Persons

Philosophers and psychologists both investigate the self, but often in isolation from one another. this book brings together studies by philosophers and psychologists in an exploration of the self and its function. It will be of interest to all those involved in philosophy, psychology and sociology.

Persons are biological beings who participate in social environments. Is human sociality different from that of insects? Is human sociality different from that of a computer or robot with elaborate rules for social interaction in its program memory? What is the relationship between the biology of humans and the sociality of persons? I argue that persons constitute an emergent ontological level that develops out of the biological and psychological realm, but that is largely social in its own constitution. This requires (...) a characterization of the relationships between the bio/psychological and the social, and of the developmental process of emergence. It also requires a framework for modeling the bio/psychological level that makes any such emergence possible. Neither attachment theory nor information processing frameworks, for example, will do — the major orientations toward human sociality today make understanding that sociality ultimately impossible. Only an action framework, such as that of Peirce or Piaget2, suffices. (shrink)

All methodologies used to characterize mother-infant interaction includes mother, infant, and other social factors. The chief difference is how each methodology selects certain elements of this interaction as relevant. I will argue that in the context of the mother-infant interaction a methodology’s results depend on the model’s presuppositions on the nature of communication. These presupposition affects the kinds of questions asked, the kind of data obtained, and how these data are analyzed. I will show this by contrasting two different analysis (...) of separation studies in infant primates: what I call the Ecological-Linear approach vs. Dynamic System Theory (DST) approach. (shrink)

How is it that someone is an agent, an active being? According to a common and dominant opinion, it is in virtue of performing actions. Within this dominant trend, some claim that actions are acts of will while others claim that actions are identical with certain basic bodily movements. First I make an assessment of these traditional accounts of action and argue that neither of them can make sense of how is it that someone is an agent. Then I offer (...) some supplementation and argue for a better alternative. (shrink)

Recently, physics and life sciences, and especially the development of neuroscience, is already leading the people to accept a rigid form of reductionism. Where the human intellect, human initiative and awareness can be identified as a purely biological vocabulary to explain. This article describes the root of the Nepalese people learn Lang; This paper argues that the root Lang Nepalese understanding of human nature-bit cell based on this idea in the legislation but the two pillars, namely: the theory of knowledge (...) by virtue of this position is, but verifiable truth can be comprehension; and its understanding of the history of the world compared to emergent probability. Human-bit cell is considered to be material and spiritual unity, both understandable and rational. This paper examines the nature of matter and spirit, and such as dualism and monism of the opposition, the emergence of human consciousness and the spiritual nature is also a topic of concern in this paper. Current developments in the physical and life sciences and especially in neuro-science have led many to accept a strong form of reductionism where it is presumed that human intelligence, human agency and consciousness will be explainable in purely biological terms. The anthropology of Bernard Lonergan is described. Lonergan's understanding of the human person is built on two pillars of this thought: his basic epistemological stance that the real is verified intelligibility and his understanding of world process as emergent probability. The human person is seen to be a unity of the material and the spiritual that is both intelligible and intelligent. The nature of the material and the spiritual are considered. Questions such as dualism versus monism, the emergence of human consciousness and the nature of the soul are considered. (shrink)

This article reflects upon the debate, initiated by Bernard Williams in 1973, concerning the desirability of immortality, where the latter expression is taken to mean endless bodily life as a human or humanoid being. Williams contends that it cannot be desirable; others have disputed this contention. I discuss a recent response from Timothy Chappell and attempt to pinpoint the central disagreement between Chappell and Williams. I propose that neither side in the debate has firm grounds for its claims, and then (...) proceed to consider four reasons for suspecting that the whole debate has yet to be placed on a conceptually coherent footing. (shrink)

This paper proposes a sociology of the person that focuses upon the socially defined, publicly visible beings of intersubjective experience. I argue that the sociology of the person proposed by Durkheim and Mauss is more accurately described as a sociology of institutions of the person and neglects both folk or ethnopsychologies of personhood and the interactional production of persons. I draw upon the work of Gossman to develop a sociology of the person concerned with means, processes, and relations of person (...) production. I also propose that the work of Goffman, Foucault, and others provides insights into the contemporary technology of person production and into how its control and use affects relations of person production. I conclude with a brief outline of the theoretical connections among institutions of the person, folk psychologies, the social constitution of the person, and the prospect of a distinctively sociological psychology. (shrink)