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  1. added 2020-05-19
    Navigating Recalcitrant Emotions.Alex Grzankowski - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
    In discussions of the metaphysics and normativity of the emotions, it is commonplace to wheel out examples of (for instance) people who know that rollercoasters aren’t dangerous but who fear them anyway. Such cases are well known to have been troubling for Cognitivists who hold the emotions are (at least in part) judgements or beliefs. But more recently, the very theories that emerged from the failure of Cognitivism (Perceptual theories and other Neo-Cognitivist approaches) have been argued to face trouble as (...)
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  2. added 2020-05-04
    A Nietzschean Theory of Emotional Experience: Affect as Feeling Towards Value.Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper offers a Nietzschean theory of emotion as expressed by following thesis: paradigmatic emotional experiences exhibit a distinctive kind of affective intentionality, specified in terms of felt valenced attitudes towards the (apparent) evaluative properties of their objects. Emotional experiences, on this Nietzschean view, are therefore fundamentally feelings towards value. This interpretation explains how Nietzschean affects can have evaluative intentional content without being constituted by cognitive states, as these feelings towards value are neither reducible to, nor to be thought along (...)
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  3. added 2020-04-28
    Recalcitrant Emotions: A Phenomenological View.Kristjan Laasik - 2020 - Problemos 97.
    In this paper, I sketch an account of emotion that is based on a close analogy with a Husserlian account of perception. I also make use of the approach that I have limned, viz., to articulate a view of the kind of “conflict without contradiction” which may obtain between a recalcitrant emotion and a judgment. My main contention is that CWC can be accounted for by appeal to the rationality of perception and emotion, conceived as responsiveness to experiential evidence. The (...)
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  4. added 2020-01-22
    Emoțiile și inteligența emoțională în organizații.Nicolae Sfetcu - 2020 - Drobeta Turnu Severin: MultiMedia Publishing.
    O argumentare a importanței dualiste a emoțiilor în societate, individual și la nivel de comunitate. Tendința actuală de conștientizare și control al emoțiilor prin inteligența emoțională are un efect benefic în afaceri și pentru succesul activităților sociale dar, dacă nu suntem atenți, poate duce la o alienare ireversibilă la nivel individual și social. Lucrarea se compune din trei părți principale: Emoții (Modele ale emoțiilor, Procesarea emoțiilor, Fericirea, Filosofia emoțiilor, Etica emotiilor), Inteligența emoțională (Modele ale inteligenței emoționale, Inteligența emoțională în cercetare (...)
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  5. added 2019-12-18
    A perceptual theory of moods.Mauro Rossi - forthcoming - Synthese:1-29.
    The goal of this paper is to offer a new theory of moods, according to which moods are perceptual experiences that represent undetermined objects as possessing specific evaluative properties. I start by listing a series of features that moods are typically taken to possess and claim that a satisfactory theory of moods must be able either to explain why moods genuinely possess these features or to explain these appearances away in a non-ad hoc way. I show that my account provides (...)
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  6. added 2019-12-11
    The Attitudinal Opacity of Emotional Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    According to some philosophers, when introspectively attending to experience, we seem to see right through it to the (apparent) objects outside, including their properties. This is called the transparency of experience. This paper examines whether, and in what sense, emotions are transparent. It argues that emotional experiences are opaque in a distinctive way: introspective attention to them does not principally reveal non-intentional somatic qualia but rather felt valenced intentional attitudes. As such, emotional experience is attitudinally opaque.
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  7. added 2019-10-05
    Understanding Meta-Emotions: Prospects for a Perceptualist Account.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):505-523.
    This article clarifies the nature of meta-emotions, and it surveys the prospects of applying a version of the perceptualist model of emotions to them. It first considers central aspects of their intentionality and phenomenal character. It then applies the perceptualist model to meta-emotions, addressing issues of evaluative content and the normative dimension of meta-emotional experience. Finally, in considering challenges and objections, it assesses the perceptualist model, concluding that its application to meta-emotions is an attractive extension of the theory, insofar as (...)
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  8. added 2019-09-27
    Christine Tappolet: Emotions, Value and Agency (New York: Oxford University Press 2016). [REVIEW]Jean Moritz Müller - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.
  9. added 2019-09-09
    Sur la phénoménologie évaluative et le caractère approprié des émotions.Stéphane Lemaire - 2018 - Philosophiques 45 (2):489-498.
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  10. added 2019-06-15
    Response-Dependent Normative Properties and the Epistemic Account of Emotion.Jean Moritz Müller - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-10.
    It is popular to hold that our primary epistemic access to specific response-dependent properties like the fearsome or admirable (or so-called ‘affective properties’) is constituted by the corresponding emotion. I argue that this view is incompatible with a widely held meta-ethical view, according to which affective properties have deontic force. More specifically, I argue that this view cannot accommodate for the requirement that deontic entities provide guidance. If affective properties are to guide the formation of the corresponding emotion, our primary (...)
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  11. added 2019-06-15
    The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling: On Affect and Intentionality.Jean Moritz Müller - 2019 - Cham, Schweiz: Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book engages with what are widely recognized as the two core dimensions of emotion. When we are afraid, glad or disappointed, we feel a certain way; moreover, our emotion is intentional or directed at something: we are afraid of something, glad or disappointed about something. Connecting with a vital strand of recent philosophical thinking, I conceive of these two aspects of emotion as unified. Examining different possible ways of developing the view that the feeling dimension of emotion is itself (...)
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  12. added 2019-06-06
    Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology. [REVIEW]Michael Lacewing - 2004 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (1):105-108.
  13. added 2019-02-08
    Emotions and Formal Objects.Fabrice Teroni - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):395-415.
    It is often claimed that emotions are linked to formal objects. But what are formal objects? What roles do they play? According to some philosophers, formal objects are axiological properties which individuate emotions, make them intelligible and give their correctness conditions. In this paper, I evaluate these claims in order to answer the above questions. I first give reasons to doubt the thesis that formal objects individuate emotions. Second, I distinguish different ways in which emotions are intelligible and argue that (...)
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  14. added 2019-01-30
    Knowing Emotions: Truthfulness and Recognition in Affective Experience. [REVIEW]Cecilea Mun - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277):869-871.
    Review of Knowing Emotions: Truthfulness and Recognition in Affective Experience by Rick A. Furtak.
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  15. added 2019-01-10
    Epistemic Perceptualism, Skill, and the Regress Problem.J. Adam Carter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies:1-26.
    A novel solution is offered for how emotional experiences can function as sources of immediate prima facie justification for evaluative beliefs, and in such a way that suffices to halt a justificatory regress. Key to this solution is the recognition of two distinct kinds of emotional skill (what I call generative emotional skill and doxastic emotional skill) and how these must be working in tandem when emotional experience plays such a justificatory role. The paper has two main parts, the first (...)
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  16. added 2018-09-26
    Précis of Emotions, Values, and Agency.Christine Tappolet - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):494-499.
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  17. added 2018-08-15
    Can Emotional Feelings Represent Significant Relations?Larry Herzberg - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (2):215-234.
    Jesse Prinz (2004) argues that emotional feelings (“state emotions”) can by themselves perceptually represent significant organism-environment relations. I object to this view mainly on the grounds that (1) it does not rule out the at least equally plausible view that emotional feelings are non-representational sensory registrations rather than perceptions, as Tyler Burge (2010) draws the distinction, and (2) perception of a relation requires perception of at least one of the relation’s relata, but an emotional feeling by itself perceives neither the (...)
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  18. added 2018-06-06
    What Kind of Evaluative States Are Emotions? The Attitudinal Theory Vs. The Perceptual Theory of Emotions.Mauro Rossi & Christine Tappolet - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):544-563.
    This paper argues that Deonna and Teroni's attitudinal theory of emotions faces two serious problems. The first is that their master argument fails to establish the central tenet of the theory, namely, that the formal objects of emotions do not feature in the content of emotions. The second is that the attitudinal theory itself is vulnerable to a dilemma. By pointing out these problems, our paper provides indirect support to the main competitor of the attitudinal theory, namely, the perceptual theory (...)
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  19. added 2018-02-17
    Ambivalent Emotions and the Perceptual Account of Emotions.Christine Tappolet - 2005 - Analysis 65 (3):229-233.
    This paper replies to an argument due to Greenspan (1980) and to Morton (2002) against the view that emotions are perceptions of values. The argument holds that this view cannot make room for ambivalent emotions both of which are appropriate, such as when it is appropriate to feel fear and attraction towards something. This would make for a contradiction, for appropriate emotions are supposed to present things as they are. The problem, I argue, is that this line of thoughts forgets (...)
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  20. added 2018-01-25
    Are Emotions Perceptions of Value (and Why This Matters)?Charlie Kurth, Enter Author Name Without Selecting A. Profile: Haley Crosby & Enter Author Name Without Selecting A. Profile: Jack Basse - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    In Emotions, Values & Agency, Christine Tappolet develops a sophisticated, perceptual theory of emotions and their role in wide range of issues in value theory and epistemology. In this paper, we raise three worries about Tappolet's proposal.
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  21. added 2017-12-05
    Ambivalence, Emotional Perceptions, and the Concern with Objectivity.Hili Razinsky - 2017 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 4 (2):211-228.
    Hili Razinsky, free downlad at link. ABSTRACT: Emotional perceptions are objectivist (objectivity-directed or cognitive) and conscious, both attributes suggesting they cannot be ambivalent. Yet perceptions, including emotional perceptions of value, allow for strictly objectivist ambivalence in which a person unitarily perceives the object in mutually undermining ways. Emotional perceptions became an explicandum of emotion for philosophers who are sensitive to the unique conscious character of emotion, impressed by the objectivist character of perceptions, and believe that the perceptual account solves a (...)
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  22. added 2017-11-08
    How (Not) to Think of Emotions as Evaluative Attitudes.Jean Moritz Müller - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):281-308.
    It is popular to hold that emotions are evaluative. On the standard account, the evaluative character of emotion is understood in epistemic terms: emotions apprehend or make us aware of value properties. As this account is commonly elaborated, emotions are experiences with evaluative intentional content. In this paper, I am concerned with a recent alternative proposal on how emotions afford awareness of value. This proposal does not ascribe evaluative content to emotions, but instead conceives of them as evaluative at the (...)
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  23. added 2017-11-05
    Emotion as Position-Taking.Jean Mueller - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (3):525-540.
    It is a popular thought that emotions play an important epistemic role. Thus, a considerable number of philosophers find it compelling to suppose that emotions apprehend the value of objects and events in our surroundings. I refer to this view as the Epistemic View of emotion. In this paper, my concern is with a rivaling picture of emotion, which has so far received much less attention. On this account, emotions do not constitute a form of epistemic access to specific axiological (...)
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  24. added 2017-10-21
    Fears as Conscious Perceivings.Kristjan Laasik - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (3):747-760.
    Peter Goldie has argued for the view that the intentionality of emotions is inseparable from their phenomenology, but certain criticisms have revealed his argument as problematic. I will argue that it is possible to address these problems, at least in the case of the emotion of fear, thereby vindicating IPE, by appeal to a Husserlian version of the perceptual account of emotions, centered on the idea that the contents of perceptual experiences are fulfillment conditions. Fulfillment means the achievement of a (...)
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  25. added 2017-10-13
    Moods, Colored Lenses, and Emotional Disconnection: A Comment on Gallegos.Bartek Chomanski - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (3):625-632.
    In “Moods Are Not Colored Lenses: Perceptualism and the Phenomenology of Moods” Francisco Gallegos presents a challenge to popular view about the phenomenology of being in a mood that he calls “perceptualism”. In this essay, I offer a partial defense of perceptualism about moods and argue that perceptualism and Gallegos’s preferred Heideggerian alternative need not be viewed as in opposition to one another.
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  26. added 2017-09-14
    Emotional Justification.Santiago Echeverri - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):541-566.
    Theories of emotional justification investigate the conditions under which emotions are epistemically justified or unjustified. I make three contributions to this research program. First, I show that we can generalize some familiar epistemological concepts and distinctions to emotional experiences. Second, I use these concepts and distinctions to display the limits of the ‘simple view’ of emotional justification. On this approach, the justification of emotions stems only from the contents of the mental states they are based on, also known as their (...)
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  27. added 2017-06-18
    Emoción y percepción: una aproximación ecológica.José Ramón Torices - 2017 - Análisis Filosófico 37 (1):5-26.
    The aim of this paper is to sketch a theory of emotion. Our thesis is that emotional experience is a type of perceptual experience. Agents perceive emotionally the world whose objects and situations present to them as being relevant to their well-being and they do it by means of practical relations towards their environment. Our proposal attempts to avoid, in this way, the problem of some classical theories of emotions such as James’s theory of emotions as feelings and cognitivist theories (...)
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  28. added 2017-06-16
    Gefühle und Gedanken. Entwurf einer adverbialen Emotionstheorie.Anja Berninger - 2017 - Münster: Mentis.
  29. added 2017-03-13
    Moods Are Not Colored Lenses: Perceptualism and the Phenomenology of Moods.Francisco Gallegos - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1497-1513.
    Being in a mood—such as an anxious, irritable, depressed, tranquil, or cheerful mood—tends to alter the way we react emotionally to the particular objects we encounter. But how, exactly, do moods alter the way we experience particular objects? Perceptualism, a popular approach to understanding affective experiences, holds that moods function like "colored lenses," altering the way we perceive the evaluative properties of the objects we encounter. In this essay, I offer a phenomenological analysis of the experience of being in a (...)
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  30. added 2017-03-08
    Emotional Experience: Affective Consciousness and its Role in Emotion Theory.Fabrice Teroni & Julien Deonna - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    This paper explores substantive accounts of emotional phenomenology so as to see whether it sheds light on key features of emotions. To this end, we focus on four features that can be introduced by way of an example. Say Sam is angry at Maria’s nasty remark. The first feature relates to the fact that anger is a negative emotion, by contrast with positive emotions such as joy and admiration (valence). The second feature is how anger differs from other emotions such (...)
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  31. added 2017-03-08
    Emotionally Charged: The Puzzle of Affective Valence.Fabrice Teroni - forthcoming - In Fabrice Teroni, Christine Tappolet & Anita Konzelmann Ziv (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Emotions: Shadows of the Soul. New York, USA: Routledge.
  32. added 2017-03-08
    The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction.Julien Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2012 - Routledge.
    The emotions are at the centre of our lives and, for better or worse, imbue them with much of their significance. The philosophical problems stirred up by the existence of the emotions, over which many great philosophers of the past have laboured, revolve around attempts to understand what this significance amounts to. Are emotions feelings, thoughts, or experiences? If they are experiences, what are they experiences of? Are emotions rational? In what sense do emotions give meaning to what surrounds us? (...)
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  33. added 2017-03-02
    Delectatio, Gaudium, Fruitio. Three Kinds of Pleasure for Three Kinds of Knowledge in Thomas Aquinas.Daniel De Haan - 2015 - Quaestio 15:543-552.
    This paper investigates Thomas Aquinas’s threefold division of pleasure into delectatio, gaudium, and fruitio, and its taxonomical basis in his threefold division of knowledge into tactility, the cogitative power, and the intellect. -/- Thomas Aquinas distinguishes three ways in which the sensory and intellectual appetites rest in the good. When the will rests in the intellectually apprehended good, this act is called fruitio; when the concupiscible appetite rests in a good apprehended by the internal senses this passion is called gaudium; (...)
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  34. added 2016-12-23
    Thinking Sadly: In Favor of an Adverbial Theory of Emotions.Anja Berninger - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):799-812.
    Introspective as well as empirical evidence indicates that emotions shape our thinking in numerous ways. Yet, this modificatory aspect of emotions has received relatively little interest in the philosophy of emotion. I give a detailed account of this aspect. Drawing both on the work of William James and adverbialist conceptions of perception, I sketch a theory of emotions that takes these aspects into consideration and suggest that we should understand emotions as manners of thinking.
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  35. added 2016-12-23
    Horror, Fear, and the Sartrean Account of Emotions.Andreas Elpidorou - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (2):209-225.
    Phenomenological approaches to affectivity have long recognized the vital role that emotions occupy in our lives. In this paper, I engage with Jean-Paul Sartre's well-known and highly influential theory of the emotions as it is advanced in his Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions. I examine whether Sartre's account offers two inconsistent explications of the nature of emotions. I argue that despite appearances there is a reading of Sartre's theory that is free of inconsistencies. Ultimately, I highlight a novel (...)
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  36. added 2016-12-23
    From Affect Programs to Dynamical Discrete Emotions.Giovanna Colombetti - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):407-425.
    According to Discrete Emotion Theory, a number of emotions are distinguishable on the basis of neural, physiological, behavioral and expressive features. Critics of this view emphasize the variability and context-sensitivity of emotions. This paper discusses some of these criticisms, and argues that they do not undermine the claim that emotions are discrete. This paper also presents some works in dynamical affective science, and argues that to conceive of discrete emotions as self-organizing and softly assembled patterns of various processes accounts more (...)
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  37. added 2016-12-08
    Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions.Robert C. Solomon (ed.) - 2004 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Philosophers since Aristotle have explored emotion, and the study of emotion has always been essential to the love of wisdom. In recent years Anglo-American philosophers have rediscovered and placed new emphasis on this very old discipline. The view that emotions are ripe for philosophical analysis has been supported by a considerable number of excellent publications. In this volume, Robert Solomon brings together some of the best Anglo-American philosophers now writing on the philosophy of emotion, with chapters from philosophers who have (...)
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  38. added 2016-11-03
    Posidonije o Emocijama I Nekonceptualnom Sadržaju.Bill Wringe - 2011 - Prolegomena 10 (2):185-213.
    In this paper I argue that the work of the unorthodox Stoic Posidonius - as reported to us by Galen - can be seen as making an interesting contribution to contemporary debates about the nature of emotion. Richard Sorabji has already argued that Posidonius' contribution highlights the weaknesses in some well-known contemporary forms of cognitivism. Here I argue that Posidonius might be seen as advocating a theory of the emotions which sees them as being, in at least some cases, two-level (...)
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  39. added 2016-10-07
    L'intéressant.Anne Meylan - 2017 - In Julien Deonna & Emma Tieffenbach (eds.), Petit dictionnaire des valeurs. Paris, France: Ithaque. pp. 178-186.
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  40. added 2016-08-18
    Natural Kinds, Social Constructions, and Ordinary Language: Clarifying the Crisis in the Science of Emotion.Cecilea Mun - 2016 - Journal of Social Ontology 2 (2):247-269.
    I argue for the importance of clarifying the distinction between metaphysical, semantic, and meta-semantic concerns regarding what Emotion is. This allows us to see that those involved in the Scientific Emotion Project and the Folk Emotion Project are in fact involved in the same project – the Science of Emotion. It also helps us understand why questions regarding the natural kind status of Emotion, as well as answers to questions regarding the value of ordinary language emotion terms or concepts to (...)
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  41. added 2016-06-19
    Emotion, Meaning, and Appraisal Theory.Michael McEachrane - 2009 - Theory and Psychology 19 (1):33-53.
    According to psychological emotion theories referred to as appraisal theory, emotions are caused by appraisals (evaluative judgments). Borrowing a term from Jan Smedslund, it is the contention of this article that psychological appraisal theory is “pseudoempirical” (i.e., misleadingly or incorrectly empirical). In the article I outline what makes some scientific psychology “pseudoempirical,” distinguish my view on this from Jan Smedslund’s, and then go on to show why paying heed to the ordinary meanings of emotion terms is relevant to psychology, and (...)
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  42. added 2016-03-08
    Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience, by Michael S. Brady. [REVIEW]Carolyn Price - 2015 - Mind 124 (496):1240-1244.
    A review of Michael Brady's book Emotional Insight.
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  43. added 2015-09-18
    Emotional Insight, by Michael S. Brady: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, Pp. X + 204, £30.Hagit Benbaji - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):173-175.
  44. added 2015-09-15
    Review: On Romantic Love, Berit Brogaard. [REVIEW]Hichem Naar - 2015 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 9.
  45. added 2015-08-21
    Boundaries Perceptual Theory of Emotions.Juraj Hvorecky - 2011 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 18:102-114.
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  46. added 2015-08-21
    Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion.Jesse J. Prinz - 2004 - Oup Usa.
    Gut Reactions is an interdisciplinary defense of the claim that emotions are perceptions in a double sense. First of all, they are perceptions of changes in the body, but, through the body, they also allow us to literally perceive danger, loss, and other matters of concern. This proposal, which Prinz calls the embodied appraisal theory, reconciles the long standing debate between those who say emotions are cognitive and those who say they are noncognitive. The basic idea behind embodied appraisals is (...)
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  47. added 2015-08-21
    Emotion as Perception: The Cognitive Role of Emotion.Teresa E. Lowe - 1989 - Dissertation, Cornell University
    I argue that emotions are analogous to sense perceptions insofar as both convey information about the external world. Sense perceptions possess the ability to carry information about the world because they are caused in a regular way by the world, and the same should be true of emotions. In order to establish the analogy, I discuss critically both the assumptions about knowledge and perception and the assumptions about emotion that underlie the widespread view that emotions could not possibly carry information. (...)
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  48. added 2015-04-02
    Emotions as Attitudes.Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (3):293-311.
    In this paper, we develop a fresh understanding of the sense in which emotions are evaluations. We argue that we should not follow mainstream accounts in locating the emotion–value connection at the level of content and that we should instead locate it at the level of attitudes or modes. We begin by explaining the contrast between content and attitude, a contrast in the light of which we review the leading contemporary accounts of the emotions. We next offer reasons to think (...)
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  49. added 2014-12-28
    Understanding the Dimensional Nature of Alexithymia.Jennifer Primmer - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (9-10):9-10.
    In this paper, I explore how best to conceptualize the nature of alexithymia. I argue that the condition is best understood as a dimensional construct; as such, it is likely that there exist various degrees of alexithymia. Moreover, I explore the merits of two analogies that others have used to try to understand the nature of alexithymia: one characterizes the condition as an analogue of associative visual object agnosia, and the other characterizes it as the emotional equivalent of blindsight. I (...)
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  50. added 2014-12-08
    Emotions: Philosophical Issues About.Julien Deonna, Christine Tappolet & Fabrice Teroni - 2015 - WIREs Cognitive Science 1:193-207.
    We start this overview by discussing the place of emotions within the broader affective domain – how different are emotions from moods, sensations and affective dispositions? Next, we examine the way emotions relate to their objects, emphasizing in the process their intimate relations to values. We move from this inquiry into the nature of emotion to an inquiry into their epistemology. Do they provide reasons for evaluative judgements and, more generally, do they contribute to our knowledge of values? We then (...)
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