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541 found
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1 — 50 / 541
  1. added 2020-04-18
    The Weight of Love: Augustine on Desire and the Limits of Autonomy.Paul Camacho - 2016 - Dissertation, KU Leuven
    Augustine developed one of the most profound and influential accounts of love ever offered. Led this way and that by the desires of his famously restless heart, Augustine came to view the experience of desiring as indicating a profound excess to the self. His theory of love has enduring philosophical relevance, not least because it disrupts our prevalent notion of freedom as self-determination. In contrast to our own dominant ethics of autonomy, Augustine argues that true freedom depends upon what exceeds (...)
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  2. added 2020-04-12
    Człowiek w rozumieniu afrykańskim.Krzysztof Trzciński - 2009 - Przeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 71 (3): 259-282.
    [PERSONHOOD IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY]. W artykule została omówiona i poddana analizie debata między dwoma współczesnymi afrykańskimi filozofami Ifeanyim A. Menkitim z Nigerii oraz Kwame Gyekyem z Ghany. Debata ta dotyczy typowych dla niektórych afrykańskich kultur sposobów myślenia o istocie człowieczeństwa, tj. o byciu człowiekiem (osobą, person). Prezentowane przez tych filozofów koncepcje nie odnoszą się do żadnych konkretnych afrykańskich ludów, lecz raczej są pewnymi wzorcami idealnymi, czy też abstrakcyjnymi. Zdaniem Menkitiego w tradycyjnym myśleniu afrykańskim jednostka (individual) stopniowo nabywa pełnię człowieczeństwa w (...)
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  3. added 2020-03-27
    How Valuable Could a Person Be?Joshua Rasmussen & Andrew M. Bailey - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    We investigate the value of persons. Our primary goal is to chart a path from equal and extreme value to infinite value. We advance two arguments. Each argument offers a reason to think that equal and extreme value are best accounted for if we are infinitely valuable. We then raise some difficult but fruitful questions about the possible grounds or sources of our infinite value, if we indeed have such value.
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  4. added 2020-02-23
    Material Through and Through.Andrew M. Bailey - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    Materialists about human persons think that we are material through and through—wholly material beings. Those who endorse materialism more widely think that everything is material through and through. But what is it to be wholly material? In this article, I answer that question. I identify and defend a definition or analysis of ‘wholly material’.
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  5. added 2020-02-23
    Our Animal Interests.Andrew Bailey - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2315-2328.
    Animalism is at once a bold metaphysical theory and a pedestrian biological observation. For according to animalists, human persons are organisms; we are members of a certain biological species. In this article, I introduce some heretofore unnoticed data concerning the interlocking interests of human persons and human organisms. I then show that the data support animalism. The result is a novel and powerful argument for animalism. Bold or pedestrian, animalism is true.
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  6. added 2020-02-23
    Composition and the Cases.Andrew M. Bailey - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (5):453-470.
    Some strange cases have gripped philosophers of mind. They have been deployed against materialism about human persons, functionalism about mentality, the possibility of artificial intelligence, and more. In this paper, I cry “foul”. It’s not hard to think that there’s something wrong with the cases. But what? My proposal: their proponents ignore questions about composition. And ignoring composition is a mistake. Indeed, materialists about human persons, functionalists about mentality, and believers in the possibility of artificial intelligence can plausibly deploy moderate (...)
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  7. added 2020-02-23
    You Are An Animal.Andrew M. Bailey - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (1):205-218.
    According to the doctrine of animalism, we are animals in the primary and non-derivative sense. In this article, I introduce and defend a novel argument for the view.
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  8. added 2020-02-23
    How Valuable Could a Material Object Be?Andrew M. Bailey & Joshua Rasmussen - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (2):332-343.
    Arguments for substance dualism—the theory that we are at least partly non-material beings—abound. Many such arguments begin with our capacity to engage in conscious thought and end with dualism. Such are familiar. But there is another route to dualism. It begins with our moral value and ends with dualism. In this article, we develop and assess the prospects for this new style of argument. We show that, though one extant version of the argument does not succeed, there may yet be (...)
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  9. added 2020-02-23
    Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
    Among your closest associates is a certain human animal – a living, breathing, organism. You see it when you look in the mirror. When it is sick, you don't feel too well. Where it goes, you go. And, one thinks, where you go, it must follow. Indeed, you can make it move through sheer force of will. You bear, in short, an important and intimate relation to this, your animal. So too rest of us with our animals. Animalism says that (...)
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  10. added 2020-02-23
    You Needn't Be Simple.Andrew M. Bailey - 2014 - Philosophical Papers 43 (2):145-160.
    Here's an interesting question: what are we? David Barnett has claimed that reflection on consciousness suggests an answer: we are simple. Barnett argues that the mereological simplicity of conscious beings best explains the Datum: that no pair of persons can itself be conscious. In this paper, I offer two alternative explanations of the Datum. If either is correct, Barnett's argument fails. First, there aren't any such things as pairs of persons. Second, consciousness is maximal; no conscious thing is a proper (...)
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  11. added 2020-02-23
    The Elimination Argument.Andrew M. Bailey - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):475-482.
    Animalism is the view that we are animals: living, breathing, wholly material beings. Despite its considerable appeal, animalism has come under fire. Other philosophers have had much to say about objections to animalism that stem from reflection on personal identity over time. But one promising objection (the `Elimination Argument') has been overlooked. In this paper, I remedy this situation and examine the Elimination Argument in some detail. I contend that the Elimination Argument is both unsound and unmotivated.
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  12. added 2020-02-23
    No Pairing Problem.Andrew M. Bailey, Joshua Rasmussen & Luke Van Horn - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):349-360.
    Many have thought that there is a problem with causal commerce between immaterial souls and material bodies. In Physicalism or Something Near Enough, Jaegwon Kim attempts to spell out that problem. Rather than merely posing a question or raising a mystery for defenders of substance dualism to answer or address, he offers a compelling argument for the conclusion that immaterial souls cannot causally interact with material bodies. We offer a reconstruction of that argument that hinges on two premises: Kim’s Dictum (...)
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  13. added 2020-02-11
    A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2003 - Mind 112 (445):148-151.
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  14. added 2019-10-23
    Il significato antropologico dell'esistenza in Mondo e Persona.Juan Gabriel Ascencio - 2017 - In Romano Guardini e il pensiero esistenziale. 53100 Siena, Italia: pp. 173-196.
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  15. added 2019-10-21
    Do Anthropologists Use Rational Actor Models? The Case of Marilyn Strathern.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    Economics uses rational actor models, but what about anthropology? I present an interpretation of the influential anthropologist Marilyn Strathern according to which she engages in a kind of rational actor modelling, but a kind that is different from economic modelling.
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  16. added 2019-06-16
    On the Concept of a Spirit.Andrew M. Bailey - 2017 - Religious Studies 53 (4):449-457.
    Substance dualism is on the move. Though the view remains unfashionable, a growing and diverse group of philosophers endorse it on impressive empirical, religious, and purely metaphysical grounds. In this note, I develop and evaluate one conceptual argument for substance dualism. According to that argument, we may derive a conclusion about our nature from the mere fact that we have the concept of a spirit. The argument is intriguing and fruitful; but I shall contend that it is, nonetheless, unsound.
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  17. added 2019-06-14
    Michael Tye, Consciousness and Persons. Unity and Identity.Andreas Blank - 2006 - Pragmatics and Cognition 14 (1):188-191.
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  18. added 2019-06-06
    Transparency, Epistemic Impartiality, and Personhood: A Commentary on Simon Evnine's Epistemic Dimensions of Personhood 1: Critical Notices.Dorit Bar-on - 2009 - Philosophical Books 50 (1):1-14.
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  19. added 2019-06-06
    Persons and the Extended Mind Thesis.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2009 - Zygon 44 (3):642-658.
    . The extended‐mind thesis is the claim that mentality need not be situated just in the brain, or even within the boundaries of the skin. Some versions take “extended selves” be to relatively transitory couplings of biological organisms and external resources. First, I show how EM can be seen as an extension of traditional views of mind. Then, after voicing a couple of qualms about EM, I reject EM in favor of a more modest hypothesis that recognizes enduring subjects of (...)
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  20. added 2019-06-06
    Reply to Brueckner.Joseph Keim Campbell - 2008 - Analysis 68 (3):264-269.
  21. added 2019-06-06
    Toward the Subjectivity of the Human Person: Edith Stein’s Contribution to the Theory of Identity.Peter J. Schulz - 2008 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 82 (1):161-176.
    Edith Stein’s work revolves around one central question, namely, the identity of the person. Discussions of this topic are already present in Stein’s dissertation. Iexamine her theory of identity, developed throughout her work and maturing in her magnum opus, Finite and Eternal Being, in three stages, each of which is historically relevant and original. First, Stein’s development of the question is examined phenomenologically, focusing on Stein’s early work. Second, I will show how Stein takes her early phenomenological positions concerning the (...)
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  22. added 2019-06-06
    Divided Brains and Unified Phenomenology: A Review Essay on Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. [REVIEW]Tim Bayne - unknown
    In _Consciousness and persons_, Michael Tye. Consciousness and persons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.) develops and defends a novel approach to the unity of consciousness. Rather than thinking of the unity of consciousness as involving phenomenal relations between distinct experiences, as standard accounts do, Tye argues that we should regard the unity of consciousness as involving relations between the contents of consciousness. Having developed an account of what it is for consciousness to be unified, Tye goes on to apply his account (...)
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  23. added 2019-06-06
    Fundamental Needs.Garrett Thomson - 2005 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 57:175-186.
    The concept of need is promising and alluring because of three factors.
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  24. added 2019-06-06
    The Constitution View of Persons: A Critique.William Hasker - 2004 - International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):23-34.
    This paper discusses the “constitution view” of human persons, as set forth by Lynne Rudder Baker in her book, Persons and Bodies. The metaphysical notion of constitution is explained and briefly defended. It is shown, however, that the view that human persons are constituted by their bodies faces difficulties in specifying the “person-favorable conditions” under which a human body constitutes a person. Furthermore, none of the arguments in support of the claim that humans are constituted by their bodies is persuasive. (...)
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  25. added 2019-06-06
    Minds, Persons and the Unthinkable: D. Z. Phillips.Dayton Z. Phillips - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:49-65.
    In a series of lectures on minds and persons, I am going to take advantage of the occasion to ask what kind of person should one be if one has a philosophical mind. I ask the question because it is itself a philosophically contentious issue. Indeed, I shall be offering answers in a climate which is generally hostile to them. I want to aise the issue in three contexts: first, in relation to questions which have been treated epistemologically, but which (...)
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  26. added 2019-06-06
    Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):592-598.
    Persons and Bodies develops and defends an account of persons and of the relation between human persons and their bodies. Human persons are constituted by bodies, without being identical to the bodies that constitute them—just as, I argue, statues are constituted by pieces of bronze, say, without being identical to the pieces of bronze that constitute them. The relation of constitution, therefore, is not peculiar to persons and their bodies, but is pervasive in the natural world.
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  27. added 2019-06-06
    Who Count as Persons? [REVIEW]Joseph W. Koterski - 2002 - International Philosophical Quarterly 42 (4):549-550.
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  28. added 2019-06-06
    Book Review. Persons and Bodies∷ A Constitution View Lynne Rudder Baker. [REVIEW]Eric Olson - 2001 - Mind 110 (438):427-430.
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  29. added 2019-06-06
    Personne Et Sujet Selon Husserl. [REVIEW]Chantal Beauvais - 1999 - Dialogue 38 (1):192-193.
    Comptant parmi les derniers-nés de la prestigieuse collection Épiméthée, ce livre constitue l'explicitation progressive d'une tension brûlante caractérisant de part en part le projet phénoménologique husserlien: l'irréductibilité du cercle téléologique constitué par la double ambition d'atteindre à l'originarité du moi sans pour autant le délester de son étoffe concrète. À ce titre, cette étude de Housset s'inscrit tout à fait dans la tendance actuelle des recherches phénoménologiques visant à nuancer l'interprétation strictement transcendantale du projet husserlien en accentuant les hésitations constantes, (...)
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  30. added 2019-06-06
    Davidson and Sellars on Persons and Science.John Tietz - 1980 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):237-249.
  31. added 2019-06-06
    Minds, Brains and People. [REVIEW]S. P. - 1974 - Review of Metaphysics 28 (2):360-361.
    The descriptivist and revisionist metaphysical accounts of persons are in apparent competition and conflict. Wilkerson analyzes both approaches to show the extent to which each account can be adequately applied. The basic advantage of the descriptivist view is that it clarifies the way we usually talk of persons, thus giving full attention to the status of first person knowledge claims. The physical or reductive picture explains much of the nature of persons in empirical terms.
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  32. added 2019-06-05
    Christian Physicalism?: Philosophical Theological Criticisms.R. Keith Loftin & Joshua R. Farris (eds.) - 2017 - Rowman & Littlefield.
    On the heels of the advance since the twentieth-century of wholly physicalist accounts of human persons, the influence of materialist ontology is increasingly evident in Christian theologizing. To date, the contemporary literature has tended to focus on anthropological issues (e.g., whether the traditional soul / body distinction is viable), with occasional articles treating physicalist accounts of such doctrines as the Incarnation and Resurrection of Jesus cropping up, as well. Interestingly, the literature to date, both for and against this influence, is (...)
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  33. added 2019-03-26
    Life in a Cage.Kristin Andrews - 2017 - The Philosophers' Magazine 76:72-77.
    Personhood is not a redundant category, but a social cluster kind. On this view, chimpanzees have their own kind of personhood profile. Seeing that chimpanzees have a personhood profile allows us to argue that chimpanzees like Tommy are individuals who deserve rights under the law. If chimpanzee personhood is a matter of public policy that needs to be decided by society, then learning more about the person profiles of chimpanzees will be essential in making this case. As the public learns (...)
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  34. added 2019-03-11
    Impersonal Identity and Corrupting Concepts.Kathy Berendt - 2005 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):159-188.
  35. added 2019-01-15
    Personhood and the Mvstery of Being: Marcel’s Ontology of Communion, Presence, and Availability.Albert Randall - 1995 - Bulletin de la Société Américaine de Philosophie de Langue Française 7 (1-2):93-103.
  36. added 2019-01-09
    Stanowisko nieredukcyjne w sporze o tożsamość osobową.Mariusz Grygianiec - 2018 - Diametros 57:23-38.
    In the debate on personal identity, different criteria of identity are proposed and defended. The criteria of identity have usually been taken to state the necessary and sufficient conditions of identity and are interpreted as providing truth conditions for relevant identity statements. The Simple View of personal identity is the thesis that there are no noncircular and informative metaphysical criteria of identity for persons. The paper intends to first deliver a precise and general formulation of the Simple View, and, second, (...)
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  37. added 2018-12-10
    Definition, Bedingungen und Träger des Personseins – drei philosophische Aporien.Gregor Damschen - 2017 - In Adrian Loretan (ed.), Die Würde der menschlichen Person. Münster: Lit. pp. 153-164.
    Definition, conditions and bearers of being a person - three philosophical aporias. -/- In this article I examine the philosophical question of how to define the concept of the person in a non-arbitrary way, how to find out the determining conditions of being a person and how to enumerate the bearers of being a person. I come to the conclusion that the question of a non-arbitrary definition, of the essential conditions and of the bearers of being a person has not (...)
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  38. added 2018-09-20
    Communities of Respect: Grounding Responsibility, Authority, and Dignity.Bennett W. Helm - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Communities of respect are communities of people sharing common practices or a (partial) way of life; they include families, clubs, religious groups, and political parties. This book develops a detailed account of such communities in terms of the rational structure of their members' reactive attitudes, arguing that they are fundamental in three interrelated ways to understanding what it is to be a person. First, it is only by being a member of a community of respect that one can be a (...)
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  39. added 2018-09-06
    Who Gets a Place in Person-Space?Simon Beck & Oritsegbubemi Oyowe - 2018 - Philosophical Papers 47 (2):183-198.
    We notice a number of interesting overlaps between the views on personhood of Ifeanyi Menkiti and Marya Schechtman. Both philosophers distance their views from the individualistic ones standard in western thought and foreground the importance of extrinsic or relational features to personhood. For Menkiti, it is ‘the community which defines the person as person’; for Schechtman, being a person is to have a place in person-space, which involves being seen as a person by others. But there are also striking differences. (...)
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  40. added 2018-09-06
    Prudence and Person-Stages.Kristie Miller - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (5):460-476.
    Persons care about their future selves. They reason about their future selves’ interests; they plan for their future selves’ happiness and they worry about their future selves’ suffering. This paper is interested in the interplay between diachronic prudential reason and certain accounts of the metaphysics of personal identity that fall under the broad umbrella ‘conventionalist’. Some conventionalists conclude that under certain conditions there are intractable decisions for there is no fact of the matter regarding whether a person-stage ought (prudentially) to (...)
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  41. added 2018-06-22
    Recovering Philosophy as the Love of Wisdom: A Contribution of St. John Paul II.Tarasiewicz Pawel - 2016 - Studia Gilsoniana 5 (1):269-281.
    The article aims at demonstrating that, by his teaching on human person and his action, St. John Paul II implicitly contributed to a resolution of the most serious problem of contemporary philosophy, which consists in separating wisdom from love and substituting wisdom with understanding or knowledge. The author concludes that John Paul II makes a persuasive contribution to recover philosophy as the love of wisdom by identifying truth in the area of freedom, self-fulfillment and conscience, and appealing to man’s honesty (...)
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  42. added 2018-06-22
    Review Article: A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person by Hud Hudson.Ryan Wasserman - 2003 - Philo 6 (2):320-330.
    This is a review article of Hud Hudson's book A Metaphysics of the Human Person. Topics covered include the problem of the many, the Partist view, and atomless gunk.
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  43. added 2018-04-25
    Humans and Hosts in Westworld: What's the Difference?Marcus Arvan - 2018 - In James South & Kimberly Engels (eds.), Westworld and Philosophy. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 26-38.
    This chapter argues there are many hints in the dialogue, plot, and physics of the first season of Westworld that the events in the show do not take place within a theme park, but rather in a virtual reality (VR) world that people "visit" to escape the "real world." The philosophical implications I draw are several. First, to be simulated is to be real: simulated worlds are every bit as real as "the real world", and simulated people (hosts) are every (...)
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  44. added 2018-04-17
    La noción de persona en san Alberto Magno.David Torrijos-Castrillejo - 2018 - In Víctor M. Tirado (ed.), Jornada de filosofía 2015. La persona. Madrid: Ediciones Universidad San Dámaso. pp. 163-190.
  45. added 2018-03-05
    Are We Causally Redundant?Jiri Benovsky - 2017 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):1-8.
    Some friends of eliminativism about ordinary material objects such as tables or statues think that we need to make exceptions. In this article, I am interested in Trenton Merricks’ claim that we need to make an exception for us, conscious beings, and that we are something over and above simples arranged in suitable ways, unlike tables or statues. I resist this need for making an exception, using the resources of four-dimensionalism.
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  46. added 2018-02-23
    Person und Relation. Zu einem metaphysischen Begriff der Person nach Thomas von Aquin und Augustinus.Falk Hamann - 2012 - Crossing Borders. Grenzen (Über)Denken – Thinking (Across) Boundaries.
    I examine two accounts of personhood: one by Thomas Aquinas, which basically draws on the doctrine of analogia entis, and another by Augustine, which focuses on the trinitarian structure of the human mind. I argue that both accounts, despite their differences, complement each other and thus contribute to a fuller understanding of human personhood.
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  47. added 2018-02-17
    Comments on Sydney Shoemaker’s Physical Realization.Andrew Melnyk - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (1):113-123.
    This paper concerns Sydney Shoemaker's view, presented in his book, Physical Realization (Oxford University Press, 2007), of how mental properties are realized by physical properties. That view aims to avoid the "too many minds" problem to which he seems to be led by his further view that human persons are not token-identical with their bodies. The paper interprets and criticizes Shoemaker's view.
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  48. added 2018-02-17
    What is a Person?: Rethinking Humanity, Social Life, and the Moral Good From the Person Up.Christian Smith - 2010 - University of Chicago Press.
    What is a person? This fundamental question is a perennial concern of philosophers and theologians. But, Christian Smith here argues, it also lies at the center of the social scientist’s quest to interpret and explain social life. In this ambitious book, Smith presents a new model for social theory that does justice to the best of our humanistic visions of people, life, and society. Finding much current thinking on personhood to be confusing or misleading, Smith finds inspiration in critical realism (...)
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  49. added 2018-02-17
    Persons and Substances.Scott Campbell - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 104 (3):253-267.
    I have argued elsewhere that the psychological criterion of personal identity entails that a person is not an object, but a series of psychological events. As this is somewhat counter-intuitive, I consider whether the psychological theorist can argue that a person, while not a substance, exists in a way that is akin to the way that substances exist. I develop ten criteria that such a 'quasi-substance' should meet, and I argue that a reasonable case can be made to show that (...)
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  50. added 2018-02-17
    Why One Hundred Years Is Forever: Hartshorne’s Theory of Immortality.Randall Auxier - 1998 - The Personalist Forum 14 (2):109-132.
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