Perceptual Reports

Edited by Benj Hellie (University of Toronto, St. George Campus, University of Toronto at Scarborough)
Related categories

43 found
Order:
  1. Perception.Kathleen Akins (ed.) - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
  2. The Determinable–Determinate Relation Can’T Save Adverbialism.Grzankowski Alex & Alex Grzankowski - 2018 - Analysis 78 (1):45-52.
    Adverbialist theories of thought such as those advanced by Hare and Sellars promise an ontologically sleek understanding of a variety of intentional states, but such theories have been largely abandoned due to the ‘many-property problem’. In an attempt to revitalize this otherwise attractive theory, in a series of papers as well as his recent book, Uriah Kriegel has offered a novel reply to the ‘many-property problem’ and on its basis he argues that ‘adverbialism about intentionality is alive and well’. If (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Do 'Looks' Reports Reflect the Contents of Perception?Berit Brogaard - manuscript
    Roderick Chisholm argued that ‘look’ can be used in three different ways: epistemically, comparatively and non-comparatively. Chisholm’s non-comparative sense of ‘look’ played an important role in Frank Jackson’s argument for the sense-datum theory. The question remains..
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4. The Phenomenal Use of 'Look'.Berit Brogaard - forthcoming - Philosophy Compass.
    The article provides the state of the art on the debate about whether the logical form of ‘look’ statements commits us to any particular theory of perceptual experience. The debate began with Frank Jackson’s (1977) argument that ‘look’ statements commit us to a sense-datum theory of perception. Thinkers from different camps have since then offered various rejoinders to Jackson’s argument. Others have provided novel arguments from considerations of the semantics of ‘look’ to particular theories of perception. The article closes with (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Perceptual Reports.Berit Brogaard - 2015 - In Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press.
    Perceptual reports are utterances of sentences that contain a perceptual verb, such as ‘look’, ‘sound’, ‘feel’, ‘see’, and ‘perceive’. It is natural to suppose that at least in many cases, these types of reports reflect aspects of the phenomenal character and representational content of a subject’s perceptual experiences. For example, an utterance of ‘my chair looks red but it’s really white’ appears to reflect phenomenal properties of the speaker’s experience of a chair. Whether perceptual reports actually reflect these things is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  6. Intuitions as Intellectual Seemings.Berit Brogaard - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (4):382-393.
    In Philosophy Without Intuitions Herman Cappelen argues that unlike what is commonly thought, contemporary analytic philosophers do not typically rely on intuitions as evidence. If they do indeed rely on intuitions, that should be evident from their written works, either explicitly in the form of ‘intuition’ talk or by means of other indicators. However, Cappelen argues, while philosophers do engage in ‘intuition’ talk, that is not a good indicator that they rely on intuitions, as ‘intuition’ and its cognates have many (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  7. It's Not What It Seems. A Semantic Account of 'Seems' and Seemings.Berit Brogaard - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (2-3):210-239.
    I start out by reviewing the semantics of ?seem?. As ?seem? is a subject-raising verb, ?it seems? can be treated as a sentential operator. I look at the semantic and logical properties of ?it seems?. I argue that ?it seems? is a hyperintensional and contextually flexible operator. The operator distributes over conjunction but not over disjunction, conditionals or semantic entailments. I further argue that ?it seems? does not commute with negation and does not agglomerate with conjunction. I then show that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  8. Phenomenal Seemings and Sensible Dogmatism.Berit Brogaard - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification. Oup Usa. pp. 270.
  9. Transient Truths: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Propositions.Berit Brogaard - 2012 - Oup Usa.
    Transient Truths provides the first book-length exposition and defense of the opposing view, temporalism: these are contents that can change their truth-values along with changes in the world.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  10. Seeing as a Non-Experiental Mental State: The Case From Synesthesia and Visual Imagery.Berit Brogaard - 2012 - In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Neuroscience Series, Synthese Library.
    The paper argues that the English verb ‘to see’ can denote three different kinds of conscious states of seeing, involving visual experiences, visual seeming states and introspective seeming states, respectively. The case for the claim that there are three kinds of seeing comes from synesthesia and visual imagery. Synesthesia is a relatively rare neurological condition in which stimulation in one sensory or cognitive stream involuntarily leads to associated experiences in a second unstimulated stream. Visual synesthesia is often considered a case (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  11. Reference, Reality and Perceptual Fields.Hector-Neri Castaneda - 1980 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 53 (August):763-823.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  12. Propositional and Nonpropositional Perceiving.Dan D. Crawford - 1974 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35 (December):201-210.
    The general theory of perception proposed by Roderick Chisholm in his book Perceiving: A Philosophical Study1 has gained considerable acceptance among contemporary philosophers of perception. In this paper, I will review and evaluate one part of this theory and show where I believe an important modification is necessary. Chisholm distinguishes what he thinks are two importantly different senses of “perceive,” a propositional and a nonpropositional sense, and then proposes a definition of each. The propositional sense of “perceive” is expressed in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. The Austin-Malcolm Argument for the Incorrigibility of Perceptual Reports.Gerald Doppelt - 1979 - Dialectica 33 (1):59-75.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Seeming to See.Clement Dore - 1965 - American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (October):312-318.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Is Perception a Source of Reasons?Santiago Echeverri - 2013 - Theoria 79 (1):22-56.
    It is widely assumed that perception is a source of reasons (SR). There is a weak sense in which this claim is trivially true: even if one characterizes perception in purely causal terms, perceptual beliefs originate from the mind's interaction with the world. When philosophers argue for (SR), however, they have a stronger view in mind: they claim that perception provides pre- or non-doxastic reasons for belief. In this article I examine some ways of developing this view and criticize them. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  16. Does Propositional Seeing Entail Propositional Knowledge?Craig French - 2012 - Theoria 78 (2):115-127.
    In a 2010 article Turri puts forward some powerful considerations which suggest that Williamson's view of knowledge as the most general factive mental state is false. Turri claims that this view is false since it is false that if S sees that p, then S knows that p. Turri argues that there are cases in which (A) S sees that p but (B) S does not know that p. In response I offer linguistic evidence to suppose that in propositional contexts (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  17. Seeing' and 'Seeing That', 'Observing' and 'Observing That.Peter A. French - 1975 - American Philosophical Quarterly 9:89-97.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Do Perceptions Justify Beliefs? The Argument From "Looks" Talk.Christopher Gauker - forthcoming - In Johan Gersel, Rasmus Thybo Jensen, M. Thaning & S. Overgaard (eds.), In Light of Experience: Essays on Reason and Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Why should we believe that perceptions justify beliefs? One argument starts with the premise that sentences of the form “a looks F” may be used to justify conclusions of the form “a is F”. I will argue that this argument for the claim that perceptions justify beliefs founders on the following dilemma: Either “a looks F” does not report the content of a perception or, if it does, then it does not justify the conclusion “a is F”.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. An Analysis of Two Perceptual Predicates.Russell B. Goodman - 1976 - Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 7 (3):35-53.
  20. Objectifying the Phenomenal in Experimental Psychology: Titchener and Beyond.Gary Hatfield - 2015 - Philosophia Scientiae 19 (3):73-94.
    This paper examines the origins and legacy of Titchener’s notion of stimulus error in the experimental study of sensory experience. It places Titchener’s introspective methods into the intellectual world of early experimental psychology. It follows the subsequent development of perceptual experimentation primarily in the American literature, with notice to British and German studies as needed. Subsequent investigators transformed the specific notion of a “stimulus error” into experimental questions in which subjects’ attitudes toward their perceptual tasks became independent variables to be (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  21. Psychological Experiments and Phenomenal Experience in Size and Shape Constancy.Gary Hatfield - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (5):940-953.
    Some experiments in perceptual psychology measure perceivers’ phenomenal experiences of objects versus their cognitive assessments of object properties. Analyzing such experiments, this article responds to Pizlo’s claim that much work on shape constancy before 1985 confused problems of shape ambiguity with problems of shape constancy. Pizlo fails to grasp the logic of experimental designs directed toward phenomenal aspects of shape constancy. In the domain of size perception, Granrud’s studies of size constancy in children and adults distinguish phenomenal from cognitive factors.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  22. On Perceptual Constancy.Gary Hatfield - 2009 - In Perception and Cognition: Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology. Clarendon Press. pp. 178-211.
    This chapter reconsiders the notion of perceptual constancy from the ground up. It distinguishes the phenomenology of perceptual constancy and stability from a functional characterization of perception as aiming at full constancy. Drawing on this distinction, we can attend to the phenomenology of constancy itself, and ask to what extent human perceivers attain constancy, as usually defined. Within this phenomenology, I distinguish phenomenal presentations of spatial features and color properties from categorizations, conceptualizations, and judgments that underlie verbal or other responses (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  23. Epilogue: Advances and Open Questions.Gary Hatfield & William Epstein - 2012 - In Gary Hatfield & Sarah Allred (eds.), Visual Experience: Sensation, Cognition, and Constancy. Oxford University Press. pp. 232-241.
    The term “perceptual constancy” was used by the Gestalt theorists in the early part of the twentieth century (e.g., Koffka 1935, 34, 90) to refer to the tendency of perception to remain invariant over changes of viewing distance, viewing angle, and conditions of illumination. This tendency toward constancy is remarkable: every change in the viewing distance, position, and illumination is necessarily accompanied by a change in the local proximal (retinal) stimulation, and yet perception remains relatively stable. The tendency toward perceptual (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  24. Love in the Time of Cholera.Benj Hellie - 2014 - In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? Oxford University Press. pp. 241–261.
    We begin with a theory of the structure of sensory consciousness; a target phenomenon of 'presentation' can be clearly located within this structure. We then defend the rational-psychological necessity of presentation. We conclude with discussion of these philosophical challenges to the possibility of presentation. One crucial aspect of the discussion is recognition of the <cite>nonobjectivity</cite> of consciousness (a technical appendix explains what I mean by that). The other is a full-faced stare at the limitations of rational psychology: much of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  25. Recent Issues in High-Level Perception.Grace Helton - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):851-862.
    Recently, several theorists have proposed that we can perceive a range of high-level features, including natural kind features (e.g., being a lemur), artifactual features (e.g., being a mandolin), and the emotional features of others (e.g., being surprised). I clarify the claim that we perceive high-level features and suggest one overlooked reason this claim matters: it would dramatically expand the range of actions perception-based theories of action might explain. I then describe the influential phenomenal contrast method of arguing for high-level perception (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  26. The Logic of Perceptual Reports: An Extensional Alternative to Situation Semantics.James Higginbotham - 1983 - Journal of Philosophy 80 (February):100-127.
  27. Perceptual Reports Revisited.James T. Higginbotham - 1999 - In K. Murasugi & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), Philosophy and Linguistics. Westview Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Seeing That and Seeing As.Igal Kvart - 1993 - Noûs 27 (3):279-302.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  29. Two Senses of 'Appears Red'.Stephen Leeds - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 28 (September):199-205.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. On an Argument of Segal's Against Singular Object-Dependent Thoughts.Teresa Marques - 2006 - Disputatio 2 (21):19-37.
    This paper discusses and criticizes Segal’s 1989 argument against singular object-dependent thoughts. His argument aims at showing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant. My criticism of Segal’s argument has two parts. First, I appeal to common anti-individualist arguments to the effect that Segal’s type of argument only succeeds in establishing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant for those aspects of subjects’ behaviour that do not require reference to external objects. Secondly, Segal’s view on singular thoughts is at odds with his (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. What's in a Look?M. G. F. Martin - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 160--225.
  32. The Phenomenal and Other Uses of 'Looks'.J. Barry Maund - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (2):170-180.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  33. Some Uses of 'Appearance'.John B. Mcclatchey - 1972 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 10 (4):463-469.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Philosophy and Linguistics.Kumiko Murasugi & Robert Stainton (eds.) - 1998 - Westview Press.
    This edited volume offers ten new essays on semantics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of linguistics by top scholars in the field. Covering a wide range of topics, the collection is sure to be of interest to scholars in those areas as well as some philosophers of mind. Because of the diversity of topics and perspectives inherent in the collection, readers will find both exposition and debate among the contributors.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  35. Perception Verbs.Reinhard Muskens - 1993 - In R. E. Asher & J. M. Y. Simpson (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Pergamon Press. pp. 6--2999.
    The semantics of a sentence containing a perception verb such as see or hear depends to a high degree on the exact syntactic form of the perception verb’s complement. Let us compare sentence (1), where the complement is tenseless, with (2), where the complement is a tensed clause.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Language and Perception.Richard H. Schlagel - 1962 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 23 (December):192-204.
  37. Seeing.Richard Severens - 1967 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (December):213-221.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. Seeking, Scrutinizing and Seeing.Frank N. Sibley - 1955 - Mind 64 (October):455-478.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Seeing, Knowing And Believing: A Study Of The Language Of Visual Perception.Jonas F. Soltis - 1966 - Addison-Wesley.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. Perception and Possibilia.James E. Tomberlin - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:109-115.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Dr Kenny's Perceptions.Joyce Trebilcot - 1970 - Mind 79 (January):142-143.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. A Computational Theory of Perspective and Reference in Narrative.Janyce M. Wiebe & William J. Rapaport - 1988 - In Proceedings of the 26th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics. Association for Computational Linguistics. pp. 131-138.
    Narrative passages told from a character's perspective convey the character's thoughts and perceptions. We present a discourse process that recognizes characters'.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  43. Perception-Statements.John O. Wisdom - 1948 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 49:47-64.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography