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  1. added 2020-06-03
    Explaining “Spatial Purport of Perception”: A Predictive Processing Approach.Wiktor Rorot - forthcoming - Synthese:1-24.
    Despite the large interest in the human ability to perceive space present in neuroscience, cognitive science and psychology, as well as philosophy of mind, the issues regarding egocentric space representation received relatively less attention. In this paper I take up a unique phenomenon related to this faculty: the “spatial purport” of perceptual experiences. The notion was proposed by Rick Grush to describe the subjective, qualitative aspects of egocentric representations of spatial properties and relations. Although Grush offered an explanation of the (...)
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  2. added 2020-03-12
    What Was Molyneux's Question A Question About?Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen - forthcoming - In Routledge Handbook on Molyneux's Question. London: Routledge.
    Molyneux asked whether a newly sighted person could distinguish a sphere from a cube by sight alone, given that she was antecedently able to do so by touch. This, we contend, is a question about general ideas. To answer it, we must ask (a) whether spatial locations identified by touch can be identified also by sight, and (b) whether the integration of spatial locations into an idea of shape persists through changes of modality. Posed this way, Molyneux’s Question goes substantially (...)
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  3. added 2019-10-26
    Dual Structure of Touch: The Body Vs. Peripersonal Space.Mohan Matthen - forthcoming - In Frédérique de Vignemont (ed.), The World at Our Fingertips. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    The sense of touch provides us knowledge of two kinds of events. Tactile sensation (T) makes us aware of events on or just below the skin; haptic perception (H) gives us knowledge of things outside the body with which we are in contact. This paper argues that T and H are distinct experiences, and not (as some have argued) different aspects of the same touch-experience. In other words, T ≠ H. Moreover, H does not supervene on T. Secondly: In T, (...)
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  4. added 2019-10-09
    The Grammatical Category of Time as a Means of the Expression of Temporal Deixis in Belarusian and English in the Comparative Aspect.Volha Artsiomava - 2017 - Language: Classic – Modern – Postmodern 3:259-266.
    The article analyzes the grammatical category of time as a means of actualizing temporal deixis in Belarusian and English in the typological aspect. Traditionally, the reference point of temporal deixis is the moment of speech. Nevertheless, it is important to take into account both the speaker and the observer. The purpose of the research is to carry out the comparative analysis of the grammatical category of time in Belarusian and English in terms of the speaker and the observer, as well (...)
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  5. added 2017-09-18
    Chromatic Layering and Color Relationalism.Jonathan Cohen - 2016 - Minds and Machines 26 (3):287-301.
    Brown highlights cases of “chromatic layering”—scenarios in which one perceives an opaque object through a transparent volume/film/filter with a chromatic or achromatic content of its own—as a way of reining in the argument from perceptual variation sometimes used to motivate a relationalist account of color properties. Brown urges that the argument in question does not generalize smoothly to all types of perceptual variation—in particular, that it fits poorly in layering cases in which there is either experiential fusion or scission. While (...)
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  6. added 2017-03-13
    Moods Are Not Colored Lenses: Perceptualism and the Phenomenology of Moods.Francisco Gallegos - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1497-1513.
    Being in a mood—such as an anxious, irritable, depressed, tranquil, or cheerful mood—tends to alter the way we react emotionally to the particular objects we encounter. But how, exactly, do moods alter the way we experience particular objects? Perceptualism, a popular approach to understanding affective experiences, holds that moods function like "colored lenses," altering the way we perceive the evaluative properties of the objects we encounter. In this essay, I offer a phenomenological analysis of the experience of being in a (...)
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  7. added 2017-03-06
    What Is It Like to See with Your Ears? The Representational Theory of Mind.Dominic M. McIver Lopes - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):439-453.
    Representational theories of mind cannot individuate the sense modalities in a principled manner. According to representationalism, the phenomenal character of experiences is determined by their contents. The usual objection is that inverted qualia are possible, so the phenomenal character of experiences may vary independently of their contents. But the objection is inconclusive. It raises difficult questions about the metaphysics of secondary qualities and it is difficult to see whether or not inverted qualia are possible. This paper proposes an alternative test (...)
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  8. added 2016-05-13
    Seeing-In as Aspect Perception.Fabian Dorsch - 2016 - In Gary Kemp & Gabriele Mras (eds.), Wollheim, Wittgenstein, and Pictorial Representation: Seeing-as and Seeing-in. Routledge.
  9. added 2016-03-08
    The Individual Variability Problem.Dimitria Electra Gatzia - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (3):533-554.
    Studies show that there are widespread intrasubjective and intersubjective color variations among normal perceivers. These variations have serious ramifications in the debate about the nature and ontology of color. It is typical to think of the debate about color as a dispute between objectivists and subjectivists. Objectivists hold that colors are perceiver-independent physical properties of objects while subjectivists hold that they are either projections onto external objects or dispositions objects have to look colored. I argue that individual color variations present (...)
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  10. added 2015-11-24
    Good Gestalt: Metzger on Seeing: Wolfgang Metzger: Laws of Seeing, Trans. Lothar Spillman, Steven Lehar, Mimsey Stromeyer, and Michael Wertheimer. MIT Press, 2009, Xxv + 203 Pp, £18.95 PB. [REVIEW]Gary Hatfield - 2011 - Metascience 20 (1):81-85.
    Review of Wolfgang Metzger, Laws of Seeing, trans. Lothar Spillman, Steven Lehar, Mimsey Stromeyer, and Michael Wertheimer. MIT Press, 2006; paperback, 2009. Pp. xxv+203. £18.95 PB. Original German edition published in 1936.
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  11. added 2015-09-21
    2D Geometry Predicts Perceived Visual Curvature in Context-Free Viewing.Birgitta Dresp-Langley - 2015 - Computational Intelligence and Neuroscience 2015 (708759):1-9.
    Planar geometry was exploited for the computation of symmetric visual curves in the image plane, with consistent variations in local parameters such as sagitta, chordlength, and the curves’ height-to-width ratio, an indicator of the visual area covered by the curve, also called aspect ratio. Image representations of single curves (no local image context) were presented to human observers to measure their visual sensation of curvature magnitude elicited by a given curve. Nonlinear regression analysis was performed on both the individual and (...)
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  12. added 2015-09-15
    Is Relativity a Requirement for Mind-Dependence?Eyja M. Brynjarsdóttir - 2010 - In François Recanati, Isidora Stojanovic & Neftali Villanueva (eds.), Context-Dependence, Perspective and Relativity. Mouton de Gruyter. pp. 317–332.
    According to a common intuition, a property is subjective or mind-dependent if it is a matter of taste whether an object possesses it or not and such matters are open to so-called faultless disagreement. For instance, assuming that funniness is subjective, two people may disagree about whether something is funny, yet both be right. If this intuition is correct, the possibility of subjective properties seems to depend on the possibility of faultless disagreement, which again seems to depend on some type (...)
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  13. added 2015-09-11
    Sensazioni o proprietà sensibili? Lo statuto ontologico dei qualia in fenomenologia.Andrea Pace Giannotta - 2015 - In Roberta Lanfredini (ed.), Architettura della conoscenza e ontologia. Mimesis. pp. 157-187.
    In this paper, I address the issue of the ontological status of qualitative properties. I discuss the prevalent approaches to the problem of qualia in philosophy of mind, in relation to the various attempts at naturalizing the mind and the various theories of perception. I compare these views with Husserl's phenomenology, highlighting the phenomenological distinction between phenomenal contents of mental states and sensory properties of the perceived objects. I present some open issues of this view, in order to show how (...)
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  14. added 2014-11-20
    Two Types of Qualia Theory.Pär Sundström - 2014 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 20:107-131.
    This paper distinguishes two types of qualia theory, which I call Galilean and non-Galilean qualia theories. It also offers considerations against each type of theory. To my mind the considerations are powerful. In any case, they bring out the importance of distinguishing the two types of theory. For they show that different considerations come into play—or considerations come into play in quite different ways—in assessing the two types of theory.
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  15. added 2014-03-11
    What’s That Smell?Clare Batty - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):321-348.
    In philosophical discussions of the secondary qualities, color has taken center stage. Smells, tastes, sounds, and feels have been treated, by and large, as mere accessories to colors. We are, as it is said, visual creatures. This, at least, has been the working assumption in the philosophy of perception and in those metaphysical discussions about the nature of the secondary qualities. The result has been a scarcity of work on the “other” secondary qualities. In this paper, I take smells and (...)
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  16. added 2014-03-07
    Experiencing Speech.Casey O’Callaghan - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):305-332.
  17. added 2014-03-06
    Appearance Properties?Andy Egan - 2006 - Noûs 40 (3):495-521.
    Intentionalism is the view that the phenomenal character of an experience is wholly determined by its representational content is very attractive. Unfortunately, it is in conflict with some quite robust intuitions about the possibility of phenomenal spectrum inversion without misrepresentation. Faced with such a problem, there are the usual three options: reject intentionalism, discount the intuitions and deny that spectrum inversion without misrepresentation is possible, or find a way to reconcile the two by dissolving the apparent conflict. Sydney Shoemaker's (1994) (...)
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  18. added 2013-11-11
    Perception and Reality.Keith Wilson - 2013 - New Philosopher 1 (2):104-107.
    Taken at face value, the picture of reality suggested by modern science seems radically opposed to the world as we perceive it through our senses. Indeed, it is not uncommon to hear scientists and others claim that much of our perceptual experience is a kind of pervasive illusion rather than a faithful presentation of various aspects of reality. On this view, familiar properties such as colours and solidity, to take just two examples, do not belong to external objects, but are (...)
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  19. added 2013-04-11
    Are Colours Visually Complex?Pär Sundström - 2013 - In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday. Ontos Verlag.
    This paper articulates a case for supposing that all shades of colour are visually complex.
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  20. added 2013-03-05
    Look-Blindness.Jason Leddington - 2012 - Analysis 72 (2):244-251.
    In Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts 2009, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Michael Tye claims that seeing can occur independently of seeing-that. Call this The Independence Claim (TIC). Tye supports this ‘general point’ by appeal to cases of ‘ubiquitous error’ (2009: 95). In this article, I show that this strategy fails: it is guilty of a certain blindness to how things look.
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  21. added 2013-01-18
    Time, Unity, and Conscious Experience.Michal Klincewicz - 2013 - Dissertation, CUNY Graduate Center
    In my dissertation I critically survey existing theories of time consciousness, and draw on recent work in neuroscience and philosophy to develop an original theory. My view depends on a novel account of temporal perception based on the notion of temporal qualities, which are mental properties that are instantiated whenever we detect change in the environment. When we become aware of these temporal qualities in an appropriate way, our conscious experience will feature the distinct temporal phenomenology that is associated with (...)
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  22. added 2012-11-27
    Report on the Network for Sensory Research/University of York Perceptual Learning Workshop.Kevin Connolly, Dylan Bianchi, Craig French, Lana Kuhle & Andy MacGregor - manuscript
    This report highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York on March 19th and 20th, 2012: 1. What is perceptual learning? 2. Can perceptual experience be modified by reason? 3. How does perceptual learning alter perceptual phenomenology? 4. How does perceptual learning alter the contents of perception? 5. How is perceptual learning coordinated with action?
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  23. added 2012-10-02
    Do We Conceptualize Every Color We Consciously Discriminate?Jacob Berger - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):632-635.
    Mandik (2012)understands color-consciousness conceptualism to be the view that one deploys in a conscious qualitative state concepts for every color consciously discriminated by that state. Some argue that the experimental evidence that we can consciously discriminate barely distinct hues that are presented together but cannot do so when those hues are presented in short succession suggests that we can consciously discriminate colors that we do not conceptualize. Mandik maintains, however, that this evidence is consistent with our deploying a variety of (...)
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  24. added 2010-09-23
    Perception Beyond Inference. The Information Content of Visual Processes.Albertazzi Liliana, Tonder Gervant & Vishwanath Dhanraj (eds.) - forthcoming - MIT Press.
  25. added 2010-09-23
    The Perception of Material Qualities and the Internal Semantics of the Perceptual System.Rainer Mausfeld - 2010 - In Albertazzi Liliana, Tonder Gert & Vishwanath Dhanraj (eds.), Perception beyond Inference. The Information Content of Visual Processes. MIT Press.
    The chapter outlines an abstract theoretical framework that is currently (re-)emerging in the course of a theoretical convergence of several disciplines. In the first section, the fundamental problem of perception theory is formulated, namely, the generation, by the perceptual system, of meaningful categories from physicogeometric energy patterns. In the second section, it deals with basic intuitions and assumptions underlying what can be regarded as the current Standard Model of Perceptual Psychology and points out why this model is profoundly inadequate for (...)
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  26. added 2010-08-13
    Cognition and Neuropsychology: International Perspectives on Psychological Science, Vol.1.P. A. Frensch & R. Schwarzer (eds.) - 2010 - Psychology Press.
    Neuropsychology. International. Perspectives. on. Psychological. Science. ( Volume. 1). This is the first of two volumes which together present the main contributions from the 29th International Congress of Psychology, held in Berlin in 2008, ...
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  27. added 2009-11-25
    No Impediment to Solidity as Impediment.Stephan Blatti - 2006 - Metaphysica 7 (1):35-41.
    ABSTRACT: Quassim Cassam (1997) accepts the standard account of solidity, according to which, if S feels x as solid, then S feels x as an imediment to his movement. Recently, Martin Fricke and Paul Snowdon (2003) have presented a battery of counter-examples designed to show that S may feel x as solid and as exerting a pressure that supports or facilitates his movement. In this note, I defend the standard account against Fricke and Snowdon’s attack. Integral to this defense is (...)
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  28. added 2009-05-06
    Pitch.Casey O'Callaghan - manuscript
    Some sounds have pitch, some do not. A tuba’s notes are lower pitched than a flute’s, but the fuzz from an untuned radio has no discernible pitch. Pitch is an attribute in virtue of which sounds that possess it can be ordered from “low” to “high”. Given how audition works, physics has taught us that frequency determines what pitch a sound auditorily appears to have.
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  29. added 2008-12-31
    Appearance and Reality: A Philosophical Investigation Into Perception and Perceptual Qualities.PETER M. S. HACKER - 1987 - Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  30. added 2008-12-31
    The Perceptual and Physical Worlds.Evelyn Begley Pluhar - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 31:228-240.
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  31. added 2008-12-31
    Quine's 'Quality Space'.Lynne M. Broughton - 1981 - Dialectica 35 (3):291-302.
    SummaryQuine uses the notion of ‘quality space’ in Word and Object and in ‘Natural Kinds' as a means of characterizing similarity recognition, which in turn is seen as basic to induction and to language acquisition. In this paper it is argued that ‘quality space’ is too simplistic a notion to bear the explanatory weight given to ‘similarity’. Similarity is explanatorily plausible only because it contains much covert complexity and is essentially mentalistic. The attempt to expunge this mentalism by the behavioural (...)
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  32. added 2008-12-31
    How Quine Perceives Perceptual Similarity.Patricia Smith Churchland - 1976 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (June):251-255.
    The explanation of a child's discriminate responses to his environment turns on ascribing to the child a perceptual discrimination which counts certain things as more similar to one another than to some other thing. As Quine forcefully puts it:If an individual is to learn at all, differences in degree of similarity must be implicit in his learning pattern. Otherwise any response, if reinforced, would be conditioned equally and indiscriminately to any and every future episode, all these being equally similar.Now for (...)
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  33. added 2008-12-31
    Criteriological Arguments in Perception.Alan H. Goldman - 1975 - Mind 84 (January):102-105.
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  34. added 2008-12-31
    Do Material Things Have Non-Physical Properties?Frank Jackson - 1973 - Personalist 54 (2):105-110.
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  35. added 2008-12-31
    Quality Orders.W. C. Clement - 1956 - Mind 65 (April):184-199.
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  36. added 2008-12-31
    Perceptual and Memory Perspectives.Evander Bradley McGilvary - 1933 - Journal of Philosophy 30 (12):309-330.
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