Phenomenology

Based on Husserl’s distinction between mode of living presence (Modus der Leibhaftigkeit) and mode of certainty (Glaubensmodus der Gewißheit), which coincide in normal univocal perception, the paper argues for a distinction between two different types of accordance (Einstimmigkeit) in perceptual experience – local accordance and global accordance. While local accordance is characterized by the unfolding of appearances in agreement with lines of accordance instituted by recent perceptual apprehensions within a certain spatio-temporal domain, global accordance is characterized by the agreement between (...) appearances unfolding in local accordance with previous and simultaneous apprehensions concerning the spatio-temporal surroundings of this domain. As will be shown, to perceive something in local accordance amounts to perceiving it in the mode of living presence, while to perceive something in global accordance amounts to perceiving it in the belief mode of certainty (relative to a certain surrounding). In light of these considerations, an account of the perception of figments and immersion is put forward which does not invoke make-belief or the idea of an as-if-perception. (shrink)

1. In colloquial language, as well as in almost all contexts where semantic analysis or distinction is not necessary, we tend to use the terms “cause” and “reason” as synonyms. We substitute these...

Open peer commentary on the article “Beyond Individual-Centred 4E Cognition: Systems Biology and Sympoiesis” by Mads Julian Dengsø & Michael David Kirchhoff. Abstract: I concur with Dengsø and Kirchhoff that if we are to ground cognition more deeply in contemporary biology, we need to focus on the organism-environment relationship as the unit of biological explanation most relevant to cognitive science. This entails questioning the individualistic bias that has pervaded 4E cognitive science. However, can we overcome that bias while retaining a (...) commitment to the importance of phenomenological descriptions for 4E cognitive science? Perhaps we can, but probably not if we continue to rely on classical Western phenomenology. Certain strands of Buddhist thought might be more compatible with sympoiesis. (shrink)

Two recent works in phenomenology of space address unusual themes. Ballanfat’s L’espace vide is concerned with a primal spatialization yielding an Open that is irreducible to a three-dimensional container for objects, while DuFour’s Husserl and Spatiality describes a layered space of ritual whose sensuous immediacy is infused with intercorporeal, interaffective, inter­generational, and geo-historical moments. Both books demonstrate that the phenomenological tradition can deal with complex topics and unfamiliar styles of experience, and both indicate the ethical import of their findings.

While correctly emphasizing that the idea of theological inspiration in phenomenology and vice versa might be very fecund, the current discussion on the theological turn does not always affirm that Janicaud was simply wrong as regards the characterization of new French phenomenology. This is why it is necessary to create a more balanced image of the discussions on the theological turn and contemporary phenomenology. The paper achieves this aim 1) by demonstrating that there was no theological turn in French phenomenology; (...) 2) by analysing the true nature of the turn taking place in phenomenology. It concludes by affirming that contemporary French phenomenology—freed from the label “theological turn”—is a living branch of philosophy capable of contributing to the solution of some of the burning issues of today’s world, such as ecological crisis. (shrink)

The Orthodox icon is often claimed as unique among images. Yet many proponents of this view, such as Leonid Ouspensky and Pavel Florensky, defend this singularity through a polemic against Western realism using a logic that culminates in a polemic against the world of experience. In this paper, I will use phenomenology to dismantle these two false dualities, against realist images and real experience, by uncovering the deeper concerns that motivate them. First, I draw on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of painting to (...) collapse the dichotomy of carnal and spiritual images. Then, I use Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenality of Revelation to reframe the dichotomy of worldly and spiritual experience. This broadened understanding of experience will serve as a starting point to refine our understanding of what is claimed by the icon, both in its function as an image and in the world it opens for those who approach it on its own terms. (shrink)

The purpose of the article is to offer a phenomenological description of VR images and their experience. In the first section, I briefly present the peculiar features of these kinds of images; in the second section, I compare VR images with phantasms, especially in the light of the idea of “presentification” (Vergegenwärtigung), and then I discuss the reality or unreality of VR image-objects; the third section elaborates an analysis of VR images according to the notions of image object (Bildobjekt), and (...) discusses the issue of “presence” both of the representing image and the user; finally, in the last section, I focus on the correlated experience of the subject, which I describe as a switching between image consciousness and perceptual apprehension. (shrink)

Henri Maldiney’s aesthetics can be seen as an attempt to push traditional phenomenological descriptions of the image, such as can be found in the works of Husserl and Sartre, to their theoretical limits. In this paper, I examine how Maldiney’s phenomenological approach to visual works of art leads him to disclose a non-intentional dimension of the image which is that of “form.” At this level, the image is not primarily a structure or modification of consciousness, but a mode of presence (...) to the world. Next, in turning towards what Maldiney considers to be non-objective forms of pictorial representation, exemplified by Byzantine mosaics and the works of Paul Cézanne, I show how this presence is articulated rhythmically in a tension which embraces both image and viewer. Finally, I explore the meaning of Maldiney’s claim that the image is not an imitation of reality, but synonymous with reality itself. (shrink)

While inheriting from Husserl’s phenomenology, Ricoeur aims at determining a philosophical anthropology. Imagination can then be thought as what makes possible a mediation dealing with the disproportion between sensibility and understanding; it can be seen as one of the guiding threads of Ricoeur’s anthropology before becoming a theme or a field of analysis. But if this philosophy of imagination encompasses the issue of image, to the point of making these two terms mostly interchangeable, it too includes a specific philosophy of (...) image, which must be recovered. In this perspective, one could follow a path going from the most general standpoint (the elaboration of a philosophy of image in the wake of a phenomenology of imagination) to the most particular one (the recognition of the image as a symbol, sign or trace) while determining the role of symbolic mediation related to image. (shrink)

Rather than examining the possibilities of the relation between phenomenology and literature as they are conditioned by the imaginary image, this paper takes up the impossibility essential to this relation, bound to the question of its experience, to the experience of literature. The question of what “the experience of literature” is, what it signifies and directs itself towards, is explicated and unravelled in an analysis of the experience of the writer (and, at times, the reader), with the aid of Emmanuel (...) Levinas’ few engagements with art and literature, paired with the thought of Maurice Blanchot on the interruption of writing (in both the subjective and objective genitives). In tracing what passes through consciousness in this experience of literature, marking its impasses and its faltering approaches, the impossibility exposed in the experience of literature shall be shown to be necessary for opening and maintaining the distance binding phenomenology and literature in their separation and their traversal of the image. (shrink)

This article examines selected texts in which Martin Heidegger thematizes the ontology of images, in order to adduce a view of how he under­stands their merits and limitations. I am primarily interested in the images seen in art works, especially those in film and photography, given Heidegger’s strong criticism of the latter alongside other 20th-century communicative media. The goal of the article is not to determine what is Heidegger’s central or overall position regarding images, as it is not clear that (...) he has such a position. Rather, the goal is to analyze how his various statements on images, as well as imagination, fit together. I contrast Heidegger’s critical views in “The Age of the World Picture” with other texts in which he describes images more favorably. I also devote some space to texts in which Heidegger treats imagination and the origin of images more broadly. (shrink)

We provide a phenomenological explanation of the particular function mental images play in the realization of enjoyment and their significance for human freedom on the basis of the idea, drawn from Sartre, that images are not things but rather a way consciousness behaves towards objects. The mental image’s matter, which consists of affectivity, knowledge, and kinaesthetic operations, allows imagination to conjure up an unreal item to satiate a desire. However, by foreshadowing enjoyment in the imaginary, the mental image urges consciousness (...) toward a change in the world that would make that enjoyment real. This is accomplished through the development of tools, which rely on the ability to overcome not just a given situation but also courses of goal-oriented behaviour that have already been prepared by the environment. Through this creation, consciousness exerts its freedom within reality, and marks the world as meaningful. (shrink)

In his conference “The Age of the World Picture” (1938), Heidegger displays a strong criticism of the concept of image (Bild). More precisely, the German philosopher rejects any consideration of the image, as he correlates the image with the process of subjective representation (Vorstellung). At first glance, that position does not seem to change in his posthumous works written from 1930 to 1940, where Heidegger develops his Ereignis-thinking. However, a more thorough study of the writings (from the Beiträge zur Philosophie (...) to Das Ereignis and the Black Notebooks) allows us to reconsider the scope of that common idea. In this paper, I analyze the project of a thinking without images (bildloses Denken) and of imagination (Phantasie) elaborated throughout the private writings. My aim is to re-examine the extent of Heidegger’s refusal of images, in order to prove that, in the end, his essay of a thinking without images cannot escape their ontological weight. (shrink)

The article explores two phenomenologies of image consciousness that were formulated by Ingarden and Blaustein, both of whom were students of Husserl. Both philosophers analyze image consciousness in the context of the phenomenon of contemplating a painting. The article is divided into seven sections. Section 1 presents the historical background of Blaustein’s and Ingarden’s explorations. In Section 2, Ingarden’s description of a painting as different from an image is reconstructed. In Section 3, Ingarden’s analysis of Husserl’s image consciousness is discussed. (...) Section 4 concerns Blaustein’s theory of intentionality, which was formulated in a critical elaboration of Husserl’s philosophy. Section 5 discusses the detailed components of Blaustein’s theory of intentionality, i.e., his theory of psychic representations. This theory is then used in Section 6 in an analysis of Blaustein’s reading of § 111 of Husserl’s Ideas I. Section 7 summarizes both theories in order to draw parallels and differences between Ingarden and Blaustein. In this regard, it is argued that both philosophers refer to different theoretical contexts when discussing Husserl’s idea of image consciousness. (shrink)

This article aims to investigate the nature and role of linguistic “images” in Husserl’s philosophy. At first, I will explain the idea of rigorous language emerging in relevant pages of Ideas I as well as the challenges that linguistic “images” pose to it. I will then examine the nature of linguistic “images,” relying on the reflections collected in Husserliana XXIII to show their nature of intuitive-imaginative syntheses. Finally, I will focus on the role that such “images” play in phenomenologizing. Taking (...) decisive cues from Fink and Adorno, I will show the figurative essence of Husserl’s operative concepts and the productivity of “conceptual constellations” in phenomenology. The main contention of this article is that the rigor of phenomenological language essentially relies on a peculiar imaginative experience. (shrink)

The complexities of Heidegger’s early accounts of nature provide a privileged perspective from which to understand the evolution of his thought into the 1930s and beyond. This movement seems largely driven by his response to what Karsten Harries has called “the antinomy of being”. In Heidegger’s early writings, Natur is associated with the “theoretical” and the “intraworldly.” However, less attested is an “unworlded” and thus intrinsically “incomprehensible” sense of nature, as the abyssal ground of worlding. This thread is traced through (...) key Marburg period texts, into Being and Time, and beyond it into the 1928 “metontology” appendix and its surprising transformation in the 1929 inaugural lecture. Finally, some cursory observations are made about how this trajectory unfolds in later Heideggerian thought, taking the 1936 Artwork essay as an example, showing how both sides of the antinomy of being come to be incorporated within a more comprehensive framing of the Seinsfrage. (shrink)

How can something finite mediate an infinite God? Weaving patristics, theology, art history, aesthetics, and religious practice with the hermeneutic phenomenology of Hans-George Gadamer and Jean-Luc Marion, Stephanie Rumpza proposes a new answer to this paradox by offering a fresh and original approach to the Byzantine icon. She demonstrates the power and relevance of the phenomenological method to integrate hermeneutic aesthetics and divine transcendence, notably how the material and visual dimensions of the icon are illuminated by traditional practices of prayer. (...) Rumpza's study targets a problem that is a major fault line in the continental philosophy of religion – the integrity of finite beings I relation to a God that transcends them. For philosophers, her book demonstrates the relevance of a cherished religious practice of Eastern Christianity. For art historians, she proposes a novel philosophical paradigm for understanding the icon as it is approached in practice. (shrink)

Tech companies have eagerly utilised mindfulness techniques in order to increase both creativity and productivity among their managers and employees. However, while a growing number of studies within fields of clinical psychology and psychiatry suggest that mindfulness provides myriad health benefits, such literature does not critically evaluate the societal and affective influences of mindfulness and other wellness practices on working bodies. By focusing on discourses related to mindfulness training, this paper explores the conception of ‘being present’. Drawing on the phenomenology (...) of the body, affect theory, and critical mindfulness studies, we develop a new theoretical framework for analysing mindfulness as a somatic and social force in technology-driven business contexts. Using research material drawn from the online advertising of mindfulness programmes for managers, this paper describes ‘presence’ as a new labour concept associated with the cultivated performance skill of the managerial body in the era of late capitalism. We conclude that mindfulness training – transforming the somatic into an affective investment – has transformed Buddhist meditation into capital that can be bought and consumed. (shrink)

Social robotics designed to enhance anthropomorphism and zoomorphism seeks to evoke feelings of empathy and other positive emotions in humans. While it is difficult to treat these machines as mere artefacts, the simulated lifelike qualities of robots easily lead to misunderstandings that the machines could be intentional. In this post-anthropocentrically positioned article, we look for a solution to the dilemma by developing a novel concept, “abiozoomorphism.” Drawing on Donna Haraway’s conceptualization of companion species, we address critical aspects of why robots (...) should not be categorized with animals by showing that the distinction between nonliving beings and living beings is still valid. In our phenomenologically informed approach to social robotics, we propose that the concept of abiozoomorphism makes it possible to transcend the strong ethos of biotism that prevails in both robot design and academic research on social robots. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic led to social restrictions that often prevented us from hugging the ones we love. This absence helped some realize just how important these interactions are to our sense of care and connection. Many turned to digitally mediated social interactions to address these absences, but often unsatisfactorily. Some theorists might blame this on the disembodied character of our digital spaces, e.g., that interpersonal touch is excluded from our lives online. However, others continued to find care and connection in (...) their digitally mediated interactions despite not being able to touch. Inspired by such contrasting cases, we ask if ‘digital hugs’ can work? We use the Mixed Reality Interaction Matrix to examine hugging as a social practice. This leads us to several claims about the nature of our embodied social interactions and their digital mediation: (1) all social interaction is mediated; (2) all virtual experiences are embodied; (3) technology has become richer and more supportive of embodiment; and (4) expertise plays a role. These claims help make the case that quality social connections online are substantially dependent upon the dynamic skilful resourcing of multiple mediating components, what we term digital tact. By introducing and developing this concept, we hope to contribute to a better understanding of our digital embodied sociality and the possibilities for caring connections online. (shrink)

Fans of arthouse cinema may lament that über-indie idol Greta Gerwig sold out to mainstream cinema with her foray into Barbie. Yet for every film snob who refuses to watch Barbie, innumerable other...

I propose and analyze moral emotions that are fittingly experienced when one is socially, institutionally, or structurally affiliated with a perpetrator without causally contributing to their harm. The project explores the nature, scope, and urgency of our reactive attitudes and concomitant responsibilities that arise on account of harms caused by social and political relations. Drawing from resources in phenomenology, social epistemology, moral psychology, and feminist ethics, I argue that affective experiences can direct attention towards the moral salience of our relations (...) and open the way for taking accountability for others’ harm. (shrink)

This short article is a “conversation” in which an android, Mort, replies to Richard Marc Rubin’s android named Sol in “The Robot Sol Explains Laughter to His Android Brethren” (The Philosophy of Humor Yearbook, 2022). There Sol offers an explanation for how androids can laugh--largely a reaction to frustration and unmet expectations: “my account says that laughter is one of four ways of dealing with frustration, difficulties, and insults. It is a way of getting by. If you need to label (...) my conception of humor, you might call it an adjustment theory, or perhaps an accommodation theory” (Rubin 256). Mort is intrigued but has his doubts. Mort contends that synesthesia likely has something to do with how humans develop humor. Perhaps, he considers, human designers crossed the androids' sensory wires, allowing them to be able to smash up concepts that do not otherwise seem to fit together, reconstruct incongruities in a manner that is not nonsensical, express the aha-eureka moment of a serendipitous discovery, and even feel blue when they fail at a given task that we were expected to complete. (shrink)