Peter Abelard

This thesis focuses on Abelard’s solution to the problem of understanding universals as presented in the Tractatus de Intellectibus. He examines this issue by asking what is understood when we consider the term ‘man’, a problem I call the ‘homo intelligitur [man is understood]’ problem. This is an important question, since earlier in the Treatise, Abelard states that understandings paying attention [attendens] to things otherwise than they are are empty, and thus, cannot be true. The challenge is therefore to explain (...) how understandings about universals, such as genera and species, can be sound, given that Abelard is a nominalist and, as such, does not believe in the existence of universal entities. His own answer to the problem is that such understandings attend to natures. However, since natures are, on his view, nothing more than the individuals they belong to, it is unclear how his solution is intended to work. I propose two ways to understand Abelard’s solution to the ‘homo intelligitur’ problem, identifying their respective merits and drawbacks. The first one is to treat ‘nature’ as meaning ‘status’. I explore this solution in Chapters 2 and 3, and conclude that while it has the advantage of establishing links between De Intellectibus and previous logical works by Abelard, it has some significant drawbacks, most notably that it is unclear how we can have epistemic access to status given that status are not things, which renders unclear how the criteria for the soundness of understandings can be met. The second one involves treating natures as referring to behaviors typical of members of a given genus or species. These behaviors come from the particular essential forms possessed by individuals, i.e. their differentiae understood as analogous to nuclear tropes in Peter Simons’ trope theory. I conclude that this solution is more intuitive than the first one and has the advantage of not depending on a specific interpretation of the evolution of Abelard’s thought. However, it is unclear how to treat behaviors and regularities in his ontology. (shrink)

It would be easy to oppose Peter Abelard and Hugh of Saint-Victor as two opposed types of masters: on one side the “intellectual,” in almost the modern sense of the word, and on the other side, a representative of the humanist, clerical and monastic tradition, soon to be effaced. In order to highlight the real significance of their divergences and the profound coherence of both historical and intellectual personalities, in this article the author investigated their social origins, how each one (...) conceived the relation between the individual and the group,and finally the way in which each appropriates earlier texts. Thus, in many respects Abelard and Hugh appear as opposite poles in the intellectual world of the twelfth century, but in a different perspective, thanks to the synthesis accomplished by their common students, as inseparable and complementary sources of what became the Scholastic age. (shrink)

Interest in philosophical anthropology in the early twelfth century was limited to the logical question of how to think and speak about dead humans. This question was prompted by the logic of living and dead humans based on the doctrine of substance found in Aristotle’s Categories and in the division of substance, as outlined by Porphyry to exemplify the logic of genus and species relations in the Isagoge. Abelard held the view that there is no such thing as a dead (...) human, and this provoked an intense response from his contemporaries. Abelard’s contemporaries, including Alberic of Paris and other anonymous authors, mounted a number of arguments against Abelard’s views. The stakes were high for them: as realists about species and genera, Abelard’s denial that there are dead humans threatened their entire interpretation of the structure of species and genera, and thereby their theory of universals. (shrink)

According to the aspect theory of instantiation, a particular A instantiates a universal B if and only if an aspect of A is cross-count identical with an aspect of B. This involves the assumption that both particulars and universals have aspects, and that aspects can mediate between different ways of counting things. I will ask what is new about this account of instantiation and, more importantly, whether it is an improvement on its older relatives. It will turn out that the (...) part of it that is new is the notion of cross-count identity among aspects. As I will show, this notion is both dubious and unnecessary. I will end by presenting a simplified aspect theory of instantiation that does not involve cross-count identity. (shrink)

As Christians, all twelfth-century Latin thinkers identified true happiness with the happiness God promises in the afterlife. This happiness was believed to be entirely spiritual, consisting in the endless vision of God. Nevertheless, along with this beatitudo in patria we also find in some twelfth-century authors the idea of a beatitudo in via as the philosophical life. This life can be characterized either as completely contemplative and solitary, or as one that remains partially attached to material circumstances and action in (...) society. Within this broad framework, this paper emphasizes three points:a. the ascetic and almost purely contemplative character of the ideal of the philosophical life as we find it in twelfth-century authors like Peter Abelard and John of Salisbury;b. the role played by philosophers in some twelfth-century triads of human types;c. the fact that, in spite of the monastic touch which often color them, many theses held by twelfth-century defenders of the philosophical... (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 53, Issue 2-4, pp 221 - 248 One of the peculiarities of Peter Abelard’s analysis of incomplete and non-assertive sentences is his use of the notion of desire: in both _Dialectica_ and _Glosses on Peri hermeneias_ the terms _desiderium_ and _desidero_ move to the foreground side by side with _optatio, expectatio, suspensio_ and the related verbs. Desire plays a structural role in Abelard’s descriptions of the compositional way in which the linguistic message is received, changing step by (...) step from incomplete to complete: the person who receives the incomplete message desires to get further information through other words since he knows that the purpose of such words or sequences of words is to combine with other words in order to form a complete sentence. On the other hand, the expression of the speaker’s attention to his inner affections renders the same semantic content a different complete sentence. (shrink)

Twelfth-century ethics is commonly thought of as following a stoic influence rather than an Aristotelian one. It is also assumed that these two schools are widely different, in particular with regards to the social aspect of the virtuous life. In this paper I argue that this picture is misleading and that Heloise of Argenteuil recognized that stoic ethics did not entail isolation but could be played out in a social context. I argue that her philosophical contribution does not end there, (...) but that she departs from both the stoics and her teacher, Abelard, in her defence of the ideal of moderation. By insisting that virtue must strike a mean between two extremes, she shows that Aristotelian virtue ethics were present in the intellectual life of the twelfth century. (shrink)

Anna Jaroszewska Sic et Non – Pierre Abelard’s Problematic Reasoning. Pierre Abelard, the philosopher called by many “the bee,” aroused much controversy because of his views. He was the most famous dialectician of his time. He used his logical and rational methods of truth investigation in the field of philosophy and theology. His thesis aroused much opposition, as evidenced by the double condemnation of the thinker by synods and his actions, intended to strengthen the role and independence of philosophy, were (...) not greeted with widespread acclaim. Abelard’s thesis Sic et Non had the purpose of correcting mistakes and ambiguities which appeared in the statements of the Church Fathers. That thesis is a perfect example of the dialectical method and serves as a textbook for students of this art – no answers given, only the arguments supporting the thesis and those against it. Does Abelard, twice condemned and conflicted with many famous thinkers, remain in his thesis a neutral person, who only quotes contradictory statements of the Church Fathers and theologians? What contradicts this thesis is the ampleness of the work and comprehensive clarifications in the first entries thereof. Despite the lack of any author comments in Sic et Non, what is clearly observable is the criticism of scholastic authority — the authority that was at Abelard’s time widely respected, without a word of opposition to the views represented. -/- Keywords: authority, dialectics, logic, rational investigation of the truth, criticism, truth, doubts. (shrink)

_Abelard in Four Dimensions: A Twelfth-Century Philosopher in His Context and Ours_ by John Marenbon, one of the leading scholars of medieval philosophy and a specialist on Abelard's thought, originated from a set of lectures in the distinguished Conway Lectures in Medieval Studies series and provides new interpretations of central areas of Peter Abelard's philosophy and its influence. The four dimensions of Abelard to which the title refers are that of the past, present, future, and the present-day philosophical culture in (...) which Abelard's works are still discussed and his arguments debated. For readers new to Abelard, this book provides an introduction to his life and works along with discussion of his central ideas in semantics, ethics, metaphysics, and philosophy of religion. For specialists, the book contains new arguments about the authenticity and chronology of his logical work, fresh evidence about Abelard’s relations with Anselm and Hugh of St. Victor, a new understanding of how he combines the necessity of divine action with human freedom, and reinterpretations of important passages in which he discusses semantics and metaphysics. For all historians of philosophy, it sets out and illustrates a new methodological approach, which can be used for any thinker in any period and will help to overcome the divisions between "historians" based in philosophy departments and scholars with historical or philological training. "This searching, thorough, and original study examines Abelard's past, present, and future, and our present. John Marenbon offers the best enquiry yet made into the sequence of Abelard's writings and their chronology, followed by an incisive and highly illuminating account of the various, successive formulations of his 'unpopular argument' to the effect that God cannot do otherwise than as he does. This is an accomplished work which will be eagerly read and hugely appreciated by students and their teachers on courses of philosophy, theology, and history." —_David Luscombe, University of Sheffield_. (shrink)

Résumé Appuyée sur une collation systématique — incluant l’orthographe — de l’unique manuscrit subsistant, cette nouvelle édition critique du début de la Logica « Ingredientibus » : Super Porphyrium, accompagnée d’une traduction française inédite et complétée par une abondante annotation, rend ainsi accessible l’exposé le plus détaillé d’Abélard sur les universaux, des pages célèbres où, dans une approche sémantique non exempte de perspectives métaphysiques, on trouve, comme l’étude précédente l’a laissé voir, des développements philosophiques importants relatifs à l’intellection et à (...) l’abstraction.Based on a systematic collation — including the orthography — of the only surviving manuscript, this new critical edition of the beginning of Abelard’s Logica “Ingredientibus” : Super Porphyrium, accompanied by an original French translation and an abundant annotation, thus makes accessible Abelard’s most elaborate account on universals, well known pages where, in a semantical approach non exempt of metaphysical perspectives, one finds, as the preceding study as shown, important philosophical developments on intellection and abstraction. (shrink)

Résumé Étude préliminaire à la nouvelle édition critique et à la traduction inédite offertes, dans ce numéro thématique, du début de la Logica « Ingredientibus » : Super Porphyrium d’Abélard, cet article opère d’abord un survol d’ensemble du texte, avec insistance sur l’exposé relatif aux universaux, et approfondit ensuite trois points de doctrine difficiles, sur lesquels l’historiographie récente a parfois hésité ou buté : la troisième signification des noms universels ; la conception prisciano-platonicienne de la pensée divine ; l’univocité de (...) la notion de status. Ce faisant, quant aux thèmes de l’intellection et de l’abstraction en particulier, une attention constante est portée au lien, parfois critique mais toujours fécond, existant entre cette portion de la Logica « Ingredientibus » et sa source principale, l’In « Isagogen » Porphyrii Commentorum Editio secunda de Boèce, dont l’article précédent fournit une présentation, le texte latin révisé et la première traduction française.As a preliminary study to the new critical edition and to the original French translation presented, in this thematic issue, of the first part of Abelard’s Logica “Ingredientibus” : Super Porphyrium, this article first operates a global survey of the text, dwelling upon the account of universals, and then elaborates upon three difficult doctrinal points, somehow problematic in recent historiography : the third signification of universal nouns ; the prisciano-platonic conception of divine thought ; the univocity of the notion of status. So doing, especially in regard to the themes of intellection and abstraction, a constant attention is given to the link, sometimes critical but always fruitful, existing between this portion of the Logica « Ingredientibus » and its main source, Boethius’ In “Isagogen” Porphyrii Commentorum Editio secunda, of which the preceding article offers a presentation, the revised Latin text, and the first French translation. (shrink)

Translated by Wanda Zemler-Cizewski. Peter Abelard's "Expositio in Hexaemeron", or interpretation of the "Six-Day Work of Creation", was commissioned by Heloise for the community of the Paraclete. The work is unusual in that it gives priority to the historical over the allegorical sense, and bears strong affinities to the writings of Thierry of Chartres and other Twelfth century students of the natural sciences. As such, it is evidence both for the general state of Twelfth century knowledge of cosmology, and for (...) the quality of scholarship available in particular to a community of women religious.The source text of this volume appeared in Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaeualis as Expositio in Hexameron. References to the corresponding pages of the Corpus Christianorum edition are provided in the margins of this translation. (shrink)

An examination the development of Peter Abaelard's views on translation and figurative meaning. Mediaeval philosophers curiously do not connect the theory of translation implied by Aristotelian semantics with the multiplicity of tongues consequent upon the fall of Babel and do not seem to have much to offer to help in solving the problems of scriptural interpretation noted by Augustine. Indeed, on the Aristotelian account of meaning such problems do not arise. This paper shows that Abaelard is like others in this (...) respect in not in general finding translation problematic. Two particular cases, oppositio in adiecto and accidental predication, however, present problems for him and the paper examines and tries to explain the differences between the account given in the Dialectica and that given in the Logica 'Ingredientibus'. (shrink)

The discussion of universals in Peter Abelard’s Logica ‘Ingredientibus’ has been interpreted in many ways. Of particular controversy has been the proper way to interpret his use of the term status. In this paper I offer an interpretation of status by comparing Abelard’s account of knowledge of universals to Edmund Husserl’s presentations of categorial and eidetic intuition. I argue that status is meant to be understood as something like an ideal object, in Husserl’s sense of the term. First, I present (...) Abelard’s discussion of status and distinguish this term from universals, things, acts of understanding, and forms. Next, I consider Husserl’s account of categorial and eidetic intuition. Finally, I draw parallels between the two while showing how an interpretation of status as ideal object overcomesthe interpretive problems encountered by other commentators on Abelard. (shrink)

Peter Abelard’s (1079-1142) conception of moral sin contains a fundamental element from Stoicism, which is the notion of “consent” (consensus). After the presentation of the essentials of that Abelardian theory, we return to the source of that same idea in ancient and imperial Stoicism. According to their main representatives, “consent” or “assent” (sugkata/qesij) has a determining function not only in ethics, but also in the process of knowledge as well. We emphasize in passing the resemblance between some important components of (...) Stoic epistemology and the theory expounded by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics on the origin of knowledge. Augustine represents without any doubt one of the main intermediaries through whom this notion of consent is transmitted up to the time of Abelard in the 12th century. Even if he was influenced by the Bishop of Hippo on moral questions in general, Abelard seems to distance himself from Augustine by considering that consent is more a rational matter than a volitional one. (shrink)

This article considers three medieval approaches to the problem of future contingent propositions in chapter 9 of Aristotle's _De interpretatione_. While Boethius assumed that God's atemporal knowledge infallibly pertains to historical events, he was inclined to believe that Aristotle correctly taught that future contingent propositions are not antecedently true or false, even though they may be characterized as true-or-false. Aquinas also tried to combine the allegedly Aristotelian view of the disjunctive truth-value of future contingent propositions with the conception of all (...) things being timelessly present to God's knowledge. The second approach was formulated by Peter Abelard who argued that in Aristotle's view future contingent propositions are true or false, not merely true-or-false, and that the antecedent truth of future propositions does not necessitate things in the world. After Duns Scotus, many late medieval thinkers thought like Abelard, particularly because of their new interpretation of contingency, but they did not believe, with the exception of John Buridan, that this was an Aristotelian view. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine Abelard’s model of the incarnation and place it within the wider context of his views in metaphysics and logic. In particular, we consider whether Abelard has the resources to solve the major difficulties faced by the so-called “compositional models” of the incarnation, such as his own. These difficulties include: the requirement to account for Christ’s unity as a single person, despite being composed of two concrete particulars; the requirement to allow that Christ is identical with (...) the pre-existent Son, despite the fact that the pre-existent Son is a part of the incarnate Christ; and finally the requirement to avoid Nestorianism, i.e., the position that Christ’s proper parts are persons in their own right. We argue that Abelard does have adequate solutions to these problems. In particular, we show that his theories of relations and predication can be put to use in defence of a compositional account of the incarnation. (shrink)

Le récit de l’Historia calamitatum dépend, au niveau thématique, d’une proportion logique que Pierre Abélard annonce au commencement de son épître de consolation. Abélard suggère que la souffrance ressentie par le lecteur de son Historia est en rapport avec la souffrance d’Abélard, tout comme la souffrance d’Abélard est en rapport avec la souffrance du Christ et des pères de l’Église. La distance entre chaque terme de cette proportion mesure en effet la consolation disponible au souffrant.

Peter Abelard develops an ethical thought, which is quite different from later moral philosophy, structured over some concepts such as reason and moral subjectivity. The first, is understood as discursive power over moral life and as moral reasoning. About moral subjectivity, emphasizes the moral act’s psychology, and develop his understanding not on the basis of sin, but its constitution. The paper traces the development of these two concepts in Abelard’s two major ethical works: Ethics and Dialogue between a Philosopher, a (...) Jew and a Christian. And also studies the relation between Abelard’s morality and the metaphysics held by him. (shrink)

Moral moments -- The neurotic and the penitent -- True, false, and feigned penance -- Fame without conscience -- Cain and conscience -- Feminine paradoxes -- Sincere hypocrisy -- The poetical consience -- Envoi : spiritual sophistry.

Peter Abelard's claim that universals are only words is well known, yet its metaphysical bearing for Abelard's philosophy is much disputed. Peter King has recently suggested that Abelard's nominalism is only an element of his larger irrealist metaphysic. Against this interpretation, I argue that Abelard's view is better understood as a form of moderate realism and a development of the solution attempted by Boethius in his Second Commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge. Both Abelard and Boethius clearly deny the independent existence of (...) universals, yet they should not be called irrealists, since they agree that universal words or concepts have a firm basis in real, individual things. (shrink)

Peter Abelard (1079 – 21 April 1142) [‘Abailard’ or ‘Abaelard’ or ‘Habalaarz’ and so on] was the pre-eminent philosopher and theologian of the twelfth century. The teacher of his generation, he was also famous as a poet and a musician. Prior to the recovery of Aristotle, he brought the native Latin tradition in philosophy to its highest pitch. His genius was evident in all he did. He is, arguably, the greatest logician of the Middle Ages and is equally famous as (...) the first great nominalist philosopher. He championed the use of reason in matters of faith (he was the first to use ‘theology’ in its modern sense), and his systematic treatment of religious doctrines are as remarkable for their philosophical penetration and subtlety as they are for their audacity. Abelard seemed larger than life to his contemporaries: his quick wit, sharp tongue, perfect memory, and boundless arrogance made him unbeatable in debate — he was said by supporter and detractor alike never to have lost an argument — and the force of his personality impressed itself vividly on all with whom he came into contact. His luckless affair with Héloïse made him a tragic figure of romance, and his conflict with Bernard of Clairvaux over reason and religion made him the hero of the Enlightenment. For all his colourful life, though, his philosophical achievements are the cornerstone of his fame. (shrink)

Abelard repeatedly claims that no thing can survive the gain or loss of parts. I outline Abelard’s reasons for holding this controversial position. First, a change of parts compromises the matter of the object. Secondly, a change in matter compromises the form of the object. Given that both elements of an object are compromised by any gain or loss of a part, the object itself is compromised by any such change. An object that appears to survive change is really a (...) series of related, but non-identical, objects. I argue that, for Abelard, this series of objects is not itself an object. Finally, I examine an apparent exception to Abelard’s claim that no thing can survive a gain or loss of parts, and I show that this specific case does not undermine his general thesis. (shrink)

For Abelard, the notion of “intention” (intentio, attentio) plays a central and important role in his cognitive and ethical theories. Is there any philosophical connection between its uses in these contexts? In recent publications, Constant Mews has argued that the cognitive and ethical senses of “intention” are related (namely, the cognitive sense evolves into the ethical sense), and that Abelard is repeatedly led to focus on intentions throughout his career due to the influence of Heloise. Here I evaluate Mews’s arguments (...) by examining and comparing the cognitive and ethical senses of the term. Although the basis for Mews’s claim seems to be false, I argue that there is nonetheless an important philosophical relationship between cognitive and ethical intentiones in Abelard’s thought, there cognition of which leads to a new and more precise understanding of his ethical theory of intention. (shrink)

Abelard’s most famous spokesman for the ancient and abiding moral and religious worth of the Law of Moses is probably the character of the Jew, invented for one of two fictional dialogues in the Collationes. The equally fictive Philosopher, a rationalist theist who gets the last word in his exchange with the Jew, condemns the Law as a useless addition to the natural law, a threat to genuine morality with a highly dubious claim to divine origin. The Philosopher’s condemnation, however, (...) does not go unanswered. Abelard himself, writing in his own voice in two major treatments of the Law, defends the ancient worth of the Law as a revolution in moral understanding and a potential guarantor of salvation. The Law is just and rational, he argues, in every one of its precepts, even when interpreted according to the letter. As such, the letter of the Law has been and ought to be retained in Christianity: its moral precepts are binding everywhere and always; its non-moral precepts are binding, when, in the changing circumstances of the Church, they are found to be useful and not conducive to scandal. (shrink)

In the "Ethics", Abelard discusses the example of a judge who knowingly convicts an innocent defendant. He claims that this judge does rightly when he punishes the innocent man to the full extent of the law. Yet this claim seems counterintuitive, and, at first glance, contrary to Abelard’s own ethical system. Nevertheless, I argue that Abelard’s ethical system cannot be viewed as completely subjective, since the rightness of an individual act of consent is grounded in objective standards established by God. (...) Likewise, any particular civil government must derive its authority objectively from the natural and/or Christian laws, which ground its possibility and function. In this paper, I examine Abelard’s explication of the natural law, discoverable through reason, and the divine laws, knowable only through revelation, in order to explore what form an adequate civil law would have to take under which the judge could be said to have acted rightly. (shrink)