Persons

People whose person-making capacities or status are diminished or who lack them altogether are mostly ignored in mainstream theories of recognition. This entry clarifies the conceptual landscape around and some of the key questions about recognition in relation to these people. The concept of personhood is analyzed into three different sub-concepts – juridical, moral and psychological – and the connection of these to recognition on relevant concepts of recognition is discussed.

This volume contains the workshop papers of the philosophical conference Dimensions of Personhood held in August 13-15, 2004 at University of Jyväskylä, Finland. The conference was organized by the Finnish Academy research project The Concept of Person. In the call for papers, the theme of the conference was formulated as follows. Recent developments in neuroscience and information technology, in medicine and biotechnology, and in society and culture more broadly have made various questions concerning our identity as human beings urgent. As (...) our power over ourselves increases, the questions of who we are, how we are to conceive of ourselves and how we should use our powers over ourselves, become more and more pressing. The concept of person is in many ways a necessary starting point in answering such questions. However, the concept is often used in an indeterminate sense, and when efforts have been made to clarify the concept, different philosophers have ended up with rival usages and rival theories. For example, the theories differ on whether ‘person’ is identical with ‘human being’, ‘subject’ or ‘self ’. Yet it seems to us that the rival theories of personhood are trying to capture a common idea, namely that persons differ from (other) animals, machines, detached ‘minds’, brains and sub-personal mechanisms in the kind of relations to self, to others and to the world that they have, or are capable of having. The general idea of the conference is thus to approach personhood along three dimensions, where the being of persons differs from the being of non-persons: 1 self-relations, 2. interpersonal relations, and 3. world-relations. The guiding question of the conference is: how does the concept of person illuminate these relations (to self, to others, to the world), and how do these relations illuminate the concept of person? Our wish is to bring together recent work done in each of these dimensions and further our understanding concerning the ways in which personhood and these relations are intertwined. (shrink)

Recent dissatisfaction with individualism and the problems of religious pluralism make this an opportune time to reassess the way in which we define ourselves and conduct our relationships with others. The philosophical writings of John Macmurray are a useful resource for performing this examination, and recent interest in Macmurray's work has been growing steadily. -/- A full-scale critical examination of Macmurray's religious philosophy has not been published and this work fills this gap, sharing his insistence that we define ourselves through (...) action and through person-to-person relationships, while critiquing his account of the ensuing political and religious issues. The key themes in this work are the concept of the person and the ethics of personal relations. (shrink)

What is the place and value of reflection in people’s lives? The answer requires a careful discussion about the relationship between our epistemic performances, our intellectual capabilities and competencies, our affective relationships with the environment, our actions and our interpersonal interactions. It is a fact that for us to navigate and interact with the world and with our society, we sometimes think about our reasons, we give reasons, we change our minds, and even think about our habits and character traits (...) in order to make them virtuous. And it seems that at least most of the times, it is by reflection that we do it. -/- This book brings together the following chapters: “Animal Versus Reflective Orders of Epistemic Competence” by Ernest Sosa; “The Status of Reflection in Virtue Epistemology” by Christopher Kelp; “The Social Value of Reflection” by John Greco; “Disagreement, Intellectual Humility, and Reflection” by Duncan Pritchard; “Philosophical Reflection and Rashness” by Plinio J. Smith; “Between Feeling and Symbolization: Philosophical Paths to Thinking about Oneself” by Robert E. Innis; “Mirrors and Reflexive processes” by Raffaele De Luca Picione; “Bodily origin of self-reflection and its socially extended aspects” by Shogo Tanaka; and “Psychological reflection, thought and imagination as epistemic skills” by Miika Vähämaa. (shrink)

Running a marathon is not solely a personal achievement; rather it sets an example. Because of the nature of this example, it constitutes an achievement that deserves our praise (contrary to what has recently been argued in this Journal).

In the Greek mythology the concept of annunciation has been often associated with the figure of “winged messenger”, in Greek “anghelos”, while in the Christian tradition it usually recalls the archangel Gabriel in his announcing to Mary the generative act per excellence: the birth. In this paper I take into consideration Botticelli’s Cestello Annunciation: the image represented in this painting suggests the interpretation of the annunciation from the viewpoint of transformation, i. e., of the crisis and the birth of something (...) that was not there before. What is special in the annunciation that transforms? In Botticelli’s masterpiece, Mary doesn’t only comprehend something that she didn’t know before, but she also feels the an-nouncement directly in her own flesh: the annunciation that transforms doesn’t exclusively let her understand something, but also allows her to feel it directly. If this is true, every transformation has its annunciation. (shrink)

Review of Individualism in Early China: Human Agency and the Self in Thought and Politics by Erica Fox Brindley.

What are persons? There are two traditional answers: the relation model of person according to which a person is nothing more than a function of her relationships to other persons and the substance model which construes the person as persisting independently of relations and accidental properties. In my paper, I explore two interesting intersections of these models occurring in Augustine's speculative doctrine of trinity and in Heidegger’s early Theory of Dasein. Are Augustine’s and Heidegger’s conceptions of person convincing reconciliations of (...) the relation model and the substance model of person and how do they compare to each other? (shrink)

Christian tradition has largely held three affirmations on the resurrection of the physical body. Firstly, that bodily resurrection is not a superfluous hope of afterlife. Secondly, there is immediate post-mortem existence in Paradise. Finally, there is numerical identity between pre-mortem and post-resurrection human beings. The same tradition also largely adheres to a robust doctrine of The Intermediate State, a paradisiacal disembodied state of existence following the biological death of a human being. This book argues that these positions are in fact (...) internally inconsistent, and so a new metaphysics for life after death is required. (shrink)

This piece raises a new challenge for Christian materialist accounts of human persons. Revisiting one of the perennial challenges for Christian materialism, explaining the metaphysical compatibility of resurrection and the life everlasting with materialist metaphysics, I argue that resuscitation phenomena reported in scripture undermine van Inwagen’s and Zimmerman’s attempts to reconcile resurrection and materialism. Although this challenge to Christian materialism is not insurmountable, it provides good reason to reject several of the most serious Christian materialist projects and offers a reason (...) for Christians to consider alternatives to materialism. (shrink)

Edward Jonathan Lowe (usually cited as E. J. Lowe) was one of the most significant philosophers of the twentieth and early twenty-first century. He made sustained and significant contributions to debates in metaphysics, ontology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophical logic, and philosophy of religion, as well as contributing important scholarly work in early modern philosophy (most notably on Locke). Over the length of his career, Lowe published eleven single-authored books, four co-edited collections, and well over 300 papers and (...) book reviews in journals and edited volumes. The range of topics covered in his published work is highly eclectic. Given this, and his prolific rate of publication, this article cannot aim to cover all of the questions that Lowe contributed work on. Instead, it will focus on some of his most significant contributions in metaphysics and ontology, and related topics in other areas of philosophy. This choice of focus stems, in part, from Lowe’s strong belief in the inescapability of metaphysical questions. Lowe argued for the need to approach metaphysics, and philosophy more broadly, in a serious, systematic fashion, likening metaphysics to putting together the pieces of a gigantic jigsaw puzzle, working with, rather than trying to overrule or being secondary to, natural science. Although the sections in this article focus on different topics, the highly systematic nature of Lowe’s work means that there are many potential points of intersection that could be drawn between them. In the interests of providing a navigable summary of Lowe’s work, this article highlights only some of these connections. (shrink)

I investigate the status of subjectivity in Integrated Information Theory. This leads me to examine if Integrated Information Theory can answer the hard problem of consciousness. On itself, Integrated Information Theory does not seem to constitute an answer to the hard problem, but could be combined with panpsychism to yield a more satisfying theory of consciousness. I will show, that even if Integrated Information Theory employs the metaphysical machinery of panpsychism, Integrated Information would still suffer from a different problem, not (...) being able to account for the subjective character of consciousness. (shrink)

Perdurantists hold that we persons—just like other ordinary objects—persist by perduring, by having temporal parts, or stages, located over time. Perdurantists also standardly endorse the B-theory of time. And, in light of this endorsement, they typically characterize our tensed beliefs as self-ascriptions of properties, made not by us but by our stages. For instance, for me to believe that Angela Merkel is currently the chancellor of Germany is for my now-located stage to self-ascribe the property of being simultaneous with Merkel’s (...) chancellorship. The problem with this way of understanding tensed belief is that it undermines—if not outright contradicts—the perdurantist’s best options for resisting the Too Many Thinkers objection. In what follows, I show why this is. I then consider what I take to be the perdurantist’s most promising alternative account of tensed belief. I argue that this alternative either leaves perdurantists no better off with respect to the Too Many Thinkers objection or, instead, leaves them vulnerable to another objection, one that they would otherwise have no problem resisting. (shrink)

Peter Forrest claims that his “Personal Pantheist” conception of God is in agreement with the Stoic pantheism. The traditional interpretation, however, treats the Stoic God as the non-personal universal law. I demonstrate that arguments in favor of the personal interpretation typically imply either a personalist or an anthropocentric metaphysical foundation. I also argue that the Stoics were neither personalists nor anthropocentrists, therefore those arguments should be rejected.

The Greek model of the Trinity, based on the Theological Orations of Gregory of Nazianzus, treats the Trinitarian relations as connections between the Father and the two other persons: the Son and the Holy Spirit. The two relations have to be heteronymous, and have to be interpreted from the extreme realistic position. The Latin Trinitarian model, based on Boethius’ De Trinitate, treats relations as three subsistent persons. The relations have to be unidirectional: from the Father to the Son, and from (...) both of them to the Holy Spirit. Both models are adequate and effective, but incompatible. One of the consequences of this incompatibility is the problem of filioque: the introduction of an additional relation of procession into the Greek model as well as the exclusion of this relation from the Latin model result in the inadequacy of the models. From the point of view of the complementability of a model, the Greek model allows introduction of new elements, while the Latin model does not. The soteriological consequences are such that the Greek model welcomes a human person to establish a unique relation with the person of the Father, which leads to the theosis of a creature. The Latin model requires the saving relation to be established with the whole Trinity, and theosis is not supported. (shrink)

What are economic exchanges? The received view has it that exchanges are mutual transfers of goods motivated by inverse valuations thereof. As a corollary, the standard approach treats exchanges of services as a subspecies of exchanges of goods. We raise two objections against this standard approach. First, it is incomplete, as it fails to take into account, among other things, the offers and acceptances that lie at the core of even the simplest cases of exchanges. Second, it ultimately fails to (...) generalize to exchanges of services, in which neither inverse preferences nor mutual transfers hold true. We propose an alternative definition of exchanges, which treats exchanges of goods as a special case of exchanges of services and which builds in offers and acceptances. According to this theory: (i) The valuations motivating exchanges are propositional and convergent rather than objectual and inverse; (ii) All exchanges of goods involve exchanges of services/actions, but not the reverse; (iii) Offers and acceptances, together with the contractual obligations and claims they bring about, lie at the heart of all cases of exchange. (shrink)

We argue that phenomenology can be of central and positive importance to the cognitive sciences, and that it can also learn from the empirical research conducted in those sciences. We discuss the project of naturalizing phenomenology and how this can be best accomplished. We provide several examples of how phenomenology and the cognitive sciences can integrate their research. Specifically, we consider issues related to embodied cognition and intersubjectivity. We provide a detailed analysis of issues related to time-consciousness, with reference to (...) understanding schizophrenia and the loss of the sense of agency. We offer a positive proposal to address these issues based on a neurobiological dynamic-systems model. (shrink)

The philosophy of John Macmurray is only now receiving the attention it deserves. It is in the contemporary climate of dissatisfaction with individualism that Macmurray's emphasis on the relations of persons has come to the fore. Moreover, Macmurray's recognition of the central importance of acknowledging human embodiment is being favourably received by a wide range of fields, which includes philosophers, theologians and psychologists.Macmurray's overriding concern is to present an adequate account of the person and of personal relationships. Nevertheless, he is (...) an eclectic writer, whose work addresses concerns in education, science and art, which all stem from his understanding of human agency. In addition, this leads Macmurray into a discussion of the ethics of personal and political relations and a critique of otherworldly religion. Hence, Macmurray's philosophy is informed by fairly unconventional religious beliefs. (shrink)

A resale copy of a special issue of Journal of Consciousness Studies (Volume 14, Issue 5-6, 2007). This collection of original articles considers the perennial question ‘What are persons?’ It aims first of all to clarify the nature of the question and its relation to associated questions such as the nature of the human animal; how the concepts of human being, person, subject, and self are related; the persistence and unity of persons; and questions as to the conditions for personhood (...) and personality.The ‘dimensions’ of the book’s title reflects the volume’s focus on the relations that persons have with themselves and each other. (shrink)

Dupré argues that at the center of the cultural crisis of our time is an objectivist attitude, an attitude which results in thinking of human existence using models appropriate to objects with the result that transcendence is lost and man is thought of as a thing to be manipulated. However, a mere retreat into subjectivity is not the answer to this crisis. What is needed is reflection on the subject itself in order to give it a content of its own, (...) and Dupré suggests that a key to this kind of reflection is given in the work of Husserl and Heidegger. It is within the temporality and historicity of the being of man that man discovers his transcending of objectivist states and an openness to the divine, understood as other than an ultimate object separated from the self and opposed to it. Dupré’s brief and provocative book is primarily a series of reflections on the inner life of human existence, guided by critical reflection on the Judaeo-Christian tradition, in which he believes the inner transcendence of the self to have been articulated. It is the passive open character of man to which Dupré invites our particular attention, not the objectifying manipulating character, which is reflected prominently in our technological age. (shrink)

The main purpose of this book is to offer a comparative evaluation of the early works of Marx and Lukács, "these two most important texts of 'unorthodox' Marxism". Feenberg refers here to the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts on the one hand, and History and Class Consciousness on the other. At a somewhat more general level, Feenberg writes in defense of, or more accurately in preparation for a new stage in, the philosophy of praxis. To proceed directly to his conclusion, Feenberg's (...) analyses culminate in the recommendation of a synthesis between Marx's concept of the internal relation between subject and object, or their participatory identity, and Lukács' mediation-theory of rationality, according to which reification is an intrinsic element at the dialectical level of reason, which is thus a mediation of nature on the one hand, and the subject-object relation on the other. In less complex terms, Feenberg recommends the development, from elements of Marxist and Lukácsian doctrines, of a "non-creationist concept of practice", i.e., one in which nature is not created by man, a concept that is also not pure objectivism, i.e., that prevents a complete identity of subject and object. Feenberg thus perceives the central problem in the early Marx and Lukács as one that links them more intimately with Absolute Idealism than his own analysis makes explicit. The "fundamental flaw in the philosophies of practice of Marx and Lukács" is, to put it as briefly and clearly as possible, that in these doctrines, man is still a creator-god. (shrink)

"The current crisis in the human sciences" can only be overcome, Calvin Schrag insists in this eloquent volume, "when we perceive how it is that science and philosophy alike have been uprooted from their origin." How origin is to be understood here emerges as the initial and perhaps even final theme of the inquiry.

One does not need to read many pages of this very rich book to realize that it is the fruit of a lifetime of study and that it is both speculatively wise and prudent. Though it may not receive the same degree of attention as other well publicized studies it clearly ranks with studies such as Hart's The Concept of Law and Erlich's The Sociology of Law. The author intends to develop a systematic theory of positive law, with close attention (...) to the circumstances that bring law into being, the purposes that law is designed to serve, and the structure of the legal system itself. He also proposes to apply this theory to an examination of the problems that law faces and the conditions that it must satisfy if it is to be an effective force in society. Nineteen chapters follow. Jenkins is aware that the study of law is but part of the larger study of society from which law receives its tasks and form. To determine the origin, end and functions of law is to search for those objective principles that define the conditions of man's well-being. While the first part of the book is concerned with the formulation of a general theory of law, the second explores the role of law in the social order and the conditions of legal effectiveness. Jenkins provides dramatic evidence that in our day, particularly in the United States, law is being employed for purposes that are unprecedented. "The legal apparatus," he writes, "is being asked to intervene in areas of social and personal life that have hitherto been handled by other agencies in other ways." It is the author's judgment that these nontraditional uses of law have for the most part been disappointing in their results. "We abuse the legal apparatus," writes Jenkins "because we have inadequate notions both of what the law is and how it works." Jenkins is convinced that law supplies the compelling social need for a force that is at once sovereign and principled. As sovereign it is entitled to habitual obedience and to the use of force when necessary. As sovereign, subject to no external control, it must be principled. It must govern itself by self-imposed provisions and mechanisms that determine the use of this power and prevent it from becoming autocratic and arbitrary. (shrink)

This collection of twelve essays on the problem of persons is divided into two general themes. Essays on "identity and physical continuity" are presented by: Lewis, Rey, Perry, Parfit, Shoemaker, and Wiggins, while Dennett, Williams, de Sousa, Frankfurt, Penelhum, and Taylor write on "social and moral conditions of personhood." A. O. Rorty’s introduction is especially lucid, arguing that the concept of a person must, finally, be treated as a moral one. With advances in technology, e.g., the plausibility of brain transplants (...) and robots that can think, conditions of responsibility change hand in hand with changes in the meaning of persons. The philosopher’s job is not to introduce new, ingenious "final" solutions but to understand the roles of conflicting as well as interrelated definitions of persons. (shrink)

A. I. Melden’s earlier writings suggested that the justification for a given moral right is simply the social institution or context in which that right characteristically was involved: "the right that A has is the right that is his moral status or role with respect to B". On this view there is no justification for such rights independent of what can be provided by the particular practices in which they are embedded. Thus, to determine and ultimately to justify the respective (...) moral rights of parents and their children we should look to the "language game" in which they are mutually involved—that of family life—for this is the context in which rights and obligations of this sort have their primary and peculiar place. (shrink)

I attempt to show that, under materialist assumptions about the nature of mind, it is a necessary condition for fetal personhood that electrical activity has begun in the brain. First, I argue that it is a necessary condition for a thing to be a moral person that it is a self—understood as something that is capable of serving as the subject of a mental experience. Second, I argue that it is a necessary condition for a fetus to be a self (...) that some form of electrical brain activity occurs. Third, I argue that since the beginning of brain activity typically occurs at around 10 weeks of gestational age, most fetuses are not persons during the first 10 weeks of pregnancy and hence that abortion of most fetuses during this period does not rise to the moral level of murder. (shrink)

This essay intends to focus on the so-called 'Literates' people of our society.It labels them as a stigma.

: In a recent issue of Der Islam, Stephen R. Shoemaker has contributed an extensive article in which he challenged the processes and findings of a number of studies conducted by Gregor Schoeler, Harald Motzki, and Andreas Görke. The following article offers a response to his findings. Whereas the three authors argued the case for the possibility that authentic traditions of the first century of the Hijra can be reconstructed, Shoemaker holds the contrary point of view, as already stated in (...) the abstract of his study: “While az-Zuhrī and occasionally other authorities of his generation can often be persuasively linked with the tradition in question, the reach back to ’Urwa is generally not convincing …” Yet he is not entirely consistent in his views. In his study several statements are to be found that in fact support the views of the authors whose studies he critically examines. Overall, Shoemaker makes more concessions towards the possible authenticity of some of the material traced back to the first century than any “sceptic” prior to him. Unfortunately, Shoemaker’s criticism and rendering of the three authors’ studies is fraught with misunderstandings and inconsistencies. They are the focus of attention in this critical review. In addition, hitherto unknown traditions as well as sources that Shoemaker mentions without quoting or paraphrasing them will be presented. This material also challenges a number of Shoemaker’s key conclusions. (shrink)