Persistence, Misc

Edited by A. P. Taylor (North Dakota State University)
Related categories

82 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 82
  1. added 2020-05-25
    The Context-Dependency of the Experience of Auditory Succession and Prospects for Embodying Philosophical Models of Temporal Experience.Maria Kon - 2014 - Empirical Musicology Review 9:213-223.
    Recent philosophical work on temporal experience offers generic models that are often assumed to apply to all sensory modalities. I show that the models serve as broad frameworks in which different aspects of cognitive science can be slotted and, thus, are beneficial to furthering research programs in embodied music cognition. Here I discuss a particular feature of temporal experience that plays a key role in such philosophical work: a distinction between the experience of succession and the mere succession of experiences. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2020-03-10
    Plotinus on the Unity and Identity of Changing Particulars.Pauliina Remes - 2005 - In David Sedley (ed.), Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy Xxviii: Summer 2005. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2020-01-12
    The Argument From Sideways Music.Sayid R. Bnefsi - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):64-69.
    Recently in Analysis, Ned Markosian (2019) has argued that a popular theory in the metaphysics of time—the Spacetime Thesis—falsely predicts that a normal musical performance is just as aesthetically valuable if it is rotated “sideways,” that is, if it is made to occur all at once. However, this argument falsely assumes that changing how something is oriented in space, and changing its duration in time, are analogous. That said, assuming they were analogous, Markosian’s argument is still unsuccessful. For the analogy (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2019-09-17
    Konstitution Und Dauer Sozialer Kontinuanten.Ludger Jansen - 2011 - In Gerhard Schönrich & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Persistenz – Indexikalität – Zeit­erfahrung. Ontos. pp. 103-128.
    The constituents of social entities (and of social continuants in particular) determine whether or not a social thing comes to be, persists and perishes. John Searle hints at two very different accounts for the persistence of social entities, a mere past related account and an acceptance theoretic account, whereas Margaret Gilbert's account is based on deontic entities like obligations or joint commitments. I demonstrate that Gilbert's account can also accommodate Searle's examples. While oblivion, protests or violence can be historical causes (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5. added 2019-09-16
    Gruppen Und Institutionen. Eine Ontologie des Sozialen.Ludger Jansen - 2018 - Wiesbanden: Springer.
    Was ist das Sein des Sozialen? Was konstituiert die Existenz von Gruppen und Institutionen, ihre Identität und Dauer in der Zeit? Dieses Buch resümiert den aktuellen Diskussionsstand der Sozialontologie und argumentiert für eine Ontologie des Sozialen, die sowohl formellen als auch informellen Institutionen gerecht wird. Es schlägt dafür eine Synthese aus Positionen vor, die in der gegenwärtigen Diskussion mit den Namen von John Searle und Margaret Gilbert verbunden sind.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2019-09-10
    Existential Inertia.Paul R. Audi - 2019 - Philosophic Exchange 48 (1):1-26.
    To all appearances, the basic building blocks of reality tend to keep existing unless something intervenes to destroy them. In other words, basic things seem to have existential inertia. But why might this be? This paper considers a number of arguments for and against existential inertia. It discusses arguments inspired by Aquinas, Descartes, and Spinoza, as well as considerations deriving from Occam’s Razor, entropy, and certain views about the nature of time and change.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2019-06-06
    Time, Existence and Identity.A. N. Prior - 1966 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66 (1):183-192.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  8. added 2019-06-05
    Psychological Continuity and the Necessity of Identity.Robert Francescotti - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):337-349.
  9. added 2019-03-03
    The Ship of Theseus Puzzle.David Rose, Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich, Mario Alai, Adriano Angelucci, Renatas Berniūnas, Emma E. Buchtel, Amita Chatterjee, Hyundeuk Cheon, In-Rae Cho, Daniel Cohnitz, Florian Cova, Vilius Dranseika, Angeles Eraña Lagos, Laleh Ghadakpour, Maurice Grinberg, Ivar Hannikainen, Takaaki Hashimoto, Amir Horowitz, Evgeniya Hristova, Yasmina Jraissati, Veselina Kadreva, Kaori Karasawa, Hackjin Kim, Yeonjeong Kim, Min-Woo Lee, Carlos Mauro, Masaharu Mizumoto, Sebastiano Moruzzi, Christopher Y. Olivola, Jorge Ornelas, Barbara Osimani, Alejandro Rosas, Carlos Romero, Massimo Sangoi, Andrea Sereni, Sarah Songhorian, Paulo Sousa, Noel Struchiner, Vera Tripodi, Naoki Usui, Alejandro Vázquez Del Vázquez Del Mercado, Giorgio Volpe, Hrag A. Vosgerichian, Xueyi Zhang & Jing Zhu - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy 3.
    Does the Ship of Theseus present a genuine puzzle about persistence due to conflicting intuitions based on “continuity of form” and “continuity of matter” pulling in opposite directions? Philosophers are divided. Some claim that it presents a genuine puzzle but disagree over whether there is a solution. Others claim that there is no puzzle at all since the case has an obvious solution. To assess these proposals, we conducted a cross-cultural study involving nearly 3,000 people across twenty-two countries, speaking eighteen (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. added 2018-11-22
    The Elusive Appearance of Time.Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson - 2013 - In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rognvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday. Ontos Verlag. pp. 304–316.
    In this paper I explain why philosophers have thought that the primary feature of our experience of time is that it is tensed and transitory, offer some reasons to doubt that time appears to us primarily in that way, and suggest instead that the main component of our experience of a temporal reality is of enduring objects in flux.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11. added 2018-11-04
    L'identità diacronica fra ontologia e metafisica.Francesco Franda - 2014 - Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Analitica Junior 2 (5):66-81.
    In this paper, I tackle the problem of diachronic identity. Far from providing a criterion for identity over time, the aim of this work is to understand if this issue pertains to ontology, conceived as that part of philosophy that tries to answer the question about what entities exist, and metaphysics, conceived as that part of philosophy that tries to explain, of those entities, what they are. On the face of it, only metaphysics has the task to solve this problem, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. added 2018-11-02
    Part‐Intrinsicality.J. Robert G. Williams - 2013 - Noûs 47 (3):431-452.
    In some sense, survival seems to be an intrinsic matter. Whether or not you survive some event seems to depend on what goes on with you yourself —what happens in the environment shouldn’t make a difference. Likewise, being a person at a time seems intrinsic. The principle that survival seems intrinsic is one factor which makes personal fission puzzles so awkward. Fission scenarios present cases where if survival is an intrinsic matter, it appears that an individual could survive twice over. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  13. added 2017-11-29
    On What We Are and How We Persist.Simon Langford - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (3):356-371.
    This article defends novel approaches to what we are and how we persist. First it is claimed that we have disjunctive persistence conditions: we can persist by way of either biological continuity or psychological continuity. Then it is claimed that we are neither human beings nor persons essentially. Rather, we are essentially bio-psycho-continuers, a concept to be explained along the way. A variety of objections are considered and found wanting.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  14. added 2017-08-11
    Folk Teleology Drives Persistence Judgments.David Rose, Jonathan Schaffer & Kevin Tobia - forthcoming - Synthese:1-19.
    Two separate research programs have revealed two different factors that feature in our judgments of whether some entity persists. One program—inspired by Knobe—has found that normative considerations affect persistence judgments. For instance, people are more inclined to view a thing as persisting when the changes it undergoes lead to improvements. The other program—inspired by Kelemen—has found that teleological considerations affect persistence judgments. For instance, people are more inclined to view a thing as persisting when it preserves its purpose. Our goal (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  15. added 2017-03-04
    Ought a Four-Dimensionalist To Believe in Temporal Parts?Kristie Miller - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):619-646.
    This paper presents the strongest version of a non-perdurantist four-dimensionalism: a theory according to which persisting objects are four-dimensionally extended in space-time, but not in virtue of having maximal temporal parts. The aims of considering such a view are twofold. First, to evaluate whether such an account could provide a plausible middle ground between the two main competitor accounts of persistence: three-dimensionalism and perdurantist four-dimensionalism. Second, to see what light such a theory sheds on the debate between these two competitor (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  16. added 2016-12-08
    Can Mereological Sums Change Their Parts?Peter Van Inwagen - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (12):614-630.
    Many philosophers think not. Many philosophers, in fact, seem to suppose that anyone who raises the question whether mereological sums can change their parts displays thereby a failure to grasp an essential feature of the concept “mereological sum.” It is hard to point to an indisputable example of this in print,[i] but it is a thesis I hear put forward very frequently in conversation (sometimes it is put forward in the form of an incredulous stare after I have said something (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  17. added 2016-12-08
    Statues and Their Constituents: Whether Constitution is Identity.Robert Francescotti - 2003 - Metaphysica 4 (2):59-77.
    This paper examines two popular arguments for the nonidentity of the statue and its constituent material. An essentialist response is provided to one of the arguments; that response is then shown to undermine the other argument as well. It is also shown that even if we accept these arguments and concede nonidentity, we can still avoid the further conclusion that constitution is not identity. These ideas are then extended to other applications of the arguments for nonidentity (specifically, their application to (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. added 2016-12-05
    Mereological Essentialism, Mereological Conjunctivism, and Identity Through Time.James van Cleve - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):141-156.
  19. added 2016-08-11
    No Paradox of Multi-Location.Kris McDaniel - 2003 - Analysis 63 (4):309-311.
    This is a defense of endurantism against an alleged paradox.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  20. added 2016-03-01
    Persisting Particulars and Their Properties.Kristie Miller - 2016 - In Francesco Federico Calemi (ed.), Metaphysics and Scientific Realism: Essays in Honour of David Malet Armstrong. De Gruyter. pp. 139-160.
    My present inclination is to say that both identity and relational analyses are intelligible hypotheses. I reject the identity analysis, looking rather to relations between different phases to secure the unity of a particular over time. But I do not think that the identity view can be rejected as illogical. If it is to be rejected, then I think it must be rejected for Occamist reasons. The different phases exist, and so do their relations. These phases so related, it seems, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. added 2016-03-01
    A New Definition of Endurance.Kristie Miller - 2005 - Theoria 71 (4):309-332.
    In this paper I present a new definition of endurance. I argue that the three-dimensionalist ought to adopt a different understanding from the four-dimensionalist, of what it is to have a part simpliciter. With this new understanding it becomes possible to define endurance in a manner that both preserves the central endurantist intuitions, whilst avoiding commitment to any controversial metaphysical theses. Furthermore, since this endurantist definition is a mereological one, there is an elegant symmetry between the definitions of endurance and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22. added 2016-02-26
    Can Things Endure in Tenseless Time.Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson - 2009 - SATS 10 (1):79-99.
    It has been argued that the tenseless view of time is incompatible with endurantism. This has been disputed, perhaps most famously by Hugh Mellor and Peter Simons. They argue that things can endure in tenseless time, and indeed must endure if tenseless time is to contain change. In this paper I will point out some difficulties with Mellor’s and Simons’ claims that in tenseless time a particular can be ‘wholly present’ at various times, and therefore endure, as well as have (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  23. added 2015-10-31
    Review of Henry Laycock, Words Without Objects: Semantics, Ontology, and Logic for Non-Singularity. [REVIEW]Kathrin Koslicki - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):160-163.
  24. added 2015-10-31
    The Crooked Path From Vagueness to Four-Dimensionalism.Kathrin Koslicki - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):107 - 134.
    In his excellent recent book, Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time (Sider, 2001), Theodore Sider defends a version of four-dimensionalism which he calls the ‘stage-theory’: according to this view, ordinary persisting objects are analyzed as being identical to momentary stages; they persist by having temporal counterparts at other times. Despite all of its many significant virtues, however, Sider’s case for four-dimensionalism is troubling in certain crucial respects, both philosophically and meta-philosophically. My purpose in this paper is to show that, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  25. added 2015-10-31
    Review of Theodore Sider, Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. [REVIEW]Kathrin Koslicki - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (1):110-113.
    How do the familiar concrete objects of common sense persist through time? The four-dimensionalist argues that they perdure, that is, they persist through time by having temporal parts at each of the times at which they exist. The three-dimensionalist, on the other hand, holds that ordinary concrete objects endure; they lack an additional temporal dimension and persist, instead, by being “wholly present” at each of the times at which they exist.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. added 2015-10-23
    Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge to the Standard Account.Michael B. Burke - 1992 - Analysis 52 (1):12 - 17.
    On the most popular account of material constitution, it is common for a material object to coincide precisely with one or more other material objects, ones that are composed of just the same matter but differ from it in sort. I argue that there is nothing that could ground the alleged difference in sort and that the account must be rejected.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   68 citations  
  27. added 2015-09-16
    Is Descartes a Temporal Atomist?Ken Levy - 2005 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 (4):627 – 674.
  28. added 2015-08-27
    Times, Worlds, and Locations.Kristie Miller - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):221-227.
    In ‘from times to worlds and back again: a transcendentist theory of persistence’ (henceforth TTP) Alessandro Giordani outlines five competitor views regarding the manner in which objects occupy regions along a dimension. These are: (1) classical uni-location (2) bare uni-location (3) multi-location (4) counterpart presence and (5) transcendent presence. Each view comes in both a temporal and modal version and Giordani argues that one ought to prefer transcendentism (i.e. 5) along both dimensions. According to temporal transcendentism, necessarily, no object is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  29. added 2015-08-26
    I—What is a Continuant?Helen Steward - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):109-123.
    In this paper, I explore the question what a continuant is, in the context of a very interesting suggestion recently made by Rowland Stout, as part of his attempt to develop a coherent ontology of processes. Stout claims that a continuant is best thought of as something that primarily has its properties at times, rather than atemporally—and that on this construal, processes should count as continuants. While accepting that Stout is onto something here, I reject his suggestion that we should (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  30. added 2015-02-09
    Institutional Objects, Reductionism and Theories of Persistence.Tobias Hansson Wahlberg - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (4):525-562.
    Can institutional objects be identified with physical objects that have been ascribed status functions, as advocated by John Searle in The Construction of Social Reality (1995)? The paper argues that the prospects of this identification hinge on how objects persist – i.e., whether they endure, perdure or exdure through time. This important connection between reductive identification and mode of persistence has been largely ignored in the literature on social ontology thus far.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  31. added 2014-11-21
    Parti connesse e interi sconnessi.Achille C. Varzi - 2002 - Rivista di Estetica 42 (20):87-90.
    The Doctrine of Potential Parts says that proper undetached parts are merely potential entities, entities that do not exist but would exist if they were detached from the rest. They are just aspects of the whole to which they belong, ways in which the whole could be broken down, and talk of such parts is really just talk about the modal properties of the whole. Here I offer a reconstruction of this doctrine and present an argument to illustrate its hidden (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. added 2014-11-20
    Riferimento, predicazione, e cambiamento.Achille C. Varzi - 2003 - In Claudia Bianchi & Andrea Bottani (eds.), Significato e ontologia. Franco Angeli. pp. 221–249.
    This paper focuses on the semantics of statements of the form ‘x is P at t’ vis-à-vis its metaphysical underpinnings. I begin by considering four main readings, corresponding to the four basic parsings of the temporal modifier ‘at t’: (1) at-t x is P, (2) x-at-t is P, (3) x is-at-t P, and (4) x is P-at-t. Each of these readings—which correspond to different metaphysical conceptions of the nature of temporal change—is found inadequate or otherwise problematic. In the second part (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  33. added 2014-11-15
    Toward a Commonsense Answer to the Special Composition Question.Chad Carmichael - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):475-490.
    The special composition question is the question, ‘When do some things compose something?’ The answers to this question in the literature have largely been at odds with common sense, either by allowing that any two things compose something, or by denying the existence of most ordinary composite objects. I propose a new ‘series-style’ answer to the special composition question that accords much more closely with common sense, and I defend this answer from van Inwagen's objections. Specifically, I will argue that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  34. added 2014-11-02
    Multilocation, Fusions and Confusions.Claudio Calosi & Damiano Costa - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):25-33.
    The paper provides a new and detailed critique of Barker and Dowe’s argument against multi-location. This critique is not only novel but also less committal than previous ones in the literature in that it does not require hefty metaphysical assumptions. The paper also provides an analysis of some metaphysical relations between mereological and locational principles.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  35. added 2014-10-10
    Entia successiva.Achille C. Varzi - 2003 - Rivista di Estetica 43 (1):139-158.
    The theory according to which most ordinary objects are mere “entia successiva”—sequences of distinct mereological aggregates, whose unity resides exclusively in our minds—is a variant of the standard, three-dimensional conception of objects. For the aggregates are, at bottom, endurants, i.e., entities that persist through time by being fully present at any time at which they exist. In this paper I compare this theory with the so-called “stage view”, according to which ordinary objects—indeed, all objects—are sequences of momentary entities that cannot (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  36. added 2014-10-10
    Review of André Gallois, Occasions of Identity: The Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness. [REVIEW]Achille C. Varzi - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):291–295.
    Book Information: Occasions of Identity: The Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness. By André Gallois. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1998. Pp. xiii + 296. Hardback, £35.00.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  37. added 2014-10-10
    Foreword to ''Temporal Parts''.Achille C. Varzi - 2000 - The Monist 83 (3):319-320.
    A brief introductory note to the Monist issue on "Temporal Parts", setting the background for the eight papers included in the rest of the issue (by Y. Balashov, B. Brogaard, K. Fine, M. Heller, R. LePoidevin, J. Parsons, P. M. Simons, and P. van Inwagen).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. added 2014-10-09
    Undetached Parts and Disconnected Wholes.Achille C. Varzi - 2013 - In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday. Ontos Verlag. pp. 696–708.
    I offer a diagnosis of the parallelism between the Doctrine of Potential Parts and the Doctrine of Potential Wholes and briefly examine its bearing on Johansson’s account of the Tibbles-Tib Problem.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. added 2014-10-09
    Promiscuous Endurantism and Diachronic Vagueness.Achille C. Varzi - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):181-189.
    According to a popular line of reasoning, diachronic vagueness creates a problem for the endurantist conception of persistence. Some authors have replied that this line of reasoning is inconclusive, since the endurantist can subscribe to a principle of Diachronic Unrestricted Composition (DUC) that is perfectly parallel to the principle required by the perdurantist’s semantic account. I object that the endurantist should better avoid DUC. And I argue that even DUC, if accepted, would fail to provide the endurantist with the necessary (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  40. added 2014-10-09
    Perdurantism, Universalism, and Quantifiers.Achille C. Varzi - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):208-215.
    I argue that the conjunction of perdurantism (the view that objects are temporally extended) and universalism (the thesis that any old class of things has a mereological fusion) gives rise to undesired complications when combined with certain plausible assumptions concerning the semantics of tensed statements.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  41. added 2014-09-14
    Persistence Through Function Preservation.David Rose - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):97-146.
    When do the folk think that material objects persist? Many metaphysicians have wanted a view which fits with folk intuitions, yet there is little agreement about what the folk intuit. I provide a range of empirical evidence which suggests that the folk operate with a teleological view of persistence: the folk tend to intuit that a material object survives alterations when its function is preserved. Given that the folk operate with a teleological view of persistence, I argue for a debunking (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  42. added 2014-03-31
    Four-Dimensionalism.Theodore Sider - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.
    Persistence through time is like extension through space. A road has spatial parts in the subregions of the region of space it occupies; likewise, an object that exists in time has temporal parts in the various subregions of the total region of time it occupies. This view — known variously as four dimensionalism, the doctrine of temporal parts, and the theory that objects “perdure” — is opposed to “three dimensionalism”, the doctrine that things “endure”, or are “wholly present”.1 I will (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   334 citations  
  43. added 2014-03-30
    Identity, Time, and Necessity.Penelope Mackie - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (1):59–78.
    The paper offers an explanation of the intuitive appeal of Saul Kripke's necessity of origin thesis, exhibiting it as the consequence of a temporally asymmetrical 'branching model' of possibilities which, in turn, rests on two plausible principles concerning possibility, time, and identity. Unlike some other accounts, my explanation dissociates the necessity of origin thesis from a commitment to individual essences or other sufficient conditions for identity across possible worlds. I conclude that although the branching model is not irresistible, its rejection (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  44. added 2014-03-28
    Identity in the Talmud.Eli Hirsch - 1999 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):166–180.
  45. added 2014-03-27
    Recent Work on Identity Over Time.Theodore Sider - 2000 - Philosophical Books 41 (2):81–89.
    I am now typing on a computer I bought two years ago. The computer I bought is identical to the computer on which I type. My computer persists over time. Let us divide our subject matter in two. There is first the question of criteria of identity, the conditions governing when an object of a certain kind, a computer for instance, persists until some later time. There are secondly very general questions about the nature of persistence itself. Here I include (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  46. added 2014-03-25
    Dion’s Foot.Eric T. Olson - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (5):260-265.
    Suppose a certain man, Dion, has his foot amputated, and lives to tell the tale. That tale involves a well-known metaphysical puzzle, for most of us assume that there was, before the operation, an object made up of all of Dion’s parts except those that overlapped with his foot-- ”all of Dion except for his foot”, we might say, or Dion’s “foot-complement”. Call that object Theon. (Anyone who doubts that there is such a thing as Dion’s undetached foot-complement may imagine (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  47. added 2012-11-19
    Why Time is Extensive.Gilbert Plumer - 1984 - Mind 93 (370):265-270.
    I attempt to show, via considering Schlesinger’s device of putting the word ‘now’ in capitals, that the transient view of time can explicate temporal extensivity without presupposing it, and the static view can’t. The argument hinges on the point that duration is generated by continuance of the present—such that ‘the present’ here is used in a nontechnical, nonindexical, and nonreflexive sense, which Schlesinger and others unknowingly give to the word ‘now’ (by “NOW” or “Now” or “’now’”).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. added 2011-10-27
    Identity Over Time: Objectively, Subjectively.Bas C. van Fraassen & Isabelle Peschard - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):15-35.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  49. added 2011-10-27
    Time and Essence.George Myro - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):331-341.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  50. added 2011-10-27
    Part-Time Objects.Paolo Dau - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):459-474.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
1 — 50 / 82