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Persons

Edited by Timothy Campbell (Rutgers University - New Brunswick)
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Summary The metaphysics of personhood primarily addresses two questions: what is the nature of persons and what are their persistence conditions across time?  Addressing the former question prompts investigations into the nature of the self (if distinct from the person), consciousness, mind, and embodiment.  Addressing the latter prompts investigations into theories of personal identity.  Because many view "person"as a thoroughly normative notion, however, its study is often connected closely to investigations into value and practical identity.
Key works Primarily metaphysical investigations into personhood are taken up repeatedly by major figures throughout the history of philosophy, from Plato to Descartes to Kant.  In the contemporary literature, there are clear discussions by Baker 2000, Olson 2007, Shoemaker 1963, and van Inwagen 2001. Personhood as a normative ("forensic") concept was introduced by John Locke, in "Of Identity and Diversity" (see Perry 1975).  Contemporary normatively-based explorations of personhood include Frankfurt 1971 and Korsgaard 1989
Introductions Gallagher 2011, Martin, Raymond and Barresi, John, eds., Personal Identity (2003).
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Subcategories:See also:History/traditions: Persons
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  1. R. A. (1955). The Dignity of the Human Person. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 9 (1):159-159.
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  2. Nicholas Agar (2001). Book Review. Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the Limits of Evolutionary Explanation Anthony O'Hear. [REVIEW] Mind 110 (438):534-537.
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  3. Lars Albinus (2016). 7 Perspective. In Religion as a Philosophical Matter: Concerns About Truth, Name, and Habitation. De Gruyter Open. pp. 204-220.
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  4. S. Alexander (1911). I.—Self as Subject and as Person. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11 (1):1-28.
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  5. A. H. B. Allen (1937). The Self in Psychology. Philosophy 12 (47):378-378.
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  6. Rudolf Allers (1953). The Person. New Scholasticism 27 (3):361-361.
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  7. Adrian Alsmith (2015). Mental Activity & the Sense of Ownership. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):881-896.
    I introduce and defend the notion of a cognitive account of the sense of ownership. A cognitive account of the sense of ownership holds that one experiences something as one's own only if one thinks of something as one's own. By contrast, a phenomenal account of the sense of ownership holds that one can experience something as one's own without thinking about anything as one's own. I argue that we have no reason to favour phenomenal accounts over cognitive accounts, that (...)
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  8. Roman Altshuler (forthcoming). Bootstrapping the Afterlife. Brill.
    _ Source: _Page Count 16 Samuel Scheffler defends “The Afterlife Conjecture”: the view that the continued existence of humanity after our deaths— “the afterlife”—lies in the background of our valuing; were we to lose confidence in it, many of the projects we engage in would lose their meaning. The Afterlife Conjecture, in his view, also brings out the limits of our egoism, showing that we care more about yet unborn strangers than about personal survival. But why does the afterlife itself (...)
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  9. A. J. Ayer (2016). 11. The Concept of a Person. In Bernard Williams (ed.), Essays and Reviews: 1959-2002. Princeton University Press. pp. 45-47.
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  10. Annette Baier & Raziel Abelson (1979). Persons: A Study in Philosophical Psychology. Philosophical Review 88 (1):112.
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  11. Lynne Rudder Baker (2013). Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective. Oxford University Press USA.
    Science and its philosophical companion, Naturalism, represent reality in wholly nonpersonal terms. How, if at all, can a nonpersonal scheme accommodate the first-person perspective that we all enjoy? In this volume, Lynne Rudder Baker explores that question by considering both reductive and eliminative approaches to the first-person perspective. After finding both approaches wanting, she mounts an original constructive argument to show that a non-Cartesian first-person perspective belongs in the basic inventory of what exists. That is, the world that contains us (...)
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  12. J. Mark Baldwin (1903). Mind and Body From the Genetic Point of View. Philosophical Review 12:563.
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  13. Edward G. Ballard (1957). Individual and Person. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 18 (1):59-67.
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  14. Dorit Bar-on (2009). Transparency, Epistemic Impartiality, and Personhood: A Commentary on Simon Evnine'sepistemic Dimensions of Personhood. Philosophical Books 50 (1):1-14.
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  15. Martin Barker (1980). Wilson: On Human Nature. [REVIEW] Radical Philosophy 24:27.
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  16. Keith Barrington (1st ed. 2016). Predicting Outcomes in the Very Preterm Infant. In Annie Janvier & Eduard Verhagen (eds.), Ethical Dilemmas for Critically Ill Babies. Springer Verlag.
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  17. L. W. Beck (1941). Goldstein's Human Nature in the Light of Psychopathology. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2:245.
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  18. Lewis White Beck (1944). Character and Deed. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (4):547-553.
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  19. Ciaran Benson (2001). The Cultural Psychology of Self: Place, Morality and Art in Human Worlds. Routledge.
    Philosophers and psychologists both investigate the self, but often in isolation from one another. this book brings together studies by philosophers and psychologists in an exploration of the self and its function. It will be of interest to all those involved in philosophy, psychology and sociology.
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  20. Sylvia Berryman (1992). Sowing the Body. The Personalist Forum 8 (2):115-118.
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  21. Peter A. Bertocci (1968). The Person God Is. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 2:185-206.
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  22. John Bishop (1990). Searle on Natural Agency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (3):282 – 300.
  23. Rakesh Biswas (2009). Human Ontology Narratives. Nova Sciences Publishers.
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  24. Mark S. Blumberg & Greta Sokoloff (2001). Do Infant Rats Cry? Psychological Review 108 (1):83-95.
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  25. Giovanni Boniolo (2005). The Ontogenesis of Human Identity. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80 (56):5-.
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  26. Lisa Bortolotti (2009). Review of Evnine, Simon J.,Epistemic Dimensions of Personhood, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, Pp. Viii + 176, £32.50 (Cloth). [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):349-352.
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  27. Brian Boyd (1998). Jane, Meet Charles: Literature, Evolution, and Human Nature. Philosophy and Literature 22 (1):1-30.
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  28. Ernest G. Braham (1937). Personality in Philosophical Theology. London: the Epworth Press.
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  29. Sebastián Briceño (2015). Action, Activity, Agent. In Patricia Hanna (ed.), An Anthology of Philosophical Studies: Volume 9. Athens Institute for Education and Research. pp. 15–27.
    How is it that someone is an agent, an active being? According to a common and dominant opinion, it is in virtue of performing actions. Within this dominant trend, some claim that actions are acts of will while others claim that actions are identical with certain basic bodily movements. First I make an assessment of these traditional accounts of action and argue that neither of them can make sense of how is it that someone is an agent. Then I offer (...)
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  30. richard Brook (2004). Statistical and Identifiable Deaths. In John Haldane (ed.), Philosophy and its Public Role.
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  31. Godehard Brüntrup (1997). Der Streit um die Person. Information Philosophie 4:18-27.
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  32. Frank Budenholzer (2006). The Spiritual Emergent: Lonergan's View of Science and the Human Person. Philosophy and Culture 33 (11):127-147.
    Recently, physics and life sciences, and especially the development of neuroscience, is already leading the people to accept a rigid form of reductionism. Where the human intellect, human initiative and awareness can be identified as a purely biological vocabulary to explain. This article describes the root of the Nepalese people learn Lang; This paper argues that the root Lang Nepalese understanding of human nature-bit cell based on this idea in the legislation but the two pillars, namely: the theory of knowledge (...)
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  33. Michael B. Burke (2002). Objects and Persons. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 111 (4):586-588.
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  34. Michael B. Burke (1996). Sortal Essentialism and the Potentiality Principle. Review of Metaphysics 49 (3):491 - 514.
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  35. Mikel Burley (2009). Immortality and Meaning: Reflections on the Makropulos Debate. Philosophy 84 (4):529-547.
    This article reflects upon the debate, initiated by Bernard Williams in 1973, concerning the desirability of immortality, where the latter expression is taken to mean endless bodily life as a human or humanoid being. Williams contends that it cannot be desirable; others have disputed this contention. I discuss a recent response from Timothy Chappell and attempt to pinpoint the central disagreement between Chappell and Williams. I propose that neither side in the debate has firm grounds for its claims, and then (...)
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  36. Stephen Burwood (2009). Are We Our Brains? Philosophical Investigations 32 (2):113-133.
    My aim in this paper is to destabilise the brain-is-self thesis, something that is now regarded in some quarters as philosophical commonsense. My contention is that it is the epithelial body that enters into the formation of our sense of self and that largely bears the burden of personal identity as well as playing the key role in grounding our psychological ascriptions. Lacking any sensorimotor or social presence of its own, the brain by itself cannot "underlie" selfhood, but only as (...)
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  37. L. C. (1957). Etudes Sur Marx Et Hegel. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 10 (4):721-721.
  38. Spencer E. Cahill (1998). Toward a Sociology of the Person. Sociological Theory 16 (2):131-148.
    This paper proposes a sociology of the person that focuses upon the socially defined, publicly visible beings of intersubjective experience. I argue that the sociology of the person proposed by Durkheim and Mauss is more accurately described as a sociology of institutions of the person and neglects both folk or ethnopsychologies of personhood and the interactional production of persons. I draw upon the work of Gossman to develop a sociology of the person concerned with means, processes, and relations of person (...)
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  39. Sorin Calin (2003). The Body, a Metaphor of Mind. Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 2 (5):143-157.
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  40. William Calvin, My Synapses, Myself.
    The self, Joseph LeDoux tells us, is “the totality of the living organism”. Most disciplines in the natural sciences focus on only one or two levels of organization. Indeed, Dmitri Mendeleev figured out the periodic table of the elements without knowing any of the underlying quantum mechanics or stereochemistry. There are, however, at least a dozen levels of organization within the neurosciences — and, if we use a metaphor, we temporarily create yet another. This leads to considerable confusion and arguments (...)
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  41. J. M. Cameron (1978). Body and Person. New Blackfriars 59 (692):5-21.
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  42. Paul Carus (1911). The Self and Personality. The Monist 21 (1):92-108.
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  43. Gerald Casenave (1989). The Body in Mind. The Personalist Forum 5 (1):58-60.
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  44. Marcia Cavell (1985). Separate Minds. Philosophy 60 (233):359 - 371.
    This fact about the grammar of selfhypenreference doesn't answer the ontological question, however, of what sort of entity I am in so far as I am a speaker. Thinking about what is presumed in my understanding the concepts ‘one’ and ‘one who is speaking’ tells us this much, that I must be able to differentiate myself from other speakers at the same time as I must be like them. If I cannot differentiate myself from you then of course I cannot (...)
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  45. Rollin Chambliss (1961). The Nature of Man. University of Georgia, Center for Continuing Education.
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  46. V. C. Chappell & A. J. Ayer (1968). The Concept of a Person and Other Essays. Philosophical Review 77 (2):235.
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  47. David Charles (1988). Introducing Persons: Theories and Arguments in the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophical Books 29 (1):46-48.
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  48. Karol Chrobak (2013). Roman Ingarden I Helmuth Plessner o Możliwości Poznawania Innych Świadomości. Studia Z Kognitywistyki I Filozofii Umysłu 7 (2).
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  49. Felice Cimatti (2009). “Me” As Speech Act: A Performative Based Psychology. Etica E Politica 11 (1):291-300.
    We propose to define a psychological hypothesis for the word “me” that designates, for each human being, his or her personal interior Ego. Every human being is naturally an Ego – it is a question of learning the particular linguistic sound in which it is named in one’s mother tongue. In fact, it is not important, for our analysis, that the Ego be innate or developed gradually through experience. The important point in the psychological hypothesis is that the Ego is (...)
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  50. Stephen R. L. Clark (1991). How Many Selves Make Me?1: Stephen R. L. Clark. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 29:213-233.
    Cartesian accounts of the mental make it axiomatic that consciousness is transparent: what I feel, I know I feel, however many errors I may make about its cause. ‘I’ names a simple, unextended, irreducible substance, created ex nihilo or eternally existent, and only associated with the complete, extended, dissoluble substance or pretend-substance that is ‘my’ body by divine fiat. Good moderns take it for granted that ‘we’ now realize how shifting, foggy and deconstructible are the boundaries of the self; ‘we’ (...)
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