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According to the perdurantist, persisting objects are “space-time worms.” That is, persisting objects are spread out in time in much the same way as how they are spread out in space—just has I have spatial parts (e.g. hand parts and a head part) which occupy spatial subregions of the greater spatial region I now occupy, I have temporal parts (e.g. me when I was an infant, me now) which occupy temporal subregions of the greater temporal region I occupy. Properly understood, the perdurantist maintains, I am a four-dimensional fusion of all these spatio-temporal parts. Perdurantists face a variety of challenges. It’s not very intuitive, some say, and this is reason to reject the view. Others argue that there are strong disanalogies between time and space which undermine the parallels between spatial parts and temporal parts that perdurantism relies upon. Then there are those who find the notion temporal parts simply unintelligible. In addition to trying to address these and other issues, perdurantists argue that their theory of persistence has a variety of virtues—including, for instance, a natural compatibility with relativistic physics.

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126 found
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1 — 50 / 126
  1. added 2018-11-10
    Functional Anatomy: A Taxonomic Proposal.Ingvar Johansson, Barry Smith, Katherine Dormandy [nee Munn], Kathleen Elsner, Nikoloz Tsikolia & DIrk Siebert - 2005 - Acta Biotheoretica 53 (3):153-166.
    It is argued that medical science requires a classificatory system that (a) puts functions in the taxonomic center and (b) does justice ontologically to the difference between the processes which are the realizations of functions and the objects which are their bearers. We propose formulae for constructing such a system and describe some of its benefits. The arguments are general enough to be of interest to all the life sciences.
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  2. added 2018-08-18
    Fragmentalist Presentist Perdurantism.Samuele Iaquinto - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-11.
    Perdurantists think of continuants as mereological sums of stages (that is, sums of instantaneous spatiotemporal parts) from different times. This view of persistence would force us to drop the idea that there is genuine change in the world. By exploiting a presentist metaphysics, Brogaard (2000) proposed a theory, called presentist four-dimensionalism, that aims to reconcile perdurantism with the idea that things undergo real change. However, her proposal commits us to reject the idea that stages must exist in their entirety. Giving (...)
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  3. added 2018-07-21
    Non-Branching Personal Persistence.Johan E. Gustafsson - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    Given reductionism about people, personal persistence must fundamentally consist in some kind of impersonal continuity relation. Typically, these continuity relations can hold from one to many. And, if they can, the analysis of personal persistence must include a non-branching clause to avoid non-transitive identities or multiple occupancy. It is far from obvious, however, what form this clause should take. This paper argues that previous accounts are inadequate and develops a new proposal.
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  4. added 2018-04-09
    Mctaggart’s Paradox.Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson - 2016 - Routledge.
    McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time, first published in 1908, set the agenda for 20th-century philosophy of time. Yet there is very little agreement on what it actually says—nobody agrees with the conclusion, but still everybody finds something important in it. This book presents the first critical overview of the last century of debate on what is popularly called "McTaggart’s Paradox". Scholars have long assumed that McTaggart’s argument stands alone and does not rely on any contentious ontological principles. The (...)
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  5. added 2018-02-17
    Perdurance and Psychological Continuity.Trenton Merricks - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):195-198.
    If persons endure, personal identity cannot be analyzed in terms of psychological continuity. That is one conclusion defended in my "Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity". Rea and Silver claim that my argument for that conclusion is sound only if a parallel argument is sound. The parallel argument concludes that if persons perdure, personal identity cannot be analyzed in terms of psychological continuity. In this paper, I show that Rea and Silver are mistaken. My argument is sound (...)
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  6. added 2018-02-16
    Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 5.Dean Zimmerman (ed.) - 2009 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is the forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. Much of the most interesting work in philosophy today is metaphysical in character: this series is a much-needed focus for it. OSM offers a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighbouring fields, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. Besides (...)
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  7. added 2017-12-05
    A Reason for the Non-Specialist to Care About the Metaphysics of Properties and Persistence.Daniel Giberman - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (2):162-177.
    We have compelling extra-philosophical reasons for caring about identity, parthood, and location. For example, we desire ceteris paribus that nothing every part of which is very near to our location be very near to the location of something dangerous, evil, or otherwise unpleasant. This essay argues that such considerations are relevant to certain first-order metaphysical debates, namely, the debates over immanent universals and tropes and endurantism and perdurantism, respectively. As a consequence, even the non-specialist has a reason to care about (...)
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  8. added 2017-05-05
    Restricted Diachronic Composition and Special Relativity.Stephan Torre - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (2):235-255.
    When do objects at different times compose a further object? This is the question of diachronic composition. The universalist answers, ‘under any conditions whatsoever’. Others argue for restrictions on diachronic composition: composition occurs only when certain conditions are met. Recently, some philosophers have argued that restrictions on diachronic compositions are motivated by our best physical theories. In Persistence and Spacetime and elsewhere, Yuri Balashov argues that diachronic compositions are restricted in terms of causal connections between object stages. In a recent (...)
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  9. added 2017-04-04
    Names Introduced with the Help of Unsatisfied Sortal Predicates.Tobias Hansson Wahlberg - 2010 - Axiomathes 20 (4):511-514.
    In this paper I answer Aranyosi’s (Axiomathes 19(2):223–224, 2009) criticism of my “Is Phosphorus Hesperus?” (Axiomathes 19(1):101–102, 2009).
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  10. added 2017-03-20
    Comments on Varzi.Fabrice Correia - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (4):499–502.
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  11. added 2017-03-13
    Parfitians as Exdurantists.Fabio Patrone - 2017 - Axiomathes (6):1-9.
    Derek Parfit’s thesis that identity doesn’t matter in survival has been extensively discussed except for its metaphysical robustness. How can we justify the abandonment of identity in the way Parfit suggests? My argument is the following. Those who want to endorse the thesis that identity doesn’t matter (and, therefore, abandon identity across time) should adopt exdurantism, i.e. a metaphysics according to which the world is composed by temporal parts each existing at a time and according to which there is nothing (...)
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  12. added 2017-03-13
    Is Time Travel a Problem for the Three-Dimensionalist?Jonathan Simon - 2005 - The Monist 88 (3):353-361.
  13. added 2017-03-06
    The Limit Decision Problem and Four-Dimensionalism.Costa Damiano - 2017 - Vivarium 55 (1-3):199-216.
    I argue that medieval solutions to the limit decision problem imply four-dimensionalism, i.e. the view according to which substances that persist through time are extended through time as well as through space, and have different temporal parts at different times.
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  14. added 2017-03-04
    Ought a Four-Dimensionalist To Believe in Temporal Parts?Kristie Miller - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):619-646.
    This paper presents the strongest version of a non-perdurantist four-dimensionalism: a theory according to which persisting objects are four-dimensionally extended in space-time, but not in virtue of having maximal temporal parts. The aims of considering such a view are twofold. First, to evaluate whether such an account could provide a plausible middle ground between the two main competitor accounts of persistence: three-dimensionalism and perdurantist four-dimensionalism. Second, to see what light such a theory sheds on the debate between these two competitor (...)
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  15. added 2017-01-15
    On Presentist Perdurantism.Jiri Benovksy - 2007 - SATS 8 (2).
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  16. added 2017-01-15
    A Flawed Argument for Perdurance.H. W. Noonan - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):213-215.
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  17. added 2017-01-14
    Theories of Persistence.Ryan Wasserman - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):243-250.
    The debate over persistence is often cast as a disagreement between two rival theories—the perdurantist theory that objects persist through time by having different temporal parts at different times, and the endurantist theory that objects persist through time by being wholly present at different times. This way of framing the debate over persistence involves both an important insight and an important error. Unfortunately, the error is often embraced and the insight is often ignored. This paper aims to correct both of (...)
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  18. added 2016-12-18
    Homunculi Are People Too! Lewis's Definition of Personhood Debugged.Cody Gilmore - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):54-60.
    David Lewis defends the following "non-circular definition of personhood": "something is a continuant person if and only if it is a maximal R-interrelated aggregate of person-stages. That is: if and only if it is an aggregate of person-stages, each of which is R-related to all the rest (and to itself), and it is a proper part of no other such aggregate." I give a counterexample, involving a person who is a part of another, much larger person, with a separate mental (...)
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  19. added 2016-12-08
    Endurantism Vs. Perdurantism?: A Debate Reconsidered.Ofra Magidor - 2016 - Noûs 50 (3):509-532.
    One of the central debates in contemporary metaphysics has been the debate between endurantism and perdurantism about persistence. In this paper I argue that much of this debate has been misconstrued: most of the arguments in the debate crucially rely on theses which are strictly orthogonal to the endurantism/perdurantism debate. To show this, I note that the arguments in the endurantism/perdurantism debate typically take the following form: one presents a challenge that endurantists allegedly have some trouble addressing, and to which (...)
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  20. added 2016-12-08
    Psychological Continuity and the Necessity of Identity.Robert Francescotti - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):337-350.
  21. added 2016-12-08
    Temporally Incongruent Counterparts.Hud Hudson - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):337 - 343.
    Despite its first page this paper is not yet another piece on Kant! Rather, the paper is a contribution to the literature on incongruent counterparts. Specifically, it concerns the question of whether we can construct a temporal version of the puzzle of incongruent counterparts--a question which (as far as I can tell) has been thoroughly neglected. I maintain that we can construct such a version of the puzzle, and that this temporal variant on the phenomenon has something to teach us (...)
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  22. added 2016-12-08
    On Staying the Same.J. Stone - 2003 - Analysis 63 (4):288-291.
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  23. added 2016-03-01
    Persisting Particulars and Their Properties.Kristie Miller - 2016 - In Francesco Federico Calemi (ed.), Metaphysics and Scientific Realism: Essays in Honour of David Malet Armstrong. De Gruyter. pp. 139-160.
    My present inclination is to say that both identity and relational analyses are intelligible hypotheses. I reject the identity analysis, looking rather to relations between different phases to secure the unity of a particular over time. But I do not think that the identity view can be rejected as illogical. If it is to be rejected, then I think it must be rejected for Occamist reasons. The different phases exist, and so do their relations. These phases so related, it seems, (...)
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  24. added 2016-03-01
    There is No Simpliciter Simpliciter.Kristie Miller & David Braddon-Mitchell - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):249-278.
    This paper identifies problems with indexicalism and abverbialism about temporary intrinsic properties, and solves them by disentangling two senses in which a particular may possess a property simpliciter. The first sense is the one identified by adverbialists in which a particular possesses at all times the property as a matter of foundational metaphysical fact regardless of whether it is manifest. The second involves building on adverbialism to produce a semantics for property-manifestation according to which different members of a family of (...)
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  25. added 2016-03-01
    Talking About a Universalist World.David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (3):499-534.
    The paper defends a combination of perdurantism with mereological universalism by developing semantics of temporary predications of the sort ’some P is/was/will be (a) Q’. We argue that, in addition to the usual application of causal and other restrictions on sortals, the grammatical form of such statements allows for rather different regimentations along three separate dimensions, according to: (a) whether ‘P’ and ‘Q’ are being used as phase or substance sortal terms, (b) whether ‘is’, ‘was’, and ‘will be’ are the (...)
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  26. added 2016-03-01
    The Metaphysical Equivalence Of Three And Four Dimensionalism.Kristie Miller - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (1):91-117.
    I argue that two competing accounts of persistence, three and four dimensionalism, are in fact metaphysically equivalent. I begin by clearly defining three and four dimensionalism, and then I show that the two theories are intertranslatable and equally simple. Through consideration of a number of different cases where intuitions about persistence are contradictory, I then go on to show that both theories describe these cases in the same manner. Further consideration of some empirical issues arising from the theory of special (...)
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  27. added 2016-03-01
    The Loneliness of Stages.D. Braddon-Mitchell & K. Miller - 2004 - Analysis 64 (3):235-242.
    Harold Noonan has recently argued (2003) that one of Lewis’s (1983: 76– 77) arguments for the view that objects persist by perduring is flawed. Lewis’s argument can be divided into two main sections, the first of which attempts to show that it is possible that there exists a world of temporal parts or stages, and the second, which attempts to show that our world is such a world. Noonan claims that there is a flaw in each of these two stages.We (...)
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  28. added 2016-02-26
    Endurance, Perdurance and Metaontology.Jiri Benovsky - 2011 - SATS 12 (2).
    The recent debate in metaontology gave rise to several types of (more or less classical) answers to questions about "equivalences" between metaphysical theories and to the question whether metaphysical disputes are substantive or merely verbal (i.e. various versions of realism, strong anti-realism, moderate anti-realism, or epistemicism). In this paper, I want to do two things. First, I shall have a close look at one metaphysical debate that has been the target and center of interest of many meta-metaphysicians, namely the problem (...)
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  29. added 2016-02-26
    Can Things Endure in Tenseless Time.Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson - 2009 - SATS 10 (1):79-99.
    It has been argued that the tenseless view of time is incompatible with endurantism. This has been disputed, perhaps most famously by Hugh Mellor and Peter Simons. They argue that things can endure in tenseless time, and indeed must endure if tenseless time is to contain change. In this paper I will point out some difficulties with Mellor’s and Simons’ claims that in tenseless time a particular can be ‘wholly present’ at various times, and therefore endure, as well as have (...)
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  30. added 2016-02-26
    Temporal Parity and the Problem of Change.Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson - 2001 - SATS 2 (2):60-79.
    I discuss the general form of arguments that profess to prove that the view that things endure in tensed time through causally produced change (the dynamic view) must be false because it involves contradictions. I argue that these arguments implicitly presuppose what has been called the temporal parity thesis, i.e. that all moments of time are equally existent and real, and that this thesis must be understood as the denial of the dynamic view. When this implicit premise is made explicit, (...)
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  31. added 2015-10-31
    Mereological Sums and Singular Terms.Kathrin Koslicki - 2014 - In Shieva Kleinschmidt (ed.), Mereology and Location. Oxford University Press. pp. 209-235.
    The relative merits of standard mereology have received quite a bit of attention in recent years from metaphysicians concerned with the part/whole properties of material objects. A question that has not been pursued to the same degree, however, is what sort of semantic repercussions a commitment to mereological sums in the standard sense might have in particular on the predicted behavior of singular terms and our practices of using such terms to refer to objects. The apparent mismatch between our actual (...)
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  32. added 2015-10-31
    The Crooked Path From Vagueness to Four-Dimensionalism.Kathrin Koslicki - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):107 - 134.
    The main goal of Sider’s book, Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time, is to show why his version of four- dimensionalism, the stage-theory, on balance, should be preferred over its main competitors: it is, in his view, the theory which presents the best unified treatment of a wide range of central metaphysical puzzles; the theory which has, on balance, “the most important advantages and the least serious drawbacks” (ibid., p. 140). I argue in this paper that, when we add (...)
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  33. added 2015-10-31
    Review of Theodore Sider, Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. [REVIEW]Kathrin Koslicki - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (1):110-113.
  34. added 2015-09-03
    Temporal Parts And Temporary Intrinsics.Andrew Botterell - 2004 - Metaphysica 5 (2):5-23.
    In this paper I consider an objection that friends of the Metaphysic of Temporal Parts (MTP) press against other solutions to the problem of temporary intrinsics and turn it against the MTP itself. I do not argue that the MTP must be false, nor do I argue that there are no arguments in favor of the MTP. Rather, the conclusion I draw is conditional: if the MTP provides an adequate response to the problem of temporary intrinsics, then the MTP provides (...)
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  35. added 2015-08-26
    I—What is a Continuant?Helen Steward - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):109-123.
    In this paper, I explore the question what a continuant is, in the context of a very interesting suggestion recently made by Rowland Stout, as part of his attempt to develop a coherent ontology of processes. Stout claims that a continuant is best thought of as something that primarily has its properties at times, rather than atemporally—and that on this construal, processes should count as continuants. While accepting that Stout is onto something here, I reject his suggestion that we should (...)
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  36. added 2015-07-28
    Enduring and Perduring Objects in Minkowski.Yuri Balashov - unknown
    I examine the issue of persistence over time in the context of the special theory of relativity (SR). The four-dimensional ontology of perduring objects is clearly favored by SR. But it is a different question if and to what extent this ontology is required, and the rival endurantist ontology ruled out, by this theory. In addressing this question, I take the essential idea of endurantism, that objects are wholly present at single moments of time, and argue that it commits one (...)
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  37. added 2015-07-28
    Critical Study of Four-Dimensionalism, by Theodore Sider, Oxford University Press 2001, ISBN 0 19 924443 X, Hardback.Katherine Hawley - unknown
    Four-Dimensionalism is a thorough, lively and forceful defence of the claim that “necessarily, every spatiotemporal object has a temporal part at every moment at which it exists” (59). The standard four-dimensionalist view is perdurance theory, according to which everyday things like boats are temporally extended. But Sider rejects perdurance theory, nicely disparaging it as the “worm view”, and he argues for the “stage view” version of fourdimensionalism instead. According to the stage view, everyday things like boats are instantaneous, and claims (...)
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  38. added 2015-07-28
    Why Neither Diachronic Universalism nor the Argument From Vagueness Establishes Perdurantism.Ofra Magidor - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):113-126.
    One of the most influential arguments in favour of perdurantism is the Argument from Vagueness. The argument proceeds in three stages: The first aims to establish atemporal universalism. The second presents a parallel argument in favour of universalism in the context of temporalized parthood. The third argues that diachronic universalism entails perdurantism. I offer a novel objection to the argument. I show that on the correct way of formulating diachronic universalism the principle does not entail perdurantism. On the other hand, (...)
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  39. added 2015-07-28
    Four-Dimensionalist Theories of Persistence.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):671-686.
    I demonstrate that the theory of persistence defended in Sider [2001] does not accommodate our intuitions about counting sentences. I develop two theories that improve on Sider's: a contextualist theory and an error theory. I argue that the latter is stronger, simpler, and better fitted to some important ordinary language judgments than rival four-dimensionalist theories of persistence.
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  40. added 2015-07-28
    Persistence in Minkowski Space-Time.Cord Friebe - unknown
    Under the eternalist hypothesis that objects or events exist temporally, but independently of being present two different views of persistence are on the market: Persisting objects endure if they are multiply located in time, and persisting objects perdure if they are singly located by having numerically different temporal parts. In the framework of the special theory of relativity, the metaphysics of persistence is confronted with peculiar difficulties. Things persist by being “wholly present” at more than one time; but what are (...)
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  41. added 2015-07-28
    Does Four-Dimensionalism Explain Coincidence?∗.Mark Moyer - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):479-488.
    For those who think the statue and the piece of copper that compose it are distinct objects that coincide, there is a burden of explanation. After all, common sense says that different ordinary objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time. A common argument in favour of four-dimensionalism (or ?perdurantism? or ?temporal parts theory?) is that it provides the resources for a superior explanation of this coincidence. This, however, is mistaken. Any explanatory work done by the four-dimensionalist notion (...)
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  42. added 2015-07-28
    Persistence, Ontic Vagueness and Identity: Towards a Substantialist Four–Dimensionalism. [REVIEW]Enrique Romerales - 2008 - Metaphysica 9 (1):33-55.
    Four-dimensionalism, the stage theory version in particular, has been defended as the best solution for avoiding vagueness in regards to composition, persistence and identity. Stage theory is highly problematic by itself, and the two views usually packed with it, unrestricted composition and counterpart theory, are a heavy burden. However, dispensing with these two views, four-dimensionalism could avoid vague persistence by issuing a criterion that would establish sharp temporal boundaries for the existence of genuine entities (simples, molecules and living organisms). This (...)
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  43. added 2015-07-28
    Persistence and Location in Relativistic Spacetime.Cody Gilmore - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1224-1254.
    How is the debate between endurantism and perdurantism affected by the transition from pre-relativistic spacetimes to relativistic ones? After suggesting that the endurance vs. perdurance distinction may run together a pair of cross-cutting distinctions, I discuss two recent attempts to show that the transition in question does serious damage to endurantism.
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  44. added 2015-07-28
    Time Travel, Coinciding Objects, and Persistence.Cody Gilmore - 2007 - In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 3. Clarendon Press. pp. 177-198.
    Existing puzzles about coinciding objects can be divided into two types, corresponding to the manner in which they bear upon the endurantism v. perdurantism debate. Puzzles of the first type, which involve temporary spatial co-location, can be solved simply by abandoning endurantism in favor of perdurantism, whereas those of the second type, which involve career-long spatial co-location, remain equally puzzling on both views. I show that the possibility of backward time travel would give rise to a new type of puzzle. (...)
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  45. added 2015-07-28
    The Rotating Discs Argument Defeated.Jeremy Butterfield - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (1):1-45.
    The rotating discs argument against perdurantism has been mostly discussed by metaphysicians, though the argument of course appeals to ideas from classical mechanics, especially about rotation. In contrast, I assess the RDA from the perspective of the philosophy of physics. I argue for three main conclusions. The first conclusion is that the RDA can be formulated more strongly than is usually recognized: it is not necessary to ‘imagine away’ the dynamical effects of rotation. The second is that in general relativity, (...)
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  46. added 2015-07-28
    Four-Dimensionalism and Modal Perdurants.Jiri Benovsky - 2006 - In Paolo Valore (ed.), Topics on General and Formal Ontology. Polimetrica International Scientific Publisher. pp. 137.
    This paper is about persistence of material objects through time and across possible worlds. It starts with the well-known argument from undetached parts, that is put as an objection to endurantism raised by four-dimensionalists who claim to have a nice treatment of it themselves. While it will be acknowledged that, indeed, four-dimensionalism has a good explanatory power here, and has an advantage over endurantism, we will then see a modified (modalized) version of the argument that will not be so easily (...)
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  47. added 2015-07-28
    Do Four-Dimensionalists Have to Be Counterpart Theorists?George Djukic - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):292 – 311.
    In 'Four-Dimensional Objects' Peter van Inwagen gives two arguments for the claim that proponents of four-dimensionalism have to be counterpart theorists. Recently Jack Copeland, Heather Dyke, and Diane Proudfoot, echoing in part points made by Mark Heller in this journal in 1993, have sought to rebut one of van Inwagen's arguments. In this paper I shall criticize their discussion and by implication certain points made by Heller. In so doing I shall also rebut a possible objection to van Inwagen's second (...)
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  48. added 2015-07-28
    Two Arguments From Sider's Four-Dimensionalism. [REVIEW]Ned Markosian - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):665–673.
    In this essay for a PPR book symposium on Theodore Sider's _Four-Dimensionalism<D>, I focus on two of Sider's arguments for four-dimensionalism: (i) his argument from vagueness, and (ii) his argument from time travel. Concerning (i), I first show that Sider's argument commits him to certain strange consequences that many four-dimensionalists may not endorse, and then I discuss an objection that involves appealing to 'brutal composition', the view that there is no informative answer to Peter van Inwagen's 'special composition question'. Concerning (...)
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  49. added 2015-07-28
    On the Persistence of Homogeneous Matter.Jeremy Butterfield - unknown
    Some recent philosophical debate about persistence has focussed on an argument against perdurantism that discusses rotating perfectly homogeneous discs. The argument has been mostly discussed by metaphysicians, though it appeals to ideas from classical mechanics, especially about rotation. In contrast, I assess the RDA from the perspective of the philosophy of physics. After introducing the argument and emphasizing the relevance of physics, I review some metaphysicians' replies to the argument, especially those by Callender, Lewis, Robinson and Sider. Thereafter, I argue (...)
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  50. added 2015-07-28
    The Case for Perdurance.Harold Noonan - 2001 - In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis. Rowman & Littlefield.
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