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Phenomenalism
Edited by Michael Pelczar (National University of Singapore)
About this topic
| Summary | Phenomenalism is the view that physical reality is ultimately nothing more than a potential for conscious experience. Classically, the view is defined in terms of “sensation-conditionals”: counterfactual conditionals to the effect that experiences with certain phenomenal properties (qualia) would occur, if experiences with certain other qualia were to occur. Classic phenomenalism is a combination of two claims: (1) that for every physical state of affairs, there is some conjunction of sensation-conditionals whose truth logically entails the existence of that state of affairs, and, (2) that in order for a physical state of affairs to exist, it’s unnecessary for there to be anything (monads, God, noumena, or whatever) that makes the relevant sensation-conditionals true. It is the second claim that distinguishes phenomenalism from canonical idealism. Influential objections to (1) include (a) that the claimed entailment only seems to hold if the phenomenalist cheats by using conditionals whose antecedents refer to physical features of observers and their environments, (b) that the claimed entailment only seems to hold if the phenomenalist cheats by using conditionals that refer to physical time and space, (c) that the claimed entailment fails as a reduction, since we have to use physical vocabulary to characterize the relevant qualia, and, (d) that it’s impossible to give a plausible phenomenological analysis of imperceptible physical entities (like electrons).
Influential objections to (2) include (e) that the states of affairs described by counterfactual conditionals can’t be fundamental states of affairs, but must have some categorical basis, (f) that if nothing makes sensation-conditionals true, the most that their truth entails is the existence of a convincing appearance of physical reality, and, (g) that we have to posit truth-makers for sensation-conditionals, in order to account for the non-chaotic character of our experience. |
| Key works | Chapters 11 and 12 of Mill 1865 contain the original statement of the phenomenalist position. The first attempt to develop phenomenalism in detail is Carnap 1928 (for subsequent attempts, see Price 1932, Chapter 8 of Lewis 1946, and Pelczar 2015). Other sympathetic discussions include Ayer 1947 and Chapters 5 and 6 of Fumerton 1985. Important critical discussions include Chisholm 1948 (who raises objection [a]), Chapters 5 and 6 of Armstrong 1961 (who raises objections [b], [d], and [e]), Chapter 3 of Sellars 1963 (who raises objections [a], [b], and [c]), Chapter 2 of Smart 1963 (who raises objections [a], [d], [e], and [g]), and Mackie 1969 (who raises objections [f] and [g]). |
| Introductions | Richard Fumerton's entry for phenomenalism in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy is a good place to start (for a more detailed discussion along the same lines, see Chapters 5 and 6 of Fumerton 1985). Armstrong 1961 and Smart 1963 summarize most of the main objections to phenomenalism in a concise and accessible way. |
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Related
Siblings
- Idealism (405)
- Dialectical Materialism (16)
- Dualism (1,120 | 416)
- Global Eliminativism (0)
- Hylomorphism (33)
- Logical Atomism (67)
- Monism (137)
- Metaphysical Naturalism (231)
- Physicalism (676 | 374)
- Process Philosophy (210)
- Humean Supervenience (86)
- Relativism (400 | 377)
- Global Metaphysical Theories, Misc (113)
Contents
132 found
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| 1 — 50 / 132 |
- The Existence of Mind-Independent Physical Objects.Leslie Allan - manuscriptThe author challenges both the eliminative idealist's contention that physical objects do not exist and the phenomenalist idealist's view that statements about physical objects are translatable into statements about private mental experiences. Firstly, he details how phenomenalist translations are parasitic on the realist assumption that physical objects exist independently of experience. Secondly, the author confronts eliminative idealism head on by exposing its heuristic sterility in contrast with realism's predictive success.
- Going Out of My Head: An Evolutionary Proposal Concerning the “Why” of Sentience.Stan Klein, Bill N. Nguyen & Blossom M. Zhang - forthcoming - Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice.The explanatory challenge of sentience is known as the “hard problem of consciousness”: How does subjective experience arise from physical objects and their relations? Despite some optimistic claims, the perennial struggle with this question shows little evidence of imminent resolution. In this article I focus on the “why” rather than on the “how” of sentience. Specifically, why did sentience evolve in organic lifeforms? From an evolutionary perspective this question can be framed: “What adaptive problem(s) did organisms face in their evolutionary (...)
- Author's summary, and replies to commentators. [REVIEW]Michael Pelczar - forthcoming - Analysis.Remove from this listExport citation
Bookmark - ChatGPT: towards AI subjectivity.Kristian D’Amato - 2024 - AI and Society 39:1-15.Motivated by the question of responsible AI and value alignment, I seek to offer a uniquely Foucauldian reconstruction of the problem as the emergence of an ethical subject in a disciplinary setting. This reconstruction contrasts with the strictly human-oriented programme typical to current scholarship that often views technology in instrumental terms. With this in mind, I problematise the concept of a technological subjectivity through an exploration of various aspects of ChatGPT in light of Foucault’s work, arguing that current systems lack (...)
- Phenomenalism: A Metaphysics of Chance and Experience.David Gordon - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (3):1047-1049.
- Knowing One's Own Consciousness: The Epistemic Ontology of Consciousness and Its Implication for the Explanatory Gap Argument(s).Biplab Karak - 2024 - Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 26 (1):171-193.It is usually, and without much disagreement, regarded that ‘knowing one’s own consciousness’ is strikingly and fundamentally different from ‘knowing other things’. The peculiar way in which conscious subjects introspectively know their own consciousness in their immediate awareness is of immense importance with regard to the understanding of consciousness insofar as it has a direct bearing upon consciousness’ fundamental existence. However, when it comes to the understanding of consciousness, the role of consciousness’ introspective knowledge is rather downplayed or not given (...)
- Between Sense-Phenomenalism, Equi-phenomenalism, Quasi-physicalism, and Proto-panpsychism.Ada Agada - 2023 - In Aribiah David Attoe, Segun Samuel Temitope, Victor Nweke, John Umezurike & Jonathan Okeke Chimakonam (eds.), Conversations on African Philosophy of Mind, Consciousness and Artificial Intelligence. Springer Verlag. pp. 37-48.African philosophy of mind is still a developing area of African philosophy. The main issues driving debates in the field include the essential components of the human being (whether this being is wholly physical or partly physical and partly non-material), the relation of the body with the mind or consciousness, whether there is a unifying principle that grounds both body (matter) and consciousness, and whether there is an aspect of the human being that survives biological death. Physicalist theories such as (...)
- Kant’s Ontological Phenomenalism.Mark Pickering - 2023 - Kant Studien 114 (2):247-270.Immanuel Kant’s oft-repeated statement that physical objects are mere representations has given rise to various phenomenalist interpretations. Here I understand phenomenalism to be the view that physical objects are actual or possible perceptions. I argue for a novel phenomenalist interpretation: for Kant a physical object is nothing but the sum of actual and possible perceptions that agree with its empirical concept. I argue that this interpretation is supported by the textual evidence and that this interpretation is not vulnerable to objections (...)
- Physical Objects as Possibilities for Experience: Michael Pelczar's Phenomenalism: A Metaphysics of Chance and Experience. [REVIEW]Stephen Puryear - 2023 - Metascience 33 (1):95-97.Every metaphysical system must take something as fundamental and unanalyzed, something to which everything else ultimately reduces. Most philosophers today prefer to conceive fundamental reality as non-mental and categorical. This leaves them seeking to reduce the mental to the non-mental and the dispositional to the categorical. Pelczar proposes to invert this picture, putting experience and chance at the foundation and attempting to explain the non-mental and categorical features of our world in their terms. The resulting view, which he calls phenomenalism, (...)
- Kant's One-World Phenomenalism: How the Moral Features Appear.Andrew Chignell - 2022 - In Schafer Karl & Stang Nicholas (eds.), The Sensible and Intelligible Worlds: New Essays on Kant's Metaphysics and Epistemology. Oxforrd University Press. pp. 337-359.The goal of this paper is to sketch an account of Kant’s signature metaphysical doctrine (transcendental idealism) that (a) has no supporters – as far as I am aware – in the contemporary literature, and (b) draws its primary motivation (as interpretation) from considerations regarding our practical situation and needs as agents. -/- The consideration I focus on here is that people not only have mental and moral features, but they also appear to us – in our daily experience – (...)
- Müfessirlerin Tarihsellikleri Çağın Fenomenleri.Erhan Görgün - 2022 - Dissertation, Siirt Üniversitesi"Müfessirlerin Tarihsellikleri" ismini verdiğimiz işbu tez vesilesiyle öncelikle günümüzde Kur'ân ile yan yana anıldığına şahit olduğumuz "tarihsellik" kavramının esas itibariyle insana ait bir mefhum olduğuna, tefsir bünyesinde yaşanan birçok ihtilafın da "tarihsellik" tabirinin insana ait oluşunun tam manasıyla idrak edilemeyişinden kaynaklandığına dikkat çekilmiştir. Tefsir sahasında vuku bulan ve esasında insanın tarihselliğinden ileri gelen bu ihtilafların giderilmesi ile muhtemel yeni ihtilafların önüne geçilebilmesi, herkes gibi bir insan olan müfessirlerin tarihselliklerini inşa eden unsurların doğru tespitine bağlıdır. Bu sebeple müfessirlerin tarihselliklerini inşa ederek (...)
- Phenomenalism, Skepticism, and Sellars's Account of Intentionality.Griffin Klemick - 2022 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30 (5):548-558.I take up two questions raised by Luz Christopher Seiberth's meticulous reconstruction of Wilfrid Sellars's theory of intentionality. The first is whether we should regard Sellars as a transcendental phenomenalist in the most interesting sense of the term: as denying that even an ideally adequate conceptual structure would enable us to represent worldly objects as they are in themselves. I agree with Seiberth that the answer is probably yes, but I suggest that this is due not to Sellars's rejection of (...)
- Resisting Phenomenalism, From Bodily Experience to Mind-Independence.Massin Olivier - 2022 - In Adrian J. T. Alsmith & Andrea Serino (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Bodily Awareness. Routledge.Can one refute Berkeleyan phenomenalism by arguing that sensory objects seem mind-independent, and that, according to Berkeley, experience is to be taken at face value? Relying on Mackie’s recent discussion of the issue, I argue, first, that phenomenalism cannot be straightforwardly refuted by relying on perceptual or bodily experience of mind-independence together with the truthfulness of experience. However, I maintain, second that phenomenalism can be indirectly refuted by appealing to the bodily experience of resistance. Such experience presents us with the (...)
- Phenomenalism: A Metaphysics of Chance and Experience.Michael Pelczar - 2022 - Oxford: Oxford University Press, Oxford.J.S. Mill famously equated physical things with "permanent possibilities of sensation." This view, known as phenomenalism, holds that a rock is a tendency for experiences to occur as they do when people perceive a rock, and similarly for all other physical things. In _Phenomenalism_, Michael Pelczar develops Mill's theory in detail, defends it against the objections responsible for its current unpopularity, and uses it to shed light on important questions in metaphysics, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of mind. (...)
- Categorical phenomenalism about sexual orientation.T. R. Whitlow & N. G. Laskowski - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):581-596.What is sexual orientation? The contemporary consensus among philosophers is that it is a disposition. Unsurprisingly, recent debates about the metaphysics of sexual orientation are almost entirely intramural. Behavioral dispositionalists argue that sexual orientation is a disposition to behave sexually. Desire dispositionalists argue that it is a disposition to desire sexually. We argue that sexual orientation is not best understood in terms of dispositions to behave or dispositions to desire before arguing that dispositions tout court fail to illuminate sexual orientation. (...)
- The Role of Imagination in Ernst Mach’s Philosophy of Science: A Biologico-economical View.Char Brecevic - 2021 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 11 (1):241-261.Some popular views of Ernst Mach cast him as a philosopher-scientist averse to imaginative practices in science. The aim of this analysis is to address the question of whether or not imagination is compatible with Machian philosophy of science. I conclude that imagination is not only compatible, but essential to realizing the aim of science in Mach’s biologico-economical view. I raise the possible objection that my conclusion is undermined by Mach’s criticism of Isaac Newton’s famous “bucket experiment.” I conclude that (...)
- Experiential Metaphysics and Merleau-Ponty’s Intra-Ontology.Gregory M. Nixon - 2021 - Constructivist Foundations 16 (2):153-155.[This is a commentary article on Michel Bitbol's TA: "The Tangled Dialectic of Body and Consciousness: A Metaphysical Counterpart of Radical Neurophenomenology".] -/- A summary of the major metaphysical positions reveals them to be variable enough that they do not deny experience to the researcher. Further, Merleau-Ponty’s intra-ontology and related terms are fleshed out.
- Phenomenalism and Kant.Roberto Horacio de Sá Pereira - 2021 - Con-Textos Kantianos 1 (13):245-258.Readings of Kant’s Critique as endorsing phenomenalism have occupied the spotlight in recent times: ontological phenomenalism, semantic phenomenalism, analytical phenomenalism, epistemological phenomenalism, and so on. Yet, they raise the same old coherence problem with the Critique : are they compatible with Kant’s Refutation of Idealism? Are they able to reconcile the Fourth Paralogism of the first edition with the Refutation of the second, since Kant repeatedly claimed that he never changed his mind in-between the two editions of his Critique? This (...)
- (1 other version)Marharyta Rouba: Translator’s Comments on T. Rosefeldt: ‘Being Realistic about Kant’s Idealism’ // Комментарии переводчика к статье Т. Розефельдта «Как быть реалистом относительно идеализма Канта?».Marharyta Rouba - 2021 - Studies in Transcendental Philosophy 2 (1).ENG: The preface to the translation of Tobias Rosefeldt’s article into Russian provides a discussion context, in which the author settles an issue of interpreting the a posteriori aspects of the content of experience in Kant’s transcendental idealism. Key points of the article are briefly formulated and the translator’s choices of certain terms are justified. // RUS: В предисловии к переводу статьи Тобиаса Розефельдта (Берлин) на русский язык переводчик очерчивает контекст дискуссии, в русле которой автор решает проблему толкования апостериорного аспекта (...)
- The History of 'Ideas'.Ilexa Yardley - 2021 - Https://Medium.Com/the-Circular-Theory/.We have to begin with the pyramid (pi-diameter-circumference). In order to understand an 'idea.' And, the history of ideas.
- The Logic of Leibniz’s Borrowed Reality Argument.Stephen Puryear - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):350-370.Leibniz argues that there must be a fundamental level of simple substances because composites borrow their reality from their constituents and not all reality can be borrowed. I contend that the underlying logic of this ‘borrowed reality argument’ has been misunderstood, particularly the rationale for the key premise that not all reality can be borrowed. Contrary to what has been suggested, the rationale turns neither on the alleged viciousness of an unending regress of reality borrowers nor on the Principle of (...)
- Ernst Mach’ın Anti-Realizminin Fenomenalist Temeli ve Öznel İdealist Sonucu: Mach Solipsist Bir Düşünür Olabilir Mi?Alper Bilgehan Yardımcı - 2020 - Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):469-487.This article initially presents Ernst Mach's anti-realist or instrumentalist stance that underpin his opposition to atomism and reveal his idea that science should be based totally on objectively observable facts. Then, the details of Mach's phenomenalist arguments which recognize only sensations as real are revealed. Phenomenalist thought is not compatible with the idea of realism, which evaluates unobservable entities such as atom, molecule and quark as mind-independent things. In this context, Mach considers the atom as a thought symbol or a (...)
- Impoverished or rich consciousness outside attentional focus: Recent data tip the balance for Overflow.Zohar Z. Bronfman, Hilla Jacobson & Marius Usher - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (4):423-444.The question of whether conscious experience is restricted by cognitive access and exhausted by report, or whether it overflows it—comprising more information than can be reported—is hotly debated. Recently, we provided evidence in favor of Overflow, showing that observers discriminated the color‐diversity (CD) of letters in an array, while their working‐memory and attention were dedicated to encoding and reporting a set of cued letters. An alternative interpretation is that CD‐discriminations do not entail conscious experience of the underlying colors. Here we (...)
- One-object-plus-phenomenalism.Roberto De sá Pereira - 2019 - Kant-e-Print 14 (1):6-30,.The aim of this paper is to present a novel reading of Kantian idealism. In want of a better name, I call my interpretation “one-object-plus-epistemic phenomenalism”. I partially endorse Allison’s celebrated position, namely his rejection of metaphysical world-dualism. Yet, I reject Allison’s deflationary two-aspect view. I argue that Kantian idealism is also metaphysically committed to an ontological noumenalism (one-object), namely the claim that the ultimate nature of reality is made up of unknown things in themselves (substantia noumena). Natural sciences can (...)
- Defending Phenomenalism.Michael Pelczar - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):574-597.According to phenomenalism, physical things are a certain kind of possibility for experience. This paper clarifies the phenomenalist position and addresses some main objections to it, with the aim of showing that phenomenalism is a live option that merits a place alongside dualism and materialism in contemporary metaphysical debate.
- One-object-plus-epistemic-phenomenalism.de Sá Pereira Roberto Horácio - 2019 - Kant-e-Print 14 (1).This paper aims to present a novel reading of Kantian idealism. In want of a better name, I call my interpretation “one-object-plus-epistemic phenomenalism.” I partially endorse Allison’s celebrated position, namely his rejection of metaphysical world-dualism. Yet, I reject Allison’s deflationary two-aspect view. I argue that Kantian idealism is also metaphysically committed to an ontological noumenalism (one-object), namely the claim that the ultimate nature of reality is made up of unknown things in themselves (substantia noumena). Natural sciences can only reveal the (...)
- Sign and Object : Quine’s forgotten book project.Sander Verhaegh - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):5039-5060.W. V. Quine’s first philosophical monograph, Word and Object, is widely recognized as one of the most influential books of twentieth century philosophy. Notes, letters, and draft manuscripts at the Quine Archives, however, reveal that Quine was already working on a philosophical book in the early 1940s; a project entitled Sign and Object. In this paper, I examine these and other unpublished documents and show that Sign and Object sheds new light on the evolution of Quine’s ideas. Where “Two Dogmas (...)
- Representation and Phenomenalism in the Critique of Pure Reason.Rafael Graebin Vogelmann - 2019 - Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã 24 (1).Kant has often been accused of being a phenomenalist, i.e., of reducing spatial objects to representations that exist only in our minds. I argue against this reading. Given Kant’s claim that appearances are mere representations, the only way to avoid the accusation of phenomenalism is to provide an alternative conception of “representation” according to which the claim that something is a mere representation does not entail that it is a mere mental item. I offer evidence that Kant does not conceive (...)
- The American Philosophy and the Problem of Time.Michal Zlatoš - 2019 - Taula: Quaderns de Pensament 47:47-56.The American philosophy and the problem of time –[article]– attempts to briefly outline the concepts of understanding of the problem of time, temporality and continuity in American philosophy which is represented by Ch. Peirce, W. James, and A. N. Whitehead. The article also tries to point out the importance of the enquiry on the field of time. Further, it gives abbreviated outline of the historic conditions of emergence of the American philosophy.
- Other minds and God: Russell and Stout on James and Schiller.Tim Button - 2017 - In Sarin Marchetti & Maria Baghramian (eds.), Pragmatism and the European Traditions: Encounters with Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology Before the Great Divide. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 86-109.In 1907–8, Russell and Stout presented an objection against James and Schiller, to which both James and Schiller replied. In this paper, I shall revisit their transatlantic exchange. Doing so will yield a better understanding of Schiller’s relationship to a worryingly solipsistic brand of phenomenalism. It will also allow us to appreciate a crucial difference between Schiller and James; a difference which James explicitly downplayed.$41.79 new (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct downloadExport citation Bookmark
- What is time?Michael Pelczar - 2017 - In Ian Phillips (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience: Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. New York: Routledge. pp. 227-238.Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- Kant's Idealism and Phenomenalism. Critical Notice of Lucy Allais's "Manifest Reality. Kant's Idealism & his Realism".Dennis Schulting - 2017 - Studi Kantiani 30:191–202.
- Review of Freedom Evolves by Daniel Dennett (2003).Michael Starks - 2017 - Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Michael Starks 3rd Ed. (2017).``People say again and again that philosophy doesn´t really progress, that we are still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were the Greeks. But the people who say this don´t understand why is has to be so. It is because our language has remained the same and keeps seducing us into asking the same questions. As long as there continues to be a verb´to be´that looks as if it functions in the same way as´to eatánd´to drink´, as long as (...)
- Boarding Neurath's Boat: The Early Development of Quine's Naturalism.Sander Verhaegh - 2017 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (2):317-342.W. V. Quine is arguably the intellectual father of contemporary naturalism, the idea that there is no distinctively philosophical perspective on reality. Yet, even though Quine has always been a science-minded philosopher, he did not adopt a fully naturalistic perspective until the early 1950s. In this paper, I reconstruct the genesis of Quine’s ideas on the relation between science and philosophy. Scrutinizing his unpublished papers and notebooks, I examine Quine’s development in the first decades of his career. After identifying three (...)
- Worlds, Voyages and Experiences: Commentary on Pelczar’s Sensorama. [REVIEW]Geoffrey Lee - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):453-461.
- Introspection in Michael Pelczar’s Sensorama. [REVIEW]Eugene Mills - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):461-471.
- Issues in Phenomenalist Metaphysics.Kevin Morris - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):471-479.This critical discussion of Michael Pelczar's Sensorama (OUP, 2015)raises several interrelated issues about Pelczar's phenomenalism that arise from its commitment to ungrounded experiential conditionals reflecting what experiences there would be, were there other experiences.
- Leibniz and the Veridicality of Body Perceptions.Kenneth L. Pearce - 2016 - Philosophers' Imprint 16.According to Leibniz's late metaphysics, sensory perception represents to us as extended, colored, textured, etc., a world which fundamentally consists only of non-spatial, colorless entities, the monads. It is a short step from here to the conclusion that sensory perception radically misleads us about the true nature of reality. In this paper, I argue that this oft-repeated claim is false. Leibniz holds that in typical cases of body perception the bodies perceived really exist and have the qualities, both primary and (...)
- Sensorama: A Phenomenalist Analysis of Spacetime and Its Contents.Michael Pelczar - 2015 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.How does the modern scientific conception of time constrain the project of assigning the mind its proper place in nature? On the scientific conception, it makes no sense to speak of the duration of a pain, or the simultaneity of sensations occurring in different parts of the brain. Such considerations led Henri Poincaré, one of the founders of the modern conception, to conclude that consciousness does not exist in spacetime, but serves as the basic material out of which we must (...)
- Consciousness and Causal Emergence: Śāntarakṣita Against Physicalism.Christian Coseru - 2014 - In Jonardon Ganeri (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 360–378.In challenging the physicalist conception of consciousness advanced by Cārvāka materialists such as Bṛhaspati, the Buddhist philosopher Śāntarakṣita addresses a series of key issues about the nature of causality and the basis of cognition. This chapter considers whether causal accounts of generation for material bodies are adequate in explaining how conscious awareness comes to have the structural features and phenomenal properties that it does. Arguments against reductive physicalism, it is claimed, can benefit from an understanding of the structure of phenomenal (...)
- Protogeometer: Falling Into Future.Vladimir Rogozhin - 2014 - FQXi Essay Contest 2014.Universe silence … Why? TechnoSfera … Where does it move? BioSfera … Where is the ―non-return point? NooSfera … What to do? The deep mind looks for primordial senses of the ―LifeWorld(LebensWelt). Сonsciousness, matter, memory … Self-Consciousness… Сonsciousness is attracting senses vector magnitude, intentional effect of absolute complexity. The Vector of Сonsciousness - the Triune Vector of absolute forms of existence of matter (limit states), the Vector of the Absolute Existential Field of the Universe, a polyvalent sense phenomenon of Ontological (...)
- Nietzsche as Phenomenalist?Pietro Gori - 2011 - In Helmut Heit, Günter Abel & Marco Brusotti (eds.), Nietzsches Wissenschaftsphilosophie: Hintergründe, Wirkungen und Aktualität. de Gruyter. pp. 345-356.During the second decade of the 20th century Hans Kleinpeter, an Austrian scholar devoted to the development of the modern science, published some brief papers on Nietzsche’s thought. Kleinpeter has been one of the main upholders of Mach’s epistemology and probably the first who connected his ideas with the philosophy of Nietzsche. In his book on Der Phänomenalismus (1913) he described a new world view that arose in the 19th century, a perspective that ‒ according to him ‒ completely contrasted (...)$168.00 new (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct download (3 more)Export citation Bookmark 7 citations
- (1 other version)The theory of knowledge of Mach and Nietzsche.Pietro Gori - 2011 - Giornale Critico Della Filosofia Italiana 7 (2):352-382.Hans Kleinpeter provided a popularization of both Ernst Mach's thought and the scientific philosophy that forerun the foundation of the Vienna Circle. Between 1912 and 1913 Kleinpeter published the articles that one finds here in their first Italian translation; they concern a comparison between Mach's epistemology and Nietzsche's thought, and are thus an original contribution to the reception of the latter's philosophy. In these texts Kleinpeter anticipates some of the ideas he later presented in his work devoted to the 'Phenomenalistic' (...)
- (1 other version)La teoria Della conoscenza di Mach E Nietzsche.Pietro Gori - 2011 - Giornale Critico Della Filosofia Italiana 7 (2):352-382.Translation and edition (with introduction) of four articles from Hans Kleinpeter: - Nietzsche als Schulreformer, «Blätter für deutsche Erziehung» 14/1912, pp. 99-101; - Der Pragmatismus im Lichte der Machschen Erkenntnislehre, «Wissenschaftliche Rundschau» 20/1912, pp. 405-407; - Die Erkenntnislehre Friedrich Nietzsches, «Wissenschaftliche Rundschau» 3/1912, pp. 5-9; - Ernst Mach und Friedrich Nietzsche, «Neue Freie Presse» 17423 (1913), pp. 31-32. Abstract: Hans Kleinpeter provided a popularization of both Ernst Mach’s thought and the scientific philosophy that forerun the foundation of the Vienna Circle. (...)
- Phenomenalism in epistemology and physicalism in aesthetics.Jacques Morizot - 2011 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 15 (3):439-452.The starting point of this paper is the intriguing observation that Goodman has defended a phenomenalist point of view in his epistemological works and a physicalist one in aesthetics. In fact, it would certainly be more accurate to say that his focus was anti-physicalist in epistemology and anti phenomenalist in aesthetics. In any case a majority of interpreters would spontaneously have waited for a diametrically opposite choice, more consistent indeed with the positions taken by the representatives in these fields. Yet (...)
- Ernst Mach on the Self. The Deconstruction of the Ego as an Attempt to avoid Solipsism.Markus Schrenk - 2011 - Deutscher Kongress Für Philosophie, 11. - 15. September 2011, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München.In his Contributions to the Analysis of the Sensations (Mach 1885) the phenomenalist philosopher Ernst Mach confronts us with a difficulty: “If we regard the Ego as a real unity, we become involved in the following dilemma: either we must set over against the Ego a world of unknowable entities […] or we must regard the whole world, the Egos of other people included, as comprised in our own Ego.” (Mach 1885: 21) In other words, if we start from a (...)
- Gustav Bergmann’s Quest for the Ontology of Knowing: From Phenomenalism towards Realism.Greg Jesson - 2007 - In Laird Addis, Greg Jesson & Erwin Tegtmeier (eds.), Ontology and Analysis: Essays and Recollection about Gustav Bergmann. De Gruyter. pp. 79-122.$191.42 used (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct downloadExport citation Bookmark
- 2. Phenomena, Phenomenalism, and Science.Mario Bunge - 2006 - In Chasing Reality: Strife Over Realism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. pp. 34-55.$156.74 new (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct downloadExport citation Bookmark
- Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate.Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.) - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.This volume will be the starting point for future discussion and research.
- Truthmakers and explanation.David Liggins - 2005 - In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. pp. 105--115.Truthmaker theory promises to do some useful philosophical work: equipping us to argue against phenomenalism and Rylean behaviourism, for instance, and helping us decide what exists (Lewis 1999, 207; Armstrong 1997, 113-119). But it has proved hard to formulate a truthmaker theory that is both useful and believable. I want to suggest that a neglected approach to truthmakers – that of Ian McFetridge – can surmount some of the problems that make other theories of truthmaking unattractive. To begin with, I’ll (...)(collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct downloadExport citation Bookmark 23 citations
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