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  1. Western Conceptions of the Individual. [REVIEW]Donald C. Abel - 1993 - Review of Metaphysics 46 (4):863-864.
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  2. Persons: A Study In Philosophical Psychology.Raziel Abelson - 1977 - London: Macmillan.
  3. Theconceptof a Person.E. M. Adams - 1985 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):403-412.
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  4. Machine Persons.Frederick Adams - 1992 - The Personalist Forum 8 (Supplement):47-55.
  5. Beyond Confederation.Lynne M. Adrian - 1988 - The Personalist Forum 4 (2):55-57.
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  6. Pictures and Persons: An Analogy.Virgil C. Aldrich - 1975 - Review of Metaphysics 28 (4):599 - 610.
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  7. The Chimpanzee's Tool.Barry Allen - 1997 - Common Knowledge 6:34-51.
  8. The Compensatory Nature of Personhood.Rayan Alsuwaigh & Lalit K. R. Krishna - 2014 - Asian Bioethics Review 6 (4):332-342.
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  9. About the Author.Pedro Amaral - manuscript
    Science starts out with the idea of a person as billions of neurons housed in a body that is a cloud of particles. Common sense starts out with the idea of a person having capacities belonging to a single individual. The common sense person does not have parts. Our objectifying science slowly takes over the person as it tends toward physical materialism. Where will it end? What is being gradually pushed out of the world? If science had already taken over, (...)
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  10. Humanities and the Idea of a Person in the 22nd Century: Kant, Descartes, Sellars.Pedro Amaral - manuscript
    Science starts out with the idea of a person as billions of neurons housed in a body that is a cloud of particles. Common sense starts out with the idea of a person having capacities belonging to a single individual. The common sense person does not have parts. Our objectifying science slowly takes over the person as it tends toward physical materialism. Where will it end? What is being gradually pushed out of the world? If science had already taken over, (...)
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  11. The Legacy of Bowne's Empiricism.Doug Anderson - 1992 - The Personalist Forum 8 (Supplement):1-8.
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  12. Editor's Note.Douglas R. Anderson - 1998 - The Personalist Forum 14 (1):1-1.
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  13. The Person in the Abrahamic Tradition: Is the Judeo-Christian Concept of Personhood Consistent?O. Anselm Ramelow - 2013 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):593-610.
    The concept of personhood in the Abrahamic tradition opens up new dimensions in contrast with the ancient world, especially the relationality and incommunicability of the person as a source of his or her dignity. However, these notions also originate their own set of contemporary challenges and problems. A proposal will be made as to how to overcome these problems by way of an integration of older insights on substance, act, and potency.
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  14. The Moral Collapse of the University.David Applebaum - 1990 - The Personalist Forum 6 (1):87-89.
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  15. “And They Have a Plan”: Cylons as Persons.Robert Arp & Tracie Mahaffey - 2008 - In Jason T. Eberl (ed.), Battlestar Galactica and Philosophy: Knowledge Here Begins Out There. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 55--63.
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  16. Vi. Reflections on Process and Persons.Harald Atmanspacher - manuscript
    This contribution reflects on Nicholas Rescher's discussion of “process and persons” in his book Process Metaphysics. Its main purposes are to offer conceptual commentary on some of Rescher's terms, and to suggest some options for process thinking more radical than Rescher's, partly motivated by recent developments in science and philosophy. First, a brief analysis of the relation between process and time is presented, emphasizing irreversibility and temporal holism as crucial for a processual worldview. Second, instability and transiency are introduced as (...)
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  17. The Philosophy of Marjorie Grene.R. E. Auxier & L. E. Hahn (eds.) - 2002 - La Salle, Illinois: Open Court.
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  18. Why One Hundred Years Is Forever.Randall Auxier - 1998 - The Personalist Forum 14 (2):109-132.
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  19. Being and Value.Randall E. Auxier & Mark Y. A. Davies - 1997 - The Personalist Forum 13 (2):304-312.
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  20. Principles and Persons.R. J. B. - 1970 - Review of Metaphysics 24 (2):343-343.
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  21. Conti's Reclamation of Farrer's Cosmological Personalism.Roger A. Badham - 1996 - The Personalist Forum 12 (1):18-34.
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  22. Conti’s Reclamation of Farrer’s Cosmological Personalism: A Pragmatist’s Response.Roger A. Badham - 1996 - The Personalist Forum 12 (1):18-34.
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  23. Are Zygotes Human Beings?John Eldon Bahde - 1989 - Dissertation, Cornell University
    The subject of this dissertation is fetal ontology, not the morality of abortion. I try to show that zygotes are not human beings. ;Unlike many philosophers, I am unwilling to give 'human being' to the biologists. It should not be confused with 'Homo sapiens' or any other taxonomic term of biology. On the other hand, it should not be confused with 'person' either. ;I investigate a number of attempts to fix the point at which we first become human beings. None (...)
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  24. A Naturalist View of Persons.Annette Baier - 1991 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 65 (3):5 - 17.
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  25. The Priority Principle.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):163-174.
    I introduce and argue for a Priority Principle, according to which we exemplify certain of our mental properties in the primary or non-derivative sense. I then apply this principle to several debates in the metaphysics and philosophy of mind.
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  26. Review Of: The Waning of Materialism. [REVIEW]Andrew M. Bailey - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):534-538.
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  27. How to Count People.Mark Bajakian - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):185 - 204.
    How should we count people who have two cerebral hemispheres that cooperate to support one mental life at the level required for personhood even though each hemisphere can be disconnected from the other and support its "own" divergent mental life at that level? On the standard method of counting people, there is only one person sitting in your chair and thinking your thoughts even if you have two cerebral hemispheres of this kind. Is this method accurate? In this paper, I (...)
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  28. Philosophy in Mediis Rebus.Baker Lynne Rudder - 2001 - Metaphilosophy 32 (4):378-394.
    So, let us begin in the middle of things. There are two senses in which I think that philosophy must begin in the middle of things: The first is epistemological: I think that the Cartesian ideal of finding an absolute starting point without any presuppositions is illusory. The most that we can do is to be aware of our presuppositions; we cannot eliminate them. Wherever we choose to start, we are in the middle of things epistemologically. The second way in (...)
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  29. Persons: Natural, Yet Ontologically Unique.Lynne Baker - 2008 - Encyclopaideia 23.
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  30. “What Does It Mean to Be One of Us?” A Response to Bransen.Lynne Rudder Baker - unknown
    Bransen takes the first question to pose “the problem of man’s uniqueness,” and his ultimate aim is to dissolve that problem. His method of dissolving it is by way of a detailed answer to the second question, which is the most fundamental. I want to show that Bransen’s answer to the second question actually provides an answer to each of the other questions, and that instead of dissolving the problem of man’s uniqueness (posed by question #1), what he offers is (...)
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  31. Selfless Persons: Goodness in an Impersonal World?Lynne Rudder Baker - 2015 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:143-159.
    Mark Johnston takes reality to be wholly objective or impersonal, and aims to show that the inevitability of death does not obliterate goodness in such a naturalistic world. Crucial to his argument is the claim that there are no persisting selves. After critically discussing Johnston's arguments, I set out a view of persons that shares Johnston's view that there are no selves, but disagrees about the prospects of goodness in a wholly impersonal world. On my view, a wholly objective world (...)
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  32. Technology and the Future of Persons.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2013 - The Monist 96 (1):37-53.
  33. Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2012 - Cambridge University Press.
    What is a human person, and what is the relation between a person and his or her body? In her third book on the philosophy of mind, Lynne Rudder Baker investigates what she terms the person/body problem and offers a detailed account of the relation between human persons and their bodies. Baker's argument is based on the 'Constitution View' of persons and bodies, which aims to show what distinguishes persons from all other beings and to show how we can be (...)
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  34. Persons and the Extended-Mind Thesis.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2009 - Zygon 44 (3):642-658.
    The extended-mind thesis (EM) is the claim that mentality need not be situated just in the brain, or even within the boundaries of the skin. Some versions take "extended selves" be to relatively transitory couplings of biological organisms and external resources. First, I show how EM can be seen as an extension of traditional views of mind. Then, after voicing a couple of qualms about EM, I reject EM in favor of a more modest hypothesis that recognizes enduring subjects of (...)
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  35. What Does It Mean to Be One of Us?Lynne Rudder Baker - 2008 - Journal of Anthropological Psychology 10:9-11.
    Bransen takes the first question to pose ―the problem of man‘s uniqueness,‖ and his ultimate aim is to dissolve that problem. His method of dissolving it is by way of a detailed answer to the second question, which is the most fundamental. I want to show that Bransen‘s answer to the second question actually provides an answer to each of the other questions, and that instead of dissolving the problem of man‘s uniqueness (posed by question #1), what he offers is (...)
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  36. Persons and the Natural Order.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - In Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Persons: Human and Divine. Oxford University Press.
    We human persons have an abiding interest in understanding what kind of beings we are. However, it is not obvious how to attain such an understanding. Traditional analytic metaphysicians start with a priori accounts of the most general, abstract features of the world— e.g., accounts of properties and particulars—features that, they claim, in no way depend upon us or our activity.1 Such accounts are formulated in abstraction from what is already known about persons and other things, and are used as (...)
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  37. The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
    Lynne Rudder Baker presents and defends a unique account of the material world: the Constitution View. In contrast to leading metaphysical views that take everyday things to be either non-existent or reducible to micro-objects, the Constitution View construes familiar things as irreducible parts of reality. Although they are ultimately constituted by microphysical particles, everyday objects are neither identical to, nor reducible to, the aggregates of microphysical particles that constitute them. The result is genuine ontological diversity: people, bacteria, donkeys, mountains and (...)
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  38. Persons and Other Things.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):5-6.
    In the large recent literature on the nature of human persons, persons are usually studied in isolation from the world in which they live. What persons are most fundamentally, philosophers say, are human animals, or brains, or perhaps souls -- without any consideration of the social and physical environments without which persons would not exist. In this article, I want to compensate for such overly narrow focus. Instead of beginning with the nature of persons cut off from any environment, I (...)
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  39. When Does a Person Begin?Lynne Rudder Baker - 2005 - Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):25-48.
    According to the Constitution View of persons, a human person is wholly constituted by (but not identical to) a human organism. This view does justice both to our similarities to other animals and to our uniqueness. As a proponent of the Constitution View, I defend the thesis that the coming-into-existence of a human person is not simply a matter of the coming-into-existence of an organism, even if that organism ultimately comes to constitute a person. Marshalling some support from developmental psychology, (...)
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  40. On Being One's Own Person.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2004 - In M. Sie, Marc Slors & B. van den Brink (eds.), Reasons of One's Own. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.
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  41. Review: A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person. [REVIEW]Lynne Rudder Baker - 2003 - Mind 112 (445):148-151.
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  42. Précis of Persons and Bodies. [REVIEW]Lynne Rudder Baker - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):592-598.
  43. Replies.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):623–635.
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  44. Brief Reply to Rosenkrantz's Comments on My "the Ontological Status of Persons".Lynne Rudder Baker - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):394-396.
    1. Primary-kind properties. Rosenkrantz does not see how a single primary-kind property can be had by x essentially and by y contingently . He offers a reductio ad absurdum of the view that a primary can be had accidentally or derivatively. The reductio has as a premise the following: “[S]omething has a primarykind property, F-ness, derivatively only if the primary-kind property of a nonderivative F, i.e., the property which determines what a nonderivative F most fundamentally is, is nonderivative F-ness .” (...)
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  45. The Ontological Status of Persons.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):370-388.
    Throughout his illustrious career, Roderick Chisholm was concerned with the nature of persons. On his view, persons are what he called ‘entia per se.’ They exist per se, in their own right. I too have developed an account of persons—I call it the ‘Constitution View’—an account that is different in important ways from Chisholm’s. Here, however, I want to focus on a thesis that Chisholm and I agree on: that persons have ontological significance in virtue of being persons. Although I’ll (...)
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  46. Review: Précis of Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. [REVIEW]Lynne Rudder Baker - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):592 - 598.
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  47. The Emergent Self.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):734-736.
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  48. Precis of Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  49. Materialism with a Human Face.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2001 - In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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  50. What Am I?Lynne Rudder Baker - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):151 - 159.
    Eric T. Olson has argued that any view of personal identity in terms of psychological continuity has a consequence that he considers untenable—namely, that I was never an early-term fetus. I have several replies. First, the psychological-continuity view of personal identity does not entail the putative consequence; the appearance to the contrary depends on not distinguishing between de re and de dicto theses. Second, the putative consequence is not untenable anyway; the appearance to the contrary depends on not taking seriously (...)
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1 — 50 / 516