Related categories

49 found
Order:
  1. added 2020-03-23
    Perception as Recognizing.Mika Suojanen - 2018 - In Hemmo Laiho & Miira Tuominen (eds.), Havainto : Suomen Filosofisen Yhdistyksen yhden sanan kollokvion esitelmiä. Turku: University of Turku. pp. 161-167.
    Things appear in perception. My article will ask whether we can recognize the perceived object, without having a concept of that object, or even a concept "object". For example, can I experience a specific shade of red, without having a concept of that specific shade? Some philosophers, like McDowell (1994) and Brewer (1999), claim for the necessity of concepts for perception. Using simple examples the article will challenge the idea that recognizing the object is based on the use of concepts. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2019-12-11
    The Attitudinal Opacity of Emotional Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    According to some philosophers, when introspectively attending to experience, we seem to see right through it to the (apparent) objects outside, including their properties. This is called the transparency of experience. This paper examines whether, and in what sense, emotions are transparent. It argues that emotional experiences are opaque in a distinctive way: introspective attention to them does not principally reveal non-intentional somatic qualia but rather felt valenced intentional attitudes. As such, emotional experience is attitudinally opaque.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2019-10-24
    Depictive Verbs and the Nature of Perception.Justin D'Ambrosio - manuscript
    This paper shows that direct-object perceptual verbs, such as "hear", "smell", "taste", "feel", and "see", share a collection of distinctive semantic behaviors with depictive verbs, among which are "draw'', "paint", "sketch", and "sculpt". What explains these behaviors in the case of depictives is that they are causative verbs, and have lexical decompositions that involve the creation of concrete artistic artifacts, such as pictures, paintings, and sculptures. For instance, "draw a dog" means "draw a picture of a dog", where the latter (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2019-10-24
    The Many-Property Problem is Your Problem, Too.Justin DAmbrosio - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    The many-property problem has traditionally been taken to show that the adverbial theory of perception is untenable. This paper first shows that several widely accepted views concerning the nature of perception---including both representational and non-representational views---likewise face the many-property problem. It then presents a solution to the many-property problem for these views, but goes on to show how this solution can be adapted to provide a novel, fully compositional solution to the many-property problem for adverbialism. Thus, with respect to the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. added 2019-10-24
    An Empirical Solution to the Puzzle of Macbeth’s Dagger.Justin D’Ambrosio - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-38.
    In this paper I present an empirical solution to the puzzle of Macbeth's dagger. The puzzle of Macbeth's dagger is the question of whether, in having his fatal vision of a dagger, Macbeth sees a dagger. I answer this question by addressing a more general one: the question of whether perceptual verbs are intensional transitive verbs (ITVs). I present seven experiments, each of which tests a collection of perceptual verbs for one of the three features characteristic of ITVs. One of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2019-08-21
    Review of Berit Brogaard Seeing and Saying. [REVIEW]Mohan Matthen - 2019 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 201906.
    Brogaard's book is extremely informative about the grammar of perceptual verbs, and questions that it indicates representationalism (as opposed to naive realism). As useful as this is, I question how much grammar tells us much about perception.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2019-07-16
    Non-Relational Intentionality.Justin D'Ambrosio - 2017 - Dissertation, Yale University
    This dissertation lays the foundation for a new theory of non-relational intentionality. The thesis is divided into an introduction and three main chapters, each of which serves as an essential part of an overarching argument. The argument yields, as its conclusion, a new account of how language and thought can exhibit intentionality intrinsically, so that representation can occur in the absence of some thing that is represented. The overarching argument has two components: first, that intentionality can be profi tably studied (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. added 2019-01-31
    It's Not What It Seems. A Semantic Account of ‘Seems’ and Seemings.Berit Brogaard - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (2-3):210-239.
    I start out by reviewing the semantics of ‘seem’. As ‘seem’ is a subject-raising verb, ‘it seems’ can be treated as a sentential operator. I look at the semantic and logical properties of ‘it seems’. I argue that ‘it seems’ is a hyperintensional and contextually flexible operator. The operator distributes over conjunction but not over disjunction, conditionals or semantic entailments. I further argue that ‘it seems’ does not commute with negation and does not agglomerate with conjunction. I then show that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  9. added 2018-06-12
    Recent Issues in High-Level Perception.Grace Helton - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):851-862.
    Recently, several theorists have proposed that we can perceive a range of high-level features, including natural kind features (e.g., being a lemur), artifactual features (e.g., being a mandolin), and the emotional features of others (e.g., being surprised). I clarify the claim that we perceive high-level features and suggest one overlooked reason this claim matters: it would dramatically expand the range of actions perception-based theories of action might explain. I then describe the influential phenomenal contrast method of arguing for high-level perception (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  10. added 2018-01-02
    The Determinable–Determinate Relation Can’T Save Adverbialism.Alex Grzankowski - 2018 - Analysis 78 (1):45-52.
    Adverbialist theories of thought such as those advanced by Hare and Sellars promise an ontologically sleek understanding of a variety of intentional states, but such theories have been largely abandoned due to the ‘many-property problem’. In an attempt to revitalize this otherwise attractive theory, in a series of papers as well as his recent book, Uriah Kriegel has offered a novel reply to the ‘many-property problem’ and on its basis he argues that ‘adverbialism about intentionality is alive and well’. If (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  11. added 2017-08-05
    Do Perceptions Justify Beliefs? The Argument From "Looks" Talk.Christopher Gauker - 2018 - In Johan Gersel, Rasmus Thybo Jensen, M. Thaning & S. Overgaard (eds.), In Light of Experience: Essays on Reason and Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 141-160.
    Why should we believe that perceptions justify beliefs? One argument starts with the premise that sentences of the form “a looks F” may be used to justify conclusions of the form “a is F”. I will argue that this argument for the claim that perceptions justify beliefs founders on the following dilemma: Either “a looks F” does not report the content of a perception or, if it does, then it does not justify the conclusion “a is F”.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. added 2017-02-07
    Perception.Kathleen Akins (ed.) - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
  13. added 2016-12-12
    What's in a Look?M. G. F. Martin - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 160--225.
  14. added 2016-12-08
    Perception Verbs.Reinhard Muskens - 1993 - In R. E. Asher & J. M. Y. Simpson (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Pergamon Press. pp. 6--2999.
    The semantics of a sentence containing a perception verb such as see or hear depends to a high degree on the exact syntactic form of the perception verb’s complement. Let us compare sentence (1), where the complement is tenseless, with (2), where the complement is a tensed clause.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. added 2016-09-14
    On Perceptual Constancy.Gary Hatfield - 2009 - In Perception and Cognition: Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology. Clarendon Press. pp. 178-211.
    This chapter reconsiders the notion of perceptual constancy from the ground up. It distinguishes the phenomenology of perceptual constancy and stability from a functional characterization of perception as aiming at full constancy. Drawing on this distinction, we can attend to the phenomenology of constancy itself, and ask to what extent human perceivers attain constancy, as usually defined. Within this phenomenology, I distinguish phenomenal presentations of spatial features and color properties from categorizations, conceptualizations, and judgments that underlie verbal or other responses (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  16. added 2016-09-13
    Epilogue: Advances and Open Questions.Gary Hatfield & William Epstein - 2012 - In Gary Hatfield & Sarah Allred (eds.), Visual Experience: Sensation, Cognition, and Constancy. Oxford University Press. pp. 232-241.
    The term “perceptual constancy” was used by the Gestalt theorists in the early part of the twentieth century (e.g., Koffka 1935, 34, 90) to refer to the tendency of perception to remain invariant over changes of viewing distance, viewing angle, and conditions of illumination. This tendency toward constancy is remarkable: every change in the viewing distance, position, and illumination is necessarily accompanied by a change in the local proximal (retinal) stimulation, and yet perception remains relatively stable. The tendency toward perceptual (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17. added 2015-11-02
    Objectifying the Phenomenal in Experimental Psychology: Titchener and Beyond.Gary Hatfield - 2015 - Philosophia Scientiae 19 (3):73-94.
    This paper examines the origins and legacy of Titchener’s notion of stimulus error in the experimental study of sensory experience. It places Titchener’s introspective methods into the intellectual world of early experimental psychology. It follows the subsequent development of perceptual experimentation primarily in the American literature, with notice to British and German studies as needed. Subsequent investigators transformed the specific notion of a “stimulus error” into experimental questions in which subjects’ attitudes toward their perceptual tasks became independent variables to be (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18. added 2015-10-09
    Psychological Experiments and Phenomenal Experience in Size and Shape Constancy.Gary Hatfield - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (5):940-953.
    Some experiments in perceptual psychology measure perceivers’ phenomenal experiences of objects versus their cognitive assessments of object properties. Analyzing such experiments, this article responds to Pizlo’s claim that much work on shape constancy before 1985 confused problems of shape ambiguity with problems of shape constancy. Pizlo fails to grasp the logic of experimental designs directed toward phenomenal aspects of shape constancy. In the domain of size perception, Granrud’s studies of size constancy in children and adults distinguish phenomenal from cognitive factors.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  19. added 2014-02-10
    Propositional and Nonpropositional Perceiving.Dan D. Crawford - 1974 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35 (December):201-210.
    The general theory of perception proposed by Roderick Chisholm in his book Perceiving: A Philosophical Study1 has gained considerable acceptance among contemporary philosophers of perception. In this paper, I will review and evaluate one part of this theory and show where I believe an important modification is necessary. Chisholm distinguishes what he thinks are two importantly different senses of “perceive,” a propositional and a nonpropositional sense, and then proposes a definition of each. The propositional sense of “perceive” is expressed in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. added 2014-02-10
    Seeing.Richard Severens - 1967 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (December):213-221.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. added 2014-02-10
    Language and Perception.Richard H. Schlagel - 1962 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 23 (December):192-204.
  22. added 2013-02-22
    The Phenomenal Use of 'Look'.Berit Brogaard - forthcoming - Philosophy Compass.
    The article provides the state of the art on the debate about whether the logical form of ‘look’ statements commits us to any particular theory of perceptual experience. The debate began with Frank Jackson’s (1977) argument that ‘look’ statements commit us to a sense-datum theory of perception. Thinkers from different camps have since then offered various rejoinders to Jackson’s argument. Others have provided novel arguments from considerations of the semantics of ‘look’ to particular theories of perception. The article closes with (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. added 2013-02-22
    Perceptual Reports.Berit Brogaard - 2015 - In Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press.
    Perceptual reports are utterances of sentences that contain a perceptual verb, such as ‘look’, ‘sound’, ‘feel’, ‘see’, and ‘perceive’. It is natural to suppose that at least in many cases, these types of reports reflect aspects of the phenomenal character and representational content of a subject’s perceptual experiences. For example, an utterance of ‘my chair looks red but it’s really white’ appears to reflect phenomenal properties of the speaker’s experience of a chair. Whether perceptual reports actually reflect these things is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  24. added 2013-02-22
    Intuitions as Intellectual Seemings.Berit Brogaard - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (4):382-393.
    In Philosophy Without Intuitions Herman Cappelen argues that unlike what is commonly thought, contemporary analytic philosophers do not typically rely on intuitions as evidence. If they do indeed rely on intuitions, that should be evident from their written works, either explicitly in the form of ‘intuition’ talk or by means of other indicators. However, Cappelen argues, while philosophers do engage in ‘intuition’ talk, that is not a good indicator that they rely on intuitions, as ‘intuition’ and its cognates have many (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  25. added 2013-02-22
    Phenomenal Seemings and Sensible Dogmatism.Berit Brogaard - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification. Oup Usa. pp. 270.
  26. added 2013-02-22
    Transient Truths: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Propositions.Berit Brogaard - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    Transient Truths provides the first book-length exposition and defense of the opposing view, temporalism: these are contents that can change their truth-values along with changes in the world.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  27. added 2013-02-22
    Seeing as a Non-Experiental Mental State: The Case From Synesthesia and Visual Imagery.Berit Brogaard - 2012 - In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Neuroscience Series, Synthese Library.
    The paper argues that the English verb ‘to see’ can denote three different kinds of conscious states of seeing, involving visual experiences, visual seeming states and introspective seeming states, respectively. The case for the claim that there are three kinds of seeing comes from synesthesia and visual imagery. Synesthesia is a relatively rare neurological condition in which stimulation in one sensory or cognitive stream involuntarily leads to associated experiences in a second unstimulated stream. Visual synesthesia is often considered a case (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  28. added 2012-10-02
    Love in the Time of Cholera.Benj Hellie - 2014 - In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? Oxford University Press. pp. 241–261.
    We begin with a theory of the structure of sensory consciousness; a target phenomenon of 'presentation' can be clearly located within this structure. We then defend the rational-psychological necessity of presentation. We conclude with discussion of these philosophical challenges to the possibility of presentation. One crucial aspect of the discussion is recognition of the <cite>nonobjectivity</cite> of consciousness (a technical appendix explains what I mean by that). The other is a full-faced stare at the limitations of rational psychology: much of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  29. added 2012-07-14
    Is Perception a Source of Reasons?Santiago Echeverri - 2013 - Theoria 79 (1):22-56.
    It is widely assumed that perception is a source of reasons (SR). There is a weak sense in which this claim is trivially true: even if one characterizes perception in purely causal terms, perceptual beliefs originate from the mind's interaction with the world. When philosophers argue for (SR), however, they have a stronger view in mind: they claim that perception provides pre- or non-doxastic reasons for belief. In this article I examine some ways of developing this view and criticize them. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  30. added 2012-03-11
    Does Propositional Seeing Entail Propositional Knowledge?Craig French - 2012 - Theoria 78 (2):115-127.
    In a 2010 article Turri puts forward some powerful considerations which suggest that Williamson's view of knowledge as the most general factive mental state is false. Turri claims that this view is false since it is false that if S sees that p, then S knows that p. Turri argues that there are cases in which (A) S sees that p but (B) S does not know that p. In response I offer linguistic evidence to suppose that in propositional contexts (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  31. added 2011-01-25
    A Computational Theory of Perspective and Reference in Narrative.Janyce M. Wiebe & William J. Rapaport - 1988 - In Proceedings of the 26th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics. Association for Computational Linguistics. pp. 131-138.
    Narrative passages told from a character's perspective convey the character's thoughts and perceptions. We present a discourse process that recognizes characters'.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  32. added 2011-01-23
    Do 'Looks' Reports Reflect the Contents of Perception?Berit Brogaard - manuscript
    Roderick Chisholm argued that ‘look’ can be used in three different ways: epistemically, comparatively and non-comparatively. Chisholm’s non-comparative sense of ‘look’ played an important role in Frank Jackson’s argument for the sense-datum theory. The question remains..
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  33. added 2010-06-22
    Philosophy and Linguistics.Kumiko Murasugi & Robert Stainton (eds.) - 1998 - Westview Press.
    This edited volume offers ten new essays on semantics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of linguistics by top scholars in the field. Covering a wide range of topics, the collection is sure to be of interest to scholars in those areas as well as some philosophers of mind. Because of the diversity of topics and perspectives inherent in the collection, readers will find both exposition and debate among the contributors.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  34. added 2008-12-31
    On an Argument of Segal’s Against Singular Object-Dependent Thoughts.Teresa Marques - 2006 - Disputatio 2 (21):19-37.
    This paper discusses and criticizes Segal’s 1989 argument against singular object-dependent thoughts. His argument aims at showing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant. My criticism of Segal’s argument has two parts. First, I appeal to common anti-individualist arguments to the effect that Segal’s type of argument only succeeds in establishing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant for those aspects of subjects’ behaviour that do not require reference to external objects. Secondly, Segal’s view on singular thoughts is at odds with his (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. added 2008-12-31
    Perceptual Reports Revisited.James T. Higginbotham - 1999 - In K. Murasugi & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), Philosophy and Linguistics. Westview Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. added 2008-12-31
    Perception and Possibilia.James E. Tomberlin - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:109-115.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  37. added 2008-12-31
    Seeing That and Seeing As.Igal Kvart - 1993 - Noûs 27 (3):279-302.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  38. added 2008-12-31
    The Phenomenal and Other Uses of 'Looks'.J. Barry Maund - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (2):170-180.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  39. added 2008-12-31
    The Logic of Perceptual Reports: An Extensional Alternative to Situation Semantics.James Higginbotham - 1983 - Journal of Philosophy 80 (February):100-127.
  40. added 2008-12-31
    Reference, Reality and Perceptual Fields.Hector-Neri Castaneda - 1980 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 53 (August):763-823.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  41. added 2008-12-31
    The Austin-Malcolm Argument for the Incorrigibility of Perceptual Reports.Gerald Doppelt - 1979 - Dialectica 33 (1):59-75.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. added 2008-12-31
    An Analysis of Two Perceptual Predicates.Russell B. Goodman - 1976 - Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 7 (3):35-53.
  43. added 2008-12-31
    Two Senses of 'Appears Red'.Stephen Leeds - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 28 (September):199-205.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. added 2008-12-31
    Some Uses of 'Appearance'.John B. McClatchey - 1972 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 10 (4):463-469.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. added 2008-12-31
    Dr Kenny's Perceptions.Joyce Trebilcot - 1970 - Mind 79 (January):142-143.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46. added 2008-12-31
    Seeing, Knowing And Believing: A Study Of The Language Of Visual Perception.Jonas F. Soltis - 1966 - Addison-Wesley.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. added 2008-12-31
    Seeming to See.Clement Dore - 1965 - American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (4):312-318.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. added 2008-12-31
    Seeking, Scrutinizing and Seeing.Frank N. Sibley - 1955 - Mind 64 (October):455-478.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  49. added 2008-12-31
    Perception-Statements.John O. Wisdom - 1948 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 49:47-64.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark