211-236.
    My paper argues for the claim that religious experience may provide evidential reasons in support of religious beliefs. I name such a claim epistemic view of mystical experience (EM). In the first section, I sketch two approaches to EM. Swinburne, Alston and Plantinga (among others) develop a notable defense of EM. On the contrary, seminal works by Feuerbach and Bultmann offer the opposite account. I briefly show how to resist to the criticism of EM. In light of such line of (...)
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  31. added 2017-08-28
    Empiricism and Experience : Two Problems.Jordi Valor Abad - 2009 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2):323 – 328.
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  32. added 2017-02-23
    Experience and Justification: Revisiting McDowell’s Empiricism.Daniel Kalpokas - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):715-738.
    In this paper I try to defend McDowell’s empiricism from a certain objection made by Davidson, Stroud and Glüer. The objection states that experiences cannot be reasons because they are—as McDowell conceives them—inert. I argue that, even though there is something correct in the objection, that is not sufficient for rejecting the epistemological character that McDowell attributes to experiences. My strategy consists basically in showing that experiences involve a constitutive attitude of acceptance of their contents.
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  33. added 2016-12-05
    Perceiving Necessity.Catherine Legg & James Franklin - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3).
    In many diagrams one seems to perceive necessity – one sees not only that something is so, but that it must be so. That conflicts with a certain empiricism largely taken for granted in contemporary philosophy, which believes perception is not capable of such feats. The reason for this belief is often thought well-summarized in Hume's maxim: ‘there are no necessary connections between distinct existences’. It is also thought that even if there were such necessities, perception is too passive or (...)
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  34. added 2016-10-26
    On Whether We Can See Intentions.Shannon Spaulding - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).
    Direct Perception is the view that we can see others' mental states, i.e. that we perceive others' mental states with the same immediacy and directness that we perceive ordinary objects in the world. I evaluate Direct Perception by considering whether we can see intentions, a particularly promising candidate for Direct Perception. I argue that the view equivocates on the notion of intention. Disambiguating the Direct Perception claim reveals a troubling dilemma for the view: either it is banal or highly implausible.
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  35. added 2016-09-26
    Perceptual Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):969-990.
    A very natural view about perceptual knowledge is articulated, one on which perceptual knowledge is closely related to perceptual discrimination, and which fits well with a relevant alternatives account of knowledge. It is shown that this kind of proposal faces a problem, and various options for resolving this difficulty are explored. In light of this discussion, a two-tiered relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge is offered which avoids the closure problem. It is further shown how this proposal can: accommodate our (...)
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  36. added 2016-09-01
    Experiences, Seemings, and Perceptual Justification.Michael Pace - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):226-241.
    Several philosophers have distinguished between three distinct mental states that play a role in visual recognition: experiences, propositional seemings, and beliefs. I clarify and offer some reasons for drawing this three-fold distinction, and I consider its epistemological implications. Some philosophers have held that propositional seemings always confer prima facie justification, regardless of a particular seeming's relation to experience. I add to criticisms of this view in the literature by arguing that it fails to solve a version of the ‘problem of (...)
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  37. added 2016-08-18
    How to Undercut Radical Skepticism.Santiago Echeverri - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1299-1321.
    Radical skepticism relies on the hypothesis that one could be completely cut off from the external world. In this paper, I argue that this hypothesis can be rationally motivated by means of a conceivability argument. Subsequently, I submit that this conceivability argument does not furnish a good reason to believe that one could be completely cut off from the external world. To this end, I show that we cannot adequately conceive scenarios that verify the radical skeptical hypothesis. Attempts to do (...)
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  38. added 2016-06-22
    Epistemic Conditions on “Ought”: E=K as a Case Study.Cameron Boult - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (2):223-244.
    In The Norm of Belief, John Gibbons claims that there is a “natural reaction” to the general idea that one can be normatively required to Ø when that requirement is in some sense outside of one’s first person perspective or inaccessible to one. The reaction amounts to the claim that this is not possible. Whether this is a natural or intuitive idea or not, it is difficult to articulate exactly why we might think it is correct. To do so, we (...)
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  39. added 2016-04-04
    Review of Anil Gupta, Empiricism and Experience[REVIEW]Alan Millar - 2007 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (2).
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  40. added 2016-03-14
    Knowledge and the Internal Revisited.John McDowell - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):97-105.
    In “Knowledge and the Social Articulation of the Space of Reasons,” Robert Brandom reads my “Knowledge and the Internal” as sketching a position that, when properly elaborated, opens into his own social-perspectival conception of knowledge . But this depends on taking me to hold that there cannot be justification for a belief sufficient to exclude the possibility that the belief is false. And that is exactly what I argued against in “Knowledge and the Internal.” Seeing that P constitutes falsehood-excluding justification (...)
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  41. added 2016-03-11
    Chapter 22. Perceptual Knowledge.Richard Foley - 2012 - In When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. pp. 106-109.
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  42. added 2016-03-11
    Review: Anil Gupta: Empiricism and Experience. [REVIEW]R. Gaskin - 2008 - Mind 117 (465):187-191.
  43. added 2016-03-11
    Is There a Problem About Appearances?Quentin Gibson - 1966 - Philosophical Quarterly 16 (October):319-328.
  44. added 2015-10-30
    Evidence and its Limits.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Conor McHugh Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press.
    On a standard view about reasons, evidence, and justification, there is justification for you to believe all and only what your evidence supports and the reasons that determine whether there is justification to believe are all just pieces of evidence. This view is mistaken about two things. It is mistaken about the rational role of evidence. It is also mistaken about the rational role of reasons. To show this, I present two basis problems for the standard view and argue that (...)
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  45. added 2015-09-22
    Modest Nonconceptualism: Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - Springer.
    The author defends nonconceptualism, the claim that perceptual experience is nonconceptual and has nonconceptual content. Continuing the heated and complex debate surrounding this topic over the past two decades, she offers a sustained defense of a novel version of the view, Modest Nonconceptualism, and provides a systematic overview of some of the central controversies in the debate. -/- An explication of the notion of nonconceptual content and a distinction between nonconceptualist views of different strengths starts off the volume, then the (...)
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  46. added 2015-09-22
    The Epistemological Objection.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism. Springer Verlag.
    In this chapter, I rebut three incarnations of the epistemological objection put forth by McDowell (Mind and World, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1994a) and Brewer (Perception and Reason, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999). According to them, only the assumption that perceptual experiences have conceptual content can account for the fact that perception plays a crucial role in justifying belief about the external world. I begin by providing some context to the objections, viz. by presenting the myth of the given that (...)
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  47. added 2015-09-07
    Reasons and Perception.Declan Smithies - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press. pp. 631-661.
    This chapter is organized around four central questions about the role of reasons in the epistemology of perception. The 'whether?' question: does perception provide us with reasons for belief about the external world? The 'how?' question: how does perception provide us with reasons for belief about the external world? The 'when?' question: when does perception provide us with reasons for belief about the external world? The 'what?' question: what are the reasons that perception provides us with for belief about the (...)
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  48. added 2015-08-27
    Introduction: Perceptual Evidence.James Genone - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):873-873.
  49. added 2015-08-13
    Perceptual Justification and Assertively Representing the World.Jochen Briesen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2239-2259.
    This paper argues that there is a problem for the justificatory significance of perceptions that has been overlooked thus far. Assuming that perceptual experiences are propositional attitudes and that only propositional attitudes which assertively represent the world can function as justifiers, the problem consists in specifying what it means for a propositional attitude to assertively represent the world without losing the justificatory significance of perceptions—a challenge that is harder to meet than might first be thought. That there is such a (...)
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  50. added 2015-07-02
    Seeming Evidence.Earl Conee - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oup Usa. pp. 52.
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