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Summary What is the role of perception in providing rational support for beliefs? Can perceptual states or events provide any rational support at all? According to a traditional foundationalism, perceptual states all by themselves were rationally inert, and only introspective beliefs in which the subjects self-ascribes such states played a role in the justifying external-world beliefs. One of the main issues is whether perception can ever provide rational support for external worlds beliefs, without the help of introspective beliefs. If they can, then several further questions arise. Which beliefs do perceptual states provide justification for? What is the relationship between the beliefs that a perceptual state can justify, and the contents of the perceptual state? Are perceptual states ever sufficient to provide justification, or do they need help from other factors?  Which features of the perceptual states are relevant to providing justification? What is the role of concepts in perceptual justification? How is the internal structure of perceptual states related to their rational role?  Does consciousness have any special rational role? What difference does it make for the rational role of perception whether disjunctivism, sense-datum theory, intentionalism, or other theories are correct about the nature of perceptual experience? Are the distinctions between perceptual states, events, and processes important for understanding the rational role of perception?
Key works Two elaborate but classic discussions of perceptual justification are Sellars 1956 and McDowell 1994McDowell 1994 argues against Davidson 1986, who in turn locates perception within coherentist theory that seems to exclude it from playing any rational role.  Pryor 2000 , Huemer 2006, and Campbell 2002 argue for a central role of conscious experience in providing justification. Goldman 1986 lays the basis for reliabilist theories of justification and their application to perception. McDowell 1982 set off discussion of whether hallucinations and non-hallucinations can have the same rational role.
Introductions Siegel & Silins 2015  provides an overview of the topic. The first chapter of McDowell 1994 sets up the problem in terms of an opposition between foundationalism and coherentism. The opening pages of both McDowell 1994 and Gupta 2006 make it seem counterintuitive to deny perceptual states any rational role.
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  1. Empirical Beliefs, Perceptual Experiences and Reasons.André J. Abath - 2008 - Manuscrito 31 (2):543-571.
    John McDowell and Bill Brewer famously defend the view that one can only have empirical beliefs if one’s perceptual experiences serve as reasons for such beliefs, where reasons are understood in terms of subject’s reasons. In this paper I show, first, that it is a consequence of the adoption of such a requirement for one to have empirical beliefs that children as old as 3 years of age have to considered as not having genuine empirical beliefs at all. But we (...)
  2. Perception: The Justification of Perceptual Beliefs.Malcolm Acock - 1977 - Dissertation, The University of British Columbia (Canada)
  3. Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules, and the Problem of the External World * By JACK C. LYONS.Keith Allen - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):391-393.
  4. Perception, Non-Propositional Content and the Justification of Perceptual Judgments.Jan Almäng - 2014 - Metaphysica 15 (1):1-23.
    It is often argued that for a perceptual experience to be able to justify perceptual judgments, the perceptual experience must have a propositional content. For, it is claimed, only propositions can bear logical relations such as implication to each other. In this paper, this claim is challenged. It is argued that whereas perceptions and judgments both have intentional content, their contents have different structures. Perceptual content does not have a propositional structure. Perceptions and judgments can nevertheless have the same cognitive (...)
  5. Perceptual Knowledge.William Alston - 1999 - In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 223--42.
  6. The Reliability of Sense Perception.William P. Alston - 1993 - Cornell University Press.
    Chapter INTRODUCTION i. The Problem Why suppose that sense perception is, by and large, an accurate source of information about the physical environment? ...
  7. Epistemic Entitlement.Jon Altschul - 2011 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    In the early 1990s there emerged a growing interest with the concept of epistemic entitlement. Philosophers who acknowledge the existence of entitlements maintain that there are beliefs or judgments unsupported by evidence available to the subject, but which the subject nonetheless has the epistemic right to hold. Some of these may include beliefs non-inferentially sourced in perception, memory, introspection, testimony, and the a priori. Unlike the traditional notion of justification, entitlement is often characterized as an externalist type of epistemic warrant, (...)
  8. Vahid, Burge, and Perceptual Entitlement.Jon Altschul, Anthony Brueckner & Christopher Buford - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (3):325-330.
    Hamid Vahid criticizes Tyler Burge's account of perceptual entitlement. Vahid argues that Burge's account fails to satisfy a criterion of adequacy that any correct account of perceptual warrant must satisfy. According to Vahid, a correct account of perceptual warrant must allow for perceptual beliefs which are produced by a properly functioning perceptual system yet which lack warrant. The present article argues that Vahid's critique of Burge fails. It presents numerous examples of such beliefs that are consistent with Burge's account of (...)
  9. Sobre a possibilidade de pensarmos o mundo: o debate entre John McDowell e Donald Davidson.Marco Aurelio Sousa Alves - 2008 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
    The thesis evaluates a contemporary debate concerning the very possibility of thinking about the world. In the first chapter, McDowell's critique of Davidson is presented, focusing on the coherentism defended by the latter. The critique of the myth of the given (as it appears in Sellars and Wittgenstein), as well as the necessity of a minimal empiricism (which McDowell finds in Quine and Kant), lead to an oscillation in contemporary thinking between two equally unsatisfactory ways of understanding the empirical content (...)
  10. McDowell, Gettier, and the Bipartite Account of Perceptual Knowledge.Adrian Avery Archer - unknown
    In his essay, “Knowledge and the Internal Revisited”, John McDowell claims that “seeing that p constitutes false-hood excluding justification for believing that p.” In this thesis I attempt to construct an account of perceptual knowledge that exploits McDowell’s notion of false-hood excluding justification. To this end, I limn a justified (strong) belief, or bipartite, account of perceptual knowledge in which justification is seen as factive. On this picture, the truth requirement of the traditional tripartite account is incorporated into the justification (...)
  11. A Direct Realist's Challenge to Skepticism. [REVIEW]Ari Armstrong - 2004 - Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 5 (2):421 - 440.
    Armstrong reviews Michael Huemer's Skepticism and the Veil of Perception and finds in it strong support for the perceptual theory of direct realism. However, Huemer incorrectly assumes perceptual experiences can contain conceptual—and thus causal —information. Regardless, Huemer's theory of "phenomenal conservatism" serves to justify our perceptual judgments and refute skepticism in a way compatible with the preliminary work of Objectivist philosophers, such as David Kelley and Leonard Peikoff.
  12. Perception and Belief.D. M. Armstrong - 1988 - In Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Perceptual Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
  13. Anti-Epiphany and the Jungian Manikin: Toward a Theory of Prepsychotic Perceptual Alterations.Kyle Arnold - 2002 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 33 (2):245-275.
    This paper articulates a psychodynamically informed phenomenological reading of prepsychotic perceptual alterations, which the author calls anti-epiphanies. Several of Carl Jung's experiences of the anti-epiphany, as described in his autobiography Memories, Dreams, Reflections , are taken as exemplar cases. These anti-epiphanies are viewed through a critical psychobiographical lens, in an interpretationwhich tacks back and forth between Jung's childhood, psychological theories, and later prepsychotic experience. It is claimed that Jung's anti-epiphanies are linked to his use of schizoid-narcissistic forms of transitional selfobjects, (...)
  14. Is Perceptual Content Ever Conceptual?Michael R. Ayers - 2002 - Philosophical Books 43 (1):5-17.
  15. Perceptual Consciousness and Perceptual Evidence.Ralph Baergen - 1992 - Philosophical Papers 21 (2):107-119.
  16. Generativist Versus Foundational Justification: A Reply to Andrew Lugg.Brian S. Baigrie - 1992 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 23 (3):503-508.
  17. Phenomenal Properties: The Epistemology and Metaphysics of Qualia.Andrew R. Bailey - 1998 - Dissertation, University of Calgary
    This dissertation develops and defends a detailed realist, internalist account of qualia which is consistent with physicalism and which does not resurrect the epistemological 'myth of the Given.' In doing so it stakes out a position in the sparsely populated middle ground between the two major opposing factions on the problem of phenomenal consciousness: between those who think we have a priori reasons to believe that qualia are irreducible to the physical , and those who implicitly or explicitly treat qualia (...)
  18. Perceptual Justification and the Cartesian Theater.David James Barnett - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.
    According to a traditional Cartesian epistemology of perception, perception does not provide one with direct knowledge of the external world. Instead, when you look out to see a red wall, what you learn first is not a fact about the color of the wall—i.e., that it is red—but instead a fact about your own visual experience—i.e., that the wall looks red to you. If you are to justifiably believe that the wall is red, you must be in a position to (...)
  19. Neuroethology: An Overnarrow Definition Can Become a Source of Dogmatism.Ulrich Bässler - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (3):382.
  20. Why Internalists Need an Enriched Theory of Perceptual and Conceptual Awareness to Escape From Bergmann's Dilemma.Benjamin Bayer - manuscript
    Michael Bergmann (2006) has argued that an internalistic view of justification faces a dilemma. Assuming as internalism does that to have a justified belief, subjects must be aware of the justifiers of the belief and of their relevance to the truth of the belief, Bergmann notes that one is either aware of this relevance conceptually or not. But, says Bergmann, if the required awareness is conceptual, internalism is encumbered with an infinite regress. If it is not-if it is only "weak (...)
  21. Belief Justification and Perception.Wolfgang Benkewitz - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):193-208.
  22. Minimal Empiricism Without Dogmas.Hilan Bensusan & Manuel Pinedo-Garcia - 2007 - Philosophia 35 (2):197-206.
    John McDowell has defended a position called minimal empiricism, that aims to avoid the oscillation between traditional empiricism’s commitment to a set of contents working as external justifiers for our system of beliefs and a coherentist position where our thought receives no constraint from the world. We share McDowell’s dissatisfaction with both options, but find his minimal empiricism committed to the idea of a tribunal of experience where isolated contents are infused into our network of inferences. This commitment is prone (...)
  23. Perceptual Justification Outside of Consciousness.Jacob Berger - 2013 - In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer. pp. 137-145.
    In his paper “There It Is” and his précis “There It Was,” Benj Hellie develops a sophisticated semantics for perceptual justification according to which perceptions in good cases can be explained by intentional psychology and can justify beliefs, whereas bad cases of perception are defective and so cannot justify beliefs. Importantly, Hellie also affords consciousness a central role in rationality insofar as only those good cases of perception within consciousness can play a justificatory function. In this commentary, I reserve judgment (...)
  24. Gupta's Gambit.Selim Berker - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):17-39.
    After summarizing the essential details of Anil Gupta’s account of perceptual justification in his book _Empiricism and Experience_, I argue for three claims: (1) Gupta’s proposal is closer to rationalism than advertised; (2) there is a major lacuna in Gupta’s account of how convergence in light of experience yields absolute entitlements to form beliefs; and (3) Gupta has not adequately explained how ordinary courses of experience can lead to convergence on a commonsense view of the world.
  25. Review of John McDowell, Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge. [REVIEW]Tim Black - 2011 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  26. HUEMER, M.-Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.E. Borg - 2002 - Philosophical Books 43 (4):307-308.
  27. Empiricism and Experience - by Anil Gupta.George Botterill - 2008 - Philosophical Books 49 (2):165-166.
  28. An Explanatory Challenge for Epistemological Disjunctivism.Cameron Boult - forthcoming - Episteme.
    Epistemological Disjunctivism is a view about paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge. Duncan Pritchard claims that it is particularly well suited to accounting for internalist and externalist intuitions. A number of authors have disputed this claim, arguing that there are problems for Pritchard’s way with internalist intuitions. I share the worry. However, I don’t think it has been expressed as effectively as it can be. My aim in this paper is to present a new way of formulating the worry, in terms (...)
  29. Precis of Perception and Reason, and Response to Commentator (Michael Ayers).Bill Brewer - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    What is the role of conscious perceptual experience in the acquisition of empirical knowledge? My central claim is that a proper account of the way in which perceptual experiences contribute to our understanding of the most basic beliefs about particular things in the mind-independent world around us reveals how such experiences provide peculiarly fundamental reasons for such beliefs. There are, I claim, epistemic requirements upon the very possibility of empirical belief. The crucial epistemological role of experiences lies in their essential (...)
  30. Perception and Reason.Bill Brewer - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
    Bill Brewer presents an original view of the role of conscious experience in the acquisition of empirical knowledge. He argues that perceptual experiences must provide reasons for empirical beliefs if there are to be any determinate beliefs at all about particular objects in the world. This fresh approach to epistemology turns away from the search for necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge and works instead from a theory of understanding in a particular area.
  31. Experience and Reason in Perception.Bill Brewer - 1998 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 203-227.
    The question I am interested in is this. What exactly is the role of conscious experience in the acquisition of knowledge on the basis of perception? The problem here, as I see it, is to solve simultaneously for the nature of this experience, and its role in acquiring and sustaining the relevant beliefs, in such a way as to vindicate what I regard as an undeniable datum, that perception is a basic source of knowledge about the mind-independent world, in a (...)
  32. Perceptual Justification and Assertively Representing the World.Jochen Briesen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2239-2259.
    This paper argues that there is a problem for the justificatory significance of perceptions that has been overlooked thus far. Assuming that perceptual experiences are propositional attitudes and that only propositional attitudes which assertively represent the world can function as justifiers, the problem consists in specifying what it means for a propositional attitude to assertively represent the world without losing the justificatory significance of perceptions—a challenge that is harder to meet than might first be thought. That there is such a (...)
  33. Cognitive Penetration and the Reach of Phenomenal Content.Robert Briscoe - 2015 - In Athanassios Raftopoulos & John Zeimbekis (eds.), Cognitive Penetrability. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter critically assesses recent arguments that acquiring the ability to categorize an object as belonging to a certain high-level kind can cause the relevant kind property to be represented in visual phenomenal content. The first two arguments, developed respectively by Susanna Siegel (2010) and Tim Bayne (2009), employ an essentially phenomenological methodology. The third argument, developed by William Fish (2013), by contrast, is supported by an array of psychophysical and neuroscientific findings. I argue that while none of these arguments (...)
  34. Communication and Rational Responsiveness to the World.Robert Briscoe - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):135-159.
    Donald Davidson has long maintained that in order to be credited with the concept of objectivity – and, so, with language and thought – it is necessary to communicate with at least one other speaker. I here examine Davidson’s central argument for this thesis and argue that it is unsuccessful. Subsequently, I turn to Robert Brandom’s defense of the thesis in Making It Explicit. I argue that, contrary to Brandom, in order to possess the concept of objectivity it is not (...)
  35. Phenomenal Seemings and Sensible Dogmatism.Berit Brogaard - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification. Oup Usa. pp. 270.
  36. Well-Founded Belief and Perceptual Justification.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2016 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (3):367-377.
    According to Alan Millar, justified beliefs are well-founded beliefs. Millar cashes out the notion of well-foundedness in terms of having an adequate reason to believe something and believing it for that reason. To make his account of justified belief compatible with perceptual justification he appeals to the notion of recognitional ability. It is argued that, due to the fact that Millar’s is a knowledge-first view, his appeal to recognitional abilities fails to offer an explanatory account of familiar cases in the (...)
  37. Internalism and Evidence of Reliability.Anthony Brueckner - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (1):47-54.
    This paper concerns various competing views on the nature of perceptual justification. Various thought experiments that motivate various views are discussed. Once reliabilism is rejected and some form of internalism is instead embraced, the following issue arises: must an internalist nevertheless require that perceptual justification involve the possession of evidence for the reliability of our perceptual processes? Matthias Steup answers in the affirmative, espousing what he calls internalist reliabilism. Some problems are raised for this form of internalism.
  38. Experiential Justification.Anthony Brueckner - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
  39. E = K and Perceptual Knowledge.Tony Brueckner - 2009 - In Patrick Greenough & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
  40. Perceptual Entitlement.Tyler Burge - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):503-48.
    The paper develops a conception of epistemic warrant as applied to perceptual belief, called "entitlement", that does not require the warranted individual to be capable of understanding the warrant. The conception is situated within an account of animal perception and unsophisticated perceptual belief. It characterizes entitlement as fulfillment of an epistemic norm that is apriori associated with a certain representational function that can be known apriori to be a function of perception. The paper connects anti-individualism, a thesis about the nature (...)
  41. Perceptual Evidence and Perceptual Inference.Eric Bush - 1977 - Behaviorism 5 (2):73-86.
  42. The Epistemic Significance of Experience.Alex Byrne - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):947-967.
    According to orthodoxy, perceptual beliefs are caused by perceptual experiences. The paper argues that this view makes it impossible to explain how experiences can be epistemically significant. A rival account, on which experiences in the “good case” are ways of knowing, is set out and defended.
  43. Spin Control.Alex Byrne - 1996 - In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception. Ridgeview. pp. 261--74.
  44. Spin Control: Comment on McDowell's Mind and World.Alex Byrne - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:261-73.
    We have justified beliefs about the external world, and some of these are formed directly on the basis of perception. I may justifiably believe that a certain dog is in certain manger, and I may have this belief because I can see that the dog is in the manger. So far, so good.
  45. Perceptual Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):969-990.
    A very natural view about perceptual knowledge is articulated, one on which perceptual knowledge is closely related to perceptual discrimination, and which fits well with a relevant alternatives account of knowledge. It is shown that this kind of proposal faces a problem, and various options for resolving this difficulty are explored. In light of this discussion, a two-tiered relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge is offered which avoids the closure problem. It is further shown how this proposal can: accommodate our (...)
  46. An Actionist Approach to the Justificational Role of Perceptual Experience.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2016 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 72 (2-3):545-572.
    In this paper, I defend an account of how perceptual experience can bear rational relation to our empirical thought. In the first part, I elaborate two claims that are central for the justificational role of perceptual experience, namely, the claim that perception and belief share the same kind of content, and the claim that perception is independent from belief. At first sight, these claims seems not to be compatible, since the first one seems to require the truth of content conceptualism, (...)
  47. Internismo Sem Intelectualismo E Sem Reflexividade.Eros Moreira De Carvalho - 2014 - Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 55 (129):153-172.
    In his book, "Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge" (2011), John McDowell advocates that the warranty provided by perception is infallible. For such, it is necessary understanding the role reason plays for the constitution of genuine perceptual states. Through reason, we situate these states on the logical space of reasoning. So, we not only make of the perceptual state into an episode of knowledge, but we also acquire knowledge of how we arrived to that knowledge. McDowell argues that this condition (...)
  48. Crenças justificadas não-inferencialmente e o mito do dado.Eros Moreira De Carvalho - 2009 - Princípios 16 (25):231-263.
    The aim of this paper is to present an explanation of how the perceptualexperience fulfills its role of justification. The idea is that the perceptual experience justifiesnon-inferentially empirical beliefs in an internalist sense of justification. Against Sellars, I want to say that S relied on his experience to believe that the world is so and so. To discussthis question, I choose the arguments of Brewer and McDowell. Both argue that theexperience can justify beliefs, provided it has a conceptual content. But (...)
  49. Knowledge, Perception and Analysis.Quassim Cassam - 2008 - South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):214-226.
    A point that Strawson often emphasises in his writings is that the concepts of knowledge and perception are closely linked. For example, the idea of such a link does important in his exposition and defense of a causal analysis of perception. According to this analysis a material object M is perceived by a subject S only if M causes an experience in S. Why should this be? One reason, according to Strawson, is that such a causal requirement on perception is (...)
  50. Intellectualism Against Empiricism.Federico Castellano - 2014 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 90:231-251.
    Intellectualism is the philosophical view that thinking involves the activity of reason-giving. In this paper I argue that the intellectualist point of view is incompatible with any form of empiricism. First, I show that Traditional Empiricism collapses because it brings together two conflicting theses: the intellectualist thesis according to which the normative properties of thoughts depend upon the activity of reason-giving, and the intuitive empiricist thesis according to which the normative properties of empirical thoughts derive from perceptual experience. Second, I (...)
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