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Perceptual Knowledge
Edited by Susanna Schellenberg (Rutgers - New Brunswick)
Assistant editor: Andrew Rubner (Rutgers - New Brunswick)
About this topic
| Summary | The literature on perceptual knowledge—or, more broadly, the epistemology of perception—addresses a wide array of issues that often overlap. Among the most prominent questions in the literature are the following: How should we account for perceptual knowledge and related notions such as perceptual evidence, justification, rationality, and entitlement? Is any perceptual knowledge/justification immediate, or is all perceptual knowledge/justification mediated by other knowledge/justification? Must perceptual experiences be understood as having conceptual content—or as having representational content at all—to justify perceptual beliefs? How should the metaphysics of perception inform the epistemology of perception (or vice versa)? How can we address skeptical threats to the status of our perceptual beliefs? Do we have the same evidence for our perceptual beliefs in good and bad cases of perceptual experience? More broadly, what is the relationship between the epistemic standing of our perceptual beliefs in good and bad cases? |
| Key works | Some central works about the nature of perceptual knowledge are Dretske(1969, 2000), Goldman (1976), McDowell (1994), Williamson (2000), Johnston (2006), and Sosa (2007). Some central works about the nature of perceptual justification, entitlement and rationality are Pryor (2000), Huemer (2001), Burge (2003) and Wright (2004). Important discussions of the relationship between perceptual content and the epistemology of perception include Sellars (1956), Martin (1993), Brewer (1999), Heck (2000), and Silins (2011). Important discussions of the relationship between the metaphysics and epistemology of perception include Fumerton (1985), Martin (2006), McDowell (2006), and Sosa (2011). Pryor (2000), Huemer (2001), and Wright (2002) rank among the most important recent discussions of perception and skepticism. Pritchard (2012) and Schellenberg (2013) have developed accounts of the relationship between the epistemology of the good and the bad cases. |
| Introductions | Opie and O’Brien (2004), BonJour (2007), and Siegel and Silins (2015) provide overviews of the literature on the epistemology of perception. |
Show all references
Related
Subcategories
Discriminability* (101)
Naive and Direct Realism* (491)
Perceptual Evidence (142)
Perceptual Justification (516)
Sense-Datum Theories* (434)
Speckled Hen Problem (28)
The Given (204)
See also
- Knowledge of Consciousness (187)
- Discriminability (101)
- The Given (204)
- Epistemic and Non-epistemic Perception (44)
- Perception and Thought (156)
Contents
1723 found
Order:
| 1 — 50 / 1723 |
Material to categorize
- Cornman on designation rules.Steven E. Boër - 1974 - Philosophical Studies 26 (3-4):271 - 278.
- Cornman's definition of observation terms.Jack C. Carloye - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 32 (3):283 - 292.
- The philosophy of James W. Cornman.Victoria Choy - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 41 (1):7 - 29.
- Cornman and philosophy of science.Zoltan Domotor & Michael Friedman - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 41 (1):115 - 127.
- Plantinga's case against naturalistic epistemology.Evan Fales - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (3):432-451.In Warrant and Proper Function, Alvin Plantinga claims that metaphysical naturalism, when joined to a naturalized epistemology, is self-undermining. Plantinga argues that naturalists are committed to a neoDarwinian account of our origins, and that the reliability of our cognitive faculties is improbable or unknown relative to that theory. If the theory is true, then we are in no position to know that, whereas theism, if true, underwrites cognitive reliability. I seek to turn the tables on Plantinga, showing that neoDarwinism provides (...)
- 'Critical study: Bill Brewer' perception and reason.Richard Fumerton - 2002 - Noûs 36 (3):509–522.
- Exemplarizing and self-presenting states.Richard Fumerton - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):431-435.The position Lehrer defends in this paper is an original and subtle attempt to penetrate some of the most fundamental issues with which serious epistemologists and philosophers of mind are concerned. Lehrer’s focus is the notion of a self-presenting state, a state that can be “apprehended through itself.” In these brief comments I’ll focus only on some of Lehrer’s claims. I’ll begin with what Lehrer calls the problems of representation and subjectivity for the doctrine that there exist self-presenting sates. In (...)
- Perceptual Assurance and the Reality of the World.Errol E. Harris - 1974 - Crown Publishers.
- Models of decision-making and the coevolution of social preferences.Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis, Richard McElreath, Michael Alvard, Abigail Barr, Jean Ensminger, Natalie Smith Henrich, Kim Hill, Francisco Gil-White, Michael Gurven, Frank W. Marlowe, John Q. Patton & David Tracer - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):838-855.We would like to thank the commentators for their generous comments, valuable insights and helpful suggestions. We begin this response by discussing the selfishness axiom and the importance of the preferences, beliefs, and constraints framework as a way of modeling some of the proximate influences on human behavior. Next, we broaden the discussion to ultimate-level (that is evolutionary) explanations, where we review and clarify gene-culture coevolutionary theory, and then tackle the possibility that evolutionary approaches that exclude culture might be sufficient (...)
- Lonergan and perceptual direct realism: Facing up to the problem of the external material world.Greg Hodes - 2007 - International Philosophical Quarterly 47 (2):203-220.In this paper I call attention to the fact that Lonergan gives two radically opposed accounts of how sense perception relates us to the external world and of how we know that this relation exists. I argue that the position that Lonergan characteristically adopts is not the one implied by what is most fundamental in his theory of cognition. I describe the initial epistemic position with regard to the problem of skepticism about the external material world that is in fact (...)
- Category specificity in mind and brain?Glyn W. Humphreys & Emer M. E. Forde - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):497-504.We summarise and respond to the main points made by the commentators on our target article, which concern: whether structural similarity can play a causal role in normal object identification and in neuropsychological deficits for living things, the nature of our structural knowledge of the world, the relations between sensory and functional knowledge of objects, and the nature of our functional knowledge about living things, whether we need to posit a “core” semantic system, arguments that can be marshalled from evidence (...)
- Experiential Realism.Allison Heartz Johnson - 1973 - New York: Humanities Press.
- Idealism and its relation to science.Philip Chapin Jones - 1941 - Philosophy of Science 8 (2):142-146.To one not philosophically inclined, idealism seems a rather fantastic doctrine—one quite obviously false. The great Dr. Johnson thought he could adequately refute it by kicking his toe against a stone. In one form or another, however, it has existed wherever men have thought deeply on the fundamental nature of mind and of the external world. One cannot go far in a study of the sources of knowledge without becoming aware that the only immediate evidence of external objects lies in (...)
- When seeing is not believing: A critique of Priest's argument from perception.Paul Kabay - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):443 – 460.In this paper I critically examine an argument proposed by Graham Priest in support of the claim that the observable world is consistent. According to this argument we have good reason to think that the observable world is consistent, specifically we perceive it to be consistent. I critique this argument on two fronts. First, Priest appears to reason from the claim 'we know what it is to have a contradictory perception' to the claim 'we know what it is to perceive (...)
- James W. Cornman.L. K. - 1978 - Philosophical Studies 34 (4):333-334.
- A defense of realism: reflections on the metaphysics of G.E. Moore.Elmer Daniel Klemke - 2000 - Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity Books.English philosopher George Edward Moore (1873-1958) developed the chief modern theory of ethics, Ideal Utilitarianism. A Defense of Realism examines Moore's conception of philosophy and his views on the importance of metaphysics, presenting and evaluating the Principia Ethica author's criticisms and refutations of certain philosophical positions, especially idealism, naive realism, phenomenalism, and pragmatism. Klemke gives a detailed analysis and an appraisal of Moore's defense of common sense, and concentrates on Moore's realism, beginning with the reality of entities in the natural (...)
- Perception and corrigibility.Bruce N. Langtry - 1970 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3):369-372.This paper, the first of mine to be published, criticizes some arguments against the logical (i.e., metaphysical) possibility that there is incorrigible knoweledge of the external world.
- Perception and reason. Bill Brewer.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Mind 110 (439):725-729.
- Finding order in our world: The primacy of the concrete in neural representations and the role of invariance in substance reidentification.Bruce J. MacLennan - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):78-79.I discuss neuroscientific and phenomenological arguments in support of Millikan's thesis. I then consider invariance as a unifying theme in perceptual and conceptual tracking, and how invariants may be extracted from the environment. Finally, some wider implications of Millikan's nondescriptionist approach to language are presented, with specific application to color terms.
- Metaphysical common sense.J. L. Mackie - 1972 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (3):247-252.
- Dogmatism versus criticism.Walter T. Marvin - 1912 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 9 (12):309-317.
- Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality.John McDowell - 1998 - Harvard University Press.This is the second volume of John McDowell's selected papers.
- Purpose, design and physical relativity.David L. Miller - 1936 - Philosophy of Science 3 (3):267-285.In a recent issue of Philosophy of Science Merrit H. Moore contends that it is not only possible but methodologically desirable to separate design in nature from purpose. The main part of his argument is devoted to a support of the proposition that “design” is objective, by which he means that design in the physical world is independent of mind. That which gives interest to Mr. Moore's argument is essentially the Kantian doctrine that the forms of the understanding, and consequently (...)
- Seeing, certainty and apprehension.Kevin Mulligan - unknown§1 Simple Seeing and its Relations §2 Acquaintance, Apprehension, Belief, Knowledge, Action & Externalism §3 Simple Seeing, Sense and Meaning §4 Simple Seeing and Primitive Certainty ...at one time they dispute eagerly over certainty of thought, though certainty is not a habit of the mind at all, but a quality of propositions, and the speakers are really arguing about certitude... (James Joyce, 1903, Occasional, Critical and Political Writing, ed. Kevin Barry, 2000, OUP, 69) Like many others, I believe that to (...)
- Cornman on the colour of micro-entities.Stephen J. Noren - 1975 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):65-67.
- Do we see with microscopes?Elisabeth Pacherie - 1995 - The Monist 78 (2):171-188.Trying to understand better the role played by epistemic artifacts in our quest for reliable knowledge, it is interesting to compare their contribution with the one made by the epistemic organs or systems with which we are naturally endowed. This comparative approach may yield the further benefit of an improved understanding of the nature and epistemic functions of our natural epistemic equipment. In this paper, I shall concern myself with comparing the role of a family of instruments, microscopes, with that (...)
- The function of acquaintance in Russell's philosophy.David Pears - 1981 - Synthese 46 (2):149 - 166.
- Are beliefs and experiences candidates for elimination?Paul Pojman - 1994 - Dialogue (Misc) 37 (1):11-14.Remove from this listExport citation
Bookmark - Acquaintance.Gary Rosenkrantz - 1984 - Philosophia 14 (1-2):1-24.
- Our knowledge of the external world: as a field for scientific method in philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1914 - New York: Routledge.Philosophy, from the earliest times, has made greater claims, and achieved fewer results, than any other branch of learning. In Our Knowledge of the External World , Bertrand Russell illustrates instances where the claims of philosophers have been excessive, and examines why their achievements have not been greater.
- Plugging the leaks in Neurath's ship: A defense of naturalistic epistemology. [REVIEW]Peter Jacco Sas - 1999 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 30 (1):131-153.This paper examines the question whether foundational epistemology (“FE”) can be replaced by naturalized epistemology (“NE”). First, it argues that Quine's defense of NE is inadequate since it is only based on arguments showing the impossibility of the logical empiricist version of FE rather than on arguments for the impossibility of FE as such. Second, it proposes that a more promising argument for the impossibility of FE can be found in the Münchhausen-trilemma which aims at showing that ultimate foundations (and, (...)
- Language and perception.Richard H. Schlagel - 1962 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 23 (December):192-204.
- Seeing, Doing, and Knowing. [REVIEW]Claudia M. Schmidt - 2006 - Review of Metaphysics 60 (1):164-165.
- The nature of the 'given'.Paul Arthur Schilpp - 1935 - Philosophy of Science 2 (2):128-138.It is by no means impossible that the discussion of epistemological problems, at the present stage of our understanding of the issues involved, may be futile. But so long as anyone desires to “know” anything at all, just so long it will be impossible for thoughtful men to leave the questions of epistemology alone. So, futile or not, this paper is concerned with an analysis of one of the most fundamental of epistemological problems, namely that of the ‘given.’ It is (...)
- Explicit primitives for psychology.Eugene Shen - 1927 - Philosophical Review 36 (3):253-257.
- A defense of Cornman's utilitarian Kantian principle.Harry S. Silverstein - 1972 - Philosophical Studies 23 (3):212 - 215.
- Changing the cartesian mind: Leibniz on sensation, representation and consciousness.Alison Simmons - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (1):31-75.What did Leibniz have to contribute to the philosophy of mind? To judge from textbooks in the philosophy of mind, and even Leibniz commentaries, the answer is: not much. That may be because Leibniz’s philosophy of mind looks roughly like a Cartesian philosophy of mind. Like Descartes and his followers, Leibniz claims that the mind is immaterial and immortal; that it is a thinking thing ; that it is a different kind of thing from body and obeys its own laws; (...)
- Explaining sense perception: A scholastic challenge.Alison Simmons - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):257 - 275.
- Experience and Foundationalism in Audi’s The Architecture of Reason. [REVIEW]Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):181–187.In The Architecture of Reason, Robert Audi claims that good reasoning always has some foundation in experience. It is not clear, however, precisely what kind of experience is supposed to ground practical reasoning. It is also not clear whether inference is necessary for a belief to be justified, even when the source of the belief is experience without inference. Finally, it is not clear why beliefs based on some kinds of experience would not need to be justified by inference when (...)
- Innate ideas as a naturalistic source of metaphysical knowledge.Steve Stewart-Williams - 2005 - Biology and Philosophy 20 (4):791-814.This article starts from the assumption that there are various innate contributions to our view of the world and explores the epistemological implications that follow from this. Specifically, it explores the idea that if certain components of our worldview have an evolutionary origin, this implies that these aspects accurately depict the world. The simple version of the argument for this conclusion is that if an aspect of mind is innate, it must be useful, and the most parsimonious explanation for its (...)
- Cornman's theory of justification.Marshall Swain - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 41 (1):129 - 148.
- A Hindu critique of Buddhist epistemology: Kumārila on perception: the "Determinatin of perception" chapter of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's Ślokavārttika.John A. Taber - 2005 - New York: RoutledgeCurzon. Edited by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.This is a translation of the chapter on perception by Kumarilabhatta's magnum opus, the Slokavarttika , which is one of the central texts of the Hindu response to the criticism of the logical-epistemological school of Buddhist thought. It is crucial for understanding the debates between Hindus and Buddhists about metaphysical, epistemological and linguistic questions during the classical period. In an extensive commentary, the author explains the course of the argument from verse to verse and alludes to other theories of classical (...)
- Feigl on raw feels, the brain, and knowledge claims: Some problems regarding theoretical concepts.Paul Tibbetts - 1972 - Dialectica 26 (3‐4):247-66.
- Prof. Stout and dr. Alexander on sense perception.J. E. Turner - 1923 - Mind 32 (127):345-351.
- Mysticism and sense perception.William J. Wainwright - 1982 - In Steven M. Cahn & David Shatz (eds.), Religious Studies. Oxford University Press. pp. 257 - 278.$39.17 new (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct download (2 more)Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
- Sense-knowledge.James Ward - 1919 - Mind 28 (111):257-274.
- Sense-knowledge (III.).James Ward - 1920 - Mind 29 (114):129-144.
- Groundless Belief: An Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology: With a New Preface and Afterword.Michael Williams - 1977 - Princeton University Press.Inspired by the work of Wilfrid Sellars, Michael Williams launches an all-out attack on what he calls "phenomenalism," the idea that our knowledge of the world rests on a perceptual or experiential foundation. The point of this wider-than-normal usage of the term "phenomenalism," according to which even some forms of direct realism deserve to be called phenomenalistic, is to call attention to important continuities of thought between theories often thought to be competitors. Williams's target is not phenomenalism in its classical (...)
- What it isn't like.Edmond L. Wright - 1996 - American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1):23-42.
- Philosophical realism and psychological data.John W. Yolton - 1958 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 19 (4):486-501.
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